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This dissertation examines the practical effects of international norm construction 
for social movements attempting to navigate the UN system, specifically UN global 
conferences. Do norms become ingrained in the practices of intergovernmental 
organizations to such an extent that they hinder a movement with different norms or help 
a movement that conforms to them? In studying the UN and especially UN global 
conferences on issues of social significance, it has been argued that the norms stemming 
from classic Lockean liberalism, such as emphasis on individual liberties, a rights-based 
framework for developing policy, and progress through science and reason, are embodied 
in the procedures and frameworks of UN global conferences.  
I compare the strategies and influence of the abortion-rights and anti-abortion 
movements over time at the UN, particularly through the International Conferences on 
Population and Development, and trace how each movement has adjusted its strategies to 
accommodate the normative context it has encountered at the UN. I use a combined 
structural and agency-oriented framework that identifies the concrete mechanisms and 
processes through which the interplay of movement ideology and institutional-normative 
context may constrain or facilitate a social movement’s actions within the UN system. 
What I’ve found in my research is that the abortion-rights network has had more 
success in actually influencing the debate and changing the language of population policy 
to reflect their goals, whereas the influence of the anti-abortion network can really only 
be measured by the language that they have blocked. But it is important to note that both 
the abortion-rights network and the anti-abortion network have adjusted over time to the 
UN in terms of their strategies, which is interesting because of the more progressive 
character of one, and the conservative character of the other. However, the progressive 
and conservative characters of the two movements still affected how easily each 
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Why are conservative organizations much less likely to advocate at the UN, and for 
those that do focus on the UN, to be less successful in their advocacy? The empirical 
puzzle that spurs this question is the differential success of the abortion-rights and anti-
abortion networks in influencing the debate and language of population policy at the UN. 
The abortion-rights network has been very successful, changing the language of family 
planning to reproductive health and rights. The anti-abortion network has not been able to 
affect any real change in language or policy, although it has succeeded in making 
reproductive health and rights controversial. Why is this? Is it simply a matter of a 
winning cause versus a losing cause, or better access to resources, whether those of 
power, influence, or money? Or might it be the deeper normative fabric of the UN? There 
have not been many studies of such transnational conservative movements, a gap in the 
literature all the more apparent given the attention conservative movements are gaining in 
the media. 
Two very different types of theories give us different explanations of why the 
anti-abortion network is not as successful as the abortion-rights network in influencing 
the UN: world-polity theory argues that the international system is predicated on liberal 
norms, which would disadvantage conservative networks and enhance liberal ones. Social 
movement theories1, on the other hand, argue that the strategies that such networks 
employ and the political opportunities open to them determine how successful each 
network is. I believe that both these theories have something to offer, but that each alone 
                                                
1 I use the label social movement theories to refer to the emerging strands of theory on transnational 
activism that are informed by a social movement framework, using the core mechanisms of framing, 
discourse, and political opportunities.  
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is inadequate: world-polity theory offers us a systemic understanding of the norms that 
are embedded in the UN as an international organization, but does not account for the 
ability of individuals to work around or adjust to those norms. Transnational movement 
theory specifically does provide specific mechanisms by which networks may create 
opportunities for themselves and adjust to existing norms, but does not provide a 
structural, normative understanding of the system in which these networks and 
movements operate. Thus, I am filling an empirical gap by studying a transnational 
conservative movement in comparison with a liberal one, and filling a theoretical gap by 
using a combined structural and agency-oriented framework to do so.  
I use world-polity theory’s liberal norms to understand the environment within 
which abortion-rights and anti-abortion networks operate when lobbying at the UN global 
conferences, and argue that both movements had to adjust to these liberal norms in order 
to advocate at the UN. I see the abortion-rights network as more privileged in its ability 
to influence both UN employees and government delegations, which is a result of its 
liberal values; I see the anti-abortion network as instrumentally adapting to key liberal 
norms in order to influence government delegations at UN global conferences, but not 
able to influence UN employees as a result of its conservative values. Thus, I argue that 
one needs to understand both the systemic norms and the agency-oriented strategies that 
individuals may employ to work around or adapt to those norms in order to fully 
understand why conservative networks are not as successful in lobbying at the UN as 
liberal networks.  
 
 3 
1.1 Research Question 
 “You might say we’re the United Nations of the pro-family movement,” said Allan 
Carlson to the online newspaper, Christianwire.com, in reference to the recent 
international conference for pro-family leaders and NGOs, the World Congress of 
Families IV (Christian Newswire April 24, 2007). He goes on to explain,  
“In terms of speakers, organizers and attendees, the Congress spans six continents. This 
demonstrates the universality of family concerns and the desire of pro-family leaders, 
scholars and activists to network and develop joint plans of action to address those concerns 
at the national level as well as in international forums.” 
 
These statements illustrate several interesting characteristics of the anti-abortion 
network’s advocacy at the international level: it seeks to claim an international audience 
as well as international advocates for its concerns, and implies that it is the desire of these 
activists to work together to advocate for their concerns at the international level. Many 
might be surprised at the first statement; pro-family organizations are part of a 
conservative movement with a long (and continuing) history of criticizing the United 
Nations for its inefficiency, its intentions to interfere with state sovereignty, and its 
support for liberal causes. Why would a pro-family organization that expresses these 
sentiments put so much effort into organizing a transnational network to advocate for 
their causes at an international forum like the UN, much less describe themselves as the 
United Nations of the pro-family movement? I believe that a clear change has occurred 
within the anti-abortion network’s strategies, including a shift towards the international 
sphere. That shift has entailed some very specific changes for the network, changes that I 
believe indicate an adjustment to the norms of the UN. 
 I am using the issue of abortion to explore the larger questions that these 
statements provoke: Is there a normative structure to the international system? Is that 
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normative structure “liberal”? Is it reflected at the UN? How does the normative structure 
shape the strategies of activists advocating around the UN? Does this differ for liberal 
versus conservative groups of activists? These questions arise from my interest in the 
sociological literature’s world-polity theory, which claims that the diffusion of liberal 
norms constrains actors in the international sphere, and the political-science literature’s 
social movement theory, which claims that actors choose strategically in order to 
mobilize and successfully advocate for their cause.  
 World-polity theory argues that international organizations in general and the UN 
in particular is embedded in a philosophy that emphasizes individualism, rights, and 
science and reason as the means to the goals of progress and justice. It is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation to prove the existence of these systemic norms. But as a 
political scientist, I address the existence of these norms in their implications for and 
impact on actors. Political science theories dealing with non-state actors tend to 
emphasize agency, while world-polity theory emphasizes the structure of norms. I intend 
to combine structure and agency in a theoretical framework that will demonstrate how 
embedded norms affect the strategies of non-state actors.  
I investigate the possible influence of the liberal norms proposed by world-polity 
theory by comparing non-state actors who seem to operate from a similar philosophy and 
those that do not. The movements that advocate for and against abortion at the 
international level, in which I include the women’s reproductive health and rights 
movement and the pro-family movement, fit these conditions well. The abortion-rights 
network springs from a liberal philosophy, given its mainly mainstream feminist 
underpinnings, while the anti-abortion network comes from an opposing philosophy, one 
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that emphasizes community, duty, and tradition and religion as the means to the goals of 
stability and prosperity.  
These two advocacy networks in the 21st century appear strikingly similar in the 
way they work: they both lobby within countries and at the UN, they both use non-
governmental organizations to do that work of reaching out to grassroots supporters and 
government delegations at the UN, they are concerned with similar sets of issues 
involving the role of women and sexuality, with the touchstone issue being abortion. One 
key difference separates these two movements: their underlying values, leading to the 
different goals of their advocacy. The abortion-rights network seeks to establish 
reproductive health and rights, including the right to safe abortion, internationally, from a 
rights-based, progressive perspective. The anti-abortion network seeks to establish the 
importance of the natural family, marriage, children, and parental rights, and that life 
begins at conception in the international system, from a moral, conservative perspective.  
Does this one difference have an effect on the success of their advocacy at the UN, and 
on the adjustments they make over time to their strategies of advocacy? 
 
The United Nations is an international institution based on liberal internationalist 
principles and a prime example of an institution that would demonstrate the liberal 
characteristics described by the world-polity theorists. It is therefore an excellent 
environment for investigating the possible influence of diffusing liberal norms on the 
success of liberal and conservative networks, as well as how activists might work around 
or adjust to such norms. 
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The UN is one of the major centers through which non-state activists, 
organizations and networks advocate for change in language, standards, and policy that 
affect not only UN agencies, but also those of nation-states. The international conferences 
held by UN agencies provide important forums for debate of cutting-edge economic and 
social issues; the negotiated documents that emerge from these conferences set the 
agenda for UN agencies and set the standard for nation-states. It is therefore not 
surprising that many non-state activists attempt to influence the debate and documents at 
these conferences. However, I believe that there are several important practices that 
actors must take into account when advocating at the UN, practices that arise from the 
liberal individualist norms that prompted its founding.  
 Liberal individualism, with its emphasis on the individual, the freedom and 
equality of each individual, and the use of science and reason as the means to progress, is 
reflected in several key practices of world culture that grew in importance at the UN, and 
especially the UN global conferences dealing with social issues: the importance of the 
individual has led over time from majority-rule voting procedures at UN global 
conferences to the practice of consensus decision-making; the importance of the freedom 
and equality of each individual has made a human rights framework increasingly 
important within the UN; and the importance of science and reason corresponds to the 
weight placed on scientific research as the rationale for policies. These practices, of 
consensus decision-making, the human rights framework, and the use of scientific 
research to justify scientific and social policy at the UN, have become more embedded 
over time, and so have a greater effect on the strategies of NGOs that began their work at 
the UN in the last few decades.  
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1.2 Case Selection 
This research asks, at the broadest level, how conservative movements fare in a 
liberal international system.  Narrowing the focus to the international anti-abortion 
movement and abortion-rights movement allows comparative research around one issue. 
The anti-abortion movement is particularly interesting as a conservative movement 
because it occupies a middle ground between the liberal/cosmopolitan internationalism of 
transnational activism literature and traditional fundamentalism movements that rail 
against it; the Christian Right and other anti-abortion movement organizations use the 
methods and mechanisms of the international liberal system, but their actions are based 
on different norms.  
The main research question asks, How do the liberal norms of the international 
system as described by world polity theory affect a social movement’s success, and its 
approach to influencing international reproductive issues and family planning policy? In 
order to explore this question, I compare the activities of the abortion rights and anti-
abortion movements over time in the domestic (United States) and international (United 
Nations) arenas. I see the domestic arena as an important factor in understanding 
movements in the international arena; it is difficult, especially in this age of advanced 
communication technology, to understand what happens in the international system 
without taking into account domestic politics. I chose the United States (U.S.) as the 
domestic environment in which to study both movements because they have been 
relatively quite important to American domestic politics, and because changes in 
American administrations have meant different types of support for this cause in the 
United Nations (UN). Additionally, many of the key organizations in both movements 
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emerged from the U.S., and so the domestic environment in the U.S. is key to 
understanding the political opportunities of which these organizations were able to take 
advantage.  
The case studies of the anti-abortion and abortion-rights movements can speak to 
the competing claims in the literature on whether, and how, the normative conditions of 
the international system are important for movements, and will do so using a combined 
structural and agency-oriented framework that will identify the concrete mechanisms and 
processes through which an international set of norms may constrain or facilitate a social 
movement’s actions. Thus, there are two key debates I am addressing with my research: 
the need to blend structure with agency in theory to better understand how agents interact 
with norms, and the need to balance the transnational activism literature with case studies 
of conservative movements. 
1.3 Importance of Research Question 
Given that the UN is an important forum for political contestation, it is important to 
explore how norms affect the success, failure, and strategies of movements that operate 
within the UN. Often those within a bureaucracy are the last to recognize the structural 
opportunities and constraints of the culture and norms that have grown up within the 
organization. Thus, because the UN continues to provide an essential medium for voices 
that go unheard elsewhere, it is important to understand the opportunities and constraints 
provided not only by resources and political opportunities, but the intersection of these 
with culture and norms. 
Conservative movements are gaining attention in both the domestic and 
international realms, sometimes for their violent tactics and sometimes for their effective 
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use of traditional resources for mobilization, such as lobbying and electoral politics, as 
well as the newer ones of the Internet, UN conferences, and international coalitions. 
However, the new body of literature on non-state activists, transnational networks and 
movements has been skewed towards more liberal issues and movements, such as human 
rights, women’s rights, and the environment. Although conservative, religious or violent 
movements may be using the same strategies, opportunities, and organizational structures 
used by liberal movements, they have been for the most part excluded from this new 
literature, which limits our understanding of these activists, networks and movements. 
Thus, this question is important because it begins to fill a need for the study of 
conservative movements in this nascent literature by comparing the conservative anti-
abortion movement’s influence and strategies with those of the abortion-rights 
movement.  
1.4 Brief Discussion of Theory, Definition of Terms and 
Literature Review 
Liberal philosophy is here defined as emphasizing individuals, a rights 
framework, and progress through science and reason (Boli and Thomas 1999). This 
philosophy is in direct contradiction with the conservative philosophies that look to 
tradition rather than reason for guidance, emphasize community rather than individuals, 
responsibility rather than rights, and do not necessarily prioritize progress (Dunn and 
Woodard 2003). 
Sociological world-polity scholars (Meyer and Rowan 1977, Meyer, Boli et al 
1997, Boli and Thomas 1999, Lechner and Boli 2005) posit that a world culture 
consisting of bureaucratic rationalization, science and reason as the means to secular 
progress, individualism, and rights is transmitted by international organizations and 
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technology, causing an unexplained isomorphism in organizations, goals, activities and 
identities all over the world. Bureaucratic rationalization spread as a result of the drive 
toward modernization: the way that states and civil groups of people organized 
themselves to solve problems and meet needs had to conform to a particular set of rules 
determined as “rational” by those in a field or sector in order to be regarded as legitimate, 
regardless of whether these rules addressed the specific circumstances found in different 
parts of the world (Meyer and Rowan 1977). The fact that an institution such as the UN 
existed for deliberating about problems and devising rational procedures to address them 
– procedures that apply equally to all – helped diffuse these norms more quickly in the 
20th century. The use of science and reason as the means to secular progress is a norm 
derived from the Enlightenment, and the importance of the individual as autonomous and 
possessing inherent rights was a radical new idea soon after; both of these norms are now 
taken for granted (Lechner and Boli 2005). Constructivist political scientists have drawn 
on this literature to argue that international organizations are constituted by and transmit 
two basic types of norms, rational and liberal, and that liberal norms are now expanding 
across the globe in a similar manner to the spread of rationalization. “[A] strong thread 
running through the ever-expanding world of international organizations (IOs) is their 
substantively liberal character. Most IOs were founded by Western liberal states and are 
designed to promote liberal values” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 15). 
UN global conferences especially combine rational and liberal norms, combining 
both the Weberian organizational structure and an individualistic, rights-based 
framework. I would argue that the UN global conferences and programs (on the social 
side, under the Economic and Social Council especially) are supported by this 
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combination of rational and liberal norms; I am particularly interested in exploring how 
the liberal norms of the importance of the individual, of human rights, and science and 
reason as the means to progress affect the successes and failures of different movements 
at the UN conferences, as well as the way they change their strategies over time. 
1.4.1 Definition of Terms 
Generally when I speak of liberal, I am referring to the Lockean or classical 
liberalism and more specifically the bundle of norms emphasized by world-polity 
theorists as liberal; conservative refers to Burkean or traditional conservatism, and the 
bundle of norms coming out of that literature which are relevant to this analysis, 
including the importance of community, responsibility, and tradition and religion as the 
means to preserving stability. When I reference the anti-abortion network, there are many 
organizations that advocate against abortion only, and many that focus on a range of 
issues including abortion, gay marriage, the decay of marriage, the family, and the role of 
mother and wife for women, connected by the term “natural family” in the late nineties. I 
will generally refer to all these organizations as anti-abortion organizations because even 
when abortion is not their central focus, their activism against abortion plays such a 
central role in their rhetoric and strategies. In addition, I see the term “pro-family” as part 
of the framing done by these organizations to position themselves in the global advocacy 
world and gain allies. As a result, I use that term sparingly and usually in reference to 
these framing efforts. These organizations are also generally united by a conservative 
philosophy; however I will try to be conceptually specific and use conservative to 
indicate a philosophy that includes the elements referred to above, and anti-abortion to 
indicate the organizations that have become involved in the UN global conferences with 
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advocacy against abortion as a major goal. There are also organizations that advocate for 
the right to abortion internationally, but most organizations include this issue as one 
among many in their focus on reproductive health and rights, which includes women’s 
empowerment, safe motherhood initiatives, family planning services, and sexual health 
and rights more recently. I will refer to all these organizations as abortion-rights, again 
because, although it may not be the only issue on the table, it is difficult to separate the 
right to abortion from the central concerns in their advocacy. I also see the term 
“women’s reproductive health and rights” as being part of the framing efforts of these 
organizations. Since these efforts took place nearly twenty years ago, the term is more 
entrenched and therefore most of the scholarship on these organizations that I cite will 
refer to them as reproductive health and rights organizations, part of a transnational 
network or movement of the same name.  
In order to be more conceptually specific concerning the non-governmental 
organizations, networks and movements referred to in this research, I will define these 
terms according to the social movement literature, and how I use them in this research. A 
social movement can be defined as “a sustained, organized public effort making 
collective claims on target authorities” by individuals who have a basic collective identity 
and an established network (Tilly 2004: 3-4). A transnational social movement is defined 
by its “sustained contentious interaction with power holders” against multiple 
governments or an international target, including international institutions (Tarrow 2001). 
The many groups organized both domestically and internationally around the issue of 
abortion and those related to it (such as women’s rights for the abortion-rights movement 
and marriage and family for the anti-abortion movement) have mobilized over the past 
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thirty to forty years to varying extents; I would describe these as social movements, in 
that they have, in many different countries and especially in the U.S., had a sustained, 
organized, and public effort in making collective claims on authorities. These social 
movements have fueled the international level activity I am researching, whether it be 
national organizations developing international branches, or supporting such 
organizations and efforts. Several scholars who have researched the women’s rights 
movement agree on their status as a transnational social movement (Moghadam 2005, 
Kardam 2004, Friedman 2003, Joachim 2003, Eager 2004); however, there have been 
comparatively few scholarly studies of the work done by anti-abortion organizations at 
the international level, and those that exist disagree on the extent to which these 
organizations have become transnational (Buss and Herman 2003, Butler 2006, Chappell 
2006). In the course of my research I have found evidence of the anti-abortion 
organizations engaging in sustained contentious interaction against an international 
institution over the past ten years, and therefore define them as a transnational social 
movement.  
The organizations from both movements that have had significant impact at the 
UN have tended to be those focused on advocacy; the women’s reproductive health and 
rights movement has tended to include more organizations involved in providing services 
in multiple countries, but the most influential organizations in both movements tend to be 
those that devote all or considerable resources to advocacy at the UN. Thus, I also refer to 
the organizations that lobby particularly at the UN as part of a transnational advocacy 
network, defined as “the relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are 
bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of 
 
 14 
information and services” (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 2). In addition, the line between 
government and non-government actors is more blurred in transnational advocacy 
networks (Tarrow 2001, Keck and Sikkink 1998), whereas social movements are 
generally seen as working more in opposition to governments (Chappell 2006). The 
interaction between state and non-governmental actors is a necessary consideration in 
studying both abortion-rights and anti-abortion organizations at UN global conferences, 
especially since non-government representatives are included in state delegations to 
international conferences (Rucht 1999: 210). This distinction in addition to the definition 
referred to earlier is why I will generally refer to the organizations that lobby at the UN 
as part of a transnational network.  
1.4.2 Empirical Puzzle 
The empirical puzzle I explain involves the differences in how the abortion-rights and 
anti-abortion networks have been able to influence the UN, and the similarities between 
the two networks’ strategies. The abortion-rights network has had more success in 
influencing the debate and changing the language of population policy to reflect their 
goals, whereas the influence of the anti-abortion network can really only be measured by 
the language that they have blocked. At the 1994 Cairo Conference, the women’s 
organizations were able to change the language of population policy from family 
planning to reproductive health and rights, completely shifting the demographic rationale 
behind family planning for the thirty years prior to this conference to a human rights 
rationale. The anti-abortion movement has since directed much more effort at the UN and 
a growing anti-abortion network began lobbying at UN global conferences since the 
Cairo conference. These organizations have had some success in watering down language 
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and blocking some language to which they object, and especially in making the term 
reproductive health and rights controversial as they equate it with abortion. However, 
they have not been successful so far in actually inserting language they approve of, or 
changing the terms of the debate on the family, marriage, adolescents, and abortion to 
those they would prefer. What explains the different levels of success these two networks 
have had? 
The abortion-rights and anti-abortion networks are very similar in their strategies of 
advocacy at the UN. Both networks use academic research and statistics to support their 
advocacy, frame their issue in terms of rights, and are building transnational coalitions 
with similar groups around the world. These changes have happened over time, 
implemented with different levels of commitment and to different extents for each 
network. Given the fundamental difference between the two networks in their normative 
background and goals, what explains these similarities in strategies? I will review the 
recent literature on the anti-abortion network, and then elaborate on several different 
theories and their possible explanations for these questions below. 
1.4.2.1 Literature on the Anti-Abortion Network 
A small but growing literature has begun to examine the anti-abortion movement in 
the international system in the past three to four years, mainly by feminist scholars 
seeking to explain what they see as a counter-movement to the women’s rights and 
reproductive health movements. They do not generally seek to explain the difference in 
influence between the two movements, instead focusing on what to them is an alarming 
amount of influence the anti-abortion network has had in the last few years. Some note 
the similarity in strategy between the two networks, but explain them simply as 
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successful strategies. Several of these studies have important empirical contributions to 
make, but I see them as handicapped by their theoretical assumptions into seeing the 
women’s rights movement as the “good” movement and the anti-abortion movement as 
working to undermine the gains made by the “good” movement in ways that contradict 
the prevailing understanding of how global civil society is supposed to work. Elizabeth 
Friedman argues that women’s rights advocates succeeded in “gendering the agenda” of 
all the UN global conferences in the 1990s, and in the process, spurred a transnational 
counter-movement who sought to preserve the status quo of women’s roles to fit their 
understandings of family, nation, and God (2003: 14). Although Friedman provides some 
detail on this counter-movement, she mainly focuses on the women’s rights advocates. 
Dorothy Buss and Didi Herman (2003) examine the influence of the Christian Right at 
the United Nations, providing detailed accounts of the individual organizations and the 
theological changes in reasoning that prompted them to lobby at the UN. However, Buss 
and Herman do not see the links between these organizations and their counter-parts 
worldwide as evidence for an international or transnational network, and focus mainly on 
the U.S. based Christian Right organizations.  
Jennifer Butler (2006) also examines the Christian Right at the UN, arguing that these 
organizations have been successful through their excellent movement-building strategies, 
and are poised to be more successful in the wake of abortion-rights organizations 
ignoring religion, neglecting their grass-roots supporters, and disregarding the importance 
of the family in the developing world. Butler’s thorough account provides a goldmine of 
information concerning the organization and strategies of the Christian Right, including 
the alliances they are building on the international scale. While Butler contextualizes her 
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study in the tension between religion and secular theory, she does not make any 
consistent argument about why Christian Right organizations adopt the particular 
strategies they do, nor deal with the different levels of influence at the UN – both the 
government delegations and the UN employees, and why the women’s rights 
organizations are so much more successful than the Christian Right in persuading those 
who work for the UN.  
Louise Chappell (2006) documents the emergence of a transnational conservative 
network in response to the women’s rights movement, and extends a domestic-level 
analysis of counter-movements to the transnational level. Chappell confirms my analysis 
of the conservative movement as succeeding in watering down language and the way that 
the women’s movement and the proceedings at the UN have had to adjust to the presence 
of the conservative movement. However, Chappell’s argument that conservative 
movements adopt the strategies they do purely in imitation of the successful movement 
they are trying to counter begs the question of why those strategies are successful in the 
first place. In addition, she puts too great an emphasis on the Bush administration 
enabling the conservative movement; many of these organizations began to lobby at the 
UN prior to Bush being elected, and show themselves to be quite established and 
proficient in their advocacy at the UN. Neither women’s rights activists nor the 
conservative activists seem to believe that the conservative network will wither away if 
an administration is elected that does not support them.  
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1.4.2.2 Alternative Explanations 
 Other theories that might be used to explain the similarities in strategy of the 
abortion-rights and anti-abortion networks as well as the difference in their overall 
influence include world-polity theory, and several political science theories.  
World-polity theory may be considered far too narrow to explain the intensity of 
conflict and the highly contentious nature of international activism. If there is a world 
culture in the international system, why does increased interaction only make differences 
more visible, and conflict over those differences more likely? Coleman and Wayland 
(2006) thus critique world-polity theory for its inability to explain the differences and 
contentiousness of global civil society. In one sense, I agree that world-polity theory does 
not explain the many differences we see in the international system and the contentious 
politics within global civil society; to explain such interactions requires a more agency-
focused approach, which emphasizes the opportunities and spaces individuals make for 
their different claims. However, world-polity theory does not preclude the possibility of 
difference and political conflict in the international system. As a theory, it provides us 
with elements of a common culture that has become so ingrained that many do not 
question it: an understanding of who humans are and what they need; an emphasis on 
individuals, which affects the decision-making structure of organizations; legitimacy and 
authority for organizations arising from the rational, voluntary actions of the individuals 
that act collectively; the goal of progress achieved by rational procedure and 
organization; and that all individuals have the same basic rights and duties though they 
may vary in their resources and capacities. These norms concerning who we are, what we 
need, and how problems are identified and solved are held to be universally applicable; 
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however, these norms do not eliminate other norms and cultures that have different 
answers to these questions. Thus, conflict between world culture and other cultures is 
eminently possible; however, the means by which people believe they should resolve that 
conflict is still greatly influenced by this common world culture.   
World-polity theory may explain the difference in success between the abortion-rights 
and anti-abortion networks by reasoning that the conservative network operates from 
very different norms than those that prevail in world culture, and as a result are not able 
to influence the UN to the extent that the liberal network does. However, this reasoning 
does not account for the ability of the anti-abortion network to operate in the international 
sphere at all, or explain the similarities in movement strategies. World-polity theory in 
general stresses structure over agency. In order to understand the different ways in which 
individuals make their claims and work with or around world culture norms, I suggest a 
theoretical framework that focuses on the micro level, stresses agency, and draws on 
concepts from social movement theory.   
Political science theories that stress agency over structure include resource 
mobilization. Resource mobilization theorists were among the first to explore the causes 
of social movement success and failure through organizational resources, organization 
structure, movement recruitment strategies and the role of leaders (McCarthy and Zald 
1977, Zald and McCarthy 1979, 1987). These theorists, instead of focusing on individual 
grievances (Gurr 1970) or structural pressures (Smelser 1963) to explain the existence of 
social movements, regarded participants and movements as a whole as rational actors 
who weighed the costs and benefits of their actions. Resources might be drawn from the 
social movement itself, from political entrepreneurs hoping to receive some benefit from 
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the movement, or groups that inadvertently provide resources to the movement. The 
resource mobilization approach to social movements is powerful, although the definition 
of resources can be too vague and thus all-encompassing. Resource mobilization theory 
would explain the difference in success between the two networks as due to their 
different abilities to command the requisite resources, whether financial or otherwise. I 
will mainly refer to funding as a key resource, and trace its role as much as possible 
through my research, but although resources matter, they may only be a means to tell the 
underlying story. Why are some movements able to garner more resources than others? I 
believe that norms play a role. Resource mobilization may explain the similarity in 
strategies between the two movements as a result of the competition for funding; the 
grants from foundations and governments may depend on the movements displaying 
certain characteristics, and thus both movements would tend to converge in their 
strategies. However, I would argue that such a theory does not explain why foundations 
and governments favor particular strategies or characteristics of NGOs over others, or 
why certain foundations and governments support abortion-rights networks and why 
other foundations and governments support anti-abortion networks.  
Banaszak (1996) argues that resources are important, and played a part in the success 
or failure of women’s suffrage movements, but that resource mobilization alone ignores 
the important role that the beliefs and values of the suffragettes in Switzerland and in the 
U.S. played in how they perceived available opportunities and appropriate tactics. 
Similarly, I am arguing that resources matter, and in the course of my research we will 
see that the funding of different UN agencies and foundations made a significant impact 
on the ability of NGOs to participate in UN conferences. However, I also argue that 
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beliefs, values and perceptions of the openness of the international system to certain 
values greatly affect the flow of resources. Thus, we need to better understand how these 
value systems work in order to understand the full impact on the flows of resources.  
Another key alternative explanation for the success or failure of social movements is 
political opportunity theory. Political opportunities consist of the constraints and 
opportunities produced by alliances, state structures, and political processes (McAdam 
1982, Tilly 1978, Tarrow 1989, 1994). The political context may alter the costs 
associated with collective action, or it may alter the benefits of collective action. The 
historical context that creates “specific configurations of resources, institutional 
arrangements, and historical precedents” (Kitschelt 1986: 58), constraining or helping a 
movement, is similar to the systemic beliefs and values that I draw on from world-polity 
theory. However, that historical context is much more narrowly conceived for political 
opportunity theory, and does not capture the values and beliefs elements, the underlying 
political philosophy that can influence so many aspects of a system over time, which I try 
to incorporate into my theoretical framework.  
A political opportunity explanation would argue that the differential success of the 
two networks is due to the different constraints and opportunities provided by their 
alliances with other issue areas, the support of state governments, or the institutional 
arrangements of the environment in which they are attempting to advocate. While I draw 
on political opportunities in my research, they do not provide a complete explanation for 
why some opportunities are available to some groups and not others, or why movements 
take advantage of some opportunities and not others. For instance, why were UN officials 
open to advocacy of abortion-rights activists in 1994, and have not been open to the 
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advocacy of anti-abortion activists subsequently? The ability of the abortion-rights NGOs 
to access the Secretary-General of the Cairo conference, Nafis Sadik, who then arranged 
for funding for abortion-rights NGOs around the world to attend the conference as 
delegates on government delegations as well as the NGO forum, was extraordinary. As a 
result of their access and ability to influence her, Nafis Sadik also provided the 
opportunity for abortion-rights NGOs to be involved in the negotiations at the third and 
final Preparatory Conference, which allowed the draft Program of Action going into the 
conference to include much of the language desired by the abortion-rights network. I 
believe that the congruence of underlying philosophies played a part in the ability of 
abortion-rights activists to access and influence key UN officials prior to Cairo, while 
anti-abortion activists have a difficult time gaining access to or persuading UN officials 
because they do not approach the issues from the same philosophical perspective. 
A political opportunity explanation also does not account for why some groups take 
advantage of some opportunities and not others. In 1984, anti-abortion organizations had 
a political opportunity in the Mexico City Population and Development conference, and 
did not take advantage of the Reagan administration’s support in the international realm. 
They were not focused on the UN at all at that point; the change in the U.S. stance was an 
indirect result of Christian Right organizations pressuring the Reagan administration to 
act on abortion domestically. Instead, the Reagan administration changed its foreign 
policy concerning family planning and the funding of organizations that performed or 
counseled for abortions; the appointment of James Buckley, and his influence on the 
delegation, also accounts for the marked change in U.S. policy. Why did anti-abortion 
organizations not care about the UN? Their perception of the UN was greatly influenced 
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by their theological and conservative views concerning international interference in 
national matters. Not until the reproductive health and rights network made such an 
impact at the 1994 Cairo conference did many anti-abortion organizations begin to 
consider advocacy at the UN. On the other hand, the Clinton administration’s support of 
the reproductive health and rights organizations prior to and at the Cairo conference did 
help them influence many other delegations. The support of the Bush administration for 
anti-abortion organizations has opened political opportunities for that network that had 
been previously open to reproductive health and rights organizations. As I will elaborate, 
the opening of political opportunities, such as the ability to be a member of the U.S. 
delegation to a UN conference, had important effects on those conferences. But the 
reason that some administrations were open to one group and not another has to do with 
political beliefs and values, and even that support does not tell the whole story of the 
ability of these groups to achieve their goals.   
Even the literature that focuses on values, beliefs and perceptions in social movement 
literature tends to focus on an individual view of beliefs, values, and perceptions, suited 
to the agent-oriented perspective of social movement theory. They also tend to be focused 
on values and beliefs about politics specifically, and how these might affect frames 
(Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford 1986; Snow and Benford 1988, 1992; Tarrow 
1994), discourses (Jenson 1987; Gamson 1992), or cultures (Swidler 1986; Tarrow 1994). 
For example, Banaszak’s argument centers on “the elements of politics that are valued, 
the beliefs about the way that politics can and should be conducted, and the ‘boundaries 
of political discussion’” (1996: 32). Although I draw heavily on this literature for the 
concrete mechanisms by which beliefs and values are translated into action for activists, I 
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also draw on more basic beliefs about the importance of individuals, the guides for 
decisions, and the possibility of progress as overarching structural systems that affect 
activists. Activists encounter these norms at the UN, a specific environment where these 
norms reside. 
Although I believe these more systemic, structural elements of political philosophy 
have an important impact on the influence of social movements, I also think that activists 
can change and adapt their strategies in order to better influence their targets. All changes 
are instrumental initially, but may lead to more transformative change within the 
organizations and eventually the movement; in addition, there may be beliefs or values 
that are too central to a movement’s beliefs to allow change through the adoption of a 
particular strategy. I believe a theoretical framework that utilizes more structural 
elements of norms and beliefs together with the agency-driven elements of social 
movement theory to articulate how those norms and beliefs are translated into practice 
will prove useful in the study of social movements’ influence and change over time in the 
international system.  
1.5 Research Design and Methods 
1.5.1 Research Design  
I am conducting a comparative case study to answer my questions concerning the 
abortion-rights and anti-abortion movements. These two movements are very different in 
their philosophies and their goals concerning the issue of abortion, among others; I 
compare their advocacy at UN global conferences and special meetings in order to 
understand the effect of their different philosophies on their ability to influence policy, 
and then trace the change in their strategies over time as they gain more experience in the 
 
 25 
UN environment to determine if their strategies fall in line with those encouraged at UN 
global conferences. The comparative case study allows me to study each movement in 
depth, and compare the effect of variance in my independent variable, value congruence, 
on my dependent variables, influence and change in strategy over time. The two 
movements hold several key conditions constant: they are engaged in advocacy over the 
same or similar issues, that of abortion and issues related to abortion for each movement; 
in the same environment, that of UN global conferences and special meetings; whose key 
organizations tend to come from the U.S. and draw funding from the U.S. government (at 
different times) and foundations (which subscribe to liberal or conservative 
philosophies). Thus, the differences in their influence and strategies can be directly 
related to their different philosophical values. 
The independent variable on which the two movements differ is that of political 
values, constituting their different approaches to the issue of abortion. The congruence of 
norms between social movement and international system is the independent variable 
which I hypothesize is responsible for the different outcomes of the efforts of these two 
movements, and the motivation behind the seeming change in approach of the anti-
abortion movement to influencing the debate and policy on abortion in the international 
system.  I have included below the initial hypotheses and variables based on this 
particular explanation with which I began this research.  
However, I would like to caution the reader that these hypotheses were a starting 
point for my research, and as I investigated my case studies thoroughly, I found that the 
lines between my independent and dependent variables blurred. The networks and the 
key UN agencies they interacted with changed each other in the course of their 
 
 26 
interactions over forty years; it thus becomes problematic to have a static model of 
normative congruence as an independent variable and the success and adjustment of the 
networks as dependent variables, because the networks helped to influence UN agency 
norms, and the networks’ variable adjustment to the UN’s norms also affected their 
success. As a result of the in-depth information I was able to gain from my case studies of 
the two different networks over time, and the analysis I pursue in this dissertation, I 
elaborate a more dynamic process in the concluding chapter of how UN norms induced 
adjustments in network strategies, and how networks helped change the agencies of the 




1. The liberal and rational norms underlying the UN global conferences enhances a 
liberal movement’s ability to influence the debate and consensus documents, 
while it hinders a conservative movement’s ability to influence the debate and 
consensus documents. 
2. The liberal and rational norms underlying the UN global conferences affects 
conservative movements’ strategies for influencing the debate and consensus 
documents at international conferences.  
3. Over time, conservatives will adapt to these norms or be ineffectual. 
 
Independent variable: Political philosophy congruence between UN context and activist 
groups 
Indicators: liberal and conservative discourse within the charters, mission 
statements, and policy documents of UN agencies, i.e., rational or moral 
justifications for action, individual equality or collective good orientations to 
justice.  
 
Dependent variables:  
1. Social movement’s ability to influence debate and consensus language;  
Indicators: Institutional access, defined both by presence and influence on policy 
enacted by institution, measured by discourse of UN conference debates and 
consensus documents.  
Evidence for indicators: a) language from negotiated conference document, and b) 




Interpretation of evidence: a) The use of language consistent with the abortion-
rights network’s goals or the anti-abortion network’s goals in the negotiated 
conference document would indicate successful advocacy. b) If activists 
themselves, UN officials, or country delegates indicate that the abortion-rights or 
anti-abortion networks had access to conference secretariats and country 
delegations, I would interpret such data as evidence of institutional access. I will 
also depend on scholarly accounts for conferences that my interviews do not 
pertain to. 
2. Social movement’s approach to advocacy (change over time of strategies in 
approaching the international system for liberal movement and conservative movement). 
Indicators: a) Scale shift 
Evidence for indicator: The number of organizations and amount of  
resources directed at the UN 
Interpretation of evidence: The increase or decrease in numbers of  
organizations and amount of resources and attention by each network  
would demonstrate a shift of scale up to the UN or away from it. 
b) Framing of arguments;  
 Evidence for indicator: the arguments made by the two networks on 
websites, in conference debates, newsletters, articles, and interviews; 
Interpretation of evidence: The use of traditional or human rights language  
in framing their arguments would demonstrate frame change or stability,  
and their correlation with liberal norms. 
c) Information politics, or the use of research and statistics to support arguments; 
 Evidence for indicator: the use of academic and scientific data as well as  
 the references in websites, documents, and interviews to research and  
statistics as important for supporting arguments and in persuading others; 
Interpretation of evidence: Content and frame analysis of websites,  
documents, and interviews with activists of each movement will  
demonstrate whether they reference research, statistics, and data analysis  
to support their arguments/claims. 
d) Coalition building 
Evidence for indicators: Interviews, newsletters, articles and websites that 
link groups together for each movement;  
Interpretation of evidence: Discourse analysis of articles, newsletters, and  
website content will link one group to another, for both movements, and  




 The case study method appealed to me especially because it “seeks to generate a 
richly detailed and thick elaboration of the phenomenon studied through the use and 
triangulation of multiple methods or procedures that include but are not limited to 
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qualitative techniques” (Snow and Trom 2002: 147). This is especially appropriate for the 
anti-abortion movement because not much scholarly work has been done on the 
international advocacy of these organizations, and I believed that close and detailed study 
of the network would yield valuable observations. 
Yin (2003) defines the scope of the case study as one that investigates a 
phenomenon within its context, specifically because the researcher believes that the 
contextual conditions might be highly pertinent to the phenomenon. This holds true for 
my research questions concerning the abortion-rights and anti-abortion movements as 
liberal and conservative movements at the UN; I began my study by wanting to 
investigate the effects of the UN context on the movements’ influence and change in 
strategies over time. The second general set of criteria involves the triangulation of 
multiple forms of evidence, and the need for theoretical propositions to guide data 
collection and analysis. For my research design, I formulated one theoretical proposition 
concerning the liberal and rational norms of the UN Charter based on the world-polity 
theory, and whether the different values of the abortion-rights and anti-abortion 
movements would affect their influence at the UN; I also used another theoretical 
proposition based on social movement theory on the different strategies that the two 
movements might adjust in order to better influence language and policy at the UN. 
These guided my data collection and analysis, especially in the realm of documents and 
written material; I studied the scholarly descriptions and analyses of the UN Population 
and Development conferences, and collected relevant documents from these conferences. 
In addition, I collected as much material on the involvement of NGOs at these 
conferences as I could, especially the accreditation and influence of the women’s 
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reproductive health and rights movement. I also used the theoretical propositions to 
loosely guide my interview questions, and begin my analysis of interview data. 
Limits of Case Study 
 Many scholars have enumerated the limitations of the case study, such as the 
inability to control for variables and the inability to generalize as a result of a small 
number of cases, selection bias, lack of systematic procedure, and inattention to rival 
explanations (Lijphart 1971; King, Keohane and Verba 1994; Geddes 1990; Snow and 
Trom 2002), and many have also recommended solutions to those limitations, such as 
using within-case variance and cases that differ widely on the independent variable  (Van 
Evera 1997, Gerring 2001, Yin 2003). Case studies by their nature limit generalizability; 
however, I believe that the rich description that emerges from case studies justifies the 
use of a comparative case design, given the dearth of information concerning the 
international advocacy of the anti-abortion movement and the contribution of such 
description and analysis to theory building. Some authors also argue that the case study 
offers advantages that outweigh its disadvantages; although a large-n study allows us to 
know whether or not a theory holds true, a case study with its emphasis on detailed 
process-tracing allows us to understand why that is the case (Van Evera 1997: 54). Thus, 
it is difficult to generalize from my research whether the norms of the UN hinder all 
conservative movements or help all liberal movements, even though these cases seem 
fairly representative. However, my research does contribute greatly to understanding how 
such norms embedded in such an institution would cause such movements to adjust or 




 Stephen van Evera defines process tracing as exploring the chain of events or the 
decision-making process by which initial case conditions are translated into case 
outcomes. “The cause-effect link that connects independent variable and outcome is 
unwrapped and divided into smaller steps; then the investigator looks for observable 
evidence of each step” (Van Evera 1997:64). I used process tracing to understand the 
history of the two movements, their engagement with the UN, and the success they had at 
different time periods and stages of their development into international networks and 
movements. In order to evaluate the engagement and success of each movement, I 
searched for evidence of their attendance at the conference, their ability to gain access to 
key UN officials and to lobby government delegations, the judgment of scholars on 
whether the movement’s goals were reflected in the debate and final document emerging 
from the conference, analysis of the final document, and interview data from the activists. 
I collected multiple forms of data in order to limit the bias of any one source, including 
UN procedural documents and political (or negotiated) documents; material distributed, 
published, or archived on-line by activists’ organizations; in-depth interviews with 
activists, UN employees, government delegates, and demographers; and scholarly 
accounts of the conferences when available.  
Textual Analysis (Frame and Discourse) 
 Textual analysis, both frame analysis and discourse analysis, are the key methods 
that I employed within my case studies to analyze the strategies of each movement as 
they lobbied at the UN. Frames are based on text, either from written material or 
transcriptions of verbal communications; “frames and framing activities are available to 
the researcher mostly through written texts or spoken language, and verification of 
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framing activities or of a frame’s content is based on evidence embodied in what people 
say or do” (Johnston 2002: 66). Frame analysis was critical to understanding two of the 
three main strategies by which the two movements attempted to influence the UN and 
adjust to its environment over time: using a human rights frame, and framing their 
advocacy as more legitimate because of its base in research statistics.  
Discourse is defined as the sum total of written documents, speeches, actions, 
media-related documents, nearly everything related to a time, a place and a people 
(Sewell 1980: 8-9). Discourse analysis is broader than frame analysis, and can be used to 
understand several levels of discourse: I use discourse analysis on the individual and 
organizational levels in order to understand both the larger philosophies each movement 
is engaged in, and the awareness of their environment as activists speak of or write about 
the strategies they as individuals and organizations engage in to influence language and 
policy at the UN.  
Limitations of Frame and Discourse Analysis 
Johnston (2002) argues that intensive textual analysis must balance its insights 
with whether the text is representative enough to generalize about its patterns. “The 
choice of widely distributed and/or milestone documents… can increase confidence in 
generalizability” (Johnston 2002: 71).  However, Johnston also writes that intensive 
textual analysis “limits” qualitative discourse analysis to certain kinds of issues, such as 
relations between movement cultures and broader cultures. “The penetrating gaze this 
strategy offers is particularly well suited to laying bare the deep structures of ideas and 
their relations within a movement, and to mapping the ideological processes in movement 
formation” (71). He sees discourse analysis as useful for suggesting other groups with 
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which movements might form coalitions, such as those that share discursive repertoires; 
which movements might be successful, such as those that draw on resonating frames or 
templates, and what ideologies might mobilize a broader array of actors, such as those 
that successfully engage the hegemonic discourse (72). 
1.5.3 Overview of the Research Process: Data Collection and 
Analysis 
Interviews 
 I conducted in-depth interviews with former employees of UNFPA and the 
Population Division, current employees of the UNFPA, former U.S. delegation members, 
demographers who attended the UN Population and Development conferences, and 
activists from women’s reproductive health and rights groups as well from anti-abortion 
groups. I attempted to reach as many activists from the two movements as possible, using 
information from the different organizations’ websites, as well as documents listing 
influential leaders of the movement. I also asked each interviewee for any other activists 
they thought I should speak to about these topics, and in this way built my sample 
through the “snowball” effect.  
Most from the reproductive health and rights groups were forthcoming and passed 
along information about colleagues freely. However, most of my interviews with anti-
abortion activists were quite different; they assumed that I was a feminist because I was a 
female academic, and that I sympathized with the abortion-rights point of view. Although 
I did my best to remain neutral in my terminology and my appearance, many were quite 
closed, and did not pass on information about colleagues freely. Thus, it was more 
difficult to build up a large number of anti-abortion activists interviews. However, I 
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verified whether I had identified all the major anti-abortion organizations by asking 
several activists for their perception of the key organizations involved at the UN. I was 
able to interview at least one of the key activists and leaders from each of following the 
major anti-abortion organizations: the Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute (C-
FAM), Concerned Women for America (CWA), Focus on the Family, Family Research 
Council, the Howard Center, and International Right to Life/Life Issues Institute. I also 
heard and spoke informally to leaders of several other important anti-abortion 
organizations at an international conservative NGO conference, the World Congress of 
Families IV in Warsaw, Poland: Carol Soelberg and Sharon Slater of United Families 
International, Steve Mosher from Population Research Institute, Peter Smith from Society 
for the Protection of Unborn Children (SPUC), Pat Fagan of the Heritage Foundation, 
and representatives of Red Familias. I include a full list of my interviewees in Appendix 
A.  
I conducted my interviews in a semi-structured manner, having a general script of 
questions that I asked each interviewee, but allowing each person to elaborate fully on 
their particular area of expertise. In this way, I learned a lot about the different types of 
participants in global conferences, the importance of demographers as a group, and 
exactly how NGO activists went about participating in and influencing delegates at an 
intergovernmental conference. I tried to verify and add detail to the accounts I received of 
the different conferences by comparing them across the different categories of 
participants; however, most of the currently influential anti-abortion organizations did not 
begin attending the UN global conferences until after the 1994 Cairo conference, and thus 
could not contribute an opposing point of view. I found that both anti-abortion activists 
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and abortion-rights activists would claim that the UN was biased against them; other 
scholars have found this to be the case as well (Eager 2004), but I believe that interviews 
with current and former UNFPA employees were the most revealing as far as which 
activists they were most comfortable with, and who they worked closely with. I analyzed 
my transcribed interviews by coding them halfway through with themes I gathered from 
my hypotheses and looking for other themes as they came up. I then went through all my 
interview data with a revised set of codes and organized relevant information into themed 
documents, noting information from different categories of participants. In this way, I 
was able to analyze my interview data as systematically as possible, and cross-check 
individual accounts or insights.  
Documents  
 I gathered documents and written material from a variety of sources, but mainly 
the UN document center, scholarly accounts, and activists’ publications, both hard-copy 
and web-published. I used UN documents to verify scholarly accounts of the conferences, 
and to check the numbers and names of NGOs that were accredited to attend. Although it 
is difficult to narrow one’s search at the UN document center, I did my best in order not 
to be buried under the sheer amount of material that documents each conference by 
focusing on documents that described the conference process, the involvement of NGOs, 
the final consensus document, and the implementation of that document. Although I had 
planned on analyzing the final consensus documents emerging from each conference in 
detail to determine the influence of the different movements, many of my interviewees 
made me realize that the influence of the anti-abortion organizations was mainly in 
watering down the language or blocking advances on existing language. Thus, measuring 
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their influence by simply analyzing the final document would be slightly misleading, in 
that it would miss this negating influence. This is not negligible, in that the number and 
influence of anti-abortion organizations is not yet at a point where they are able to insert 
language of which they approve into UN consensus documents; however, they do work to 
block language of which they do not approve.  
I used activist accounts of the conferences, from newsletters, web articles, and 
website information, to supplement interview data in discourse and frame analysis of the 
two movements, especially their change over time. The newsletters of both movements 
were quite revealing, in that they were often pointedly directed at a particular audience in 
a particular time when activists believed they could use grassroots or coalition support in 
achieving their goals. However, most of this material came from groups that focused on 
advocacy as a main goal, and some abortion-rights groups did not have as much 
advocacy material because they were more focused on fieldwork. This was one big 
difference I noticed between abortion-rights groups; those focused on advocacy knew and 
felt the effects of the anti-abortion groups a great deal more than those who focused on 
fieldwork.  
1.6 Key findings 
Similarities and differences between the two networks 
There are several similarities between the abortion-rights and anti-abortion 
networks besides their focus on a similar set of issues. The abortion-rights movement and 
the anti-abortion movement both have strong grass-roots support in many different 
countries. While many of the abortion-rights organizations that advocate at the UN also 
provide services in different parts of the world, several are solely focused on advocacy at 
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the UN. Anti-abortion organizations that advocate at the UN tend to be mostly advocacy 
organizations that do not provide services, but a few Catholic and evangelical 
organizations that began as service organizations continue to do so. The differences 
between these networks can be described as arising from their fundamentally different 
approaches to the issues, defined by their liberal and conservative values. The abortion-
rights network has been eager to work at the UN, and although critical of the agencies 
when they do not match the positions the network wants them to take, they support the 
cooperative, international norms setting and monitoring work that the UN seeks to 
accomplish. The anti-abortion network both in the past and currently is critical of the UN, 
the liberal position it takes on social issues, the inefficiency of its bureaucracy, and its 
attempt to interfere with state sovereignty by dictating norms and monitoring country 
compliance. These differences make it much more difficult for the anti-abortion network 
to adjust to UN norms, and less likely that they will find those sympathetic to their 
concerns within the UN.   
Change and continuity within each network 
The differences between the two networks suggests that the abortion-rights 
network would be able to work UN without much change in their strategy, while the anti-
abortion network would have significant adjustments to make. However, my research 
indicates that both the abortion-rights and the anti-abortion networks had to adjust their 
strategies when they began lobbying at the UN. The similarities between the strategies 
that the opposing abortion-rights and anti-abortion networks adopted to lobby the UN 
suggest that both movements are responding to a prevailing set of norms. I use several 
well-known mechanisms from social movement theory to demonstrate exactly how those 
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adjustments were made in practice: both networks shifted the scale of their advocacy up 
to the UN, adjusted over time to frame their arguments within a rights framework, built 
coalitions with similar groups world-wide for the purpose of gaining leverage at the UN, 
and increased their use of research and statistics to support their advocacy.  
The changes that have occurred within each network have not affected the core 
norms or issues that tie them to their grassroots supporters or define their positions on the 
key issues, including abortion. This lack of change suggests that there are core norms and 
issues that neither network can compromise without changing their fundamental 
character, but there are more peripheral issues and norms that can be manipulated and 
framed in different ways to give the movement better traction in different venues.  
Influence and success of each network 
The ability of the two movements to change language and policy at the UN global 
conferences depends on their ability to affect two levels of influence at the UN: that of 
UN officials and employees, and that of government delegations. While the ability to 
approve consensus language and support changes in the terms of debate lie with the 
government delegations, a considerable amount of power to set the agenda, influence the 
leadership and composition of committees, and determine the involvement of civil 
society rests with those who work in the UN bureaucracy. Thus, movements’ ability to 
lobby both levels helps determine their influence.  
My research reveals that the abortion-rights network has had the most success in 
influencing the debate and language of consensus documents because it is able to affect 
UN officials and employees, as well as government delegations. The anti-abortion 
network has successfully changed its strategies when advocating at the UN, but these 
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changes only affect their ability to influence government delegations. Thus, despite the 
support of the Bush administration, the anti-abortion network has not been successful at 
inserting language representing their key concerns into consensus documents, only in 
blocking language they object to or watering down advances that women’s rights activists 
lobby for. 
The fact that liberal and rational norms translate into practices that a conservative 
movement can adapt without changing its content, and have some limited success in 
advocacy at the UN, suggests that world culture can be successfully contested by groups 
that do not hold these norms. Thus, while it is important to take liberal norms into 
account when trying to understand the success of different networks and movements, 
they do not eliminate contention at the UN, nor necessarily transform opposition 
movements into agreement with these norms.  
Implications for theory 
These liberal and rational norms that prevail in the international sphere currently are 
not permanent, nor uncontested. However, they have grown in influence in the past fifty 
years, and do play a role in how the abortion-rights and anti-abortion networks conduct 
their advocacy at the UN global conferences. 
Neither a structural framework nor an agency-oriented framework alone will explain 
the influence and change over time of liberal and conservative movements at the UN; a 
structural framework misses the changes that actors make to adjust to or work around 
prevailing norms in order to be more successful in their advocacy, while an agency-
oriented framework misses the norms embedded in the structure and practices of an 
organization that may dictate actors’ choices. 
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1.7 Brief summary of following chapters 
Chapter Two describes the literature in sociology and political science that I draw 
on for my theoretical framework, and builds the integrated structural and agency-oriented 
framework that I propose for studying liberal and conservative movements in the 
international sphere. In addition, I provide a theoretical background on liberal 
individualism, the norms of world-polity theory that draw on liberal individualism, and 
how those norms are translated into practice at the UN.  
In Chapter Three, I introduce the history of the UN global conferences on 
population, and the importance of the “expert” meetings as opposed to the later 
intergovernmental meetings for establishing the authority of demographers based on their 
status as scientific experts. The “population control” point of view that most 
demographers promoted elicited opposition from both feminists and the Holy See, but for 
completely different reasons. Feminists opposed family planning programs because they 
did not focus on the health and rights of the women to whom they distributed 
contraceptives, while the Holy See and other Catholic NGOs opposed family planning as 
wrong in and of itself. Feminists began organizing at the international level, while the 
conservative opposition continued to focus on domestic arenas of influence. 
I then trace the emergence of the women’s reproductive health and rights 
movement as it develops in opposition to the population control view of demographers in 
Chapter Four. The organizations in this movement gained experience in lobbying at the 
UN over the course of the UN Decade for Women as they attended the three Women’s 
conferences. A network of NGOs focused on lobbying for reproductive health and rights 
emerged in the early nineties, and lobbied at these conferences with greater organization 
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and influence due to the greater role given to NGOs. During this time, the women’s 
reproductive health and rights network began to adopt a human rights frame and ally with 
the environmental and human rights communities. The anti-abortion movement did not at 
this time direct its attention or resources to the UN. 
The culmination of the women’s movement’s influence can be seen at the Cairo 
conference, explored in detail in Chapter Five, along with the unprecedented activism of 
the Holy See and its spurring of a greater number of non-governmental organizations 
against abortion into the international sphere. The women’s reproductive health and 
rights network helped change the language of family planning from a population control 
rationale to one that emphasized reproductive health and rights; I trace the importance of 
the several changes in strategy to the success of the women’s network, including their 
adoption of a human rights frame, their coalition building with similar groups from the 
developing world, and the professionalization of their advocacy. 
Chapter Six details the development of the anti-abortion network after Cairo, and 
its growth in expertise and experience throughout the late nineties and into the new 
century. The network made some clear changes in movement strategies, especially in 
terms of coalition building and frame change, evident in the five-year reviews of Cairo 
and Beijing; however, their influence was still limited as a result of their relatively recent 
efforts at the UN, and their inability to affect a significant number of government 
delegations. The abortion-rights network continued to advocate for its reproductive health 
and rights agenda by increasing its coalition building and frame change, successfully 
adding sexual health to the language of the Cairo +5 negotiated document. 
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Chapter Seven examines how the two movements had to adjust to each other and 
continue to adapt their strategies to the UN in order to either maintain their gains or 
increase their influence in the 2000-2004 time period. The anti-abortion network became 
much more visible at the UN, although still far smaller as far as numbers of organizations 
than the abortion-rights network; this was due partly to the support of the Bush 
administration, and partly to the success of its framing of reproductive health and rights 
as a controversial issue. As a result, the Millennium Development Goals did not include 
reproductive health and rights, and the ten-year review of Cairo did not occur as an 
international conference. The abortion-rights network has spent this time lobbying to 
have reproductive health and rights included as a Millennium Development Goal, and 
attempting to supplement decreasing funding for reproductive health and rights by 
attaching its concerns to the HIV/AIDS issue.  
Chapter Eight reflects on the similarities and differences between the two 
movements and the implications of this research for my larger theoretical concerns and 
framework. I also describe and analyze two recent conferences that demonstrate the 
current agenda, problems, and strategies of the two movements, and how they continue to 
use framing, coalition building, and research to support their advocacy. I also briefly 
describe some important factors that emerged during my research that should be 




2 Theory  
 
2.1 Literature Review 
 
Several bodies of literature within political science and sociology make the argument that 
international norms or culture affect both international and domestic politics: 
international relations constructivists who developed the literature on norms and ideas 
(Klotz 1995, Finnemore 1996, Adler 1997, Ruggie 1998); world-polity sociologists who 
argue that a liberal world culture explains liberal trends in international and domestic 
arenas better than rational choice theory (Meyer and Rowan 1977, Biggart and Hamilton 
1988, Boli and Thomas 1999); and critics of the global civil society literature, who argue 
that a bias exists in the literature towards liberal and progressive issue and causes, and 
against conservative causes, movement, and actors (Amoore and Langley 2004, 
Rajagopal 2003, Baker 2002, Tvedt 2002, Thomas 2001).  Taken as a whole, these 
literatures make an argument for the existence of a liberal normative, cultural or 
ideological fabric in the international realm, affecting domestic and international politics 
in varying degrees. I detail the claims of these literatures here, and argue that studying the 
movements around the cause of abortion in the international realm is one way to evaluate 
these claims: does the allegedly liberal character of the international system, specifically 
the UN international conferences on population and development, affect the work of the 
abortion-rights and the anti-abortion movements differently? 
First, however, I will address the question of why I use the terms I do, since abortion is a 




2.1.1 Defining Terms 
2.1.1.1 Abortion-rights and Anti-abortion  
 
The two sides of the abortion issue have given themselves certain names and have been 
given other names by opposing sides; the movement associated with liberal political 
norms (hereafter the liberal movement) has called themselves pro-choice and been called 
anti-life by the conservative movement, while the movement associated with 
conservative political norms (hereafter the conservative movement) has called themselves 
pro-life and been called anti-choice by the abortion rights movement. Many academic 
works choose to use the terms given by each side to themselves, but I find this confusing 
and more concerned with political spin than the goal of the movement. Thus, I have 
chosen to call the conservative movement the anti-abortion movement, because they 
strive to either limit or curtail the availability of abortion; I have chosen to call the liberal 
movement the abortion rights movement because they are not pro abortion in that they 
want to increase abortions but they are committed to abortion being available to women 
as an inherent right. 
The conservative movement in the international system has been fueled in large 
part by the Vatican, in its role as a special participant in UN conferences, and more 
recently by NGOs that are part of or supported by the U.S. Christian conservative 
political movement, often referred to as the Christian Right in American politics. The 
term “Christian Right” has been used by both the political left as a pejorative term as well 
as the right as a positive term. Since there is nothing inherently derogatory about the 
term, and academics studying the movement (Buss and Herman 2003) as well as 
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organizations within the movement use the term, I will also refer to the Christian 
conservative political movement as the Christian Right. 
2.1.1.2 Liberal Norms and Conservative Norms 
 
My definition of liberal and conservative as two different bundles of norms are 
not ideal types, and they are not static, but change over time. My definition of liberal is 
composed from the many definitions of liberal political philosophers and the norms 
detailed by the world-polity literature. Liberalism is mainly defined as a cluster of values 
and ideas, including political rationalism; hostility to autocracy; individualism, 
egalitarianism, universalism; freedom, tolerance, privacy, constitutionalism, rule of law, 
reason, science, progress, and property. Some philosophers emphasize one value or idea 
above others, such as individualism, freedom, or reason. The bundle of norms that seem 
to best describe liberal internationalism, as detailed below in my exploration of the 
world-polity literature, include bureaucratic rationalism, individualism, and the goals of 
justice and progress.  
It is important to realize that liberalism is not consistent, and that in an institution 
such as the UN, liberalism includes economic liberalism. The tension between neo-
liberalism, or economic liberalism, and political liberalism, is one that I see as 
irreconcilable in terms of norms and ideas – neoliberalism seems to fit in the conservative 
arena of ideas rather than liberal. This tension between neoliberalism and liberal 
internationalism has its roots in the tension between elitist and egalitarian strands of 
liberalism that date back to the first writings of liberal philosophers (Richardson 2001), 
and I have tried to consider whether an alliance between social conservatism and 
economic liberalism similar to that in the U.S. exists in the international system. 
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However, in the practical research of how resources are distributed for the different social 
programs I am concerned with, and what justifications and pressures are brought to bear 
in that distribution, economic liberalism seems to be more of factor at the country level 
than at the Economic and Social Council.  
My definition of conservative is composed from the norms detailed by 
conservative political philosophers as they seem relevant to the ideological underpinnings 
of international conservative social movements. Conservatism is defined as “a defense of 
the political, economic, religious, and social status quo from the forces of abrupt change, 
that is based on a belief that established customs, laws, and traditions provide continuity 
and stability in the guidance of society” (Dunn and Woodard 2003:30).  Conservatives 
emphasize a) orthodox and traditional religious values; b) less faith in the goodness, 
reason, and perfectability of mankind; c) belief in less power for the centralized 
government; d) the duties of the individual more than his or her rights; e) a trust in the 
free markets of capitalism; and f) a desire that economic, political, religious, and social 
stability be maintained through gradual changes within existing institutions (Dunn and 
Woodard 2003).  The elements detailed here that seem most relevant to the conservative 
movements in the international system are those of orthodox and traditional religious 
values, the duties of the individual more than his or her rights, and a desire for gradual 
change within existing institutions.  
 
2.1.2 Political Science Constructivists 
 
The constructivist literature on norms in international relations theory has 
addressed theoretical issues regarding the origins and influence of norms in the 
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international society, including Audie Klotz (1995), Martha Finnemore (1996), Emanuel 
Adler (1997), John Ruggie (1998), and the edited volumes by Peter Katzenstein on the 
culture of national security (1996) and Adler and Michael Barnett (1998) on security 
communities. Although norms can be defined as either ethically concerned “oughts” 
defined by the international society, they can also be defined in a more positivist way as 
simply what is done, what is normal. However, these two definitions of norms are not 
mutually exclusive, because ethically concerned norms can be introduced and established 
and become simply normal. The most basic definition of a norm is thus: a standard of 
appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity (Klotz 1995, Katzenstein 1996, 
Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).  
Most norms identified in international relations scholarship have to do with 
ethical norms, normatively concerned standards that states are to strive for, such as 
human rights, education, abolition of slavery, but which are not necessarily fully realized 
by all states all of the time. This does not negate the importance of norms; norms are still 
important because they set the standard for states and individuals in domestic as well as 
international interactions, and violations of norms may spur international recrimination. 
The fact that many norms are established in international laws, treaties, or conventions 
gives individuals and groups recourse against states in violation of these norms.  
International relations scholars have been concerned with determining what a 
norm is, how norms evolve, and the conditions under which they exercise influence. This 
is a very agency-oriented view of how the normative fabric of the international system is 
established: norms have “life cycles” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), domestic norms 
become international norms because of norm entrepreneurs, such as those that established 
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women’s suffrage (Dubois and Ruiz 1994), and norms may decay (Kacowicz 2005).  
However, since constructivists believe that “people and societies construct, or constitute 
each other” (Onuf 1989:36), and because norms are inherently social and collective, 
constructivists see norms as constitutive components of both the international system and 
society. Norms not only constrain states’ actions, but partially define their interests and 
shape their identities. The content of most international norms are mainly concerned with 
principles that would be philosophically defined as liberal: the sovereign equality of 
states, the self-determination of peoples, peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for 
human rights, and international cooperation (Kacowicz 2005:9).  
Although most scholars concerned with norms do not question why we have the 
types of norms we have (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999), Barnett and Finnemore in their 
collaboration on the nature of international organizations (2004) explore the reasons why 
international organizations act as they do. They note that international organizations 
claim authority on the basis of how they carry out their missions (rational, technocratic, 
impartial and nonviolent) and the content of their missions (acting to promote socially 
valued goals such as protecting human rights, providing development assistance, and 
brokering peace agreements) (5). Thus, although most international organizations (IOs) 
were founded by states for specific progressive goals, those same organizations now 
constrain states to adhere to these progressive goals, demonstrating the ability of 
institutions to exert power over actors in the international system. Barnett and Finnemore 
are more specific concerning the nature of the norms underlying and being acted out in 
international organizations: “a strong thread running through the ever-expanding world of 
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IOs is their substantively liberal character. Most IOs were founded by Western liberal 
states and are designed to promote liberal values” (2004:15).  
They note that the IMF’s neo-liberal economic policies have unapologetically 
promoted private property and free markets around the globe; other IOs including the UN 
and UNHR have slowly come to accept the protection of individual rights, a liberal value, 
as part of their missions. “The human rights regime that is pushed by a wide variety of 
IOs and is used to legitimate their activities has a strong liberal cast since it makes 
individual rights a nonnegotiable trump card in many political situations” (Barnett and 
Finnemore 2004: 168).  
 
2.1.3 Sociological World-Polity Theory 
 
Another influence on Barnett and Finnemore’s work is that of sociological 
institutionalism, which explains the growth of international organizations as the result of 
two central components of global culture, rationalization and liberalism. Barnett and 
Finnemore argue that liberal ideas have seen an expansion across the globe similar to the 
spread of rationalization that Weber saw as a historical process that would come to define 
all areas of life, including the economy, culture, and the state.  
Liberal political ideas about the sanctity and autonomy of the individual and about 
democracy as the most desirable and just form of government have spread 
widely… these two cultural strands have constituted IOs in particular ways, and 
IOs in turn have been important transmitters of global rationalization and global 
liberalism. (Barnett and Finnemore 2004:166) 
 
This argument of a global culture is based on the world-polity theory developed by 
Meyer and Rowan (1977), Meyer, Boli et al (1997), Boli and Thomas (1999), and 
Lechner and Boli (2005).  World-polity scholars posit that a world culture is transmitted 
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by international organizations to all parts of the world, causing an unexplained 
isomorphism in the organizations, goals, actions and identities; that world culture consists 
of bureaucratic rationalism, individualism and the goals of justice and progress, defined 
respectively as equality and wealth accumulation (Finnemore 1996).  Unlike political 
constructivists, world-polity scholars emphasize the structural level of analysis; social 
structure produces social actors, not the other way around. There is a place for agency, 
but it is a fairly limited one in comparison with other theories in political science: “actors 
everywhere defining themselves in similar ways and pursuing similar purposes by similar 
means, but specific actions in specific contexts vary almost without limit” (Boli and 
Thomas 1999:18). The world cultural rules constitute actors – including states, 
organizations, and individuals – and define legitimate or desirable goals for them to 
pursue.  
World cultural norms also produce organizational and behavioral similarities 
across the globe that are not easily explained by traditional paradigms in political science. 
Sociological institutionalists explain the spread of bureaucratic organizations not as a 
result of economic and technological development (bureaucratization was happening 
much quicker than the development of either) but because the wider environment 
supports and legitimates rational bureaucracy as a social good (Meyer and Rowan 1977). 
The social values that support and legitimate some organizational forms and not others, 
some social activities and not others, are cultural values, which include rationality and 
individualism.  
The increase in numbers and influence of international non-governmental 
organizations (INGOs) on states is explained by world-polity, world culture, and world 
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authority. In particular, the authority of INGOs is based on a conception of authority 
called “rational-voluntaristic” authority, articulated by Boli as different from Weber’s 
because it is not a dominant authority but one of freely exercised reason “in which 
fundamentally equal individuals reach collective decisions through rational deliberations 
open to all” (Boli and Thomas 1999:273). Rational voluntarism has emerged in world 
culture as the morally superior form of authoritative organization, the ideal to which all 
societies should aspire (Boli and Thomas 1999: 273). Why? The sovereign individual has 
become “both the primordial building-block of society and the ultimate source of value, 
meaning and purpose” (274). Individuals have the right to manage their own existence 
with due respect for the right of other individuals to do the same; the only legitimate 
collective authority must be built up from the authority that resides in free individuals. 
Rationality, as noted before, is taken from Weber’s understanding of the increasingly 
formalized and bureaucratized structures put in place to coordinate complex and 
specialized interactions. I would argue that the UN conferences and programs (on the 
social side, under the Economic and Social Council especially) are supported by this 
rational-voluntaristic authority, and exploring the impact of such authority on 
organizations and events might help explain the successes and failures of different 
movements at the UN conferences. 
World-polity theory’s structural analysis leaves little room for agency, and does 
not explain resistance to the content of world culture (Finnemore 1996). With regard to 
my interests in conservative movements in the international system, world polity theory 
does not take into account the actors, groups and movements that do not fit in with the 
liberal (individual and rational) character of world culture. How do they exist at all if the 
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prominent social values, organizational structures, and knowledge centers of the 
international system do not support them? Or if they begin, how do they continue? I 
believe a framework that includes both the insights of a structural perspective such as 
world-polity theory and an agency-oriented perspective such as transnational social 
movements theory is needed to understand what constraints are posed by a world culture, 
and how movements work around them. I would like to note that world-polity theory did 
take a step toward investigating the agency through which the rules of world culture are 
constructed and established, and how contestation over the content of world-cultural 
models is conducted, in the volume edited by Boli and Thomas (1999). For example, 
Finnemore argues that we cannot understand the establishment of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in any self-interested, rational-choice way; the 
impetus for forming the organization on the part of its founders was personal experience 
in war, and the arguments used to persuade volunteers and states afterwards were framed, 
not in terms of competition and advantage but in terms of duties, responsibilities and 
identity. Finnemore thus reasons that agency in this case is not driven by interest but by a 
cultural model of Christian charity and humanitarian duty constructed by the founders 
from existing cultural principles and applied in new ways to the conduct of war.  The 
conflict over the establishment and state approval of the ICRC was not over interests but 
over appropriateness, and thus a cultural conflict to determine world-cultural rules 
(Finnemore 1999). 
 




Although critics of global civil society doubt the existence of one monolithic world 
culture, they point to the importance of the perception of such a world culture through 
their very resistance and criticism of it in the global civil society. Several critics of global 
civil society problematize the assumptions of a global civil society literature that focuses 
only on peaceful, liberal causes (Batliwala 2002, Tvedt 2002, Adamson 2003), while 
others question the usefulness of the major frames in global civil society for truly 
addressing the development needs of developing states (Ford 2003, Rajagopal 2003).  
 Global civil society is generally understood as a sphere of voluntary societal 
association above the individual and below the state, representing a liberal democratic 
space that complements the states-system and as such constitutes global governance (Falk 
1998).  Global civil society’s actors include NGOs, social movements, transnational 
networks and movements. One of the problems identified by resistance scholars is 
symptomatic of the issues faced by global civil society: many grassroots movements 
become institutionalized and lose their grassroots character, while newer grassroots 
movements have fought to balance the power between their constituents and more 
professional NGO participants. The exponential growth of NGOs in the international 
system has brought up important questions of accountability and procedures of 
participation and representation in NGOs and movements as they work within a highly 
bureaucratized system.  
Critics of global civil society have pointed out the literature’s tendency to focus 
on “good,” “progressive”, and “humanitarian” causes, movements, and NGOs, as well as 
to only tell success stories; not every author posits a reason for this tendency, but those 
that do ascribe it to a normative bias in the literature arising from a similar liberal bias in 
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the international system. The global civil society is predicated on specific assumptions 
about human nature, the individual, society and history: “built into the discourse and 
practice [of civil society] are strong assumptions that are anything but neutral: individuals 
are autonomous, self-interested, rational and moral” (Thomas 2001:517). The liberal 
international system, focusing on the individual rather than community, allows a human 
rights discourse but no outlet for economic rights and violence. Rajagopal (2003) argues 
that the concept of human rights was developed solely in the Western world and yet is 
increasingly applied in the Third World; human rights requires the state to enforce them, 
and although it recognizes public violence and private forms of violence, it does not 
recognize the private violence of the market on individuals and communities (202). His 
contention is that by making the human rights discourse the only approved discourse of 
resistance, the Third World’s concerns over developmental violence and rights are made 
unacceptable.  
Another effect of the emphasis on the individual in the international system is that 
indigenous groups that are struggling for community rights must contend against the 
international normative consensus that the “self” in self-determination always refers 
either to a sovereign state or to individuals within sovereign states; what they are instead 
advocating is a collective, cultural self that has rights to territory and the ability to control 
their own development (Muehlebach 2003). Liberal analysis does not account for the 
power relations between global civil society, the inter-state system and the global market. 
Ford (2003) argues that social movements can be forces for social change, but NGOs 
from the global civil society that participate in institutions of global governance run the 
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risk of cooptation because the real power remains within international organizations that 
pay more attention to the voices of business and industry (130). 
George Thomas (2001) explicitly implicates a world culture when evaluating the 
place of religion in global civil society, arguing that world cultural principles on the one 
hand allow conversion as an individual right, but on the other hand disallow proselytizing 
as illegitimate because the need for other-worldly salvation calls into question the 
collective liberal project of progress in this world (528). A more radical framing of the 
global civil society would recognize the contradictory and contested nature of what it 
means to be ‘civil,’ as well as recognize that there are tensions surrounding who is being 
empowered or what is being resisted (Amoore and Langley 2004:106). Thus, global civil 
society critics acknowledge the existence of a liberal set of norms that dominates 
international institutions, but critique it as unrepresentative of much of the developing 
world. 
2.1.5 Social Movement Theory 
The history of social movement theory has seen the importance of many different 
types of approaches, including social psychological and breakdown theories, resource 
mobilization theory, and political process theory (Klandermans and Staggenborg 2002: 
ix). Resource mobilization theory critiqued previous theories of social movements, which 
focused on the question of why people were aggrieved, and changed that question to why 
aggrieved people protested. Resource mobilization theory also brought a concrete 
specificity to the factors that affect social movements, focusing on the differential 
availability, mobilization, and allocation of resources, as well as the costs and benefits of 
participation in social movements and the professionalization of these movements. 
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Political process theory critiqued resource mobilization theory for neglecting the fact that 
social movements develop and act in political environments, which can have a significant 
influence on their success and direction. Political process theory offered social movement 
theory the core concept of political opportunities (Eisinger 1973, Kitschelt 1986, 
McAdam 1999), answering the question of why movements arise or fail with 
explanations centered on differences in political opportunities, or the various political 
environments that social movement organizations face. This has led to the stretching of 
political opportunities to various other types of opportunity structures that have been 
fruitful in this field, and reflect another new direction for social movement theory, 
involving a critique of political process as too structural and neglecting factors such as 
identity, culture, and emotions (Goodwin and Jasper 1999). Klandermans and 
Staggenborg (2002) in their review of the field have also noted that scholars have been 
developing methodological approaches more appropriate to studying cultural processes, 
such as the development of collective identity, the influence of discourse on protest, 
organizations, and movements, and the interplay between culture and structure (Jasper 
1997, Melucci 1996, Steinberg 1999), although they believe that unresolved 
methodological and measurement problems in studying identity, emotion and culture may 
slow down this cultural turn in social movement theory.   
2.2 Combining Structural with Agent-Oriented Theoretical 
Framework 
 
Theorists from three bodies of literature, political science constructivism, 
sociological world polity theory, and critics of global civil society demonstrate a central 
claim that a normative and ideologically liberal culture of the international system affects 
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the types of norms established in the international system, the organizational and 
behavioral similarities found across the system, and the “civil” focus of global civil 
society, respectively. I would like to articulate a theoretical framework that combines 
structural and agency analysis as well as some concrete indicators of how such a 
normative fabric would affect social movements by adding relevant concepts from social 
movement theory. 
A top-down approach such the world-polity lens of sociological institutionalism 
helps us understand the structural constraints of the international system by positing that 
the content of the social structure of the international system is a liberal Western world 
culture (Finnemore 1996). This culture emphasizes rationality and individualism, and 
thus movements and organizations that argue from a different set of norms do not find 
traction. 
 However, a world-polity lens does not account for how and why a movement with 
conservative goals has been able to form or gain strength in a liberal system. This is 
where a bottom-up approach such as the social movement perspective injects a more 
agentic view, giving us the tools to analyze the nuts and bolts (framing, resources 
mobilization and opportunity structures) of this movement and thus expand our 
understanding of transnational movements and non-state actors to include those outside 
the liberal bias of the existing literature. However, the social movement perspective alone 
does not explain the lack of opportunity structures available to these conservative 




Thus the theoretical framework that seems best suited for this type of research is 
one that uses both structural and agency-oriented analysis, taking into account both the 
structural opportunities and constraints as well as the actions and strategies of agents on 
the ground that take advantage of these opportunities or circumvent these constraints. 
One example of such a theoretical framework is that of Fiona Adamson’s global structure 
of political opportunities (2003), which addresses the liberal bias of mainstream social 
constructivism, in which constructivists have focused on liberal actors promoting liberal 
norms in the international system, as well as a lack of theorization of the relationship 
between individual agents and global structures. These two shortcomings are the result, 
Adamson maintains, of the “ideological structure of global liberalism within which it is 
embedded” (2003:2). Although global liberalism currently dominates world politics 
(Hovden and Keene 2002), Adamson argues that multiple macro-level ideological 
structures exist in the current international system, supplying their own “competing sets 
of systemic level political opportunities for differently situated norms entrepreneurs” 
(Adamson 2003:3), and she theorizes these competing political opportunities as an 
evolving and only partially institutionalized global structure of political opportunities. 
Using political opportunities as a means of mapping out changes in the 
international arena provides social constructivists with a means of integrating the 
literatures on top-down and bottom-up approaches to normative change in world politics, 
a key goal of my research. In Adamson’s framework, three types of systemic-level 
political opportunity structures shape the dynamics of norm promotion in world politics: 
discursive opportunity structures, institutional opportunity structures, and geopolitical 
opportunity structures. Discursive opportunity structures have been introduced into the 
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study of social movements to delineate the symbolic, cultural and ideational resources 
that exist in a given environment for political actors to draw on when engaging in 
strategic framing (Ferree et al 2002). Individual political actors do not conjure frames out 
of thin air, but are influenced by the structures of meaning within which they are 
embedded; these structures of meaning influence the content and type of claims that are 
made by actors within a particular political space. The discursive structure of the 
international system is not consistent, but contains dominant and subordinate discourses, 
which change over time (Adamson 2003). Institutional resources are distinguished from 
the ideational resources that political actors may draw upon; institutional opportunity 
structures in the international system change over time in terms of the number of 
international organizations and non-governmental organizations that exist and exert 
influence in the system since the late 19th century. Geopolitical opportunity structures, as 
described by Adamson, refer to the structure of global power relations and the interests of 
great powers as they provide structural incentives and constraints to norm entrepreneurs 
in world politics.  
Processes and mechanisms within opportunity structures 
 I believe the concepts of discursive and institutional political opportunity 
structures are both especially important to studying conservative movements in the 
international system and geopolitical opportunity structures impact them peripherally; 
however, Adamson does not provide concrete mechanisms and processes of just how a 
social movement may be affected by the structures of the international system. For these I 
turn to Tarrow’s work on transnational contention (2005), and present four processes that 
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highlight the importance of discursive and institutional opportunity structures for social 
movements.   
Discursive opportunity structures: Adamson argues that liberalism is one 
ideological framework that provides individual norm entrepreneurs with opportunity 
structures to draw upon for framing their normative claims. Liberalism not only provides 
a language of rights, equality, rationality and progress for norm entrepreneurs to draw on, 
but “liberal ideology undergirds the political and legal systems of the major industrial 
democracies of the world, and also undergirds the legal framework of the United Nations 
system” (2003:14). However, the liberal ideological framework is not the only one that 
exists or exerts influence in the international system; other frameworks that have 
competed with liberal internationalism at particular historical junctions include those of 
nationalism, socialism, and anarchism. With the end of the Cold War, socialism has lost 
much of its power as an ideological framework, and many of the claims made in Marxist 
terms have since been made in human rights terms (Rajagopal 2003). Adamson argues 
that these changes can be traced to changes in the discursive opportunity structures that 
exist at the level of the international system (2003:15).  
One of the ways in which an international discursive opportunity structure would 
specifically affect a social movement is the extent to which conservative social 
movement actors change their frame alignments to match the dominant discursive 
opportunity of liberalism, whether that involves frame extension, bridging, or 
transformation (Tarrow 2005).  Framing can be defined as the conscious strategic efforts 
by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that 
legitimate and motivate collective action (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996); its use 
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for this analysis is appropriate given the connection of framing to ideological structures 
as a source of resources and constraints (Snow and Benford 2000:613). I am interested in 
the way the abortion rights movement and the anti-abortion movement change their frame 
alignment over time, and especially at the International Conference on Population and 
Development (ICPD) in Cairo, the ICPD+5 Review in New York, and the ICPD+10 
Review by the UNFPA. This will shed light on whether the dominant international 
discursive opportunity structure of liberalism affected the framing of their issues. 
Information politics, used by activists to diffuse information to sympathetic parties that 
can then exert pressure on the institution that is the target of the movement (Tarrow 
2005:158), is another tactic that anti-abortion organizations may use to circumvent a 
competing discursive opportunity structure. This would work like a reverse boomerang 
effect, of Keck and Sikkink fame; the anti-abortion movement may use information 
politics to bring domestic pressure to bear on international targets. Information politics 
also depends on a particular norm, the importance of science and reason, which I will 
explore in more detail. 
 Institutional opportunity structures: International organizations may socialize 
states into a set of norms, actors may use international organizations as a platform for 
establishing and diffusing norms, and actors may use international NGOs to exert 
pressure on their unresponsive domestic regimes, a process Keck and Sikkink refer to as 
the boomerang pattern (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Thus, international governmental 
organizations and non-governmental organizations are opportunity structures that can be 
drawn upon by social movement actors. Adamson makes the important point that 
political actors wishing to make claims at the level of the international system can use the 
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platform of international organizations but if they do so they will be constrained to frame 
their message in ways that fit the institutional culture of the organization. “Political 
entrepreneurs who promote norms that do not conform with the dominant liberal 
institutional culture of international organizations will have to adjust their normative 
claims or draw on other institutional infrastructures…” (Adamson 2003:16). This insight 
provides the basis for my hypotheses concerning liberal and conservative movements at 
the UN. 
Thus, I see the international discursive opportunity structure influencing the 
institutional opportunity structure; this would have particular relevance in the case of the 
anti-abortion movement attempting to influence the Program of Action emerging from 
the ICPD in Cairo and the ICPD+5 in New York, since the goal of their advocacy did not 
conform to the dominant liberal institutional culture of the UN’s social agencies. One 
specific mechanism which the social movement organizations could use to overcome the 
liberal institutional structure is that of building transnational coalitions, complicated by 
framing, trust, management of difference, and selective incentives (Tarrow 2005:165).  
For the anti-abortion movement in particular, transnational coalitions are an important 
factor in gaining leverage in an international arena; however, many scholars studying 
both conservative movements and transnational movements agree that while instrumental 
coalitions may succeed in the short run, they are difficult to maintain for long term 
collaboration (Buss and Herman 2003, Tarrow 2005). But Tarrow argues that coalitions 
built around campaigns, with their ability to make short-term tactical alliances, minimal 
institutionalization, and focus on a specific policy issue, may be the most successful 
strategies for social movements (179). Measuring how closely the coalitions built by the 
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anti-abortion movement match these characteristics may grant us a better idea of how 
successful and lasting these coalitions are likely to be. One way in which I measure the 
success of these movements overall is that of institutional access, measured not solely by 
the presence of anti-abortion organizations at the UN but also by their influence on the 
final Program of Action in comparison to abortion-rights advocates. 
2.3 How liberal norms are embodied in social practices 
 
This research examines the practical effects of international norm construction for 
social movements attempting to navigate the UN system, specifically UN global 
conferences. Do norms become ingrained in the practices of intergovernmental 
organizations to such an extent that they hinder a movement with different norms or help 
a movement that conforms to them? In studying the UN and especially UN global 
conferences on issues of social significance, it has been argued that the norms stemming 
from classic Lockean liberalism, such as emphasis on individual liberties, a rights-based 
framework for developing policy, and progress through science and reason, are embodied 
in the procedures and frameworks of UN global conferences in several ways: first, 
individuals are so important that collective decisions must be consensus decisions (Boli 
and Thomas 1999), making coalition-building necessary; second, the rights framework 
has become so embedded that it is a legitimizing frame for most social issues, especially 
in the post-Cold War world (Rajagopal 2003); and third, science and reason are seen as 
the most legitimate methods of justifying policy and action, as opposed to religion and 
tradition (Thomas 2001). I will first trace the norms posited by world-polity and other 
approaches to liberal individualism, and then attempt to demonstrate how these norms are 
 
 63 
embodied in particular practices at the UN that affect the UN global conferences and 
meetings where these social movements attempt to exert influence. 
2.3.1 Liberal Individualism 
Liberal theory and philosophy, as mentioned earlier, has grown over time to 
include many different positions, and its authors do not often try to summarize the key 
tenets of the theory of liberalism. So I will not attempt to include all the many different 
types of liberalism, but focus my attention on the central tenets of liberalism that I believe 
have been transferred to liberal internationalism.  
Most theorists would argue that the central, deepest commitment of liberal 
political philosophy is to individualism (Waldron 1996: 600); this individualism consists 
of four elements that have distinct implications. First, the importance of the individual 
underlies the evaluation of social and political institutions. Early liberal philosophers 
based the importance of the individual on each person being the workmanship and 
property of God; however, since John Locke, liberal philosophers have based the 
importance of the individual on a more secular tradition. Utilitarians based it on the 
desire and preferences of the individual, while Kant linked individual value to the will, 
conscience, and sense of duty of each individual. Thus, each person was meant to be 
regarded as an end in themselves, not just the means to broader social ends, and as such 
was the key to social and political institutions.  
A second key element of liberal individualism is the importance of freedom, 
defined as the capacity of individuals to direct their actions and live their lives on their 
own terms. Libertarians focus on a negative conception of freedom, while liberals also 
include a positive conception of freedom, and spend considerable time balancing between 
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the two. Most liberal, positive conceptions of liberty allow the state a considerable role in 
providing and maintaining freedom. Those who argue for an extensive understanding of 
positive liberty go beyond the bounds of liberalism and enter that of socialism (Waldron 
1996). The combination of negative and positive understandings of freedom is the 
predecessor of the rights framework we are so familiar with today. The third key element 
of liberal individualism is the commitment to equality; this is not a belief in economic 
equality, but that all individuals are equal in their basic worth, and as a result are entitled 
to equal concern for their interests in the design and operation of their social institutions.  
A fourth element of liberal individualism involves an insistence on the rights of 
individual reason – that rules and institutions of social life must be justified by each 
individual’s reason. The legacy of the Enlightenment can be found in the importance 
liberalism gives to reason, believing in the ability of man to understand both nature and 
human nature through his own reason. “The Enlightenment was characterized by a 
burgeoning confidence in the human ability to make sense of the world, to grasp its 
regularities and fundamental principles and to manipulate its powers for the benefit of 
mankind” (Waldron 1987: 134). Philosophers trace liberal normative attitudes toward 
social and political justification to the legacy of the Enlightenment, which encouraged 
men and women to believe that they held the key to understanding the world around 
them; this leads to an impatience with justifying social and political institutions with 
“tradition, mystery, awe and superstition” as the basis of order (Waldron 1987: 134).  
John Rawls revisited liberal theory in his 1972 A Theory of Justice, which 
emphasized the idea of equality and thus the importance of justice, even more than 
liberty, to the theory of liberalism. He uses Kant’s understanding of human autonomy and 
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features the concept of a set of basic non-overridable rights within his concept of justice; 
scholars of liberalism agree “Rawl’s theory of liberalism put the issue of rights back on 
the agenda and was constructed in individual terms” (Avineri and DeShalit 1992:1). This 
understanding of human rights as essential to liberalism was articulated after the creation 
of the UN and the acceptance of the UN Charter, but reflects that institution’s emphasis 
on the individual, freedom and equality. The application of liberal individualism’s 
elements to a human rights framework in the international sphere can be traced back to 
the desperate search for peace in the international sphere, and the belief by many who 
were instrumental in creating the UN that one of the factors leading to World War II was 
the failure of states to recognize and respect the human rights of their citizens (Campbell 
2006).  
2.3.2 World-Polity Theory and liberal and rational norms 
World-polity theory, especially in the work of John Boli and George Thomas, 
describes the culture that permeates world society, including international organizations 
such as the UN, in terms of liberal and rational norms. These norms include universalism, 
individualism, rational-voluntaristic authority, human purposes of rationalizing progress, 
and world citizenship. Individualism, rational-voluntaristic authority, and human 
purposes of rationalizing progress are especially important for my purposes, as they 
reflect the liberal norms discussed earlier.  
Universalism describes the understanding that human nature, agency, and purpose 
are universal: “Humans everywhere have similar needs and desires, can act in accordance 
with common principles of authority and action, and share common goals” (Boli and 
Thomas 1997). Individuals are accepted as the true or real members of most international 
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non-governmental organizations (INGOs), with states represented by individuals at 
international governmental organizations (IGOs). Individualism also affects the structure 
of such organizations, in that each individual needs to be represented in any group 
decision; as a result, democratic procedures are generally considered to be the only way 
to make fair decisions (Boli and Thomas 1997). 
Rational-voluntaristic authority is the informal authority of many organizations in 
the international sphere, especially NGOs because they do not have legal authority or 
dominance in any conventional sense. Thus rational voluntaristic authority is that which 
invests organizations in which individuals act collectively through rational procedures. It 
has its basis, as mentioned before, in freely exercised reason, where “fundamentally equal 
individuals reach collective decisions through rational deliberations which are open to 
all” (Boli and Thomas 1999: 273). Individuals are the key: they are free to choose, be and 
do as they will, and “If there is to be collective authority, it must be built up from the 
authority that inheres in free, self-directed individuals, with due recognition of the basic 
equality that reigns among sovereign individuals” (Boli and Thomas 1999: 274). Thus, 
rational-voluntaristic authority finds its legitimacy in liberal norms, especially the 
emphasis on the freedom, equality and reason of the individual. Most IGOs are also 
invested with rational-voluntaristic authority: sovereign states do not have power over 
each other, and no world government exists, so collective action by states can only 
proceed by rational voluntarism. Because each individual is equally important, rational-
voluntaristic authority also encourages democratic procedures, and refers to the legal-
bureaucratic authority of states to enforce these democratic decisions.  
World culture approves a very specific modus operandi for achieving goals: 
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progress through science and reason. A specific purpose, formalized structure, and 
attention to procedures, are the rational methods by which most organizations achieve 
their goals, and these are evident in both IGOs and INGOs. Those INGOs that are 
engaged in technical fields have very clearly rationalized activities; those INGOs that do 
not engage in technical fields define themselves by their rationalized activities and their 
commitment to science and reason.  
…almost all other INGOs rely on science, expertise, and professionalization in their operations 
and programs. …The scientific method, technique, monetarization, logical analysis-these are the 
favored modi operandi. These instruments of progress may often be criticized, but they are built 
into worldwide institutions and the ideology of development. (Boli and Thomas 1997: 181)  
 
Even when many of these organizations direct themselves towards irrational or 
nonrational aims, such as organizations that have altruistic aims, desire revolution, 
believe in the existence of UFOs, or the importance of transcendental meditation, they are 
channeled into rationalized activities and forms, such as organizing a non-governmental 
organization, holding meetings, electing officers, and producing research and newsletters 
(Boli and Thomas 1997: 182). 
All these characteristics of world culture inhere in the principle of world 
citizenship: all human beings are individuals with certain human rights and subject to 
certain obligations, and “everyone is capable of voluntaristic actions that seek rational 
solutions to social problems, therefore, everyone is a citizen of the world polity” (Boli 
and Thomas 1997: 182). Boli and Thomas go on to note that world citizenship is 
prominently featured in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; however in the 
absence of a world state, the Declaration puts the burden of enforcing world citizenship, 




 World culture did not always consist of these norms; in fact, Boli and Thomas 
detail three different stages of world culture, during which different norms prevailed, 
beginning prior to World War I, the interwar period, and after World War II. After World 
War II, when individual choice became the normal discourse, international NGOs 
focusing on labor, family, religion, and distinctive cultural identities declined and 
constitute the smallest percentage of INGOs. Boli and Thomas argue that “the 
individualism of world culture works against collectivist forms of transnational 
organizing” and that individualism has become stronger now than in the early part of the 
century (1997: 184). They use the issue of population to demonstrate the different types 
of discourse that were acceptable during the three periods, arguing that the focus on 
individual reproductive rights came about after World War II in accordance with the 
victory of liberal nations who then began to concentrate on the international sphere in the 
form of the UN. Although I agree that individual choice became very important after 
World War II, I think that Boli and Thomas oversimplify the issue by characterizing the 
entire period after World War II as the time when individual reproductive choice became 
acceptable; they do not tell us how that change came about. They miss the importance of 
the interaction of NGOs concerned with advocating individual reproductive choice and 
the inertia of the UN in enacting individual reproductive choice in its language and 
programs. Although the period after World War II was greatly influenced by the liberal 
norms of individualism, the rights framework that ultimately allowed reproductive choice 
to become the dominant paradigm of population discourse did not permeate the UN’s 
more scientific focus on population until the late nineties, when feminist organizations 
advocated strongly for it.  
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2.3.3 How UN practices reflect liberal and rational norms 
Liberal individualism, as described above, is reflected in several key practices of 
world culture that grew in importance at the UN, and especially the UN global 
conferences dealing with social issues: the importance of the individual led over time 
from majority-rule voting procedures at UN global conferences to the practice of 
consensus decision-making; the importance of freedom and equality of each individual 
leads to the embeddedness of rights within the UN; and the importance of reason 
corresponds to the UN emphasizing progress through science and reason as the rationale 
for policies.   
2.3.3.1 Consensus Decision-Making 
The importance of the individual is reflected in many different ways in the 
international sphere, but at the global UN conferences, one of the key practices it is 
reflected in is the norm of consensus decision-making.  
There is agreement among scholars who study the decision-making process at the 
UN that there has been a gradual shift from majority voting to toward the use of 
consensus procedures in all the major bodies of the UN (Smith 1999, Kaufmann 1994, 
Marin-Bosch 1987). At the UN as a whole, majority-voting strategies were used by 
developing countries prior to and during the 1970s in order to make headway concerning 
economic concessions they wanted to force on developed countries (Kaufmann 1980). 
However, consensus decision-making became more the norm as developing countries 
grew more diverse in their opinions and could no longer count on a voting bloc, but also 
as they began to realize that forcing decisions on developed countries did not further their 
cause in the long term (Smith 2004: 10). Even powerful countries with minority 
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positions, such as the U.S., are much more successful at the UN when they spend time 
engaging many other countries to support their position and lobbying delegations rather 
than engaging in heavy-handed techniques of withholding funds or insisting on certain 
resolutions (Smith 2004: 14). These strategies are the forerunners of coalition building, 
which allows actors to be successful in consensus decision-making. The end of the Cold 
War made consensus decision-making even more of a prevalent norm in the 1990s, 
affecting, arguably, even the Security Council, where vetoes were cast much less often 
(Luck 2003: 13); seventy-six percent of General Assembly resolutions and eighty-six 
percent of Security Council resolutions were adopted by consensus in 2000 (Fasulo 2004: 
146).  
Intergovernmental UN global conferences especially depend on rational-
voluntaristic authority; as a result, democratic procedures for making decisions are 
considered especially important, whether for particular language negotiations or the 
approval of the final Program of Action. Earlier UN global conferences still saw the 
practice of voting on measures, with majority rule winning the day. However, as 
conferences became intergovernmental and the UN sought to include the civil society that 
worked on these social issues on a global and local scale, consensus decision-making 
became more and more the norm (Singh 1998). Majority rule is a democratic procedure, 
but consensus-decision making allows the minority a say in the final product, and I 
believe that as the UN global conferences continued to be held through the 1990s, the 
importance of the individual as represented in each government delegation grew to the 
point where simple majority rule became unacceptable.  
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Consensus, as opposed to voting, provides more say for the minority, but also 
provides for the possibility of compromise between positions rather than supporting false 
dichotomies, and ensures the commitment of all members to the consensus position. “The 
fact that the U.N. can only make recommendations to governments, and that these 
recommendations will carry maximum weight if adopted unanimously, constitutes a 
powerful force toward the negotiation of compromise solutions acceptable to everybody” 
(Kaufmann 1980: 16). In fact, even though delegations did vote on certain measures 
during the intergovernmental conferences, the very structure of UN global 
intergovernmental conferences encouraged consensus decision-making: preparatory 
committees met to decide on the agenda and the main text of the Program of Action, 
regional meetings were held to gather information and discuss concerns from all parts of 
the world, special issue meetings were also held that involved experts on the topics, and 
the draft Program of Action was revised accordingly. Any unresolved issues were placed 
in brackets until the actual conference, where negotiations to resolve differences went on 
into the night, and until delegations could agree on the language, or agree with 
reservations (Schechter 2005). Most Programs of Action were approved by most 
delegations, although most also had reservations from individual countries. However, the 
preparatory process was designed specifically to mobilize support from national 
delegations on the themes and issues of the conference, to prevent serious conflict, given 
“the tradition of consensus decision-making at UN global conferences whereby any 
single delegation might block an agreement or an aspect of a program of action that all of 
the other delegates support” (Schechter 2005: 10). The shift towards consensus decision 
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making plays an important part in how social movements and networks of NGOs attempt 
to influence debate and final consensus documents of UN global conferences.  
2.3.3.2 Politics of Rights 
The UN Charter and the UN Declaration of Human Rights are two key documents 
that reflect the liberal foundations on which the international organization was created, 
and especially the underpinnings of the human rights framework that has been the basis 
of many social movements’ frames. The concept of human rights – the definition of 
human rights as social and economic as well as civil and political – has been greatly 
contested by many different nations, and it has been quite a struggle to have states sign 
onto the covenants that have the legal authority of international treaties. Even in the 
1990s, many developing countries argued that they subscribed to relative and cultural 
understandings of human rights that should be taken into account when discussing human 
rights. It is not my intention to brush aside these disputes over human rights at the UN, 
but to incorporate them into a larger observation: human rights has become an important 
touchstone within the UN, a concept so well accepted as being worthy of action that 
nearly every nation with any misdeeds on its conscience argues over the definition of 
human rights or the enforcement of them by the UN.  
Many different histories of the UN make note of the major ideas that emerged 
from the 1945 conference that created the United Nations: peace, independence and the 
sovereignty of nations, development, and human rights (Shaw 2005: 3).  
The new spirit fostered in opposition to the flagrant disregard for human rights during the war also 
helped reify liberal notions of individualism and national development in the world polity. This 
liberal model was codified in normative international agreements such as the UN Charter and the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. World society valued the sovereignty and development 




 The League of Nations, in contrast, did not deal with human rights, reflecting the 
current understanding that human rights were the concern of individual states. However, 
the League of Nations did begin important work in the international sphere concerning 
human rights issues, including the areas of trafficking in women and children, narcotics, 
slavery, and forced labor. This work was downplayed in the history of the League, but it 
is among the most remembered of its accomplishments (Green 1956:10).   
World War II marked a distinct increase in international concern for human 
rights. Although they were well established as an issue of national concern in Western 
nations, the brutal violence and banal efficiency of the Nazis in Germany and the Fascists 
in Italy shocked policy makers and publics throughout the world (Green 1956: 13). The 
Dumbarton Proposal for the United Nations had only one sentence in it concerning 
human rights, which stressed its importance for peace: “With a view to the creation of 
conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly 
relations among nations, the Organization should facilitate solutions of international 
economic, social, and other humanitarian propositions and promote respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms” (Chapter IX, Sec. A (1)). The four sponsoring powers 
introduced amendments to specifically promote human rights and fundamental freedoms 
in San Francisco. The U.S. delegation consulted with forty-two American NGOs before 
agreeing to propose a specific reference to the creation of a commission on human rights 
under the Economic and Social Council. Many Latin American countries also pushed for 
further recognition of human rights in the UN Charter (Keck and Sikkink 1998).  
As a result, there were seven specific references to human rights incorporated in 
the Charter of the UN: in the Preamble, delegates agreed to “reaffirm faith in 
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fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal 
rights of men and women, and of nations large and small…” The second mention is in 
Article 1, which states that one of the purposes of the United Nations is to achieve 
international cooperation “in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion…” 
Article 13 states that the General Assembly will initiate studies and make 
recommendations for the purpose of “assisting in the realization of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.” 
Article 55 states that the United Nations will promote “universal respect for, and 
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to 
race, sex, language or religion,” and closely related, Article 56, “All Members pledge 
themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the 
achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.” The Economic and Social Council 
specifically is given the power in Article 62 to “make recommendations for the purpose 
of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for 
all.”  Article 68 provides for the Commission on Human Rights, among others: “The 
Economic and Social Council shall set up commissions in economic and social fields and 
for the promotion of human rights, and such other commissions as may be required for 
the performance of its functions.” And lastly, Article 76 of the Charter sets forth as one of 
the basic goals of the trusteeship system: “to encourage respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, 
and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world.” 
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The interpretation of these references to human rights and freedoms in the Charter 
of the UN is made more complicated by the fact that the phrase “human rights and 
fundamental freedoms” was not defined – thus, countries may understand the phrase to 
mean both individual and group rights (Green 1956: 18). Also left undefined was the role 
of the UN in positively guaranteeing rights; the words used in the charter were in the vein 
of encouraging and promoting rights rather than protecting or guaranteeing rights. 
Another complicating factor is the inclusion in the Charter of an article (2) specifically 
guaranteeing that the UN should not interfere with the sovereignty of a state by 
intervening in matters that are within its domestic jurisdiction. However, the United 
Nations also defined human rights for its members and the whole world in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. 
The drafting of an International Bill of Rights was moved from the General 
Assembly to the Economic and Social Council, which then recommended that the 
Commission of Human Rights, consisting of eighteen members, should draft such a 
document. The Commission appointed a drafting committee, which at its second session 
at the end of 1947 considered three proposals: a draft declaration, a draft convention, and 
measures for implementing human rights (Green 1956: 25). The United States supported 
a declaration with goals and aspirations rather than a binding legal convention, which 
would then need Senate approval; it also supported a declaration because most nations 
would probably support a declaration, which would demonstrate the consensus of the 
international community on the importance of human rights. The United Kingdom 
supported a convention on human rights that would be binding on the governments that 
ratified it, believing that such a convention would be more useful to those members who 
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accepted it than a general declaration of goals concerning human rights. While the 
drafting committee considered both a declaration and a convention, it gradually moved 
toward a declaration. The text of that declaration was completed by the Commission on 
Human Rights in June 1948, revised painstakingly, and accepted by the General 
Assembly on December 10, 1948, by a vote of 48 to 0, with eight abstentions of countries 
that objected to certain portions of the Declaration but did not want to cast a negative 
vote (Green 1956: 29). The focus on human rights was justified for many in the newly 
formed United Nations by considerations of how best to achieve peace in the 
international sphere. This sentiment is exemplified in an often-quoted statement by then 
United States Secretary of State Marshall:  
Systematic and deliberate denials of basic human rights lie at the root of most our troubles and 
threaten the work of the United Nations. …Governments which systematically disregard the rights 
of their own people are not likely to respect the rights of other nations and other people and are 
likely to seek their objectives by coercion and force in the international field. (U.S. Department of 
State 1948) 
 
The text of the Universal Declaration recognizes civil, political, economic, social 
and cultural rights, as well as the duties of the individual. Several countries objected to 
civil rights; the Soviet Union wanted to amend the rights to assemble, the right to perform 
religious services, and the right to freedom of speech; Saudi Arabia abstained on the final 
vote because of the clause guaranteeing the right to change one’s religion or belief. In 
addition, several countries, including South Africa, abstained based on the rationale that 
the Declaration would have some force on individual countries because the General 
Assembly voted on it and accepted it, even though the Declaration was specifically not a 
legally binding document. These are emblematic of the future disagreements many 
countries would have on the concept of and the enforcement of human rights. However, 
the fact that the Declaration was adopted without a dissenting vote was an important 
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event in history, and it has become “as it was intended to be, a yardstick for measuring 
the progress of governments and peoples toward the full respect for human freedom” 
(Green 1956: 35).    
Some scholars would argue that human rights has become the only acceptable 
way to express claims and resistance. “In this new sensibility, the idea of human rights 
has emerged as the language of progressive politics and resistance in the Third World… 
No other discourse, except perhaps anti-colonial nationalism, has had such a stranglehold 
on both the imagination of progressive intellectuals as well as mass mobilization in the 
Third World” (Rajagopal 2003: 171). This has important implications for how social 
movements go about framing their arguments on many different issues at the UN; we can 
see these effects especially in the framing changes of the abortion-rights and anti-abortion 
movements. 
2.3.3.3 Science and Reason as Rationale for Policy Change 
One of the main functions of special UN agencies is the collection of data, the 
analysis of data, and the production of statistics and research on the many issues that 
these agencies are established to deal with. The data that the UN collects from its 
members, and then standardizes across those countries, is also a crucial resource for 
scholars around the world, adding to the scientific research practice that then again 
informs policy. The importance placed on science and scientific research as a rationale 
for policy and policy change by the UN is also reflected in the adoption of science 
bureaucracies by nations around the world as international organizations within and 
outside the UN began to emphasize science as central to development (Finnemore 1991, 
1993; Jang 2000). 
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The UN Charter establishes the Economic and Social Council as a body meant to 
undertake research and produce reports in order to promote the respect of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms for all:  
1. The Economic and Social Council may make or initiate studies and reports with 
respect to international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters 
and may make recommendations with respect to any such matters to the General 
Assembly, to the Members of the United Nations, and to the specialized agencies 
concerned. 2. It may make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, 
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. (UN Charter 1954: 
Article 62) 
 
A key UN agency that established science as an integral function of UN agencies 
is the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); one of its main 
goals is the use of the natural sciences to support the work of the United Nations and its 
specialized services (Florkin 1956). UNESCO oversees the International Center for 
Theoretical Physics and the International Institute for Education Planning. Since then, the 
UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) was established in 1966, becoming a 
specialized agency in 1985; its purpose is to help developing countries industrialize by 
mobilizing knowledge, skills, information and technology. UNIDO undertakes research 
in eight different areas that support this purpose: industrial governance and statistics, 
investment and technology, industrial competitiveness, private sector development, agro-
industry, sustainable energy and climate change, substances that deplete the ozone layer, 
and environmental management. UNIDO also oversees the International Centers on 
Science and High Technology and Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology. These are 
some examples of the UN organizations focused on science, although most agencies of 
the UN perform their functions through rational bureaucratic methods and with an 
emphasis on scientific research and data analysis, regardless of substantive goals.  
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Many of the agencies within the UN that deal with social issues also have 
research organizations associated with them. For example, the United Nations 
International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women 
(INSTRAW) was created in 1976 by ECOSOC on the recommendation of the first World 
Conference on Women, in 1975. INSTRAW’s purpose is to generate and disseminate 
research on gender that will be used in development policies, programs and projects, as 
well as to develop gendered training programs. Its strategic framework demonstrates the 
key role of research for the organization:  
UN-INSTRAW’s Strategic Framework emphasizes the importance of articulating 
research, training and information distribution in a continuous cycle of analysis, learning 
and action, so that research results feed into the distribution of information and the design 
of training and capacity-building programmes, as well as the formulation of policy. 
Through its applied research programmes, the Institute aims to make policies and 
programmes gender-responsive on the basis of concrete research results, the application 
of lessons learned, and the replication of best practices. (INSTRAW – Who we are) 
 
The Population Division is another organization with a research focus meant to 
support policy: its purpose is to prepare high-quality documentation and analytical work 
and facilitate consensus-building and policy development on population issues. It also 
supports the implementation of the ICPD Program of Action recommendations by 
“monitoring progress towards the achievement of the goals set out in the Programme of 
Action, as well as identifying, analyzing and investigating policy issues and salient global 
trends in the field of population and development” (Population Division 
http://www.un.org/esa/population/aboutpop.htm). The Commission on Population and 
Development (CPD) is one of the main organizations that reviews the work of the 
Population Division and other agencies on population and development issues; it was 
established by ECOSOC in 1946 as the Population Commission, and renamed in 1994 as 
the Commission on Population and Development. One of the CPD’s main functions is to 
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arrange for studies on population issues and trends. The CPD submitted a report in early 
1999 on progress in implementation of the ICPD Program of Action and general progress 
in the field of population, which included a section on the dissemination of information 
and research studies done by the Population Division to governments around the world 
and the public at large. In this report, a list of the publications, expert group meetings and 
other materials prepared by the Population Division is listed for the year 1998: they 
include thirteen research studies, two periodical issues, one expert group meeting, and 
seven databases. The databases especially can be noted as key to those in the 
demographic field, including the “Global Population Policy Database, 1997,” “World 
Population, 1950-2050,” “Demographic Indicators, 1950-2050,” and “Age Patterns of 
Fertility, 1995-2050” (Commission on Population and Development 1999). These are 
some examples of the many different Commissions and Committees and Funds that 
emphasize a research oriented approach to the issues tackled by the economic and social 
agencies of the UN, and produces a wealth of statistics and data for research and policy 
consideration.  
Martha Finnemore’s study (1993) on the UN as a diffuser of norms concerning 
science discusses mainly the influence of the UN on states. I would extend this argument 
to NGOs that attempt to influence the UN and states at the UN. Finnemore argues that 
although most political science explanations of the creation of science policy 
bureaucracies by states all over the world focused on the demand for such ministries by 
producers or consumers of science, in fact a quantitative study of such demand indicators 
did not correspond with the emergence of these ministries. She consequently argues 
instead that in response to a new norm articulated within the international community 
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concerning the need to coordinate and direct science, the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) influenced states to believe the value 
and utility of science policy organizations, especially for national development. Another, 
more recent study by Yong Suk Jang (2000) uses both resource-mobilization theory and 
institutional theory to analyze the same phenomenon, and finds that while resource-
mobilization, or factors internal to the state were significant in the early years of states 
creating science bureaucracies, institutional or factors external to the state, such as 
cultural rules or discourse, became increasingly significant over time.   
 I would contrast the emphasis on science and reason as the means to progress with 
a conservative point of view, which first doubts the prospects of progress in the 
Enlightenment sense, as embodied in the liberal philosophy. Conservative philosophy 
also looks to tradition and religion as guides for action. Many conservative NGOs justify 
their actions or arguments to “insider” audiences, those that already agree with them, by 
using tradition or religion; however, when addressing “outsider” audience, those they are 
trying to persuade, they will use arguments based on science and reason. Many of the 
anti-abortion organizations I am studying are based in the U.S. and began using a rights 
framework to persuade “outsider” audiences within the U.S. because such a framework 
was so accepted and easy to turn to their own arguments – thus the right to life. However, 
most of these organizations did not start to focus on developing research and statistics to 
provide evidence for their arguments until they began to scale up into the international 





3 Importance of Demographic Experts and Science: 




The early UN population conferences, held in Rome in 1954 and in Belgrade in 
1964, were strictly “expert” meetings, rather than intergovernmental meetings, to which 
population experts and demographers from all over the world were invited to discuss 
population trends and scientific evidence in the field. As a result, the international 
discussion on population issues was dominated by demographers and the influence of 
scientific evidence and quantitative results. The first intergovernmental conference, held 
in 1974 in Bucharest, marked the beginning of political challenges to the expert point of 
view; however, the UN agency responsible for the global conference on population, the 
Population Commission, preferred to keep these conferences limited to scientific experts 
rather than political representatives lest the usefulness of the conference be derailed. The 
U.S.  representative to the UN Population Council, William H. Draper, Jr., persuaded 
both the U.S.  and the Population Commission to recommend the convening of an 
intergovernmental conference rather than another “conference of demographers and 
experts along the lines of the Rome and Belgrade conferences” (Singh 1998: 4). As I will 
discuss in greater detail in this chapter, the preference for an expert conference was not 
only because UN officials were aware of the differences in political opinion concerning 
population issues, but because the UN in addition to most Western industrialized 
countries put great store in scientific and expert opinion.  
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The increasingly alarmist literature published by demographers in the U.S.  in the 
late 1960s (Paddock and Paddock 1967, Erhlich 1968) pushed the U.S.  government to 
consider population growth as a security threat and worthy of millions of dollars in 
foreign aid. As I will show, the political challenges raised at the Bucharest conference 
marked the opening for other types of challenges to the predominant demographic view 
on population growth, including the feminist health and rights movement as well as the 
anti-abortion movement. However, the importance that the UN and Western developed 
countries place on scientific, expert information continued to influence those who would 
challenge the prevalent point of view, and thus both feminists and anti-abortion activists 
would in the future use scientific research to support their points of view.  
 These early conferences also reveal much about the history of the family planning 
programs and the movement to reduce population growth; Rome (1954) and Belgrade 
(1964) bracket the period of time in which the U.S. was very reluctant to become 
involved in family planning, and the complete turnaround in U.S.  policy to actively 
supporting and promoting family planning programs. Bucharest marks the greater 
involvement of developing countries in the international discussion on population and 
development. 
3.2 1954 Rome Conference and 1964 Belgrade Conference: 
Expert Meetings 
 
The Population Division of the UN, along with the International Union for the 
Scientific Study of Population, organized the Rome Population conference, held from 
August 31st – September 10th, 1954, and the Belgrade Population Conference, held from 
August 30th – September 10th, 1965. These conferences were “designed as scientific 
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meetings of individual experts (drawn mostly from among the community of 
demographers),” and as a result, these conferences did not produce any negotiated 
resolutions or recommendations on population issues (Singh 1998: 2). In both 
conferences, the sessions reflected the concerns of the individual experts that organized 
them. The organizers of the conferences specified that it should be a meeting of experts in 
demography and related disciplines, and not a meeting of representatives of governments. 
Thus, the participants would not pass resolutions or make recommendations, but the 
conference would be a “forum for exchange of ideas and information which could 
contribute to a better understanding of the interrelationships of population trends and 
economic and social factors and stimulate further scientific research on these subjects” 
(Adams 1965: 436). In fact, observers believed that the success of these conferences 
depended on keeping the conference scientific rather than political, with participants 
invited in their personal capacities as experts rather than representatives of governments 
or organizations (Notestein 1954: 242). Although these demographic discussions had 
clear political implications, the UN agencies responsible for these early conferences 
believed they would be better served by limiting them to expert rather than political 
conferences. As a result, demographic experts influenced the majority of the international 
understanding of population issues at this time. Although demographers were regarded as 
experts in their field, their claims concerning the threat of over-population were disputed 
by other groups who did not have the legitimacy of scientific authority. As will be later 
discussed in this paper, developing country governments and communist regimes, among 
other groups, disagreed with the view held by many demographers at this time that 
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population increases would be unsustainable, and that these increases also interfered with 
the ability of countries to develop properly.  
In Rome, about 400 participants from over 80 countries and territories presented 
more than 400 technical papers for discussion in 30 working sessions. The Preparatory 
Committee appointed individuals to organize the different sessions, each dealing with a 
specific topic. Proposals made by the organizers were then reviewed by the Preparatory 
Committee, and then transmitted to the Secretary-General of the Conference (the director 
of the Population Division). The Secretary-General then issued the invitations to prepare 
papers and participate in the panel discussions of the meetings, and also gave access to 
the floor of the conference to representatives of governments, interested specialized 
agencies, and non-governmental scientific agencies. This was also true of the Belgrade 
conference, and demonstrates how carefully the UN controlled participation in these 
population conferences, although the proceedings were open to the public.   
The second World Population Conference in Belgrade saw a substantial increase 
of interest in population issues all over the world, with a doubling of participants in the 
conference. More than 800 people attended the Belgrade conference, from nearly 90 
countries; observers report that organizers made special efforts to encourage experts from 
developing regions to attend this second conference, and as a result, a higher proportion 
of the participants came from Africa, Asia, and Latin America in comparison to the Rome 
conference. By the 1960s, demographers were sounding the alarm about population 
growth, but it would be 1968 before the Ehrlich’s Population Bomb would be published 
and at that time the U.S. began to financially and rhetorically promote family planning 
programs all over the world. 
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The World Population Conference in Rome (1954) was held at the request of the 
Economic and Social Council; although previous international conferences on population 
had been held (for example, three sponsored by the Union for the Scientific Study of 
Population in London (1931), Berlin (1935), and Paris (1937)), these were on a much 
smaller scale. The 1954 Rome conference was the first international conference to 
include the participation of experts from nearly every part of the world, the exception 
being mainland China. This was especially important because very little demographic 
information was released from the USSR at the time, and so the information presented by 
experts from that region was of great interest to the other participants; however, there was 
no way to verify any of the information, which revealed a birth and death rate very close 
to that of the United States (Notestein 1954). The inclusion of so many participants from 
different parts of the world was mainly due to the contribution of funds from several 
different sources, including private foundations such as the Carnegie, Ford, and 
Rockefeller Foundations, which contributed nearly as much as, or more than, some 
governments (Notestein 1954: 242). The World Population Conference in Rome was thus 
supported quite widely by several of the largest foundations in the U.S., reflecting the 
growing interest in population issues among private institutions and individuals (Green 
1993: 305), although the U.S. government was at the time opposed to being involved in 
family planning within the U.S. , much less in the developing world (Eager 2004). In 
1959, President Eisenhower stated “Birth control is not our business… I cannot imagine 
anything more emphatically that is not a proper political or governmental activity or 
function of responsibility” (Green 1993: 303). However, even before 1960, the State 
Department became interested in population issues, further advanced by the Kennedy 
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Administration when Secretary of State Dean Rusk named Robert Barnett as Special 
Assistant to the Secretary for Population (Green 1993: 305).  
In the U.S., the rapid increase of interest in population growth as a problem to be 
solved can be attributed to the quite serious attention paid to the issue by private 
foundations and individuals, and in turn by U.S. government officials, spurred by 
publications by demographers. In 1952, delegates from 14 countries attending the World 
Conference on Planned Parenthood in Bombay founded the International Planned 
Parenthood Federation as the umbrella organization of private family planning 
associations all over the world. At the same time, John D. Rockefeller III established the 
Population Council, separate from his own foundation, dedicated to understanding 
population problems. The Ford Foundation also began supporting population issues by 
granting money to the Population Reference Bureau in 1952, but did not support 
population activities in developing countries until 1959. The Rockefeller Foundation 
formed its own population program in 1963, delayed by its unease over the issue of 
promoting birth control. These NGOs and foundations were the main source of financial 
resources for population programs until governments became more involved in the mid to 
late sixties.  
In the mid-60s, food shortages in developing countries such as India, a result of 
the lack of monsoon rains, highlighted the population problems of developing countries. 
This unprecedented opportunity for statisticians to document a ‘genuine Malthusian 
Crisis’ helped to elevate the population problem on the American political agenda 
(Schindlmayr 2004: 38). President Johnson in 1965 promised to seek new ways to deal 
with the “explosion in world population and the growing scarcity of world resources” 
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(Donaldson 1990: 38), and Senator Ernest Gruening held hearings on every aspect of 
population growth and family planning from 1965 to early 1968. These hearings “created 
a new climate of opinion in Washington about birth control, defined a new issue for 
government responsibility, and set the stage for other actions in Congressional 
committees that had more direct jurisdiction in matters involved in the subject” (Green 
1993: 306). 
Shortly thereafter, demographers Paddock and Paddock published a book called 
Famine – 1975!, arguing that population growth and inadequate food production would 
lead to massive famines, which, in turn, would lead to civil unrest in developing countries 
beginning in 1975.  Such publications gave many in Congress the opportunity and 
ammunition to advocate for serious governmental intervention on behalf of population 
programs. Although USAID continued to be reluctant to undertake population assistance, 
Congress continued to apply pressure and earmark funds for population assistance in the 
foreign aid budget (Piotrow 1973: 127). A change of attitude in USAID can be marked in 
September 1967, when the agency issued the following directive: “The desired action 
[population programs] must be undertaken soon enough and on a broad scale to prevent a 
food-and-population disaster of sweeping proportions” (USAID 1968:11).  
The U.S.  government at this time began to see population growth in developing 
countries as a security threat, as evidenced by the National Security Study Memorandum 
200 (NSSM 200), a conception of population issues that continued to be prevalent until 
the Reagan administration (Green 1993: 310). Just prior to the Bucharest Conference in 
1974, President Nixon directed the National Security Council to study how world 
population growth would affect U.S. security interests over the next 25 years. President 
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Nixon specifically desired the study to address the following concerns: the corresponding 
pace of development in poorer countries, the demand for U.S. exports, especially for 
food; potential trade problems facing the U.S. due to competition for scarce resources; 
and the likelihood that unchecked world population growth would disrupt foreign policies 
and international stability (Eager 2004: 72). The memo specifically also stated that 
population policy is connected to the dignity of the individual, and that the U.S. should 
strive to work closely with others rather than impose its own view (Eager 2004: 72), 
indicating that the National Security Council was aware of the negative implications of 
recommending population control policies for the developing world. However, the 
majority of the memo dealt with just such policies. The executive summary of NSSM 200 
estimates that the world population will reach 6.4 billion in the year 2000, and that the 
majority of the increase in population will occur in the developing world; the major 
security concern as a result involved instability in the developing world, and a rejection 
of U.S. foreign policy. The causes of instability as a result of population growth included 
high percentages of young people, slow improvement in the standard of living, urban 
concentration, and pressures for foreign migration to more affluent regions. Rapid 
population growth was also implicated as a major deterrent to development, which would 
then widen the gap between rich and poor. NSSM 200 lists “increasing levels of child 
abandonment, food riots, juvenile delinquency, separatist movements, communal 
massacres, revolutionary actions and counterrevolutionary coups” as further undesirable 
effects of the lack of development and widening income gap. This document 
demonstrates not only the complete turnaround of the U.S.  government on the subject of 
family planning and population issues, but one of the key reasons used to justify such a 
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turnaround: the security of the U.S. and the world, both in terms of decreasing resources 
in the face of larger populations, and the political unrest that could result from young, 
dissatisfied populations in developing countries.  
In the early 1970s, there was a great sense of urgency concerning population 
growth, both for Western governments and international agencies, such as the World 
Bank. In 1970, the World Bank gave its first population loan to expand maternity 
facilities in Jamaica. Norwegian and Swedish government officials devoted 9-10% of all 
development assistance to population activities (Salas 1976), and Canada, Denmark, 
Japan, the Netherlands, and West Germany began providing assistance for population 
programs (Schindlmayr 2004: 40). The creation of the UNFPA as a multilateral agency 
through which donors could channel funds greatly increased the amount of assistance 
Western governments could dedicate to population programs without “being accused of 
conspiring with imperialist ambitions” (Schindlmayr 2004: 40). Such accusations would 
play an important role in the first intergovernmental population conference held by the 
UN, the 1974 Bucharest conference.  
The United Nations Population Fund, a key player in the future of population 
policy, began as the UN Fund for Population Activities in 1969, under the administration 
of the UN Development Program (UNDP). The impetus for the creation of the UNFPA 
came from both the UN General Assembly and the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, U Thant. In 1966, the General Assembly called on all UN agencies to draw up 
plans for assistance in the population field in training, research, information, and advisory 
services; in 1967, Secretary-General U Thant proposed an action program and fund that 
led to the establishment of the UN Trust Fund for Population Activities, which became 
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the UN Fund for Population Activities in 1969 (Caldwell et al. 2002). Just prior to the 
Bucharest conference in 1974, the increased interest in population policy and funds 
directed toward population assistance caused the original mandate of the UNFPA to be 
augmented: to be active in population planning and programming activities; promoting 
awareness of the implications of population growth on social and economic development, 
the environment and human rights; to provide assistance at the request of states in 
population and family planning activities; and to promote and coordinate these activities 
within the UN (Ridell 2000).  
3.3 1974 Bucharest Conference: the first intergovernmental 
conference 
 
The UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) adopted a resolution in 1970 
declaring the need for a world population conference to consider basic demographic 
problems, their relationship with economic and social development, and population 
policies and action programs needed to promote welfare and development (Johnson 1987: 
80). The U.S.  and other Western governments mainly pushed for this global conference 
to be an intergovernmental conference in order to involve government officials from all 
countries, developing countries in particular, and thus ensure some level of political 
commitment to population programs, which the expert conferences of earlier decades had 
been unable to accomplish (Singh 1998, Finkle and McIntosh 2002). However, the U.S.  
and other Western governments did not anticipate the serious objections that developing 
countries would raise to the draft World Population Plan of Action: developing countries 
were determined to make the point that development, not population control, was their 
overriding objective, and that they would not allow developed countries to infringe on 
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their national sovereignty, in many cases newly won (Finkle and McIntosh 2002). These 
challenges to the Western understanding of population issues came as a surprise to the 
organizers of the conference and to most developed countries; the industrialized nations 
along with the relevant agencies of the UN that most strongly supported population 
programs believed that they were simply consolidating a “nearly complete consensus” on 
the dangers of rapid population growth (Eager 2004: 65). This was a result of the 
paramount importance given to population experts, demographers, at the early World 
Population Conferences, and the limitation of international discussion on these issues to 
scientific experts on population. Demographers from developing countries were being 
trained at Western institutions on Western grants, and agreed that population growth was 
a serious detriment to development.2  
Although population issues had been pushed to include development as an 
integral component, and developing countries resisted the U.S.’s urging of concrete 
targets and time periods for fertility rates, the conference adopted a clearly defined goal 
concerning reducing mortality levels, especially infant and maternal mortality 
(Recommendation 22), and acknowledged the intimate relationship of education, health 
and development in reducing fertility (Recommendation 18). “In spite of the real 
disagreements on substance which existed, the Plan adopted at Bucharest was important 
in that it set the framework for national action and for international assistance in the field 
of population” (Johnson 1995: 19).  
 
                                                
2 Since the USAID population assistance program began in 1965 until at least 1978, bilateral agreements 
and contracts provided for 400 to 500 participants to study in research institutions and demography centers 
(Eager 2004: 78). 
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 Four symposia and five regional conferences were held to prepare for the 
Bucharest conference. Three of the symposia were held in 1973, one year prior to the 
conference, on the subjects of population and development, population and the family, 
and resources and the environment (Johnson 1987: 86). The fourth symposium, on the 
subject of population and human rights, was held in 1974. The symposia reflect a 
significant range of topics considered in relation to population prior to this first 
intergovernmental conference, most experts on the conferences note that the majority of 
the preparations for the conference did not involve the political elements of the UN or the 
member governments (Finkle and Crane 1975: 94). The Population Division, composed 
mainly of demographic experts, was responsible for the draft World Population Plan of 
Action (Joseph Chamie Interview 2006).  
 The regional conferences were meant to allow countries in each region to examine 
the Draft World Population Plan of Action (WPPA) and voice their concerns in order to 
prevent significant political and substantive objections at the global conference. Very few 
countries raised objections at the regional conferences and as a result, the conference 
Secretariat believed that few divisive issues would arise in Bucharest. However, during 
the Bucharest conference, four very different positions emerged on population (Singh 
1998: 8-9). Asian and European countries, as well as the U.S., argued that rapid 
population growth intensified problems of economic and social development and required 
urgent attention. On the other side, many Latin American and African countries 
expressed the view that population growth was not an important variable in development. 
Another group of countries argued that population growth was, contrary to the view being 
popularized at the time, desirable – to defend the country (China), to fill empty land 
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(Brazil), or to stimulate the economy (France). A fourth group of countries, mainly the 
USSR and countries in the Soviet bloc, blamed the problems of development on the 
biased world economic system, which favored developed countries. This fourth group of 
countries supported overall development goals and the New Economic International 
Order (NIEO), with no need for specific population policies. Romania, the host of the 
conference, was part of this group. The Working Group responsible for negotiating the 
compromise text put together a fragile agreement, although many delegations recorded 
their reservations, especially on the subject of the NIEO (Singh 1998: 9). This 
compromise involved considering family planning programs and developmental aid 
together, rather than presenting developing countries with population programs as an 
alternative to development. 
 Several key agreements were made at Bucharest that influenced population policy 
for the following decade, especially in developing countries (Singh 1998: 10-11). The 
first is that population and development have a close and mutually reinforcing 
relationship, not necessarily in one direction or another; however, most countries agreed 
that population programs should be part of comprehensive social and economic plans 
(Recommendation 95, WPPA, 1974). A second agreement that helped seal the 
compromise involved the principle of sovereign decision on the formulation and 
implementation of population policies (Paragraph 14). Given the different national 
positions on the population issue, and the sensitivity of developing countries to what 
seemed like a violation of their sovereignty by developed countries in the funding of a 
plan to reduce population growth in developing countries, these recommendations made 
the point that it was up to each individual country to make decisions concerning their 
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population programs. The third agreement was one on human rights; one of the 
recommendations asked countries to consider population policies and programs “within 
the framework of socio-economic development, which are consistent with basic human 
rights and national goals and values” (Recommendation 17). The WPPA also adopted 
nearly wholesale the language from the International Conference on Human Rights in 
Tehran that recognized the basic right of parents to “decide freely and responsibly the 
number and spacing of their children and to have the information, education and means to 
do so.” However, the Bucharest Conference made one significant change, substituting 
“couples and individuals” for “parents” (Paragraph 14). Although several attempts have 
been made at following conferences to “alter it or water it down,” this wording has 
remained (Singh 1998: 11).  
 One of the reasons cited by Finkle and Crane (1975) as to why the regional 
conferences failed to give a true picture of the objections that many developing countries 
would have to the WPPA is that the participants at the regional meetings were not as high 
ranking as those who represented their governments at Bucharest. “Although they were 
official governmental representatives, they were likely part of the population community 
and were thus more inclined to compromise and develop a consensus on the content of 
the Draft WPPA” (Finkle and Crane 1975: 96). Jyoti Singh, at the time an NGO Liaison 
Officer with UNFPA, also tries to answer this puzzle by noting that the preparatory 
activities were divided into separate sectors, and that the technical and regional events 
were “mostly attended by technical and professional participants and focused on 
demographic issues” (Singh 1998: 7-8). Many years later, Finkle and McIntosh note that 
population experts and family planning experts played a dominant role in preparing for 
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the Bucharest conference, and that the preparatory process for the Bucharest conference 
was fairly closed to “nonscientific influence” (Finkle and McIntosh 2002: 14).  
 Demographers established “a distinct and academically recognized independent 
discipline” (Demeny 1988: 477) through the 20th century, and an intellectual community 
that emphasized empirical research. There has been some difficulty for demographers 
themselves to define their field because of their strict emphasis on scientific research and 
statistics, and the acknowledgement of the social sciences applications that have come 
with the politicization of population change. Some define it as a field because it contains 
its own body of interrelated concepts, techniques, journals, and professional associations 
(Stycos 1987). Early demographic journals did exist prior to World War II, such as 
Population, published by the International Population Union, and Population Literature, 
now called Population Index, produced by Princeton’s Office of Population Research. 
However, Population Studies, first published in 1947, “virtually had the field to itself, 
and this continued to be the case for 16 critical years that moulded [sic] the nature of 
modern demography, until Demography joined it in 1963, and for another eleven years 
until Population and Development Review started publication in 1974” (Caldwell 1996: 
314). David Glass and E. Grebenik edited the Population Studies journal for decades, and 
as a result shaped the field of demography greatly. Caldwell in his review of the field 
determines that the journal began modestly in its social science applications of 
demography, with 41 per cent of the articles covering social science areas of 
demography; however, that percentage grew in each subsequent decade until social 
science articles made up about 76 percent of the articles in 1990s. Caldwell 
characteristically remarks that Population Studies should be considered to a great extent a 
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social science journal, “albeit one that leaves its own imprint on the social scientists who 
write for it in compelling them to take a rather empirical and population-based approach 
to their subject” (1996: 315).  
Other scholars divide demography into formal demography and population 
studies in order to separate the statistical discipline contributing to social, biological, and 
health science from the social science aspects contributing descriptive studies of the 
causes and consequences of population change (Preston 1993). However, according to a 
demographer reviewing the relationship between demography and the social sciences, a 
demographer can be characterized by his or her approach to the field: “a belief that the 
world can be largely defined in empirical terms, and that edifices of theory which are not 
quantitatively testable are likely to, or indeed often should, collapse” (Caldwell 1996: 
328). Thus, I would argue that demographers are an intellectual community with shared 
principles concerning the importance of empirical, scientific research, professional 
associations, journals and a discourse of science and reason as the means to progress that 
lend them expert status. That expert status had an important effect in the ability of 
demographers to influence the U.S. government and the UN as an international 
organization, and continues to influence the advocacy around population policy. 
Paige Eager argues that the dominance of population experts and demographers at 
the preparatory events for Cairo is evidence of the degree to which demographic experts 
permeated countries worldwide, and became part of a transnational population epistemic 
community.  
…scientists from the developing world were often trained in Western research centers and 
universities, sponsored by Western donor organizations, and attended Western-organized 
international conferences to discuss the ‘population problem.’ Therefore, those developing 
countries’ governmental representatives who attended the regional consultations were sufficiently 
socialized… They had become accustomed to the population control discourse, were convinced by 
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the assumptions supporting the ‘accepted wisdom’ regarding the need to decrease fertility rates in 
the developing world, and supported the implementation of family planning programs as the best 
way for the developing countries to break out of this cycle of high fertility rates and low 
socioeconomic development. (Eager 2004: 63) 
 
Eager’s point that a transnational population epistemic community had been socialized by 
the normative and soft power exerted by the West on behalf of population issues also 
supports my argument that demographers, as part of an expert, scientific community, had 
enormous power in both national environments such as the U.S., and the international 
environment, as seen in the World Population conferences in Rome and Belgrade as well 
as the lead-up to the Bucharest conference. Only when government officials, who had 
different political ideologies and were accountable to constituencies, became involved for 
the first time at Bucharest was the demographic view of population issues challenged. 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter, in addition to providing a history of the early UN Population 
Conferences, also provides a brief look at how demographers influenced Western 
governments, especially the U.S., to view population growth as a serious security 
problem, one to which programs and resources must be dedicated in order to alleviate the 
risk to developed countries and the global environment in general. “Indeed, 
demographers built up a substantial arsenal of research and activities to intellectually 
justify the promotion of government-organized family planning programs and to advance 
this view” (Schindlmayr 2004:36). These Western governments and the U.S. in particular 
also dedicated resources to convincing developing countries through their own academics 
and leaders of the need for population programs. “Thus, the United States government 
was actively trying to counter the resistance population control programs engendered in 
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the developing world… by effectively socializing leaders from the developing world on 
the necessity of controlling population growth” (Eager 2004: 78).  
 The importance and influence of demographers in these early UN Population 
Conferences, and on the U.S. policy on population and allocation of foreign aid resources 
also testifies to the importance of the scientific evidence, research and analysis at the 
time, and the continuing importance of such authority and these methods of generating 
knowledge in the future of the UN Population agencies and programs. The very definition 
of population as a technical expertise issue requiring global cooperation reflects the 
importance of the world-polity culture that has influenced nations and international 
organizations so much. “What functionalists forget is that technique and the definition of 
problems as technical are themselves cultural processes” (Boli and Thomas 1997). The 
core norms of science and reason as the means to progress, the use of empirical research to 
understand problems and solve them, and the individualist approach are apparent in the 
shared principles and discourse of demographers as an intellectual community; thus, 
demographic authority made a serious impact on the UN and the U.S. government. 
Although demographers included these core norms that I identify as key to the UN 
environment, they lacked the emphasis on human rights at a time when the importance of 
human rights at the UN was still being contested. However, as the human rights framework 
became more embedded, demographers continued to urge the use of policies that would 
address population growth issues from a bureaucratically efficient point of view. 
Demographers ultimately had to adjust to the growing importance of the human rights 
framework, which the abortion-rights network used to their advantage. I will elaborate on 











4 Development of the Women’s Health and Rights 
Movement: The Women’s Decade through the 1990s 
 
Two groups of particular interest in this project challenged the demographers’ 
perspective on population policy, which focused mostly on targets and quotas of births: 
women’s groups that advocated full access to family planning services and abortion, and 
anti-abortion groups. However, these two groups came from very different starting points 
and desired very different types of policies instead of those advocated by demographers, 
and so did not ally with each other. Instead these two groups went on to try and affect 
population policy in substantially different ways, both in domestic U.S. and international 
contexts. In this section I will explore the evolution of the abortion-rights movement in 
response to the demographic perspective on population policy. 
4.1 Historical Context 
 
The international movement for women’s health and rights reflects a split between 
the radical or progressive portion of the women’s movement, and the more pragmatic or 
mainstream liberal faction that has its roots in the politics of the modern birth control 
movement (Higer 1999: 124). In the nineteenth century, women’s rights advocates split 
into radical and reformist factions in response to the issue of voluntary motherhood. The 
radical faction wanted to transform the socioeconomic order, while the reformers pursued 
their goals through the narrower means of distributing birth control information and 
technology. The reformers, led by Margaret Sanger, dominated the movement by 
advocating family planning. This split between advocates of radical change and those 
who moderated their approach in order to accomplish their goals still exists within the 
movement for women’s health and rights. Those who take a radical feminist approach 
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argue for a restructuring of society’s approach to reproduction and childcare such that 
women are afforded real choices, rather than simply the one to not have children and 
work, or have children and not work. The more mainstream, liberal approach to women’s 
health and rights has dominated the movement, and has taken on the liberal, human rights 
frame in order to make an impact on specific international institutions, namely, the UN. I 
argue that the pragmatic, reformist faction of the movement had to take on specific 
frames for their arguments and ignore the more radical factions of the movement in order 
to influence the liberal institution of the UN, and that this more pragmatic, mainstream 
segment of the movement has become defined by its position on abortion. As a result, 
when referring to this faction of the movement, I call them the abortion-rights movement, 
in direct contrast to the anti-abortion movement in the international sphere. 
The Effects of Bucharest   
 In the mid 1960s, the United States became very involved in using its soft power 
and resources in establishing family planning and population policies in developing 
countries. Demographers and feminists were advocating similar goals, programs that 
distributed contraceptives and abortion services, but for different reasons. Since 
demographers strongly influenced the U.S. and the U.S. in turn heavily funded the 
UNFPA, the demographic perspective also influenced UN population programs; 
however, feminists became disillusioned with target-oriented programs as well as the use 
of incentives and disincentives advocated by demographers, believing that such an 
approach took away the proper focus of these programs on women themselves and their 
need for healthcare that addresses more than contraceptives and sterilization. Feminists 
began to challenge the rationale on which population policies were based: “that 
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population control in the social interest has precedence over individual well-being and 
individual rights” (Garcia-Moreno and Claro 1994:47).  
 The first opportunity to challenge the demographers’ stranglehold on population 
policy came at the Bucharest conference, where developing countries’ challenge of 
population control opened the international forum to different points of view on 
population. Feminists took advantage of this opening to highlight concerns about the 
abuses of population programs and the lack of attention to the health and well-being of 
women (Eager 2004). These abuses range from the blatant violation of human rights, 
such as the alleged forced sterilization of the Roma in Eastern Europe, or compulsory 
gynecology exams instituted in Romanian workplaces, to more coercive practices within 
population programs that used social pressure or less ambiguous means to force women 
to become sterilized or have abortions, such as China’s one-child policy or India’s 
economic incentives that encouraged sterilization (Sen 1994). In the late 1980s, feminists 
have argued that the lack of attention to safety in promoting birth control and the 
demographic rationale for population programs inevitably lead to abuses because they do 
not address the root causes of inequality or health issues (Hartmann 1987). Paige Eager in 
her study of the global women’s health and rights movement (2004) argues that the first 
step in normative change is critical debate, and that critical debate was stimulated by the 
suspicions of developing countries of developed countries, but also by feminists who 




4.2 The Women’s Decade, 1975-1985  
4.2.1 Introduction 
Why did the UN declare 1975-1985 the UN Decade for Women? The 1970s 
began the era of UN global conferences; UN agencies convened conferences to raise 
consciousness on issues of global reach and significance, including the environment, food 
security, housing, population, energy, and women. There are several conflicting accounts 
of what brought about the UN Decade for Women; some give the credit to women’s 
rights NGO that lobbied for the UN Decade for Women, while others see the main 
responsibility lying with Secretary General U Thant. The preamble to the UN Charter 
took an initial step towards equality for women in the statement “to reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal 
rights of men and women and of nations large and small.” In 1946, the Economic and 
Social Council created the Commission on the Status of Women, which was to 
investigate the causes of inequality and suggest actions to repair such inequalities 
(Zinsser 2002). However, it was not until 1975 that the first Women’s Conference was 
held, and at that conference, a large non-governmental forum and a governmental 
conference put together a comprehensive articulation of the problems facing women all 
over the world, and a Plan of Action to address these problems. The main problems of 
women were not, in 1975, expressed in terms of rights; the key themes of the conference 
reflected the concerns of developing countries at the time: equality, development and 
peace. Only after the UN Human Rights conference in Vienna, 1993, did human rights 
become the prevailing means of expressing women’s rights, a development I will explore 
later in this chapter.  
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 During the UN Decade for Women, three women’s conferences were held: in 
Mexico City in 1975, in Copenhagen in 1980, and in Nairobi in 1985. Although none of 
the conferences had an explicit focus on population, international population policy and 
women’s reproductive autonomy were inevitably addressed at these conferences. These 
conferences also provided an opportunity for the many activists who attended to network 
with like-minded women all over the world, and it was at these conferences that a truly 
global women’s health and rights network began to emerge (Eager 2004:82). In addition, 
the ability to work through similar issues from a similar perspective over three global 
conferences also afforded these women the opportunity to become more professional in 
their advocacy skills and strategize on how to best influence states’ behavior through 
these UN global conferences and the UN system in general.  
 As a result of the UN Decade for Women and the three international conferences 
held during that time, the attention of many women’s groups turned to the international 
sphere as a focus for their energy and resources. This scale shift happened gradually and 
many of the groups continued to focus on their domestic environments; some feminists 
argue that the reason that the women’s movement turned to the UN global conferences as 
an avenue of activism was the monolithic hold that the population control community had 
on the attention of government actors, especially in the developed world (Eager 2004). 
These actors were generally unresponsive to the concerns of the women’s organizations 
about health and rights, and thus, the women took advantage of an international site of 
contestation on the topic of population policy, which also had considerable influence on 
national discourses on population (Eager 2004: 20).  
 
 106 
4.2.2 UN Women’s Conferences  
 In 1975, the first UN’s International Women’s Year conference was held in 
Mexico City; 6,000 men and women attended, as well as 125 member states of the UN. 
This was the largest conference held on the concerns of women up to this time, and 70 
percent of the delegates were women. The main purpose of the conference was to elevate 
the status of women in society, and discuss the obstacles to achieving equality in rights, 
opportunities and responsibilities. However, this conference also displayed the same split 
between the developed and developing world, with the Group of 77 forming their own 
working group and drafting a politically charged document that not only supported the 
principles of the New International Economic Order (NIEO), but also equated Zionism 
with racism and apartheid. Although industrialized countries strongly opposed it, the final 
document from the Mexico City conference included these elements.  
 Women’s groups concerned with health and rights had continued to criticize 
population control policies throughout the 1970s, and many at the Mexico City 
conference labeled coercive practices in contraceptive services as human rights abuses 
(Correa and Reichmann 1994: 57). The World Plan of Action for the Implementation of 
the Objectives of the International Women’s Year echoed the Bucharest document by 
recognizing the need to achieve equal status for men and women in the family and 
society; the right to enter into marriage with the free and full consent of both spouses; the 
right of individuals and couples to freely and responsibly determine the number and 
spacing of their children; the close interaction of social, economic, and demographic 
factors; and the legitimacy of including population policies and programs within 
development plans (Miro 1977: 430). The explicitly stated right of individuals and 
couples to freely and responsibly determine the number and spacing of their children is 
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now looked back on as the precursor to reproductive health and rights, and causes some 
debate between those who believe the Cairo conference helped population programs, and 
those who believe it hurt them3. 
Another significant outcome of the women’s conference in Mexico City was the 
connections among the many NGOs that attended the NGO forum, called the Mexico 
City Tribune. As a result of their interactions at this meeting, three international 
newsletters dedicated to addressing women’s concerns were established, and continue to 
this day: the Isis (www.isisforwomen.com), WIN News (www.feminist.com/win.htm), 
and the International Women’s Tribune Center (www.iwtc.org). As one of the early UN 
global conferences, the NGO forum in Mexico City was still quite separate from the 
intergovernmental meeting and unmonitored by governments or the press. The NGO 
forum was just as important as the intergovernmental meeting in helping women’s groups 
exchange information and experience, and develop international connections with like-
minded groups (Fraser 1987: 12).   
The second women’s conference was held in 1980 in Copenhagen, with the 
purpose of reviewing progress made during the Decade for Women. This conference was 
preceded by five regional conferences, reflecting the growing institutionalization of the 
UN global conferences and the preparation they now required; at this time, the Women in 
Development (WID) offices were also established at the UN and at the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The document that came out of 
Copenhagen reiterated the Mexico City Plan of Action and added to it by explicitly 
addressing domestic and sexual violence, the needs of women refugees, and the dangers 
of illicit abortions to women’s health (Fraser 1987: 89). By 1980, the UN had also begun 
                                                
3 I will elaborate on this in the analysis of the 1994 Cairo conference.  
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to systematically collect data on women around the world through its various offices, and 
this information was used at Copenhagen in the form of pithy statistics, such as the 
following: women, constituting half of the world’s population, performed two-thirds of 
the world’s work, received one-tenth of the world’s income, and owned less than one 
percent of the world’s property (Fraser 1999:898).  
Although women’s groups gained momentum through the conferences of the UN 
Decade for Women, the political climate at both Mexico City and Copenhagen 
overshadowed the accomplishments of the women’s movement. The media focused on 
the political controversy surrounding the equating of Zionism with racism and the end of 
détente in 1979, with more conservative governments being elected in the U.S., Great 
Britain, and Germany. Women’s groups realized that the gains made since 1975 were 
significant but insufficient (Eager 2004: 83).  
One of the key gains made since 1975 was the signing of the UN Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). The draft 
form of CEDAW was endorsed by the Mexico City Women’s Conference in 1975, 
adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1979, and ceremonially re-signed at the 
Copenhagen Women’s Conference in 1980. CEDAW is the first legally binding treaty 
under international law to address women’s civil, political, social, and economic rights; 
however, as a treaty, CEDAW also has the most reservations attached to it, reflecting the 
unease with which many governments viewed the treaty. The U.S. has still not ratified 
the treaty. CEDAW is often described as an international bill of rights for women; it 
defines what constitutes discrimination against women, and actions states may take to 
end such discrimination. The Convention defines discrimination as  
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...any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or 
purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, 
irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any 
other field. (CEDAW 1979) 
 
One hundred and eighty-five states have ratified CEDAW as of 2007; these states are 
required to incorporate the principle of equality of men and women in their legal system, 
abolish all discriminatory laws and adopt appropriate ones prohibiting discrimination 
against women. As signatories, states agree to appropriate measures, including 
legislation, to ensure women can enjoy their human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
which in the Convention includes reproductive rights. States also agree to take 
appropriate measures to halt traffic and exploitation of women (CEDAW 1979).  A 
commission on CEDAW reviews reports from each signatory state every four years and 
recommends measures to each state to ensure full compliance with the treaty. 
One of the reasons that CEDAW is controversial is that it moves away from a 
sex-neutral norm, which strives to treat men and women equally based on how men are 
treated, and instead develops a new legal norm which recognizes that discrimination 
against women is worthy of a legal response, one that is particular to women (Cook 1993: 
237). CEDAW signatories must not only provide negative and cost-free rights, as civil 
and political rights are characterized because governments are only required to abstain 
from activities which would violate these rights; CEDAW requires governments to 
provide economic, social, and cultural rights, which entails committing considerable 
resources and positive action (Eager 2004: 84-85). CEDAW requires states to eliminate 
discrimination against women in health care and family planning (Cook and Hawes 1986: 
49), but does not go much further. It affirms women’s rights to family planning 
information, counseling, and services, and re-affirms that women have the same right as 
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men to decide on the number and spacing of their children (Correa and Reichmann 
1994:59).  
 The last global conference of the UN Decade for Women was held in 1985 in 
Nairobi, Kenya; the purpose of this conference was to formulate strategies and goals for 
the future. At this conference, women from the developing world were a majority of the 
participants for the first time (Fraser 1987:6). 159 governmental delegations and many 
NGOs attended, and the press extensively covered the conference, which conveyed the 
diversity of the international women’s movement (Fraser 1999:900), and served to 
confront many critics who accused the movement of being mostly white, Western, and 
middle class rather than global. The participants at the Nairobi conference were 
significantly different than those that attended the first conference, although they were 
the same women; they were “much more pragmatic, professional, and political. Many of 
them had been through two world conferences [Mexico City and Copenhagen] and knew 
each other or knew about each other. They knew how to use the UN system to place 
women’s issues on the agenda of every world meeting” (Fraser 1987: 159).  
 The issue of violence against women came up for international public debate for 
the first time at the Nairobi conference. The NGO Forum in particular discussed the links 
among violence in the home, violence in society and violence between countries (Fraser 
1999:901). The NGO Forum at Nairobi was the most well-organized and comprehensive 
yet, offering over 1,200 workshops and panel discussions (Fraser 1987:200). Several 
important networks developed out of the Nairobi conference which are generally feminist 
but engage in advocacy and research around reproductive rights as well. The Ford 
Foundation sponsored the attendance of a group of developing country experts who then 
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created Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN); DAWN is now 
a network of women from the global south who engage in feminist research and analysis 
of global issues related to economic justice, environmental sustainability, reproductive 
health and rights, and debt restructuring (Bunch et al. 2001: 224). The International 
Women’s Rights Action Watch (IWRAW) was also established out of a series of 
workshops at the Nairobi NGO Forum; the purpose of this group is to monitor, analyze, 
and encourage law and policy reforms consistent with CEDAW (Fraser 1987:129).  
4.2.3 Effects of the UN Decade for Women on Abortion-Rights 
Movement 
The UN Women’s conferences galvanized the women’s health and rights 
movement because women were able to discuss their concerns about population policy in 
international terms. As the meetings went on, feminists began to focus attention on issues 
such as human rights abuses in some population control programs, safety concerns about 
different contraceptive methods, and the role of women in society. In addition, feminists 
criticized the top-down nature of family planning programs that also tended to neglect 
women’s health in general. Although it seemed that feminists were critiquing these 
programs with a view to removing them, most women’s groups did not want to eliminate 
women’s access to family planning services, but instead to give family planning a 
different rationale – one derived from health and human rights as opposed to the 
demographic rationale that was advocated by the U.S. and other developed countries.  
Paige Eager records that U.S. feminists coined the term “reproductive rights” 
during the 1970s (Eager 2004: 87); one of the earliest public uses of the term is in the 
name of the U.S. non-profit National Family Planning and Reproductive Health 
Association (NFPRH), founded in 1971. Its mission is to “assure access to 
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comprehensive and culturally sensitive family planning and reproductive health care 
services, and to support reproductive freedom for all” (National Family Planning and 
Reproductive Health Association Mission Statement 2007). However, a basic search of 
newspaper articles in the U.S. and worldwide reveals that it is not until 1989 that the term 
reproductive health is used as a term to replace family planning, rather than to refer to the 
NFPRH. Some believe that the term came from more radical feminists, offering 
reproductive rights as a counterpoint to abortion rights, meaning an individual’s claim to 
something positive, whether food, shelter, health care or abortion. Liberal feminists used 
the term abortion rights from the liberal tradition of rights, meaning an individual’s 
freedom to act without government restriction; thus, governments had an obligation not 
to interfere with a woman’s right to seek an abortion. For more radical feminists, 
governments also had a more positive responsibility to ensure that women had the means 
to exercise their choice regarding abortion. The term reproductive rights was meant to 
refer to the need to treat women’s health holistically, to give women decision-making 
power concerning their health and fertility as a whole, rather than simply trying to control 
fertility without seeing the woman that control was affecting. “A family planning 
program designed to improve health and expand women’s control over reproduction 
looks very different from one whose main concern is to reduce birth rates as fast as 
possible” (Hartmann 1995:57). Nafis Sadik, former director of the UNFPA, states that 
she believed that the original purpose of family planning was to improve the health of 
women, not reduce fertility, but in the hands of governments, family planning programs 
were subject to coercion and corruption (Nafis Sadik Interview 2006). Thus one of the 
main goals of the movement was to rethink population policies and programs, and shift 
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the terms of the debate to reproductive health and rights rather than population control. 
Barbara Crane articulates this concisely as needing to look at “women’s reproductive 
needs more comprehensively, that it wasn’t a good idea to just offer a contraceptive 
method if you weren’t also checking for other conditions, or needs, and also making 
available access to safe abortion” (Barbara Crane Interview 2006).  
The use and spread of the term reflected the growing influence of the global 
women’s health and rights movement, and it became an umbrella term for women’s 
groups in the global North and South to refer to local concerns as well as those that 
spanned cultures and economic situations (Eager 2004). Although the concept of 
reproductive rights is Western, feminists argue that it is a concept that women from the 
global South have embraced. A more ambiguous point of view was expressed when 
Peggy Curlin, former president of CEDPA, commented, “Yes, it is a very Western 
concept. The language we use can be off-putting, but if you talk to developing world 
women about safe motherhood, they want it” (Eager 2004:87). In the U.S. especially, 
reproductive rights is associated with abortion rights; anti-abortion groups have worked 
to frame reproductive rights as synonymous with abortion rights, and thus make it more 
controversial. Despite the growing popularity of the term among women’s groups, it did 
not appear in any of the UN global conference documents until the UN Population and 
Development conference in Cairo, 1994.  
However, the framing of women’s health issues with the rights discourse was not 
accepted without debate. Within the women’s movement for health and rights, more 
liberal voices prevailed over radical ones; radical feminists do not approve of the rights 
discourse because it is based in a liberal understanding of rights, and continue to criticize 
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the human rights framework (Otto 1999). Whereas liberal feminists use the language and 
logic of the human rights framework to argue for increased concern for women’s needs, 
cultural and radical feminists “are convinced that a real inclusion of women in the human 
rights system requires a transformation of that [human rights] system” (Brem 1997: 138). 
Cultural feminists critique the human rights framework for not recognizing differences 
between men and women, and thus the need to revise the catalogue of human rights to 
include reproductive rights or sexual autonomy rights (Cook 1994). Cultural feminists 
also critique the public/private dichotomy taken for granted by the liberal human rights 
framework, arguing that this leads to discrimination against women since many of their 
concerns are considered to belong to the private sphere. Radical feminists reject theories 
of equality and difference between men and women as being based on a male yardstick 
(Brem 1997: 139). Radical feminists critique human rights law especially as perpetuating 
male dominance (MacKinnon 1989). However, the liberal feminist organizations were 
able to, through the women’s conferences and the upcoming population and development 
conferences, overcome the opposition of radical critiques and steer the efforts of the 
movement in the direction of the human rights framework.  
 In July 1984, just prior to the Population and Development conference in Mexico 
City, a large number of women’s health activists attended the first global conference held 
by the International Campaign on Abortion, Sterilization, and Contraception (ICASC) in 
Amsterdam (Correa and Reichmann 1994: 61). This conference is often cited as the 
founding event of the global reproductive health and rights movement; it brought together 
individuals representing different views from around the world, with the one common 
theme being condemnation of abusive population control measures and anti-abortion 
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forces (Eager 2004: 107). It was also at this conference that ICASC officially changed its 
name to the Women’s Global Network for Reproductive Rights (WGNRR); many 
women’s activists from the global South believed that the explicit reference to 
reproductive rights would more accurately represent their broader health and rights 
agenda. The Women’s Network links developing country activists with activists in the 
developed world in order to foster transnational activism on the issue of reproductive 
health and rights (Dixon-Mueller and Germain 1994). The WGNRR was especially 
critical of the population control establishment promoted by the global North; women in 
the developing world also blamed the international donor agencies for disregarding 
women’s health in general.  
4.3 UN Population and Development Conference, Mexico City, 
1984 
 
The reversal of U.S. delegation on population policy, due to Reagan and Christian 
Right, spurred strengthening of the family planning movement (by taking away 
government funding and forcing them to rely on more private donors and non-profit aid) 
and laid the foundation for the adoption of the reproductive rights framework by 
mainstream population programs (by shifting the power from the U.S., effectively 
challenging the dominant demographic point of view, and giving feminists and neo-
Malthusian population experts an incentive to work together. 
The Population Commission of the UN recommended preparation for a second 
intergovernmental population conference by 1981; for the first time, ECOSOC requested 
that the Executive Director of UNFPA serve as the secretary-general of the conference, 
with the director of the Population Division to serve as deputy secretary-general. This 
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request reflects the growing importance of the UNFPA as a source of funding and 
advocacy for population programs. The Population Division continued to serve as the 
research arm, responsible for the substantive issues and the draft of the Program of 
Action (Interview with Joseph Chamie, 2006). In August 1984, 147 country delegations 
met at Mexico City, where 137 met at Bucharest (Johnson 1987:282). More than one 
thousand official participants attended, and women headed 22 country delegations. 154 
NGOs also attended the conference; sixteen of these NGOs were able to address the 
plenary sessions and distributed their position and background papers to official delegates 
(Eager 2004: 104).    
 The international political climate toward population programs had changed 
substantially since Bucharest; as discussed previously, developing countries in 1974 had 
viewed offers of population assistance with suspicion. By 1983, however, two-thirds of 
all countries indicated that they had formulated an explicit policy with respect to 
population growth (Johnson 1987:225), including many of the strongest objectors to such 
policies at Bucharest. In the decade since Bucharest, the annual rate of world population 
growth had declined from 2 percent to 1.7 percent. In addition to population programs 
and assistance administered by the UNFPA and the Population Division, the World Bank, 
under Robert McNamara, became heavily involved in financing population and health 
projects in developing countries with the explicit goal of improving family planning 
services (Eager 2004: 101). The developing countries’ acceptance of the importance of 
reducing population growth through family planning programs can be seen as the success 
of developed countries and international agencies in socializing these countries into the 
norm through education and funding (Eager 2004).  
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 The U.S. position at Mexico City surprised developed and developing countries 
alike, given the U.S.’s decades of financial and research support for population programs. 
After advocating population programs and control so strongly for so long, to the point 
where developing countries had nearly universally started supporting the need for 
reducing population growth in order to develop, the U.S. delegation to Mexico City 
retracted its position; the first statement by conservative former Senator James Buckley to 
the Mexico conference was his view that “First and foremost, population growth is, of 
itself, neither good nor bad. It becomes an asset or a problem in conjunction with other 
factors such as economic policy, social constraints, and the ability to put additional men 
and women to useful work” (Singh 1998: 16). In addition, Buckley stated that the U.S. 
would not allow its financial assistance for population activities to finance or support 
abortion. This became termed the “Mexico City policy,” and consisted of three parts: 
U.S. funds would be placed into segregated accounts for those countries that supported 
abortion with other funds; the U.S. government would no longer contribute to NGOs that 
performed or actively promoted abortion as a method of family planning in other 
countries; and the U.S. government would not contribute to the UNFPA unless the 
UNFPA first proved that it did not engage in, provide funding for, or in any way support 
abortion or coercive family planning programs (Singh 1998). The reversal of the U.S. 
position generated a great deal of press coverage for the Mexico Conference, and 
consternation among developed countries and developing countries, as well as NGOs and 
UN agencies that promoted family planning programs with abortion services.  
Many scholars have attributed the U.S.’s reversal to the Reagan administration’s 
conservative electoral base, specifically the New Right coalition, which included the 
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Catholic Church, Protestant evangelicals, and right-to-life advocates. Some changes were 
made to domestic policy, but not nearly enough for the Christian Right; as a result, one 
could analyze the appointment of conservative former Senator James Buckley as the head 
of the U.S. delegation to Mexico City as a concession to the Christian Right by the 
Reagan administration (Finkle and McIntosh 1995). Anti-abortion advocates did not put 
many resources toward international policy on abortion at this time; one might infer that 
the intended effect of this reversal in U.S. funding for family planning was meant to send 
a signal domestically concerning the Reagan administration’s loyalties. In fact, some 
experts believe that the Mexico City Policy was meant to influence the Republican 
National Convention, which was being held a week after the conclusion of the Mexico 
City Conference (Eager 2004: 105).  
Despite the U.S. reversal of policy on population, the conference continued and 
adopted by consensus a Declaration on Population and Development as well as 
Recommendations for the Further Implementation of the World Population Plan of 
Action. The Mexico City Plan of Action continued and strengthened the trend from the 
Bucharest conference of emphasizing the empowerment of women; in particular, the 
conference document stressed the importance of enabling women to control their own 
fertility, as that ability formed the basis for the enjoyment of other rights (Johnson 1995). 
The Mexico City Declaration also stated “Improving the status of women and enhancing 
their role is an important goal in itself, and will also influence family life and size in a 
positive way,” contributing to development (1984, Paragraphs 11 and 12). Dr. Nafis 
Sadik, then Assistant Executive Director of UNFPA, and several other women from 
developing countries formed an ad hoc Women’s Caucus at Mexico; this caucus 
 
 119 
succeeded in establishing a separate chapter devoted to women’s rights, covering such 
diverse issues as legal, economic and social equality, access to education and family 
planning, and the delaying of marriage (Singh 1998: 20).  
The declaration reaffirmed and in some cases furthered the main principles 
adopted at Bucharest: in ensuring the right of couples and individuals to family planning 
information and services, the Mexico City document emphasized community-based 
distribution of services and the innovative role of NGOs, in particular women’s 
organizations in improving the availability and effectiveness of family planning services 
(UN 1984: Recommendation 28). In addition, the document recommends “suitable family 
planning information and services should be made available to adolescents within the 
changing socio-cultural framework of each country,” (Recommendation 29). The issue of 
abortion came up for discussion at Mexico City, and the document recommended 
governments “to take appropriate steps to help women avoid abortion, which in no case 
should be promoted as a method of family planning, and whenever possible provide for 
the humane treatment and counseling of women who have had recourse to abortion” 
(Recommendation 18(e)). This final consensus on the issue of abortion was close to the 
position taken by the Holy See, but its representative did not join the consensus on the 
grounds that the document had also agreed to support family planning services for 
adolescents and that insufficient attention had been paid to the concept of the family 
(Tabah 1984).  
 The reversal of the U.S. stance on population policy had a significant impact on 
the abortion-rights movement. First, several of the NGOs that most strongly supported 
access to abortion and family planning services for adolescents, namely IPPF, were 
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denied U.S. funding as a result of refusal to comply with the strict anti-abortion policy 
(Green 1993: 315). In 1985, the U.S. withheld $10 million of the $46 million pledged to 
the UNFPA because it alleged that the UNFPA was involved in China’s population 
program, which it declared to be coercive. In 1986, the U.S. withheld $25 million for the 
same reason.  
 Second, the reasoning behind the U.S. reversal on population policy definitively 
challenged the neo-Malthusian population control movement, which continued to 
advocate reduction of population growth rates in order to sustain the ecological balance 
of the planet. New Right economists were influenced by the book The Resourceful Earth, 
and challenged the idea that there were limits to growth, or the “carrying capacity of the 
earth” philosophy (Hartmann 1995). The “conservative Cornucopians” believed that 
neoliberal economic policy would best solve the issue of population growth: that free 
market enterprise, the potential of technology, and sheer human ingenuity could alleviate 
the ecological demands placed on the earth by a growing population (Hartmann 1995: 
35). Hartmann claims that the conservative cornucopians, who were likely to hold anti-
abortion views, were able to sway the Reagan White House, whereas women’s groups 
and NGOs concerned about population control, reproductive rights and health were not 
able to do so. However, Hartmann also believed that “the Cornucopians performed a 
great service, by opening up the population debate. After two decades of hegemony, the 
Malthusian orthodoxy was forced to go on the defensive and cede some ground in order 
to save the church” (Hartmann 1995: 36). As a result, the crisis mentality and “population 
time bomb” metaphor began to lose its influence, and other critiques of population 
programs, including feminist ones, came to the fore (Hodgson and Watkins 1996).  
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 Third, feminists argue that the Mexico City Policy ended up stimulating the 
global women’s health and rights movement and demographers. It shifted the locus of 
power in the population field away from the U.S. (Higer 1999), and allowed other 
developed countries as well as the private sector to help keep family planning programs 
functioning in developing countries, both through voluntary and for-profit agencies. As a 
result of being cut off from government-initiated or subsidized family planning services, 
the women’s movement was forced to become more densely networked and increasingly 
professionalized, in order to help keep many family planning clinics in developing 
countries running without U.S. government support. For demographers who sought to 
preserve family planning programs, the Mexico City Policy “created an incentive to 
invoke alternative justifications for family planning assistance,” such as improving 
women’s health (Higer 1999: 128). The U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID), the most influential donor in the population field at this time, began to 
emphasize how family planning programs helped improve maternal and child health 
(Higer 1999).  
Also, the Mexico City Policy created a strong incentive for cooperation between 
two groups that wanted to ensure continued provision of family planning services: U.S. 
feminists and neo-Malthusian population planners, or demographers. Although the 
alliance between feminists and demographers was not strong, there was enough dialogue 
between the two movements that cooperative enterprises were begun (Hodgson and 
Watkins 1997). The Population Crisis Committee gave International Women’s Health 
Coalition (IWHC) a grant to promote menstrual regulation and early-term abortion in 
developing countries. The International Women’s Health Coalition was a mediator 
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between the two movements and encouraged a balance between the concerns of 
population control and women’s health (Hartmann 1995). 
4.4 UN Global Conferences of the 1990s  
Through the global conferences of the UN Women’s Decade, feminists and 
especially women’s reproductive health and rights activists were able to gain experience 
in advocacy at the UN level, and become established and organized in their networks. 
Most importantly, women’s organizations were able to frame women’s concerns, 
including access to family planning, as central to development. They were also able to 
put women’s equality and rights on the UN agenda as important in and of themselves. 
However, several scholars and activists note that at the beginning of the 1990s, many 
politically active women, especially those involved in feminist groups, felt that men 
rather than women were controlling the population debate. Men were determining 
population policies, working out family planning targets and quotas, devising rewards 
and penalties for good or bad performance. This did not fit feminists’ perception of 
population issues as being mainly affected by the decisions of women, and thus needing 
to be controlled by women. In addition, feminists were growing cynical concerning the 
rhetoric of women’s rights to family planning; they increasingly believed that other rights 
were just as, if not more, important than family planning, such as the right to health, 
education, and jobs (Johnson 1995: 131). The UN global conferences on the environment 
and human rights became key opportunities for cooperation and alliance for the global 
women’s health and rights movement; the Vienna conference on Human Rights was 
especially important because the human rights frame for reproductive health and rights 
helped the concept become established at the UN.  
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4.4.1 UN Conference on Environment and Development, Rio, 1992 
Rio was the first occasion for women’s groups such as WEDO to exercise its 
influence as a reformist organization that aimed to influence the UN specifically. 
UNCED also demonstrated the split between women’s groups and environment groups; 
although there was a strong incentive for an alliance and overlapping interests, the 
difference in the reasons why they both advocated access to family planning programs 
ultimately became a problem.  
Feminists formed several new organizations to bridge the gap between women, 
population and the environment; two different organizations demonstrate the split 
between the radical and the mainstream factions of the feminist movement. The 
Committee on Women, Population and the Environment (CWPE), created in the late 
1980s, holds a radical position on population policy, calling for a reconfiguration of the 
international policy agenda to reduce consumption rates in developed countries and 
redistribute wealth between and within countries. CWPE rejects the argument that 
population growth is a primary cause of environmental degradation and instead 
emphasizes the many related causes of environmental problems (Higer 1999: 130). 
CWPE does not try to engage the UN directly, or orient its activities around UN 
conferences.  
A second group, the Women’s Environment and Development Organization 
(WEDO), was created by Bella Abzug in 1990. WEDO had a very similar agenda to 
CWPE, but it approached that agenda with an insider, reformist perspective, organizing 
in order to better influence the UN conference process; it created an international network 
of women’s activists that could then pressure governments to adopt policies that advance 
women’s interests (Higer 1999: 130).   
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Prior to the 1992 UNCED meeting in Rio, WEDO helped organize the World 
Women’s Congress in Miami, Florida in November 1991, which brought together more 
than 1,500 women from 83 countries to work together on a strategy for UNCED (WEDO 
2007). The Congress adopted a Declaration for a Healthy Planet that included broad 
understandings of the empowerment of women: recognizing women’s role as managers 
and conservers of natural resources, providing equality for women in political 
participation and international representation, ensuring access to agricultural credit and 
loans, and allocating development aid and funding to women’s projects. This broader 
understanding of the empowerment of women was not successful at Rio, where radical 
and reformist feminists struggled over how best to frame their advocacy, especially in 
response to demographers and environmental activists joining forces on a more 
Malthusian vision of family planning. The difficulties that the feminist groups 
encountered at UNCED began before the conference and continued throughout.  
Although the environmental movement and the women’s reproductive rights 
movement had many of the same concerns, many tensions existed between the two 
movements, never more pronounced than at Rio. By this point in the environmental 
debate, most countries as well as the UN accepted that population was an important 
factor affecting the environment and development (Cohen 1993: 61). However, some 
environmental groups leaned in a neo-Malthusian direction, believing that due to the dire 
ecological situation, world population growth had to decrease (Cohen 1993); some of 
these environmental groups made strong calls for zero or negative population growth. 
Their point of view was represented at the first plenary session by the UNCED Secretary-
General Maurice Strong, who said, “We are the most successful species ever, but now 
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we’re a species out of control” (Earth Negotiations Bulletin June 3, 1992). He went on to 
say that the world’s population had grown by 1.7 billion since 1972, and that 1.5 billion 
of those live in developing countries that cannot support them; he emphasized that this 
growth cannot continue, for “if we don’t control it, nature will” (Earth Negotiations 
Bulletin June 3, 1992). Again, although environmentalists supported the provision of 
family planning services for women, they supported it for very different reasons than 
feminists. Feminists were concerned that as long high fertility rates were considered a 
significant cause of environmental pollution, women would be held responsible for 
environmental degradation. Adrienne Germain of the International Women’s Health 
Coalition recalled that coming out of Rio, many held the misperception that women are 
against family planning. “Coming out of the Earth Summit, there was a lot of concern 
expressed by women regarding the downside of how population programs had so far been 
implemented, but it was not a statement against population or contraception” (Eager 
2004: 120).  
The nineties changed the neo-Malthusian demographic community as well; 
lacking the security impetus of preventing the spread of communism in developing 
countries, population programs were not getting as much money from foundations or 
support from the executive and congressional branches in the United States. Thus, in the 
post-Cold War world, neo-Malthusian arguments for population control in the global 
South took on a much more humanitarian tone (Eager 2004: 119). Instead of focusing on 
the population growth rates in the South as depleting world-wide resources and resulting 
in poverty, disease, and social unrest, demographers began to argue that population 
control would help the global South. Lowered fertility rates would enhance rates of 
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economic growth, reduce emigration pressures on the North, and increase the possibilities 
of trade between the North and the South (Hodgson and Watkins 1997: 496). Thus, we 
see that in this time period demographers adjusted to the change in the political situation 
by changing their rationale for population policy from one that emphasized the harm to 
the world at large of controlled population growth in the developing world, to a softer and 
more humanitarian argument that emphasized the benefits to the South of lower 
population growth rates. The demographic community also sought new allies, and found 
a natural one in the environmental movement.  
The relations between the demographic community, the environmental 
movement, and the population movement were not always adversarial. There were some 
groups that included elements of both sides, including the Women’s Environment and 
Development Organization (WEDO), and Campaign on Population and the Environment 
(COPE), a joint effort by the Audubon Society, the National Wildlife Federation, the 
Planned Parenthood Federation of America and several other groups to educate public 
awareness of the links between population growth, environmental degradation, and the 
resulting human suffering (Hartmann 1995: 146).  
 The Rio conference in 1992 signified some serious rifts between the 
environmental movement and the global women’s health and rights movement as a result 
of the two different rationales the groups brought to family planning programs. However, 
after failing to significantly affect the Rio document for the cause of women’s 
reproductive health and rights, feminist groups determined to find a way to organize 
themselves and build up other alliances in order to make a more decided impact on future 
conferences. It took considerable effort on the part of the Clinton administration to bridge 
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the divide between the environmental movement and the global women’s health and 
rights movement prior to Cairo (Eager 2004).  
4.4.2 Human Rights Conference, Vienna, 1993 
At the UN Human Rights conference in Vienna, feminists built an alliance with 
the human rights community and used the language of human rights to build support for a 
General Assembly Resolution on the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Violence Against Women (UN 1993), and the appointment of a Special Rapporteur on 
Violence against Women. Women’s global health and rights organizations followed up 
on the new alliance and framing of the larger feminist community with the human rights 
community by beginning to use the language of human rights to combat both population 
control and anti-abortion groups as they prepared for the Cairo conference.  
The UN World Conference on Human Rights was the first intergovernmental 
meeting held on human rights since the 1968 Tehran conference; at that time women’s 
activists made an effort to separate human rights from women’s rights, fearful that 
women’s issues would be marginalized if the two were considered together (Joachim 
1999). In fact, when the UN Human Rights Commission was being created in 1946, 
women’s activists lobbied for a separate Commission on the Status of Women, with the 
Commission on Human Rights located in Geneva and the Commission on the Status of 
Women located in New York (Pfeffer 1985: 468). However, at the UN Human Rights 
Conference in Vienna, feminists made a concerted effort to use media, a global tribunal 
providing personal testimonies, and technical arguments in order to link women’s rights 
with human rights (Joachim 2003). I will discuss briefly why women’s groups began to 
work with the human rights community and use the human rights framework after using 
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development and critical approaches for so long, and how women’s reproductive health 
and rights activists used the human rights frame to further their advocacy.   
Women’s rights activists and scholars offer many reasons as to why women began 
to use the human rights framework at this time rather than some other frame, involving 
the political climate, current events, and the opportunities afforded by the human rights 
framework at UN global conferences (Eager 2004). A key reason involves understanding 
the opening of the political climate at this time; the end of the Cold War brought with it 
an easing of tension between communist and democratic countries concerning the issue 
of human rights, which many communist countries were unwilling to concede as being 
universal, the enforcement of which should transcend sovereign borders. However, after 
the Cold War, there was a sense of optimism concerning the ability of the UN to 
encourage cooperation among states on a number of global problems (Bunch 1995). In 
particular, “security within the UN was redefined: in contrast to the security of the state, 
the well-being and rights of individuals were increasingly emphasized, a frame that was 
more commensurable with that of women’s rights” (Joachim 2003: 260).  
As the conferences of the 1990s got underway, the human rights frame became 
increasingly important as one of the few frames that drew support from most states. 
Countries still disagreed on whether human rights should include or be superceded by 
social and economic rights, reflecting the continuing division between the global North 
and South, or whether human rights should be tempered by cultural relativism, another 
argument put forth especially by Asian countries from the South; however, the 
importance of human rights and whether states were obligated to protect them was 
increasingly accepted. Activists of that time period also cite the vividness with which 
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human rights violations came to the fore due to current events as one of the key reasons 
that the human rights framework became so powerful. Ethnic conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda demonstrated not only the responsibility of the 
international community to protect human rights, but the gendered nature of human rights 
violations (Joachim 2003).  
Another reason that feminists took up the human rights frame was the opportunity 
it provided to mobilize and gain leverage internationally because human rights were seen 
to be universal, appealing to the most basic understanding of who a human being is and 
what they are inherently entitled to. Women’s rights activist Lori Heise explains “The 
human rights framework speaks to all people, cultures, and religions . . . and beyond 
these divisions there is a common understanding what is fundamental for the dignity of 
people and the person” (Joachim 2003: 259). The human rights frame was also perceived 
to have strategic advantages: “it helped to gain access to institutional resources and win 
allies because human rights was an already accepted framework (Mary Carrillo in 
Joachim 2003: 259). 
As a result, women’s rights activists began to frame women’s rights as a central 
component of human rights. They began to pressure human rights NGOs to include 
information concerning women’s rights violations, and to prepare to participate in the 
Vienna Conference. Friedman argues that before 1989, major human rights groups did 
not pay specific attention to women’s human rights (1995). Only in the late 1980s did 
Amnesty International start to work on women’s human rights when it was brought to 
their attention that women were systematically underrepresented in their research. In 
1989, Amnesty International’s highest executive body passed a resolution stating that the 
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organization would increase its efforts to protect women’s human rights at every level of 
its work (Friedman 1995: 26). Both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch 
established Women’s Human Rights Programs in the early 1990s following the pressure 
exerted by women’s groups (Roth 1994); both these groups investigated and reported on 
women’s human rights violations. Their reports “enhanced the issue’s legitimacy among 
states because these organizations were known for credible and reliable information” 
(Joachim 2003: 259).  
Women’s activists participated in the process of the Vienna Conference by using 
a variety of tactics. They engaged in symbolic actions such as vigils and tribunals 
throughout the world, linking November 15th, the day commemorating victims of gender 
violence, with December 10th, the Human Rights Day (Center for Women’s Global 
Leadership 1993: 39). They also produced articles and technical knowledge to support 
their advocacy, a tactic that women’s health and rights activists would use effectively in 
Cairo: “Charlotte Bunch published an article entitled ‘Women’s Rights as Human Rights’ 
in the prestigious journal Human Rights Quarterly in 1990, providing a scientifically 
grounded explanation for why women’s rights were human rights” (Joachim 2003: 258). 
During the conference, activists demanded that women’s human rights concerns be 
included at Vienna, and they succeeded in making the rallying slogan for the conference 
“Women’s rights are human rights” (Bunch and Reilly 1994: 10).  
In addition to these explanations from the literature and activists involved, I 
would argue that the human rights frame is one that fits well with the liberal 
philosophical framework that is the basis of the UN. This framework, including the 
norms of rational organization and scientific basis for progress, worked extremely well 
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for the neo-Malthusian demographic community before it, which lacked only the 
emphasis on individual human rights. It was difficult to achieve consensus on that 
emphasis, as mentioned previously, because of the tension between communist and 
democratic countries within the UN. In the 1990s, however, the emphasis on individual 
human rights became a key focusing element for the global conferences, and the most 
accepted framework for making claims in the international sphere. The fact that all 
members of the UN were also signatories to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
gave them legal precedent and claim as well. As a result, the human rights framework 
became a rallying point for many organizations within the feminist movement, although 
as I have discussed before, not without controversy. 
The fact that most governments at least nominally accepted political demands 
framed in the human rights framework helped it gain legitimacy among social 
movements such as the women’s movement that had previously viewed the human rights 
framework with suspicion. In addition, the many resources behind mainstream human 
rights groups and the established credibility of human rights law formed key resources to 
advance women’s rights. “Therefore the global women’s health and rights movement 
strategically utilized deepening connections with the organized and professional human 
rights community. The utilization of a human rights framework was crucial for gaining 
international acceptance of the reproductive rights argument” (Eager 2004: 116).  
The global women’s health and rights movement framed reproductive health and 
rights as an international human rights norm; they then framed coercive population 
control programs as unjust and intolerable in that they abused women’s human rights. 
Since human rights were by this time accepted by more and more states, framing 
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reproductive rights as human rights “gave women working within their domestic social 
movements a language to lodge oppositional claims against their governments, public 
agencies, and even other individuals” (Eager 2004: 114).  
4.5 Conclusion 
The women’s health and rights movement gained considerable experience and 
acumen concerning the UN system, and especially the process by which one may 
influence the UN global conferences, through the three Women’s Conferences that 
marked the Women’s Decade. In this time, activists for women’s reproductive health and 
rights formed key NGOs and umbrella organizations for NGOs in different regions that 
focused their efforts on advocacy in the international sphere, but especially at the UN. 
This shift in scale reflects the importance of international forums such as the UN for 
developing norms, and especially the increasing perception of the UN global conferences 
as key avenues for influencing the international, and over time the national, policies 
concerning family planning. Feminists were also able to gain an understanding of the 
lobbying process by which NGOs influenced the country delegations at the global 
conferences, and form relationships with delegates that have stood them in good stead for 
many conferences. In the early 90s, women’s health and rights groups made important 
alliances with environmental and human rights organizations that gave them leverage in 
terms of numbers and connections with other issues deemed important by a majority of 
governments. Coalition building with other issue areas was important for these women’s 
organizations because the environment as an issue area was on the urgent list for many 
countries, and so connecting it with population issues helped widen their appeal. In 
addition, the alliance with human rights organizations helped connect reproductive health 
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and rights to one of the few issues that most countries supported, and that was also 
intimately connected to the UN charter. This helped change the frame with which 
feminists pitched their arguments about reproductive health, proposing it as a human 
right that all women were entitled to.   
During this time period, organizations against abortion were also active, but much 
more locally focused. As evidenced in the 1984 Mexico City Population and 
Development conference, the Christian Right organizations that sought to influence the 
national executive they helped bring to power, Ronald Reagan, ended up indirectly 
influencing international policy when the U.S. instituted the Mexico City policy, taking 
away U.S. funding for any international programs that supported or performed abortions. 
However, the Christian Right was not aiming to influence international policy, but rather 
national policy; thus they had not yet shifted their scale to the international level. The 
Vatican, which had been operating at the UN since the start of these global conferences, 
was not instrumental in influencing the U.S. delegation to take its stand against abortion 
or the neutrality of population growth to economic development. Although the Mexico 
City policy was a setback for women’s health and rights groups, it was not an action 




5 The Influence of the Women’s Health and Rights 
Movement: The Cairo Conference 
 
5.1 Background 
In 1989, ECOSOC designated a third governmental conference on population (UN 
ECOSOC Resolution 1989/91). The purposes of this conference, to be held in 1994, 
included assessing the progress made in the last decade on population issues; continuing 
work on the implementation of prior international agreements; strengthening international 
awareness of population issues and their linkage to development; making new 
recommendations for the treatment of population issues in the context of development; 
and mobilizing the required resources, especially for the developing world, to carry out 
such recommendations (UN ECOSOC Resolution 1991/93). The meetings held prior to 
the conference included six expert meetings, several roundtables, three Preparatory 
Committee meetings (PrepComs), and five regional meetings. 
Prior conference history  
The controversy sparked by the U.S. position against abortion at the 1984 conference 
caused the planners of the 1994 Cairo conference to arrange for approximately 35 
preparatory meetings on intergovernmental and intraregional levels, to ensure that 
controversial issues would be aired and resolved before delegates voted final approval on 
the draft Program of Action in Cairo. Although consensus was achieved on most of the 
document, several issues caused conflict that needed to be negotiated at the conference 
itself.  
Political background  
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One of the key political changes that affected the Cairo conference was the end of the 
Cold War; the collapse of the Soviet Union removed a source of tension that the 
conference organizers had feared, and replaced it with a willingness to cooperate between 
members of the former Soviet bloc. The end of the Cold War also meant a change in 
status for the U.S.; all its economic and diplomatic efforts against the Communist regime 
were now seen as unnecessary by a government and population that saw greater needs 
domestically.  
Several other potential sources of tension were allayed by political events and 
circumstances: the conflict over occupied territories that had disrupted the Mexico City 
conference was allayed when Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization signed a 
peace agreement before the Cairo conference. The Group of 77 (G77), which had exerted 
such influence on behalf of developing countries in the Bucharest conference of 1975, 
had exerted less influence in Mexico City and did not contribute much of a presence in 
Cairo; the group itself was no longer a cohesive whole (Finkle and Crane 1985). The 
developing countries had become much more divided along economic and demographic 
lines, and they could no longer speak with one voice.   
 
5.2 The International Conference on Population and 
Development, Cairo, 1994 
Preparation for the Conference 
 
Expert Meetings 
Six expert meetings were held in preparation for the ICPD, corresponding to the six 
groups of issues identified by ECOSOC as those requiring the greatest attention during 
the coming decade: the first meeting, on population, environment and development, was 
held at UN headquarters from January 20-24 1992; the second, on population policies and 
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programs, was hosted by the government of Egypt in Cairo from April 12-16 1992; the 
third, on population and women, was hosted by the government of Botswana in 
Gaborone, from June 22-26, 1992; the fourth on family planning, health and family well-
being, was hosted by the government of India in Bangalore from October 26-29, 1992. 
The fifth, on population growth and demographic structure, was hosted by the 
government of France in Paris from November 16-20, 1992; the sixth, on population 
distribution and migration, was hosted by the government of Bolivia in Santa Cruz from 
January 18-23, 1993.  
 Each expert group meeting included 15 experts along with representatives of 
relevant bodies and organizations of the United Nations system and selected 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. Efforts were made to have a full 
range of relevant scientific disciplines and geographical regions represented. Each 
meeting had the benefit of a substantive background paper prepared by the Population 
Division, technical papers prepared by each of the experts and technical contributions 
provided by the participating UN and non-governmental organizations. Each meeting 
concluded by adopting a set of recommendations, to be submitted to the Preparatory 
Committee of the conference at its second session in May 1993. A total of 162 
recommendations were submitted (Johnson 1995).  
 
Regional Meetings 
ECOSOC resolution 1991/93 called for regional conferences in preparation for the ICPD 
in Cairo, to be held in 1992 and 1993. The regional conferences in addition to the 
preparatory conferences were meant to allow as much discussion as possible of the 
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controversial issues that the ICPD would be concerned with, and encourage consensus 
building at these more local levels and on smaller scales, so that the Program of Action in 
Cairo would have a minimum amount of bracketed or controversial language still to be 
negotiated. These regional conferences varied on how strongly they advocated family 
planning services or how strongly they recognized the need to reduce population growth 
rates. The terms “reproductive health and rights” appears infrequently, and references to 
abortion as a need or issue is almost non-existent. The contribution of most of the 
regional conferences was the setting of numerical targets for fertility rates, maternal and 
infant mortality, and the prevalence of contraception.  
Bali Declaration  The first regional conference was held in Denpasar, Indonesia, from 
August 19-27th, 1992, and called the Fourth Asian and Pacific Population Conference. 
The conclusions of that conference are found in the Bali Declaration on Population and 
Sustainable Development. One of the key statements in the declaration recognized that 
the average fertility in the Asia and Pacific region was 3.1 per woman; however, this did 
not reflect the substantial differences between and within sub-regions of Asia and the 
Pacific. For instance, East Asia had the lowest fertility in the region at that time, at 2.1 
per woman; South Asia had the highest fertility at 4.3 per woman. There was a similar 
disparity when comparing infant mortality rates within sub-regions: infant mortality in 
South Asia was 90 per 1000 births, more than three times the level of infant mortality in 
East Asia, where it was 26 per 1000 births. The Bali Declaration set several ambitious 
goals in the area of population for Asia and the Pacific: to attain replacement level 
fertility (2.2 children per woman) by the year 2010, to reduce the level of infant mortality 
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to 40 per 1000 births, and where maternal mortality was high, of reducing it at least by 
half by the year 2010.  
Dakar/Ngor Declaration   The second regional conference was held in Dakar from 
December 7-12th, 1992, and called the Third African Population Conference. The 
Dakar/Ngor Declaration on Population, Family and Sustainable Development included 
commitments by participating governments to integrate population policies in 
development strategies; to work toward resolving population problems by setting 
quantified national objectives for reduction of population growth from 3% to 2.5% by 
2000 and 2% by 2010; and to ensure the availability and promotion of all tested available 
contraceptive and fertility regulation methods, including traditional and natural family 
planning methods, in order to double the regional contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR) 
from 10% to 20% by 2000, and 40% by 2010 (Dakar/Ngor Declaration paragraph 1,3). 
Broader goals on were detailed in the section on Fertility and the Family, including such 
key ones as setting fertility and family planning targets for all people of reproductive age, 
implementing legal measures to improve the status of women and their reproductive 
health, and strengthening information, education and communication in maternal and 
child health programs and family planning programs.  
Arab Population Conference The third regional conference was held in Amman, Jordan, 
from April 4-8th, 1994. The Arab delegates did not adopt a declaration that mandated the 
need to lower population growth rates in the region as a whole. However, one of the goals 
they set was to provide the services needed to attain national policy goals concerning 
population growth rates. The need for providing family planning services and maternal 
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and child health care was limited to those countries “wishing to reduce their population 
growth rates” (E/CONF.84/PC.16, para.19).  
Latin American and Caribbean Consensus  The fourth regional conference was held in 
Mexico City from April 29- May 4th, 1993. The conference adopted the Latin American 
and Caribbean Consensus, which viewed the issue of population through the broader 
perspective of the search for equity. The Latin American Demographic Centre presented 
an analysis to the delegates that argued that family planning services were important in 
that they presented an opportunity for greater equity within Latin American societies, 
rather than perpetuating the old saying of “the rich get richer while the poor get children.” 
Latin American countries were also interested in equity between nations. The external 
debt of this area accounted for almost a quarter of all Third World debt, a 
disproportionate share; the Consensus argued that servicing this debt placed an unduly 
heavy burden on Latin American and Caribbean countries that prevents resources being 
allocated for development and social programs aimed at such services as family planning. 
The Consensus recognized that the pronounced decline in fertility from 6 to 3.5 children 
per woman was an important demographic change in the region, and although it further 
recognized the need to reduce discrimination against women and high morbidity and 
mortality rates associated with childbirth, there were no targets set as a region for 
population growth rates.  
 As a Latin American and Caribbean intergovernmental conference, the issue of 
abortion was not addressed as directly as at other conferences. However, Jyoti Singh, as 
the Executive Coordinator for ICPD, mentioned the topic directly in his opening speech 
at the conference (Johnson 1995:36). The UNFPA had conducted research in the region 
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and circulated a paper stating that abortion in the region was “pervasive and carried out in 
vast numbers” (UNFPA paper 1993 – “Experiences in Population in Latin America and 
the Caribbean: Historical Perspective and Current Challenges”). This resulted in a 
paragraph reference in the Consensus, accepting that abortion is a major public health 
issue in the region, and while none of the countries accept abortion as a method of 
regulating fertility, “it is recommended that governments devote greater attention to the 
study and follow-up of this issue, with a view to evaluating how prevalent abortion really 
is and its impact on the health of women and their families…” 
European Conference  The fifth regional conference was held in Geneva, from March 23-
26th, 1993, and included the major donor countries of Europe and North America. The 
focus at this conference was to make a strong case for increased international cooperation 
in the population field. While developing countries were held to have primary 
responsibility for their own social and economic development, the 51st recommendation 
of the document emerging from this conference stressed the need for developed countries 
to create a favorable environment for increased economic development, and to increase 
the quantity and quality of their assistance, especially in the area of population issues. 
Another major area of focus at this conference was the need to provide family planning 
services to fulfill the growing unmet demand in developing countries for these services; 
as a result, population growth rates would naturally decline to a more sustainable rate. 
Along this vein, the influence of the Rio Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED) was felt in the recommendations that urged awareness of the close relationship 
between poverty, population growth and environmental degradation. Developed 
countries’ patterns of disproportionate production and consumption were also implicated 
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in the deterioration of the environment; however, nothing concrete was recommended to 
change those patterns.  
 
Preparatory Conferences 
ICPD PrepCom II  
The second PrepCom was noticeable for the strong leadership of the UN 
conference staff and influential countries such as the U.S. on population issues, especially 
women’s rights and abortion. The Secretary General spoke up on several key issues, 
including targets for the total human population, infant and maternal mortality, abortion, 
and contraceptive prevalence. The U.S. delegation also made a strong stand for family 
planning and choice in the matter of abortion, in stark contrast to the U.S. position in 
Mexico City. The Vatican reiterated its position against abortion, but did not make much 
of an impact.  
The second PrepCom began on May 14th, 1993, and in her opening speech, the 
ICPD’s Secretary General Dr. Nafis Sadik, asked delegates to consider setting 
quantifiable goals for their countries in such areas as maternal mortality, infant mortality, 
life expectancy, education especially for women and girls, gender equality and 
availability of and access to a full range of modern, safe and effective family planning 
services “to enable the exercise of choice.” In the area of total population size, Dr. Sadik 
set an ambitious goal for the conference. The Population Division projected three 
different estimates of the total human population in 2015, based on different assumptions 
about fertility: a high of 7.92 billion, a medium of 7.61 billion, and a low of 7.27 billion. 
The difference between the high and the low projections was 660 million people. 
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Although the initial goal was meant to be the medium projection of 7.61, Dr. Sadik 
circulated a paper to delegates with goals for 2015 in which she articulated her belief that 
the low population projection could be reached by 2015 if family planning information 
and services were provided to all couples and individuals who currently desired them, 
and if policies were formulated and implemented to empower women to participate fully 
in socio-economic development. She then urged the conference as a whole to set the goal 
of attaining the low population projection of 7.27 billion by 2015 (Johnson 1995: 40).  
Other specific targets were also proposed by Dr. Sadik, again clearly setting the 
bar for infant mortality, maternal mortality, life-expectancy and contraceptive prevalence 
by suggesting that these rates in the developing world be reduced to developed levels by 
the year 2015. For infant mortality and maternal mortality, these goals were quite 
ambitious: infant mortality in developing countries from the period 1990-95 was 62/1000 
births, while it was 12/1000 in developed countries. Maternal mortality in developing 
countries was 450/100,000 live births at the time, while it was 30/100,000 in developed 
countries. Dr. Sadik also exerted her influence briefly but clearly for the issue of 
abortion, saying that the conference should address it as a health issue rather than a 
means of family planning, but that they must address it. 
The head of the U.S. delegation, former U.S. senator Timothy Wirth, declared the 
changes in U.S. policy since the change in administrations, and although the former 
senator’s area of expertise was the environment, the three major concerns mentioned for 
the U.S. were first, women’s health and status; second, population and the environment; 
and third migration. In connection to the contested issue of abortion, Wirth stated 
unequivocally that the U.S. “supported reproductive choice, including access to safe 
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abortion” (Johnson 1995:43). This generated a round of applause from the audience 
(Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 2 June 1993).  
Archbishop Renato Martino, speaking for the Holy See, addressed the issue of 
abortion also, stating that the Catholic Church views the right to voluntary abortion as 
violating the most fundamental right of any human being – to life (Earth Negotiations 
Bulletin, June 2 1993). Although the Catholic Church did not support procreation at any 
cost, it opposed “demographic policies and family planning that are contrary to the 
liberty, dignity and conscience of the human being” (Johnson 1995:44). The PrepCom’s 
Chairman, Dr. Fred Sai, countered the Archbishop’s statement by asking why the 
Vatican, which supported modern medicine, did not support modern contraceptives. This 
was followed by several delegations, including Sweden and the U.S., who continued the 
debate along the lines which Dr. Sai began, urging attention on the issue of abortion 
especially in a health context. Argentina, alone, expressed its opposition to any mention 
of abortion in the context of family planning. The “Chairman’s Summary on the 
Conceptual Framework” included a paragraph on abortion that clearly indicated a need to 
address abortion as a major public health issue given the number of women who died as a 
result of unsafe and illegal abortion. However, Dr. Sai also faithfully included the 
reactions of most delegations to the issue:  
“While many delegations suggested that all women should have access to safe abortion, 
others suggested that the best way to eliminate abortions was provision of effective, 
modern contraception information and services; a few delegations reiterated that abortion 
should not be promoted as a method of family planning” (E/CONF.84/PC/L.9 of May 
20th, 1993).  
 
ICPD Third PrepCom 
The third meeting of ICPD’s preparatory committee was held in April 1994. On January 
24th, 1994, the Draft Programme of Action, put together by the ICPD Secretariat, was 
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circulated to the Preparatory Committee. While the third PrepCom was not bound by the 
text, this draft document was important as the most comprehensive look at the issues 
considered to be important in the field of population and development at the time, and 
what could possibly gain an international consensus based on the previous meetings of 
the Preparatory Committee.  
 One of the key issues the Draft tackled was that of population growth; prior to the 
Cairo draft, no official intergovernmental conference had had the objective of stabilizing 
the world’s population. The first objective proposed in the Cairo draft’s section on 
population growth was to achieve stabilization of the world population as soon as 
possible while respecting individual rights, aspirations and responsibilities. In addition, 
the draft program also made a clear connection between demographic pressures and 
problems of environmental degradation; thus another objective was to achieve and 
maintain a harmonious balance between population, resources, food, the environment, 
and development, especially by curbing unsustainable population growth.  
 In addition to population growth, the program of action proposed that the Cairo 
conference should adopt quantitative goals in three areas seen as integrally connected: 
education, especially for girls; infant, child, and maternal mortality; and the provision of 
universal access to family planning and reproductive health services. In this last area, the 
draft treated the controversial issue of abortion: all participants were urged to deal with 
unsafe abortion as a major health concern, especially as many of the maternal deaths the 
participants were concerned with preventing were due to unsafe abortions. The draft 
urged governments to reduce the need for abortion through expanded and improved 
family planning services, to “frame abortion laws and policies on the basis of a 
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commitment to women’s health and well-being rather than on criminal codes and 
punitive measures” (Paragraph 8.15). Although the language did not call for the right to 
universal access to abortion, the document did state that women should have access to 
safe abortion services in the case of rape and incest, and that women who wish to 
terminate their pregnancies should have ready access to reliable information, 
compassionate counseling and services for the management of unsafe abortions.  
 In addition, a basic definition of reproductive health was provided in chapter VII, 
paragraph 7.4:  
Reproductive health care in the context of primary health care should include: family-
planning information and services; education and services for prenatal, normal delivery 
and post-natal care; prevention and treatment of infertility; prevention and treatment of 
reproductive tract infections and sexually transmitted diseases; prevention and treatment 
of other reproductive health conditions; and information, education and counseling as 
appropriate on human sexuality, sexual and reproductive health and responsible 
parenthood. 
 
Scholars have argued that two main themes were stressed in the Draft Program of Action: 
the need to integrate population and development issues, and the need to emphasize the 
“centrality of the individual,” frequently referred to by Dr. Nafis Sadik. The emphasis 
placed on individual rights and choices, particularly in gender issues, was an increasingly 
important feature of the Cairo process, and was serving to distinguish the preparations for 
Cairo, 1994 from the previous world population conferences (Johnson 1995:59). In an 
environment where precedent and consensus plays a major role in determining the 
acceptability of language, this draft contained 40 “new issues” and 22 “new specific 
actions” that had no precedent in the Bucharest or Mexico City documents (Johnson 
1995). Most of these new issues dealt with gender issues. 
 Given the many new issues proposed in the draft program of action, the debate 
over it during the third PrepCom was mainly positive (Johnson 1995:63). Most countries 
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accepted the new objectives, and brackets were placed mainly on the extraction of 
resources for the programs, the achieving of universal primary education for all by the 
year 2015, and on the terms “reproductive and sexual health,” at the request of the Holy 
See. The Vatican’s position on the issue of abortion was not surprising, but how 
vigorously the Vatican defended its position at PrepCom III did surprise many. In a 
statement issued by the Vatican prior to PrepCom III, the main sticking points seemed to 
be the possibility of a governmental imposition of limits on family size, sterilization and 
abortion as methods of family planning, and the total lack of reference to marriage in the 
context of family planning. The Holy See exerted its influence among as many countries 
as possible to oppose the language on reproductive health and rights, which it perceived 
as code for the right to abortion. In this, it was joined by several countries, such as Costa 
Rica, Argentina, Malta, Venezuela, Morocco and Ecuador, who argued that they could 
not agree to any terms unless they were clearly defined to exclude abortion (Johnson 
1995:69). A secondary issue was that of the phrase “couples and individuals” in the draft 
program’s recommendation concerning the right to decide the number and spacing of 
their children. The Vatican and several Catholic countries argued against directing family 
planning services and sex education at adolescents, while IPPF argued that unmet 
demand for family planning included adolescents. Although much was accomplished at 
PrepCom III, including what Jyoti Singh would call the “near universal public acceptance 
of the integral relationship between reproductive health and the empowerment of 
women,” the focus of the Vatican and a small number of other countries on abortion-
related issues prevented consensus on the reproductive health approach coming out of 





Opposition to the Cairo program of action was voiced by Islamic countries about 
two weeks prior the start of the conference. It began with a condemnation of the Program 
of Action by the Islamic institution at the heart of Egypt’s religious establishment, al-
Azhar, for promoting sexual activity by teenagers, legitimizing abortion and protecting 
homosexual or extramarital sexual relationships. This was countered by the Grand Mufti, 
who rejected the criticism of al-Azhar theologians as based on a faulty translation of the 
program of action. Sheikh Mohamed Sayid Tantawi also stated that he found no 
encouragement for free sexual relations outside of matrimony, nor for abortion as a 
means of birth control. Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak also criticized al-Azhar for 
creating a furor over non-existent issues; he argued that the conference was essential for 
development, providing a proper standard of living for citizens, maintaining stability, and 
supporting investment. However, this did not stop al-Azhar from calling on all Muslim 
nations to rally against the conference. As a result, Bangladeshi Prime Minister Khaledi 
Zia decided not to attend the conference. This was a major blow for conference 
organizers because Bangladesh, as one of the most densely populated states in the world, 
had reduced its fertility rate drastically from seven children per woman in 1972 to 4.2 in 
1994; the lowered birth rate, from 4% in 1974 to 2.1% in 1994, was attributed to national 
family planning programs. Thus, Prime Minister Zia, as a woman and a leader of a 
populous Muslim nation, was to be an influence both in words and in example, and her 
absence from the conference a serious loss.  
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 At the end of August, Saudi Arabia also issued declarations against the 
conference, and warned that any Muslim attending would be guilty of violating Sharia. 
Saudi Arabia then decided not to attend the conference, and Turkish Prime Minister 
Tansu Ciller also announced that she would be too busy to attend the conference. Sudan 
announced at the opening of the conference that it would not attend. Pakistan announced 
that it considered the program a challenge from the West and planned on attending to 
counter it. One moderate influence came from Iran, which announced that it would attend 
the conference and hoped to incorporate its religious ethics into the final document. Iran 
had reduced its own population growth rate drastically with the use of a family planning 
program, supporting every method of contraception except for abortion.  
 The media reported extensively on the declarations of Muslim nations, as well as 
on efforts by the Vatican to reach out to Muslim countries for support against abortion 
rights or greater sexual freedom at the Cairo conference. The Holy See acknowledged a 
meeting between the Papal Envoy in Tehran and Iranian officials on the subject of the 
Cairo Conference, but Iran attended the conference with an critical but essentially pro-
family planning perspective. Egypt as a moderate Muslim country was able to do much 
that other hosts might not have been able to do. Invested as it was in the conference’s 
success, the Egyptian government did all it could to reassure the Vatican, and was able to 
mobilize moderate Muslim countries to support the conference and prevent the 
withdrawal of many Muslim countries. In the end, only Libya and Sudan publicly 
boycotted the conference; Saudi Arabia and Lebanon simply informed the Conference 
Secretariat that they were not attending at the last minute.  The final count of attendance 
at Cairo was 179 countries – successful by any standard. 
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 In the U.S., several Catholic organizations mounted a campaign against the U.S. 
stand on abortion, most probably in response to a cable sent by the U.S. Department of 
State to its diplomatic and consular posts on March 16, 1994; the cable read in part: “the 
United States believes that access to safe, legal, and voluntary abortion is a fundamental 
right of all women” (U.S. Department of State, March 16, 1994). When the Holy See 
spokesman, Joaquin Navarro-Valls, criticized Vice President Gore for his involvement 
with the ICPD Program of Action, then Vice President Gore responded by saying that the 
U.S. had not sought to establish an international right to abortion in the past, present or 
future (Federal News Service, August 25, 1994). The head of the U.S. delegation, Under-
Secretary of State Tim Wirth took a similar tone in explaining the U.S. position on 
abortion; he clarified his position as seeking access to safe abortion, not a universal 
human right to abortion. The issue of abortion specifically and reproductive health and 
rights as an approach in general would continue to be of importance and controversy as 
the Cairo conference opened.  
Role of NGOs 
 The history of NGOs at UN Population and Development global conferences 
show that NGOs were considered peripheral in the beginning, especially at the Bucharest 
conference. Since many were established with the technical and financial assistance of 
developed countries, developing countries in Asia and Africa regarded them suspiciously. 
However, after Bucharest, many more NGOs involved with the issue of population were 
created, receiving funding from both governmental and non-governmental sources (Singh 
1998: 124). These NGOs received more recognition and support from the UN. In 
Bucharest, only NGOs that had consultative status with ECOSOC had official 
 
 150 
accreditation at the main Conference. In Mexico, “a broader interpretation of the rules” 
permitted accreditation not only of the NGOs that had consultative status with ECOSOC 
but also any NGO that was recognized by a UN agency or organization.  
 Although there was no parallel NGO forum for the Mexico Conference, NGOs 
involved in population and development activities organized a Working Group, held a 
large NGO Conference in 1983 to formulate their recommendations for Mexico, and 
were represented at the two meetings of the Mexico Preparatory Committee. One 
hundred and fifty-four NGOs with 367 representatives were accredited by the 
Conference, and 16 of them had the opportunity to address the Conference; papers 
prepared by NGOs were distributed as background documents, and the Conference 
Secretariat gave NGOs daily briefings on the progress of the Conference. The Mexico 
recommendations reflect the changing attitude of the government and the UN towards 
NGOs: in Recommendation 84, NGOs were recognized for their pioneering work and 
urged to continue their work in implementing the Program of Action emerging from the 
conference.  
Opening Session 
In the opening session, addresses were given by the Secretary General of the UN, 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali; the President of Egypt, Muhammad Hosni Mubarak; the 
Secretary General of the Conference, Dr. Nafis Sadik;, the Prime Minister of Norway, 
Gro Harlem Brundtland; the Vice President of the U.S., Al Gore; the Prime Minister of 
Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto; and the Prime Minister of Swaziland, Prince Mbilini. While the 
opening addresses supported the draft Program of Action’s use of the term reproductive 
health and rights, several of the speakers took the time to clarify their understanding of 
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that term as not referring to abortion, and not supporting abortion as a form of family 
planning. 
Prime Minister Brundtland gave the most explicit justification of reproductive 
health, arguing that “it therefore seems sensible to combine health concerns that deal with 
human sexuality under the heading ‘reproductive health care.’ I have tried, in vain, to 
understand how that term can possibly be read as promoting abortion or qualifying 
abortion as a means of family planning.” In addition, Brundtland addressed the issue of 
abortion explicitly, saying “It is encouraging that the Conference will contribute to 
expanding the focus of family-planning programs to include concern for sexually 
transmitted diseases, and caring for pregnant, delivering and aborting women.” (UN 
1994:171).   
Prime Minister Bhutto’s address, from a Muslim head of government, was 
especially important, given the unexpected withdrawals of Bangladesh and Turkey; while 
she critiqued some aspects of the Draft Progamme, she supported family planning and 
reproductive health, confirming that the major objective of her government was a 
commitment to improve the quality of life their people through provision of family 
planning and health services. She also made a point of supporting the traditional family 
as the basic unit of society and rejecting abortion as a method of population control.  
Vice President Gore’s address also supported in general the goals of the Cairo 
Conference, and specifically defined the U.S. position on abortion by stating that while 
the U.S. Constitution guarantees every woman in the U.S. the right to choose and 
abortion, he reiterated the same point as speakers before him: “let us take a false issue off 
the table: the U.S. does not seek to establish a new international right to abortion, and we 
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do not believe that abortion should be encouraged as a method of family planning” (UN 
1994b: 177). Gore also detailed his understanding that policy-making in these matters 
should be the sovereign province of each government; however, with regard to abortion, 
he condemned coercion relating to abortion, recommended that where abortion is 
permitted, it should be medically safe, and restated his belief that unsafe abortion is a 
matter of women’s health that must be addressed. 
Prince Mbilini, speaking as a representative of the African continent, was very 
supportive of the draft Program of Action, declaring that OAU heads of government 
understood the responsibilities of governments to understand and take action concerning 
the role of population in development. President Mubarak and Vice President Gore both 
made strong appeals to delegates to respect differences and to work together, which gave 
the opening of the conference a much needed boost of optimism (Singh 1998:61).  
The issue of abortion and reproductive health and rights are intimately connected 
but placed in different chapters due to the emphasis on abortion as a health issue. The 
very important issue of defining reproductive health and reproductive rights in Chapter 
VII could not be resolved until the Conference had debated and negotiated the issue of 
abortion (Singh 1998:61). On September 6th, Ambassador Biegman opened the 
discussion on the text of Paragraph 8.25; he asked delegates not to delay the resolution of 
the issue, to demonstrate that the conference was truly about population rather than 
abortion. Again, to speed that resolution, the emphasis was put explicitly on the medical 
implications of unsafe abortion: “The purpose here, he said, is not to delve on the ethical 
or moral dimension of the question but, rather, to concentrate on the medical aspects of 
unsafe abortion” (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, September 7th, 1994).   
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 However, negotiations still lasted for next four days. Two versions of the text on 
abortion were on the table; both described unsafe abortion as a major health concern and 
supported the provision of services for the management of complications of unsafe 
abortion. The significant differences between the two texts lay mainly in one urging 
governments to evaluate their abortion-related laws and perhaps change abortion-related 
laws and policies from a criminal perspective to one that focuses on women’s health, and 
the other not including such proposals but including a statement preferred by the Holy 
See and some other countries: “in no case should abortion be promoted as a method of 
family planning.”  
The first day of discussion was inconclusive, with many of the 85 delegations 
who spoke in the Main Committee supporting the more inclusive text, while the Holy See 
supported the second text with reservations about some parts. Chairman Biegman 
proposed a compromise text that included the phrase supported by the Holy See and 
emphasized the need to prevent unwanted pregnancies, eliminate the need for abortion, 
and where abortion is legal, have it be safe. This compromise text had the support of most 
delegates, but the Holy See still had reservations about it. On the morning of the seventh, 
Chairman Biegman suggested setting up a smaller group chaired by Muzzafar Quereshi 
from Pakistan to negotiate a compromise; this group included a representation of the 
many views on abortion, such as Iran, Egypt, the U.S., Norway, Indonesia, the EU, the 
Russian Federation, Barbados, South Africa, Nicaragua, Trinidad and Tobago, El 
Salvador, Benin and Malta. This small group negotiated through September 8th, and 
provided the Chairman with a consensus text that evening; this text began with the 
sentence, “In no case should abortion be promoted as a method of family planning,” 
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included recommendations to prevent unwanted pregnancies by expanding family-
planning services, and stipulated that where abortion is legal, it should be safe. One 
notable addition is the caveat that “Any measures or changes related to abortion within 
the health system can only be determined at the national or local level according to the 
national legislative process” (UN, 1994).  
This caveat of the sovereign right of each country to implement the 
recommendations of the Program of Action became part of the umbrella paragraph in the 
Principles chapter (II):  
“the implementation of the recommendations contained in the Program of Action is the 
sovereign right of each country, consistent with national laws and development priorities, 
with full respect for the various religious and ethical values and cultural backgrounds of 
its people, and in conformity with universally recognized international human rights.” 
(UN,1994:11) 
 
This understanding of the sovereign right of each country to decide how the Program of 
Action would be implemented greatly facilitated the adoption of the consensus texts on 
abortion, reproductive health and rights (Singh 1998:69). 
When the delegates at large discussed the consensus text, most of the delegates 
accepted it, while Egypt and Bahrain accepted the text but said it would be interpreted 
according to national and religious laws. Those who did not accept the text included 
Argentina, Peru, Malta, the Dominican Republic, and the Holy See; the representative of 
the Holy See stated that while they were very concerned about maternal mortality and 
willing to endorse the parts of Paragraph 8.25 that addressed women’s health issues, they 
could not endorse legal abortion for moral reasons, and would withhold consent until the 




The paragraph defining reproductive health was adopted on September 9th by the 
Main Committee; it defined the term as a state of complete physical, mental and social 
well-being in all matters relating to the reproductive system and to its functions and 
processes. Paragraph 7.2 stated that men and women have the right to be informed and 
have access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods of family planning of 
their choice, as well as other methods of their choice for regulation of fertility which are 
not against the law. Paragraph 7.3 includes the Bucharest formulation of right to family 
planning services, recognizing the basic right of all couples and individuals to decide 
freely and responsibly the number, spacing and timing of their children, but adding “the 
right to attain the highest standard of sexual and reproductive health” (UN 1994).  
The consensus on the language on abortion and on reproductive health and rights 
reflected the support of most of the countries at the Conference. However, several 
countries recorded reservations on specific terms in the language. Afghanistan and Libya 
objected to the use of individuals in the phrase individuals and couples. Jordan and 
Kuwait stated that the Program of Action would be applied in accordance with Islamic 
laws and moral values. Many Latin American countries affirmed that life begins at 
conception and recorded their reservations or clarifications on various words or concepts 
in the approved text (El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Ecuador, Guatemala 
and Peru). For the first time, the Holy See joined the consensus on parts of the Program 
of Action, and expressing its reservations on others; the Holy See especially noted the 
affirmations against all forms of coercion in population policies and the improvement of 
women’s status through education and better health-care services; it also recognized the 
importance of the family as a basic unit of society, and the need for greater respect for 
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religious and cultural beliefs of persons and communities (UN 1995:143). The Holy See 
also expressed its concerns on abortion and adolescent health issues, noting that it 
regarded the terms ‘sexual health,’ ‘sexual rights,’ and ‘reproductive health,’ and 
‘reproductive rights,’ as applying to a holistic concept of health, but did not consider 
abortion or access to abortion as a dimension of these terms.  
With reference to the issues of reproductive health and rights and specifically the 
issue of abortion, the Cairo document was significant because it defined reproductive 
rights, going beyond the Bucharest formulation on the rights of couples and individuals: 
the inclusion of the right to attain the highest standard of sexual and reproductive health 
was significant because it recognized that sexual relations are not solely for procreation 
(Singh 1998:74). In addition, while the Conference confirmed Mexico City’s consensus 
that abortion should not be a method of family planning, the Cairo Conference elaborated 
on it by giving unsafe abortion high priority as a major health concern.  
Paragraph 7.6 listed reproductive health service to be provided in the context of 
primary health care, including “abortion as specified in paragraph 8.25;” this has been 
interpreted to mean that services and facilities would be improved to ensure safe abortion 
in countries where it is permitted by law (Singh 1998:75).   
 
5.3 Analysis of Cairo 
5.3.1 Abortion-rights movement 
The abortion-rights movement took advantage of several key openings in the 
political opportunity structure as well as the accumulation of the previous twenty years of 
experience with the UN conference process and in advocacy to change the language of 
population policy from family planning and population control to reproductive health and 
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rights at the UN Population and Development Conference in Cairo. The movement used a 
human rights frame to advance the language of reproductive health and rights; science 
and research to support their advocacy; and alliances with both the environmental and 
human rights communities to better connect their cause to UN agencies, and women’s 
health and rights organizations from the global South to ensure greater representation 
with developing country delegations.   
Several feminist organizations concerned with population issues were key players 
during the preparation for and process of the Cairo conference, including the 
International Women’s Health Coalition (IWHC); the Women’s Environment and 
Development Organization (WEDO), founded and led by Bella Abzug; and the Center 
for Development and Population Activities (CEDPA). The Women’s Caucus was created 
by Bella Abzug of WEDO to bring together influential female government officials and 
activists for the purpose of influencing the Rio conference. The organization became a 
professional and highly organized force at Cairo, inviting government delegates to hear 
their views on the Program of Action, and influencing governmental delegations to take 
into account their “Women’s Declaration on Population Policies." One of the key ways in 
which women’s health and rights organizations such as WEDO helped lobby for 
women’s interests at Cairo was through the Women’s Caucus, which simultaneously 
mobilized women outside official processes by distributing insider information to 
women’s networks and producing independent data on relevant issues. The Women’s 
Caucus also coordinated lobbying efforts inside the UN by holding NGO strategy 
meetings and NGO press conferences, and distributing information on relevant issues to 
delegates at conferences. 
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The strategies of feminist NGOs over the UN Decade for Women show awareness 
of and adjustment to the environment of the UN, in that they adjusted their arguments to 
purposefully use human rights frames, they aligned their advocacy with research which 
supported their goals, they formed alliances with the human rights and environment 
communities in order to present a more united front, and developed connections with 
local groups in developing countries order to build a broader consensus among women’s 
health and rights groups and lobby developing country delegations more effectively.  
5.3.1.1 Framing 
Feminists shifted population policy language to reproductive health and rights at 
Cairo using a human rights frame. As discussed previously, human rights was embedded 
in the UN charter and agencies nearly since its inception, but was more accepted now that 
the Cold War had ended,  
Throughout the early nineties, feminist NGOs had participated in UN international 
conferences, on such subjects as human rights and the environment. During those 
conferences, they built important connections and alliances with these groups, and 
attempted to put their concerns about population programs and the need for reproductive 
health and rights on the table at these conferences. Although they had better success at 
the Human Rights Conference in Vienna, the Environmental Conference in Rio was a 
great disappointment as many environment groups tended to either shy away from 
reproductive health and rights, or to agree with the neo-Malthusian population control 
groups that given the dire ecological situation, world population growth had to decrease 
(Cohen 1993). Although feminists were able to prevent references to rapid population 
growth as a legitimate environmental concern from being part of Agenda 21, these two 
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earlier conferences emphasized the importance of framing the argument for reproductive 
health and rights in such a persuasive way as to unite the different portions of the 
women’s movement, unite the allies of the women’s movement, and to head off 
arguments from the anti-abortion groups. As a result of decreased tensions between 
formerly communist states and democratic states, as well as the connections made during 
the Human Rights conference in Vienna, “… the global women’s health and rights 
movement was strategic in utilizing the human rights discourse as a political language” 
(Eager 2004: 113).  
Women’s rights activists would say that the “international women’s movement drew 
upon human rights principles to remove women’s reproduction from its isolation, placing 
it in the larger context of equitable development policies to provide for basic social and 
material needs…” (Correa and Reichmann 1994: 92). Feminists interested in women’s 
rights in general urged women to use human rights discourse and norms to frame issues 
such as reproductive health and rights because they were not separate but “crucial to the 
future of human rights” (Correa and Reichmann 1994: 107). This transition had been 
taking place for some time; Charlotte Bunch of the Center for Women’s Global 
Leadership at Rutgers University noted that “in the late 1980s and early 1990s, women in 
diverse countries took up the human rights framework and began developing the analytic 
and political tools that together constitute the ideas and practices of women’s human 
rights” (Bunch and Frost 2000: 2). Not only was the human rights framework more 
universal in its appeal to member countries, but it was also a key part of the UN’s charter 
and justification for intervention in many countries. However, if human rights had always 
been a part of the UN culture, why did it take so long for other organizations and activists 
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to draw on it as a framework? Human rights became the dominant framework for many 
NGOs involved with many different issues in the early 1990s – but not earlier. The most 
proximate reason, besides the time it took for women’s health and rights activists to 
network with the human rights community, is I believe the opening of discursive space 
for new rights claims that was brought about by the end of the Cold War (Eager 2004: 
115); women were able to exchange ideas and experiences more freely around the world, 
and to strategize on how best to use human rights (Bunch and Frost 2000).  
All groups within the women’s health and rights movement did not immediately 
accept the human rights framework. The global women’s health and rights movement 
was composed of many different groups: radical versus more liberal, mainstream 
feminists; groups that focused on lobbying and policy-making versus those that focused 
on fieldwork and programs; developed, Northern/Western hemisphere groups versus 
developing, Southern/Eastern hemisphere groups. This diversity and the problems that it 
spurred for the women’s movement can be seen in the splits within the movement prior to 
the Cairo conference, and especially in two meetings held by the IWHC in preparation 
for Cairo. 
As a result of women’s rights hardly being mentioned at the first Preparatory 
Committee for the ICPD, the IWHC organized a meeting of an international group from 
other women’s health organizations in 1992. They formed the Women’s Alliance and 
adopted Women’s Voices ’94: The Women’s Declaration on Population Policies (IWHC 
1994). The declaration defined women’s ability to control their fertility as a human right 
and specified seven ethical principles that population programs should adhere to in order 
to uphold women’s well-being (Antrobus et al. 1993). The Women’s Declaration proved 
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to be a focus of criticism within the women’s movement and from a conservative alliance 
formed by the Vatican with other Catholic countries and fundamentalist Islamic 
countries. The Vatican saw reproductive rights and health as threatening the family and 
violating the rights of the unborn and the dignity of women by standing for the 
unrestricted right to abortion. Throughout the preparatory conferences and at the ICPD, 
this conservative alliance blocked discussion on the issue of women’s reproductive rights 
and health by making frequent oral interventions and demanding brackets. The media 
highlighted this controversy and focused on the issue of abortion during the preparation 
for Cairo.  
The more radical of the progressive women’s organizations were also critical of the 
Declaration because of its narrow interpretation of reproduction as abortion rights 
(Joachim 2003). Other women’s health and rights organizations that disagreed with the 
Women’s Declaration were the WGNRR (established at the Tribunal), the Boston 
Women’s Health Book Collective, the Feminist International Network of Resistance to 
Reproductive and Genetic Engineering in Hamburg, Germany, and the Committee on 
Women, Population, and Environment in Amherst, Mass. They critiqued Women’s 
Voices ’94 for procedural and substantive reasons. Gisela Dutting of the WGNRR saw 
the Declaration as drafted by an exclusive group of women who represented only the 
pragmatic wing of the women’s movement, or those who were willing to work with UN 
agencies and conform to the UN norms in order to make a difference on this international 
stage. In addition, the Declaration and Women’s Voices were critiqued for joining the 
general consensus that population policies would solve problems like poverty and 
environmental degradation, without addressing the underlying causes of these problems. 
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As a result of this opposition from radical progressive women’s organizations and the 
conservative alliance, the Women’s Alliance altered its strategy in order to unite the 
different women’s health and rights organizations and present a stronger movement with 
language that the different sides could agree on. They believed a movement that included 
the different radical organizations, many of which came from developing countries, 
would be able to lobby a greater number of delegations successfully.    
The IWHC organized another event shortly before the ICPD, in Rio de Janeiro in the 
spring of 1994, a conference entitled “Reproductive Health and Justice.” Learning from 
its mistakes, the IWHC invited more than two hundred participants from seventy-nine 
countries, selected to include a diversity of nationalities, cultures, ages, sexual 
orientations, income levels, profession and philosophies (Joachim 2003).  The location of 
this meeting made it much more accessible for Southern women. Although the diversity 
slowed down and complicated the decision-making process, it elicited a more inclusive 
agenda. Including the radical women’s organizations in the Alliance did not erase the 
differences between the radical and pragmatic points of view, but used them as a strength 
in their strategy: the pragmatic organizations relied on their connections within the 
population establishment to push for a reproductive rights and health agenda inside the 
UN while radical organizations continued to work outside established institutions. “They 
[radical activists] mobilized political pressure, maintained a critical voice in the process, 
and held those working inside the UN accountable” (Joachim 2003: 266). 
 In addition, these radical groups prompted the more moderate ones to adopt more 
extreme positions. At the Rio conference, the delegates agreed on a twenty-one point 
statement that voiced strong opposition to population policies that sought only to control 
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the fertility of women and did not provide for such basic rights as a secure livelihood or 
freedom from poverty and oppression. Whereas the Women’s Declaration had justified 
women’s reproductive rights and health solely in terms of human rights, the twenty-one 
point statement also placed the issue in the development framework, claiming inequitable 
development models and strategies were responsible for existing problems with 
population (Joachim 2003: 266). This twenty-one point statement was much more critical 
of the population establishment than the Women’s Declaration, and the Women’s 
Alliance began to gain leverage at the ICPD following the Rio Conference. 
The Rio statement did include more development framing, but a close study of 
several of the points reveals that a focus on abortion and a human rights frame had 
become embedded in the arguments made for women’s rights, and these elements were 
uppermost in the rhetoric of the feminist groups at Cairo. Under the “Sexual and 
Reproductive Rights and Health” section in the Rio Statement, the document states that 
women’s right to safe, legal, accessible, and affordable abortion is non-negotiable and 
should be inserted in the final document adopted by governments at Cairo. Under the 
advocacy section, the document asserts that one tool the women’s network would use to 
accomplish their goal would be “the human rights framework to advance reproductive 
health and justice and to hold governments and international organizations accountable” 
(Rio Statement 1994). Point 14 of the 21-point summary at the beginning of the statement 
reads as follows:  
Reproductive rights are inalienable human rights that are inseparable from other basic 
rights to health, security, livelihood, education, and political empowerment. Therefore, 
the design and implementation of the policies affecting reproductive rights should 




The pragmatic women’s groups that gathered in preparation for Cairo understood the 
need to strategically frame reproductive health and rights in terms of human rights in 
order to make sure this language was included in the Cairo Program of Action. Paige 
Eager in her study of the global health and rights movement observes that the women’s 
groups made “an explicit strategic decision … to utilize the human rights framework and 
methodology,” and that “the framing of reproductive rights and health as an international 
human rights issue was key to the GWHRM’s ultimate victory in gaining codification of 
reproductive rights and health” (Eager 2004:137). One of the activists from the abortion-
rights network emphasized the importance of the human rights framework at the UN, and 
how that helped their advocacy.  
Obviously it helps that human rights is the core foundation of the UN, and obviously it 
helps that in working in social development issues, there is a tremendous push on human 
rights discussion. And so it’s easy to hook onto that prevalence… It offers a lot of entry 
points, the fact that human rights is the crux of everybody’s mandate within the UN 
system, because we can link the reproductive rights issues to its founding rights, to 
liberty, right to freedom, right to choose marriage, right to health. So that well-developed 
human-rights system and the UN agencies within that permits us to be able to hook onto 
that discussion and terminology. (Confidential Interview 2006) 
 
  At the third preparatory meeting for the Cairo Conference (PrepCom III), 
delegates tried to reach agreement on as much of the final draft of the program of Action 
as possible. One of the most divisive issues was the entire chapter dealing with 
reproductive health and rights, Chapter VII; although the Holy See and its allies opposed 
any language pertaining to reproductive health and rights, by the third PrepCom, a shift in 
language had occurred from family planning to reproductive health (Eager 2004: 143). 
Many different activists recalled one of the key moments of the third PrepCom that led to 
that shift in language as when the women’s NGOs were allowed onto the meeting floor to 
participate in negotiating the language of the Program of Action. 
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The human rights frame allowed the women’s groups to “take the high moral ground” by 
putting the issue of reproductive health and rights in terms of the human right to life and 
control of the body (Eager 2004: 144).  
The determined opposition of the Holy See and its allies to reproductive health 
and rights also helped bring together the disparate factions of the women’s movement; a 
woman’s rights activist and scholar argues that many women’s NGOs began shifting their 
discourse from a health paradigm to a human rights frame out of practical considerations; 
they sought to counter the vocal opposition of the Vatican (Petchesky 1997:576) at the 
Cairo conference. The audience of their framing efforts at this point were other state 
delegations, to appeal to a more universal paradigm than that of health in response to the 
Vatican’s appeal to conservative religious tradition, and to UN officials, in order to 
present an established basis for their advocacy. 
5.3.1.2 Information Politics 
 The feminist groups also changed their lobbying strategy to use more scientific 
data and provide expert information and well-written documents for the many delegates 
that came to the Cairo conference with small delegations and less than expert 
information. More scientific data was available to them as a result of the UN Decade for 
Women, in which many UN agencies began to collect systematic information on women 
all over the world for the first time. By the late 1980s, this information had been collected 
for nearly 20 years, and was significant in the arguments and information presented to the 
UNFPA and country delegates in preparation for Cairo and at the Cairo conference. 
Although this may seem more of a logical choice than a deliberate strategy, I would argue 
that the environment of the UN conferences and the agencies which the feminist NGOs 
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were trying to influence came very specifically from a bureaucratic rationalization point 
of view that emphasizes scientific research to support change in procedure and policy, 
and that a shift in lobbying strategy from more symbolic activities to the distribution of 
scientific information was an effective strategy. It was both an unconscious adjustment to 
the culture of the UN given the acclimatization of the women’s groups to the UN 
conferences during the Women’s Decade, and a conscious adjustment to the need for 
expert, scientifically based information in written form for the Cairo conference.  
The background document on the Population Program issued by the UNFPA in 
1994 emphasizes the “data collection, research, analysis, training, dissemination of 
information” done by UN agencies before the provision of financial assistance or 
monitoring and evaluation of population projects and programs. The document goes on to 
state  
In spite of the highly sensitive and controversial character of population issues, the United 
Nations has served as a neutral forum to debate openly such issues and to negotiate common 
strategies. Through its program of research and analysis, it has accomplished pioneering 
work in the development of new methodologies for demographic analysis, and particularly, 
in creating awareness of the key role that population variables play in social and economic 
development. (ICPD Secretariat 1994)  
 
Clearly, the underlying assumption of this document, and its writers, was that research 
and analysis are the only reasonable methods of establishing progress in the field. This 
research and analysis was also the method by which the more subjective process of 
“creating awareness” was accomplished. This document is one example illustrating the 
existence of the norm at the UN that science and reason are the means to progress. These 
rational methods also contribute to the belief that the results of research are neutral, and 
that the UN is truly a neutral forum, with no bias in terms of its underlying philosophies. 
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 One of the delegates from the U.S. to the Cairo conference recalled clearly that 
one of the factors in the success of the women’s organizations shifting the terms of the 
debate from population control to reproductive health and rights was the social science 
that emerged at that time, and how activists parlayed that research to support their goals 
(Confidential Interview II 2006). A research document by John Bongaarts and Judith 
Bruce, working at the Population Council, came out just prior to the Cairo conference; 
this research split up the elements that were going to drive demographic growth and cited 
unmet need for contraception as one of those elements. For this particular delegate, this 
research document presented “a very vivid picture of why family planning only wasn’t 
going to get to the demographic goals some were seeking, and why a broader approach 
needed to be undertaken” (Confidential Interview II 2006, emphasis in original). This 
delegate felt that Bongaarts and Bruce’s research was a very useful tool because it helped 
bridge the divide between demographers and women’s health and rights activists; it 
moved past making a “numbers only” argument, and instead tried to “understand what 
the numbers are, and the quality of life that people were going to have was going to have 
an impact, and the quality of life they were having was going to have an impact in terms 
of demographics” (Confidential Interview II 2006, emphasis in original). The delegate 
describes the shift from a demographic goal of reducing numbers to a reproductive health 
and rights goal of access to health services including contraception in the following way:  
I don’t think population as an argument is even much of an argument anymore. But still 
then – there were a lot of people that were very concerned about numbers. They thought 
achieving the rights numbers was the goal. And this was sort of a shift to – well, the way 
to achieve the right numbers is by taking the quote unquote right, correct, broader 
approach. (Confidential Interview II 2006, emphasis in original) 
 
 An activist at the time of the conference working at the Alan Guttmacher Institute 
also stressed the importance of evidence and research supporting the advocacy of 
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women’s health and rights groups at Cairo, stating that the Guttmacher Institute was 
“very pivotal in putting a factual floor, or an evidence floor, underneath some of the 
advocacy debates” (Confidential Interview III 2006). The Guttmacher Institute put out 
research with a clear reproductive health and rights vision, but 
the evidence couldn’t be criticized. The methodology was really transparent, it could 
have been replicated by anybody and they would have found the same things. That turned 
out to be very influential in terms of policy-making, and helping to shore up the 
advocates’ conversations during those conferences. (Confidential Interview III 2006, 
emphasis in the original) 
 
The evidence not only supported the advocacy of the women’s health and rights 
organizations, it did so in a way that was accepted as objective and true, and this was 
what made the use of science and research really powerful in supporting advocacy. This 
activist felt that research and evidence were key to the success of women’s health and 
rights groups in Cairo; in addition, the way the Guttmacher Institute coordinated the 
distribution of this evidence with the advocacy groups such as International Women’s 
Health Coalition, Population Crisis Committee (now Population Action International), 
and International Planned Parenthood helped make the advocacy messages consistent. 
Part of that consistency was aligning advocacy messages with research. “…when you 
have an evidence base, advocacy messages have to follow the evidence. So it’s almost 
like a natural consistency and added strength. Even the pro-life or anti-groups have to 
react to the same piece of data” (Confidential Interview III 2006).  
 This activist also related one dramatic example of how the research produced by 
the Guttmacher Institute was used directly to affect the debate at the Cairo conference. 
This activist worked very closely with the lead representative, Judith Hellner, of 
International Planned Parenthood Federation, Western Hemisphere region on the research 
the Institute was conducting in Latin America; Hellner called the activist from the floor 
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of the UN and asked for the statistics on the levels of abortion in six Latin American 
countries that the Institute had not released yet.  
She said, “I need them now, because Brazil is ready to take on the Vatican.” And so I 
gave her the go-ahead to give them the statistics. And the guy from Brazil stood up to the 
Vatican after the Vatican said, “There is no support for abortion in Latin America,” he 
got up and said, “Wait a minute, there may not be any support according to you, but there 
are abortions, and I have new statistics.” …It was thrilling, because for the Brazilians to 
say that our Catholic country is not going to be falling in line with your rhetoric was 
pretty, pretty amazing. (Confidential Interview III 2006) 
 
 Activists from women’s health and rights organizations also made a particular 
point of mentioning that their ability to provide government delegations with information 
relevant to the debates, and clear, concise language concerning the issues of reproductive 
health, maternal mortality, and adolescent rights among others was a distinct advantage in 
their advocacy. Barbara Crane of IPAS indicated that her organization tries to combat 
anti-abortion organizations by assembling public health data on the impact of unsafe 
abortion, and its links to other issues delegates are concerned about such as sexual 
violence and HIV/AIDS (Barbara Crane Interview 2006). Stirling Scruggs, then Director 
of Information and External Relations at UNFPA, also confirmed that one of the key 
means of influence women’s health and rights NGOs used at the PrepComs and at the 
Cairo conference was the information and organized material they provided to 
delegations. In fact, he noted that at the Cairo conference, even well-prepared delegations 
such as those from Europe would approach the health and rights NGOs and say “How do 
we frame this and how do we do that?” and the women’s organizations had the 
opportunity to directly influence the language by helping them write text (Stirling 
Scruggs Interview 2006).   
 The process by which women’s organizations were able to disseminate 
information to delegations and influence the actual document itself depended on the 
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openness of the Secretariat of the conference as well as the U.S. government to these 
NGOs. In addition to using a human rights frame and research-based evidence to support 
their advocacy, the women’s health and rights activists took advantage of their 
connections to UN officials, especially in the UNFPA, and strategic lobbying techniques. 
During the preparation for Cairo, Tim Wirth’s office requested NGOs to contribute to the 
U.S. position; one women’s health and rights activist prepared ten to fifteen pages of text, 
half of which was adopted into the U.S. official position before the third PrepCom 
(Confidential Interview 2006). Steven Sinding also related how he worked closely with 
Nafis Sadik at UNFPA when he was the director of the Office of Population at USAID, 
and his close relationship continued when he worked at the Rockefeller Foundation 
afterward. He was able to arrange a key meeting between Nafis Sadik and the leaders of 
women’s health and rights NGOS with the help of Carmen Barroso at the MacArthur 
Foundation, a meeting which caused Dr. Sadik to change her position to involve NGOs 
very closely in the process of the Cairo conference (Steven Sinding Interview 2006, Nafis 
Sadik Interview 2006, Carmen Barroso Interview 2006). Steven Sinding also relates how 
a working committee of employees from the Population Division and UNFPA prepared 
the first draft of the Program of Action, the results of which deeply disappointed Nafis 
Sadik. Sinding was able to hire Sharon Camp, who had then just stepped down as the 
legislative director of Population Crisis Committee and is now the president of the Alan 
Guttmacher Institute, to re-write the draft; it was then reviewed by policy experts in the 
field of population from around the world, but remained mostly intact as the draft that 
went to the Third PrepCom, and then became the Program of Action (Steven Sinding 
Interview 2006). Sharon Camp was active on behalf of reproductive health and rights, 
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and these connections with UNFPA allowed women’s health and rights activists to 
greatly influence the draft Program of Action for Cairo.  
 Women’s health and rights activists were also able to influence the delegations by 
providing them with organized and relevant information. An activist noted that after she 
talked to members of UN missions,  
I started realizing a lot of the people who would be negotiating really didn’t know the 
substance, and didn’t have time. Basically I realized there was a huge opportunity to give 
them, tailored to what a negotiator would need, … the argumentation, the international 
conventions, the laws and the scientific basics they needed to argue the proposals we 
were developing. (Confidential Interview 2006) 
 
This was a very standard and pragmatic approach to lobbying, but this activist highlights 
several elements that fit the science and reason norm I believe is important at the UN: the 
precedents developed in previous international conventions and laws and the scientific 
basis of the arguments of these women’s rights lobbyists were both necessary 
components of the information that these activists distributed to delegations. In addition, 
this activist also detailed the process by which the women’s health and rights network 
was able to produce a document that so many women’s organizations endorsed from all 
over the world, and how the network was able to target many different delegations. The 
activist orchestrated a strategy that involved creating alliances with over a thousand 
different organizations in over one hundred countries; using their input and the draft 
Program of Action, she created a proposal with consensus language on all the different 
controversial issues. The activist noted that she consulted the experts in the field for each 
topic to make sure the language was as precise and correct as possible; she also used prior 
conventions to ground the document legally for delegates. “A lot of research went into 
regional conventions and international conventions to give the delegates a juridical basis 
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for what they would fight for and have to argue for as well” (Confidential Interview 
2006).  
The strategy of the women’s organizations was two-fold: they produced a 
consensus document that pushed the language the utmost level that most governments 
and civil society organizations could agree on; several of the more influential 
reproductive health and rights organizations then went on to try and push the language 
past that consensus level to see how far they could get. One activist stated, “The 
consensus document was forged with politics in mind, meaning it should represent where 
we knew the majority of governments could agree by pushing the envelope to that 
progressive level, but not provoking it so that it would undermine the 80 and 90% of 
what we wanted” (Confidential Interview 2006). Although most of these organizations 
wanted to push for legal abortion and sexual rights, “those were the two things everybody 
in the coalition was hoping for but we knew would be breaking points, so we didn’t make 
it part of the quorum platform of consensus” (Confidential Interview 2006). However, the 
women’s health and rights activists that did push for more were able to include safe, legal 
abortion in the final Program of Action in Cairo, although in the minds of the women’s 
health and rights activists, this was limited by the fact that the document did not propose 
that abortion should be legal, but that where it was legal, it should be safe, based on 
national laws of each country. 
The consensus document that the activists put together was sought after and well 
distributed to both agencies and delegations because of the work and expertise put into it, 
and the connections that the women’s health and rights organizations had developed. The 
UNFPA invited the activists to share the document, and shipped it to all their field offices 
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and representatives, where many activists mobilized behind the scenes to work with 
official delegates on supporting the language. The consensus document was so widely 
distributed and respected by the time of the third PrepCom that this activist and her 
colleagues were asked to prepare the delegates and ministers of different countries for the 
conference negotiations. For example, the delegates of the Caribbean countries asked the 
coordinators of the consensus document to brief them and help them prepare for the 
conference; this group of delegates then broke with the Vatican’s position during the 
conference negotiations on abortion and reproductive health (Confidential Interview 
2006).  
Through contacts in developing countries, this activist and her colleagues were 
also able to find out who was being recruited for official delegations, and targeted their 
distribution and approach at the country level to those who would be key lobbyers or 
friendly to the position in the official delegations. “We also targeted all the friendly UN 
missions, so that we made sure they received the documentation they needed to 
negotiate” (Confidential Interview 2006). The “friendly” missions were known well 
ahead of time by the country positions on these controversial issues, and the activist 
mentioned that “there was a good mapping going on by the coalition of NGOs of who 
was going to be problematic and who would be supportive” (Confidential Interview 
2006).  
5.3.1.3 Coalition Building 
 Why alliances are an important means of adjustment to the UN environment: 
From the 1970s to the 1990s, UN global conferences changed in several important ways. 
First, they became more inclusive of the many NGOs that were experts in the field with 
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which the conference was concerned, rather than simply treating these NGOs as an 
important avenue through which services should be delivered. The Cairo conference in 
1994 was the most inclusive of any conference before or since: a large parallel NGO 
forum, held in the same location as the intergovernmental conference, allowed NGO 
members important lobbying access to country delegates; NGO delegates were allowed 
to attend many negotiation sessions, where they were able to lobby and provide language 
amendments to delegates; and Dr. Nafis Sadik urged many country delegations to include 
NGO members in their delegations to the Cairo conference (Steve Sinding Intervew 
2006), which gave NGOs unprecedented access and influence over the language of the 
final Program of Action. As a result, the NGOs themselves had to work together and 
build coalitions in order to make sure they did not waste their resources or work against 
each other.  
 Another important change that occurred over three decades of UN global 
conferences was that, procedurally, they became much more consensus-based than 
majority-vote based (Singh 1998, Joseph Chamie Interview 2006). As discussed in the 
theory chaper, studies of decision-making at the UN have noted that consensus-based 
decision-making has become more of a norm for all bodies of the UN, including the 
Security Council (Fasulo 2004). Majority-based strategies were used by the Group of 77 
countries throughout the 1970s to exert their power over the developed world; however, 
the increasing diversity of views within the Group of 77 made it difficult to maintain a 
common position from which to negotiate, and just as importantly, developing states 
realized that if their goals was to legitimize actions and bring together strong opinions on 
an issue or situation, consensus-based strategies served their interests better (Smith 
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2004). Thus, consensus decision-making became more of a norm throughout the UN, but 
especially at UN global conferences, where the goal was to bring together international 
opinion on a topic of concern and decide on a plan of action to address that concern. 
Without consensus, the plan of action, which sets a standard for policy but cannot be 
enforced except by public opinion, is of little value. The very nature of UN global 
conferences and the growing understanding by developing and developed countries alike 
of the limits of majority and minority-based strategies of decision-making made 
consensus decision-making more common, and as time went on, also prescriptive. 
As a result of the growing use of consensus decision-making, even large blocks of 
countries, no matter how powerful, could not carry off a major change in policy. It 
became much more important to appeal to a very large audience, and gain widespread 
support for any change. Thus, the need for widespread agreement across issue areas and 
regions of the world encouraged women’s groups to build coalitions with the 
environmental and human rights communities, as well as to focus their efforts on building 
connections and consensus with developing country groups from across the world. 
 As described in the previous chapter, the women’s movement began to try to find 
common cause on the topic of population with the environmental movement and the 
human rights community in the early nineties in order to further the cause of reproductive 
health and rights. They were more successful with the human rights community than with 
environmental groups because many environmental groups agreed with population 
control groups on the need for widespread family planning programs; in fact, during the 
1992 Earth Summit in Rio, the women’s groups were greatly frustrated with the many 
environmental groups for allying with family planning and demographic groups. 
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Although Paul Ehrlich made the connection between population issues and environmental 
degradation in the early 1970s, this connection began to fade in the mid-1980s as issues 
of sustainability rose to prominence. It was at this time that the rationale for demographic 
concerns moved away from traditional economic development arguments to softer, more 
benefits-based rationales, such as a case for environmental balance (Correa and 
Rechmann 1994: 13). Feminists argued that demographers made this connection to plug 
into the environmental movement that at the time commanded respect, and which some 
demographers argue also helped mobilize new sources of funding (Furedi 1997: 144). 
However, both demographers and feminists have argued that there is very little empirical 
data supporting the causal connection between larger populations and environmental 
degradation, and that this connection has taken on more of the character of an ideological 
assumption (Furedi 1997: 145).  
During the Cairo conference, both environmental and human rights NGOs allied 
with the women’s health and rights groups. This was due to the efforts of many different 
groups, including the efforts of the Clinton administration to bring together the 
population control or demographers, the environmentalists, and the reproductive rights 
activists for Cairo (Eager 2004: 120). Head of the U.S. delegation Tim Wirth, as a 
politician, consulted with many different NGOs around the country prior to the Cairo 
conference, and this brought together U.S. NGOs that had not been talking to each other 
up to that point: the environmental groups, the women’s groups, and health groups 
(Barbara Crane Interview, June 2006). Some feminist NGOs, such as WEDO, worked to 
reconcile their position with the environmentalists; in addition, private groups and 
foundations worked to bring together the environmental movement and the women’s 
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groups. Soon after the Rio Earth Summit, the Pew Charitable Trusts encouraged 
environmental groups and feminist groups to “engage in dialogue around the issues of 
population control, the environment, and reproductive rights” (Eager 2004: 124). In July 
1993, the Public Conversations Project also sponsored a meeting to facilitate dialogue 
between the population control establishment, environmentalists, and reproductive health 
activists. This meeting put together several steps to “articulate a new set of values, goals, 
and objectives with the intent of influencing the conversation or discourse at ICPD,” 
including educating environmental groups interested in population so that they would be 
less inclined to oversimplify the problem (Eager 2004: 125).  
In addition, the women’s groups articulated a very pointed critique of the 
population and demographic community, who they perceived as coercing women into 
complying with family planning quotas in order to reach population growth reduction 
rates. Many in the demographic and family planning community resented this 
characterization of their work during the 20th century, because most of them were 
sympathetic to and worked toward a greater focus on the needs of women (Steve Sinding 
Interview 2006). Even for many demographers that did not necessarily agree with the 
reproductive health and rights groups, their success in capturing the attention and 
language of the Cairo conference caused family planning groups and demographers to 
move into a tentative alliance with the feminists rather than be marginalized (Eager 2004: 
144). However, after the conference, many demographers and family planning experts 
criticized the feminists for vilifying the family planning community in order to gain 
acceptance for the “new” language of reproductive health and rights, and also for taking 
away any urgency connected with family planning programs by re-framing the basis for 
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these programs as human rights issue rather than a security issue (Richard Cincotta 
Interview 2006, Steven Sinding Interview 2006). Steven Sinding, a member of the U.S. 
delegation who had been involved in population programs with USAID, spoke quite 
strongly on both the attack on family planning and the subsequent effect on funding for 
such programs:   
You don’t have to attack family planning programs in order to make the case that they 
need to be more focused on women’s health and women’s rights… And, you know, the 
fact that population and family planning became dirty words after Cairo, and that one 
could only talk about reproductive rights and health, and subsequently sexual and 
reproductive health and rights, I thought was an unnecessarily negative approach. I 
mean, I thought that the fact that the women’s groups felt that in order to build support 
for their approach, they had to trash the history -- which I thought was in fact quite a 
noble history -- was deeply unfortunate and inaccurate. 
By removing, in effect, concern about population growth or high fertility as a 
rationale for public action, the Cairo conference I think undermined the strong funding 
base that had existed to support programs around the world.  I think that the biggest 
impact of Cairo was to shift population programs from being -- from an imperative to 
being a nice thing to do. (Steven Sinding Interview 2006, emphasis added) 
 
Another aspect of coalition building for the women’s health and rights 
organizations included the widening of their network to include domestic developing 
women’s groups; by representing developing countries in their network, they hoped to 
include their language, issues, and very importantly, gain their endorsement.  
The Women’s Declaration from 1992 and the 21-point agenda from the Rio 
conference in January 1994 included the language and concerns of developing country 
groups such as Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN) and Isis 
International. The feminist groups involved at ICPD understood the power of widespread 
agreement among the NGO community in helping to pressure delegates at the actual 
conference. The “Women’s Declaration on Population Policies” in September 1992 was 
reviewed, modified and finalized by over 100 women’s organizations across the world. It 
was then circulated to health advocates, health professionals and experts, networks, 
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organizations, governments, and individuals for signatures and endorsements (Sen, 
Germain and Chen 1994). In their plenary speeches, four country delegations indicated 
that the “Women’s Declaration on Population Policies” should be considered in the Cairo 
deliberations, including Canada, Sweden, Norway, and the United States (Eager 2004: 
129). In addition, the Rio Statement, which emerged from the preparatory conference that 
women’s groups held in Rio de Janeiro in January 1994, included precise language on the 
many issues with which the Cairo conference would deal, and much of this language was 
imported into the draft Program of Action by the Secretary-General, Dr. Nafis Sadik 
(Steven Sinding Interview 2006; Eager 2004).  
Jill Sheffield of Family Care International elaborated on the process by which she 
and her colleagues also reached out to developing country women’s rights NGOs in order 
to get their suggestions and revisions of the proposed language for the draft Program of 
Action. “We would then go to friends on government delegations and say, ‘You’ll be 
working on these paragraphs today, could you please use this modified language.’ 
Roughly eighty percent of everything we suggested was agreed. It was monumental” (Jill 
Sheffield Interview 2006). The fact that quite a few government delegations included 
members of the consortium from whom Family Care International had solicited 
suggestions on the Cairo document was immensely helpful; those relationships with 
developing country government delegates paid dividends for the women’s groups as they 
tried to influence the wording of the Program of Action during the conference as well 
(Jill Sheffield Interview 2006). 
As mentioned in the previous section, individuals from the key developed country 
groups such as IWHC and the Women’s Coalition were able to meet with Dr. Nafis Sadik 
 
 180 
in the preparatory stages of Cairo and ask her to encourage the involvement of NGOs in 
the conference. One of the most important ways in which Dr. Sadik did this was to write 
letters to country delegation heads and urge them to consider adding NGO members onto 
their delegations. Many developing countries did in fact add many NGO members, most 
of them women’s health and rights NGOs, to their delegations, their incentives increased 
when the UNFPA, NGOs such as IPPF, and foundations such as MacArthur and Ford 
provided funds to pay the way of those NGO delegates (Steve Sinding Interview 2006, 
Stirling Scruggs Interview 2006, Carmen Barroso Interview 2006). As a result of the 
endorsement of the developing country NGOs from around the world on the language 
they proposed, and especially the support of women’s health and rights NGOs on many 
developing country delegations, the women’s health and rights groups were able to claim 
widespread support from both developed and developing country groups. 
5.3.1.4 Institutional Access and Influence 
The women’s organizations were quite successful in influencing the agenda and 
program of Action in Cairo, which can be attributed to several factors. One was certainly 
the opening in the domestic opportunity structure afforded by the election of the Clinton 
administration in the U.S., which was quite active in its support for abortion rights, as 
opposed to the Reagan and Bush administrations that preceded it. “It is no secret that the 
Clinton administration selected delegates who were pro-choice and pro-reproductive 
rights to join the official governmental delegation” (Eager 2004: 125), as many former 
delegates were able to attest (Confidential Interview II 2006). “The pro-life and religious 
groups were probably equally powerful in their organizational efforts [at the prepcoms], 
but the Clinton administration was able to tilt the scales so that the NGOs more aligned 
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with its views got on the delegation and had their comments make more of a difference” 
(Lori Ashford in Eager 2004:125). This was an important factor at the Cairo conference 
because of the power and influence of the U.S. at the UN; even though it could not shift 
the debate or change policy by itself, the hegemonic power of the U.S. gives its 
delegation great influence when it speaks at the UN. A delegate for the U.S. recalls that 
the “willingness and the different position that the U.S. held at the time was extremely 
helpful” for the change in language and policy at Cairo. “I mean when Tim [Wirth] gave 
his first speech at the second PrepCom, he got a standing ovation, which is pretty unusual 
at the UN. But people were really happy to have the U.S. on board in a widely agreed 
approach, and not being a naysayer” (Confidential Interview II 2006). Another activist 
adds, “…the other key factor for Cairo… is the difference between Reagan and Clinton. 
The Clinton administration, Al Gore in particular, Tim Wirth – I mean it was a different 
time. Our government, which for better or worse is always going to be a key player, was 
in the vanguard” (Confidential Interview III 2006). 
Another factor was the opening of the international opportunity structure to the 
greater participation of NGOs. The Rio conference had large numbers of NGOs attending 
the NGO forum, but Cairo was the first conference at which NGO members were 
encouraged to be part of government delegations and many NGOs were involved in the 
PrepCom process. Five hundred observers from 185 national, regional and international 
NGOs attended PrepCom II, including representatives from developing countries whose 
travel costs were subsidized by bilateral agencies, private foundations and the UNFPA 
field offices. “Many of these representatives, including leaders of women’s groups, were 
also included in national delegations appointed by the governments” (Singh 1998: 46). In 
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addition, the NGOs that participated in the Women’s Caucus were pro-choice and pro-
family planning. “This became clear when at one of the informal sessions a representative 
of the Women’s Caucus commented that ‘women have the right to decide when and how 
to have children free from coercion and with universal access to safe abortion services’” 
(Singh 1998: 47). The Women’s Caucus greatly influenced PrepCom II by persuading 
governmental delegations to address reproductive health and rights, access to safe 
abortion, sexuality, and a broader vision of socioeconomic development (Garcia-Moreno 
and Claro 1994: 55-56).  
At the third preparatory meeting for the Cairo Conference (PrepCom III), 
delegates tried to reach agreement on as much of the final draft of the Program of Action 
as possible. By the third PrepCom, a shift in language had occurred from family planning 
to reproductive health, a change this is especially significant when considering that the 
initial outline of the program of Action, written almost two years before by the ICPD 
Secretariat, was written almost entirely within the context of a traditional demographic 
rationale (Sen 1994: 1). In the intervening two years, the global health and rights 
movement had successfully advocated for substantial changes in the language of the 
Program of Action, to the point where reproductive health and rights was the dominant 
theme rather than family planning (Eager 2004: 143). “Explicitly or implicitly, attempts 
were made throughout the Document to show the interrelationship between the concepts 
of freedom of choice, particularly for women, and the continuing importance of family 
planning in the broader framework of reproductive health” (Singh 1998: 53). 
More recently, individuals from both the family planning and UN spheres have 
articulated skeptical viewpoints concerning the importance and “newness” of Cairo. 
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These individuals tend to be demographers or long-time family planning experts in the 
field who see the importance of Cairo as inflated, and they emphasize that the Cairo 
conference did not generate anything new because the 1974 Bucharest conference first 
instituted the language concerning the basic right of individuals and couples “to decide 
freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children and to have the 
information, education, and means to do so” (Plan of Action, Paragraph 14f). However, 
both the abortion-rights and anti-abortion movements recognize Cairo as a historical 
benchmark, and therefore it is difficult to make the argument that the ICPD was not really 
new, or simply cheap talk (Eager 2004: 150-151). In addition, changes to population 
programs in countries all over the world have been documented (UNFPA 1998). One 
example is that of the U.S.: visible changes in U.S. policy in response to the Cairo 
Program of Action included policy changes reflected in official statements, the 
incorporation of conference recommendations into U.S. foreign aid programs, and 
commitment of financial resources to achieve Cairo goals (Lasher 1998: 18). The U.S. 
certainly financially supported the Cairo agenda for the first two years following it, 
providing more than $600 million in both 1995 and 1996, which led the donor 
community and represented nearly half of all international population assistance for these 
two years (Jacobsen 2000: 254).  
On the other hand, their very success has also been a problem for the women’s 
network; the pervasive inclusion of reproductive rights and health language in the Cairo 
Program of Action has reopened and exacerbated divisions within the women’s health 
movement. One scholar notes: 
Contrary to pragmatic organizations which perceive and celebrate the ICPD as a success, 
radical women’s organizations feel that their concerns, in particular the linkage of 
reproductive rights and health to development, have been left off the agenda. According 
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to these organizations, the reproductive rights and health rhetoric has been adopted by the 
population establishment, but nothing has changed in practice. (Joachim 2003: 268) 
 
5.3.2 Anti-Abortion movement 
Anti-abortion organizations at this time focused on the domestic environment. 
International anti-abortion organizations (many of them Catholic) established a domestic 
presence in different countries, but their numbers and resources for work at the UN was 
small. Anti-abortion organizations in the U.S. were quite active in domestic mobilization 
and advocacy; most evangelical Protestant organizations did not view the UN favorably 
as a result of one pre-dominant interpretation of the second coming of Christ, in which an 
influential world organization such as the UN becomes an instrument of the anti-Christ. 
Their support for the Reagan administration, especially that of the Christian Right, was 
rewarded by the Reagan in 1984 with the Mexico City Policy. The anti-abortion Christian 
organizations in the U.S. had used that opportunity with Reagan administration to 
influence how U.S. resources were used abroad but primarily to make a statement 
domestically. These, among other reasons, explain why anti-abortion organizations at 
Cairo were few: International Right to Life Federation was one of the few organizations 
present, but had few delegates. However, the Holy See, as a Special Observer at the 
Population and Development conferences since Bucharest, acted as an influential anti-
abortion presence at the Cairo conference. Thus, the Holy See’s activism at Cairo offers a 
baseline from which to compare future activism by the Holy See and other anti-abortion 
organizations.  
The Holy See 
The Vatican has been an international presence and activist for many years; its 
status as a special observer at the UN attests to its power and respect for the international 
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sphere. Beginning with the appointment of John Paul II as Pope, the Vatican has also 
become a significant international actor (Hanson 1987), using its diplomatic service and 
staff as the Secretariat of State to focus on the issues of human rights, economic justice, 
and peace (Reese 1996:231). While the Vatican has been noted for its involvement in 
gender and family issues, it is also intensely interested in international development and 
peace. Thus, while the Vatican strongly opposed an international right to abortion, which 
they saw encoded in the framework of reproductive health and rights at Cairo, it has also 
been a strong advocate of addressing global inequality and ending poverty through 
developmental work. Although the Vatican is most well known for its strong stand 
against the right to abortion, at each global conference it has attended, issues of poverty 
and peace have also been part of its agenda. The Vatican is a conservative actor that has 
seen the international arena as important and legitimate, and it has directed its efforts and 
resources at the UN for some time. The attendance and involvement of the Vatican at the 
Cairo conference does not show any serious change or adjustment, but the degree to 
which it was involved and the effort that it put into opposing the reproductive health and 
rights consensus does acknowledge the increased influence and efforts of the women’s 
health and rights organizations. “While the Vatican has played an active international role 
in the United Nations since its inception, the Cairo conference was something of a 
catalyst for this current phase of Vatican international activism” (Buss and Herman 
2003:105). 
The Holy See recognized the efforts of the U.S. delegation4 and women’s 
organizations to influence the direction of the Cairo conference, and made an effort to 
                                                
4 The U.S. delegation to Cairo consisted of a broad cross-section of people, representing public sector, 
private, NGO, academic, and activist perspectives on the topic of population and development; however 
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counter that influence. Specifically, the Vatican was worried that the language of 
reproductive health and rights would create an international right to abortion. In response, 
the Holy See called for Catholic organizations to mobilize in opposition to the Cairo 
Program of Action. American Catholic conservative organizations became involved, 
including the Catholic Campaign for America (CCA), which worked as an NGO at Cairo 
to oppose aspects of the program (Buss and Herman 2003:106). Jyoti Singh, the ICPD 
Executive Coordinator, notes in his book on the Cairo conference that many U.S. anti-
abortion organizations may have been helped along in their mobilization against the U.S. 
position on abortion at Cairo because of a State Department cable sent to all the 
diplomatic and consular posts of the U.S. on March 16, 1994, and which became 
available to many participants at PrepCom III. The cable in part read, “the United States 
believes that access to safe, legal and voluntary abortion is a fundamental right of all 
women” (Singh 1998: 192). This may have fueled the fire of the Vatican’s argument that 
the U.S. and other countries were attempting to include an international right to abortion 
in the Cairo Program of Action.  
The Vatican itself launched an unexpectedly vigorous response within the 
conference preparations, lobbying state governments directly and asking bishop’s 
conferences around the world to pressure their governments to oppose pro-abortion 
language in the Cairo Program of Action. During PrepCom III, the Holy See along with 
Argentina, Guatemala, Venezuela, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Malta disagreed 
                                                                                                                                            
that cross-section did not include those who were against abortion or reproductive health and rights. 
Several key members of the delegation were leaders of the women’s health and rights organizations, 
including Bella Abzug, of the Women’s Environment and Development Organization (WEDO), Adrienne 
Germain of the International Women’s Health Coalition (IWHC), and Peggy Curlin of the Center for 
Development and Population Activities (CEDPA). Interviewees from both abortion-rights and anti-abortion 
organizations confirmed this process of appointing to the delegation those that reflect the agenda of the 
current U.S. administration, especially NGO members and activists. 
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with the majority of the delegates on how to address abortion in the chapter on Health 
and Mortality. Although many of the delegates agreed on shifting from family planning 
to a broader reproductive health approach, the objections from the Holy See and other 
countries against abortion blocked agreement on the definition of reproductive health. 
The Vatican refused to remove its brackets around the phrases, “unsafe abortion” and 
“reproductive health services;” the phrase “safe motherhood” was also bracketed because 
of the emphasis on abortion as a health and mortality issue. In fact, the Holy See called 
for written assurance in the document that safe motherhood programs would not include 
abortion (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, April 22, 1994).  
The words used by the Vatican after PrepCom III in preparation for and leading 
up to the Cairo conference show a greater willingness to use the language of rights to 
express their point of view, but this use seems overpowered by the traditional language of 
moral outrage against abortion as murder. For example, Archbishop Renato Martino, 
addressing the issue of abortion during PrepCom II, stated that the Catholic Church views 
the right to voluntary abortion as violating the most fundamental right of any human 
being – to life (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, June 2 1993). He continued to say that 
although the Catholic Church did not support procreation at any cost, it opposed 
“demographic policies and family planning that are contrary to the liberty, dignity and 
conscience of the human being” (Johnson 1995:44). These statements show a growing 
awareness of the rights-dominated environment in which the Vatican was contending, 
and an attempt to connect its point of view with that of an individualist rather than 
traditional outlook on life and morality. In addition, the Vatican argued against abortion 
as detrimental to women’s health; maternal health and mortality was one of the issues 
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concerning the Vatican, and coincided with the increased emphasis on women’s health by 
feminist organizations at Cairo. However, even to the extent that the Vatican used rights 
language to describe their position, arguing that abortion violated the most basic human 
right to life and that abortion hurts women’s health, it is not seen as legitimate as 
progressive organizations that use the rights language (Stan Bernstein Interview 2006, 
Barbara Crane Interview 2006). Although anti-abortion organizations may have similar 
goals and express them in rights or health language, this language is usually reserved for 
the persuasive arguments directed at the UN or outside their own organizations (Jack 
Willke Interview 2006). 
Prior to the start of the ICPD in Cairo, the Vatican continued to try to fight the 
new consensus on reproductive health and rights by allying with other countries that had 
similar convictions on the family for religious or cultural reasons. This included much 
publicized efforts by the Vatican to reach out to Muslim countries for support against 
abortion rights or greater sexual freedom at the Cairo conference. Libya and Sudan 
boycotted the conference altogether, while Saudi Arabia and Lebanon informed the 
Conference Secretariat at the last minute that they were not coming. The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in Egypt made a determined effort to counteract the spiraling opposition 
of several other Muslim countries to the Cairo conference, and as a result of their efforts, 
most of them attended the conference. However, the Muslim heads of state from 
Bangladesh and from Turkey did not attend.  
Much has been made of this tentative alliance between the Vatican and the 
Muslim countries to oppose abortion, as well as sex education for adolescents. It is one of 
the mechanisms of a social movement to seek allies to further the cause of a particular 
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issue, and one can see that the Vatican made use of it, although many speculate that as an 
alliance, it is a quite tenuous one, based at as it is on a few issues. However, this tentative 
alliance has been cultivated in the present by anti-abortion NGOs, in that they have 
continued to seek allies in the Muslim world around the theme of the “natural family,” a 
development I will elaborate on later.  
Institutional access is generally one of the indicators by which the success of a 
movement’s framing, scale shifting and coalition formation can be measured. The 
organizations and individuals against abortion were not truly international at this point, 
and therefore did not have much institutional access. However the Vatican, as a special 
observer, did have significant access to the negotiations in that it was able to voice its 
objections at the PrepComs and at the actual conference. Continuing the tradition of 
respect to the Vatican, the Secretary General of the Cairo conference, Dr. Nafis Sadik, 
met with the Pope at the Vatican prior to the conference, and discussed the issue of 
reproductive health and rights. The Vatican’s ability to lobby individual governments 
through domestic Bishop’s Councils throughout the world also shows a form of 
institutional access that is not international but transnational. Thus, one could argue that 
the institutional access of the Vatican was significant, and could have resulted in 
substantive gains for its objectives. Indeed, the Vatican was successful at the Cairo 
conference in making its objections to the proposed Program of Action public, and also in 
voicing such strong objections to the concept of legal abortion or abortion as an option in 
family planning that the consensus language of the document had to either specify against 
it (in the case of abortion as a method of family planning) or hold their peace (as in the 
case of legal abortion). However, the Vatican’s influence on the Cairo Program of Action 
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is mostly measured by what is not in the document than what is; the document articulates 
very little of the conservative point of view on reproductive health and rights, except for 
the paragraph that says that each country will implement the recommendations with 
respect to its individual religious and ethical values and cultural backgrounds. “While 
maintaining the concept of national sovereignty, Cairo provided strong momentum to the 
efforts to apply internationally recognized human rights in the formulation and 
implementation of population policies and programs. Freedom of choice and reproductive 
rights are strongly emphasized throughout the Program of Action” (Singh 1998:105). 
5.4 Conclusion 
The ICPD in Cairo was a landmark conference for the women’s health and rights 
movement, in that their experience at the UN, their efforts to reach out to developing 
countries, and their relationships with country delegates and UN officials all combined to 
give them a great deal of influence over the wording of the final Program of Action. The 
Cairo conference displayed the ability of the women’s health and rights movement to 
take advantage of key political opportunities, such as the opening of the UN global 
conference system to NGO involvement and the Clinton administration’s sympathy with 
the women’s health and rights arguments, to negotiate a significant change in the 
population policy paradigm, as well as their ability to create important opportunities for 
themselves by lobbying delegates of governments across the world. This conference also 
was a signal to anti-abortion organizations that the international sphere was an important 
policy realm, and one that was open to the influence of NGOs and INGOs, given the right 




The women’s health and rights movement were able to change the prevailing 
language of population policy from family planning or population control to reproductive 
health and rights. They did this as a result of their involvement in the preparatory phases 
of the ICPD, which were open to NGOs as a result of their access to important UN 
officials such as Dr. Nafis Sadik. However, the success that the women’s health and 
rights movement had in lobbying for the involvement of NGOs in the process of the 
conference, and in persuading key UN officials to include their concerns in the language 
of the draft document, would not have been possible without the recognition by important 
members of the movement that they would better influence the UN system by adapting 
their strategies to the environment of the UN, specifically accommodating practices such 
as consensus decision-making, the politics of rights, and the use of science and reason to 
justify policy.  
The women’s health and rights movement was made up of many different 
factions, many from the more radical side of the spectrum, which were more inclined 
towards redistributive solutions to reproductive health issues. However, the women’s 
health and rights movement emphasized the more mainstream, rights understanding of 
reproductive health in an effort to swing the language used at the international level from 
population control to reproductive health and rights.  
They also reached out to the environmental and human rights communities in an 
effort to build cross-issue coalitions, and to grass-roots feminist organizations in 
developing countries in an effort to build more transnational coalitions; these alliances 
helped the reproductive health and rights network influence many more delegations than 
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they would have been able to do by themselves. Their outreach to developing country 
feminist organizations was especially fruitful because many of these NGO members were 
then funded as members of their own country delegations, able to directly influence their 
country’s position on the language of the final document.  
Another key element of the women’s movement’s success was their ability to 
utilize information politics to influence both UN officials and government delegations. 
The organizations were able to use data collected by UN agencies and their own 
organizations around the world in order to support their advocacy for policy and language 
change, from population targets to a more holistic focus women’s health, citing the 
abuses found within these programs in some developing countries and the inability of 
women to get health care connected to reproductive needs. In addition, women’s 
organizations were able to put together and distribute language already written to fit the 
needs of the Program of Action; as a result, many government delegations that did not 
have extensive resources or members were happy to support language that was already 
written and which fit the standards of professional advocacy, utilized scientific research, 
and which could also be proved to be supported by many developing country NGOs.  
The anti-abortion movement was not well organized or focused on the 
international sphere in 1994, leaving much of the opposition to women’s organizations to 
the Holy See; however, the success of the feminist organizations at the ICPD spurred 
many anti-abortion organizations to subsequently focus their resources on the UN, both 
Catholic and several Protestant organizations.   
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5.4.2 Comparison of the two movements  
As a result of the early expert population conferences, feminist groups concerned 
with access to birth control and abortion began to emphasize the international sphere in 
their advocacy. They were able to take advantage of the Women’s Decade to understand 
the UN system better, and work the international conferences to a greater degree. A large 
number of feminist organizations attended the ICPD for the purpose of advocating 
reproductive health and rights at the international policy level. As a result of their shift of 
scale up to the UN, these organizations also then had to take into account some practices 
at the UN in order to better influence it. For the most part, these adjustments came 
naturally to a movement that was based on very similar principles as those underlying the 
UN Charter; they too were founded on the importance of the individual and especially the 
woman, and the rights of women. As a result, the women’s movement was inclined to be 
more inclusive, organizing the many different types of feminist organizations concerned 
with the issues of reproductive health, and promoting dialogue between the developed 
and developing country organizations. They also built coalitions across issues, with a 
very successful ally in the human rights community. Although they had been framing 
family planning as reproductive health and rights for years at that point, the emphasis on 
the framework of human rights and the support of the human rights community made the 
language more visible and convincing. In addition, the adjustment of several other 
strategies, such as coalition-building, framing family planning as coercive rather than 
respecting of human rights, and distributing professional, organized, and research-
supported written materials to delegations helped the reproductive health and rights frame 
prevail at the time that it did.  
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Although the Vatican was and is a transnational institution with a presence at the 
UN that it used during the ICPD to advocate against the right to abortion and 
reproductive health, there were very few NGOs advocating against the right to abortion. 
These organizations that did attend, such as International Right to Life, Human Life 
International, and the Rockford Center, were not nearly as well organized as the feminist 
organizations, did not have any access to influence the draft documents, and did not have 
good relationships with delegations in order to influence the final Program of Action 
(Allan Carlson Interview 2006). These conservative organizations did focus on the UN, 
although anti-abortion NGOs in general did not focus on the international level. Since 
many of the prominent anti-abortion NGOs were Christian Right organizations from the 
U.S. that had a marked distrust of the UN, this is not surprising. However, the success of 
the feminist organizations at the ICPD was a decided catalyst for many Christian Right 
organizations that did not previously lobby at the UN to start putting resources towards 
advocacy at the UN, as revealed by interviews with key personnel within these 
organizations. In fact, Catholic Institute for Family and Human Rights was created after 
Cairo for the express purpose of NGO advocacy at the UN level (Austin Ruse Interview 
2006). The anti-abortion organizations would make their adjustments as they first 
attended, gained more experience with, and then prepared for advocacy at the UN at 
subsequent conferences.  
The women’s health and rights movement used their experience at the UN during 
the Women’s Decade to adjust their strategies to the consensus decision-making that 
became more widespread in the 1980s and 1990s; consensus-building rather than voting 
at the conferences meant that it was important to appeal to many delegations in order to 
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get approval on language. In order to appeal to many different delegations, these feminist 
groups allied themselves with the environmental and human rights communities, other 
issue areas that were considered important in that day. Although there were important 
disagreements with the environmental movement, the feminist alliance with the human 
rights community was a key partnership, both for coalition building and the use of human 
rights language in the framing of reproductive health concerns. The importance of 
coalition building across issues was reflected in the fact that human rights groups would 
eventually take on abortion as an issue they would advocate for (Barbara Crane Interview 
2006).   
The anti-abortion NGOs that attended the ICPD did not make strategic alliances 
with any other issue groups or delegations from developing countries. However, the Holy 
See did attempt to create an alliance with Muslim countries based on their common 
opposition to liberal views on adolescent sex education, abortion, and alternative 
conceptions of the family. This alliance caused some problems for the Cairo conference 
in that a few of these Muslim countries were going to back out of the conference, but the 
host country of Egypt was able to prevent that. In addition, these Muslim countries also 
joined the Holy See in objecting to the more liberal language concerning reproductive 
health and rights, but their opposition did not last throughout the entire conference. Thus, 
most women’s groups considered this attempted alliance a failure; however, I would 
consider this a strong first attempt at a cross-faith alliance by an institution not much used 
to or inclined to such alliances. Clearly, this quite conservative Catholic institution 
recognized the need for support from many different delegations in order to influence the 
negotiations of language in a consensus decision-making environment; it initiated such 
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outreach, which encouraged Catholic NGOs also to lead the way in forming cross-sect 
and cross-faith coalitions at subsequent conferences. 
Women’s health and rights groups had begun framing reproductive health in a 
rights framework in the late 1970s, in the process of the Women’s Decade. However, due 
to the splits in the movement between more left-leaning groups and those that took a 
more mainstream liberal approach, the language of reproductive health and rights did not 
become widespread within the movement until the 1980s. By the late 1980s, several of 
the progressive foundations that had become involved in population issues early 
instituted Reproductive Health and Rights programs, many of which employed women’s 
activists (Steven Sinding Interview 2006, Carmen Barroso Interview 2006). However, the 
language of reproductive health and rights did not permeate UN policy until the Cairo 
conference, when the women’s health and rights movement had unprecedented access to 
the preparatory process, country delegations, and most importantly to UN officials such 
as Nafis Sadik (Nafis Sadik Interview 2006, Steven Sinding Interview 2006). Thus, the 
success of the human rights framing of reproductive health was not because of the human 
rights frame alone – women’s rights groups had framed family planning in reproductive 
rights terms since the 1970s. It was the combination of adjustments in strategy, including 
the scale shift, coalition building and information politics, which allowed this frame of 
reproductive health and rights to prevail.  
 Although human rights were embedded in the UN Charter and included in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and became part of the environment of the UN 
as human rights became more important to Western liberal countries as a result of the 
horrors of World War II, there were still many disputes between developed and 
 
 197 
developing countries as to the definition of human rights and the responsibility of an 
international organization in promoting versus protecting such rights. As a result, 
although human rights was a convincing call to arms in terms of violations of negative 
human rights (such as failure of states to not interfere with the right to life, freedom, the 
pursuit of happiness), it was much harder to rally member states or convince UN officials 
of positive human rights violations, such as the failure to provide economic equality, the 
right to work in safe conditions for adequate pay, or the right of women to reproductive 
health care. 
After the Cold War, the human rights framework was much less disputed, and that 
political opportunity allowed more claims based on human rights to find currency at the 
UN. Positive rights, including economic rights, had become more accepted. There were 
still disputes by some developing countries that one universal standard of human rights 
would be difficult to define because of cultural exceptions (one controversial issue that 
embodied this dispute was that of female genital mutilation). However, the Vienna 
Conference on Human Rights effectively attacked the cultural argument as a cowardly 
evasion by countries that repeatedly violated the human rights of their citizens.  
In addition, the use of a human rights frame alone was not enough to carry the 
reproductive health and rights paradigm; although it was a key component, it was the 
combination of several different adjustments in strategy made by the movement that 
allowed the reproductive health and rights frame to succeed. Other contextual factors 
should also be taken into account, which opened up political opportunities that did not 
exist prior to the Cairo conference. 
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The Holy See also employed framing as a strategy, most effectively to depict 
reproductive health and rights as including the right to abortion. This caused several key 
speakers at the conference, including Prime Minister of Norway, Gro Brundtland, to 
specify that abortion was not to be considered a method of family planning. It also caused 
Vice-President Al Gore to follow a similar route and pacify any fears that the conference 
was trying to create an international right to abortion. As such, the Holy See was 
successful. However, in trying to frame the right to abortion as violating the right to life 
of a baby, the Holy See was much less successful. In addition to the rights frame being 
out of sync with the Holy See’s conservative stance on women’s roles and adolescent 
rights, the Holy See was also not successful in its coalition building, and did not reach out 
to many different types of delegations. Information politics did not play into its strategy 
for the 1994 Cairo conference at all.  
The importance of science and research as the basis of policy, not only at the UN 
but also in nearly any rational bureaucratic organization, very subtly informed the tactics 
of the women’s health and rights movement. As rational organizations founded on liberal 
principles, they already conformed to the norm of progress, pursued through reason and 
science. Professionalization of their advocacy, made easier by their many years of 
experience with the UN global Women’s conferences, helped their cause in that the 
women’s movement appeared knowledgeable, organized, and as a result, to be trusted. 
The women’s organizations spent a great deal of time gathering research and putting it 
together in palatable ways for government delegations, in particular organizing 
information by subject and key issues; this is why Jill Sheffield of Family Care 
International could say that women’s NGOs made themselves invaluable to government 
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delegations at Cairo and beyond (Jill Sheffield Interview 2006). In addition, they 
provided delegations with language already written on key controversial issues, which 








6.1.1 1999 Five-Year Review of Cairo 
The five-year review of Cairo was held as a special session of the General 
Assembly, from June 30-July 2, 1999, in which an evaluation of the implementation of 
the Cairo Program of Action would be conducted, with the explicit provision that “there 
will be no renegotiation of the existing agreements” (UN 1997). Although it was not to be 
an elaborate international conference, the preparations for the five-year review were 
nearly as extensive as those for the original ICPD conference, reflecting the momentum 
gained in that conference for the issues of reproductive health and rights (Sinding 
Interview 2006). The UNFPA organized four round-table and three technical meetings in 
1998, focused on the key themes of the Program of Action. The round-table topics 
included adolescent sexual and reproductive health, reproductive rights and 
implementation, international migration and development and partnership with civil 
society; the technical meeting topics included population ageing, population change and 
economic development, and reproductive health services in crisis. In addition, the 
UNFPA and the UN Regional Commissions held regional reviews on population and 
development for Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, Western Asia, 
Africa, and Europe, all in 1998.  
 A series of international meetings were held at The Hague in February 1999 to 
draft reports on the successes and shortcomings of the implementation of the ICPD 
Program of Action. These meetings did not result in negotiated documents, but in 
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inventories of lessons learned and actions needed. These were to then provide the basis of 
a draft Program of Action written by the Conference Secretariat, which would then be 
negotiated by the Commission on Population and Development prior to presenting it as a 
final report to the special session of the General Assembly. The Hague Forum meetings, 
including the NGO Forum and the Youth Forum, emphasized shortfall in resources as 
one of the most serious obstacles to implementing the ICPD; governments generally 
failed to meet the levels of funding that they pledged at Cairo. Another theme was the 
significance of youth, given that young people aged 15-24 then made up about one-fifth 
of the population. The discussions at the Hague were centered on five topic areas: 
creating an environment that would allow implementation of ICPD goals; enhancing 
gender equality and equity and empowering women; promoting reproductive health; 
strengthening partnerships with civil society; and mobilizing resources. The titles of these 
topic areas demonstrate how much the terms of debate had changed – family planning no 
longer appeared on the agenda. 
 In preparation for the conference, the UNFPA compiled a report on the changes in 
national policies in response to the ICPD Program of Action (POA), specifically for the 
Round Table meeting on Ensuring Reproductive Rights and Implementing Reproductive 
Health. The highlights of this document will demonstrate the importance of the UN 
document in beginning to change the way many countries viewed family planning, and 
the concrete changes in programs that resulted.  
The report first confirms that the POA “defines reproductive health as a human 
right,” and that women “have the right to access sexual and reproductive health services” 
(UNFPA 1998: 3). It also states that the although many countries have changed their 
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policies to include or further implement reproductive health and rights, there have been 
pockets of resistance, especially in some countries in Latin America where the Catholic 
Church promoted such resistance. However, this initial resistance was overcome by 
“national stakeholders, primarily NGOs,” after which reproductive health policy could be 
formulated (UNFPA 1998:5). In Peru, Brazil, Bolivia, and Mexico, government programs 
recognized the importance of reproductive health to development goals, and have 
established policies that implement reproductive health changes (UNFPA 1998:10). 
Countries in Asia moved toward reproductive health policies without losing their 
family planning services. However, both Thailand and India abandoned demographic 
targets as a rationale for family planning programs. Thailand endorsed a broad 
reproductive health policy, which included adolescents in a life-cycle approach; India, 
which announced a “target-free” approach in 1996, showed through two pilot programs 
with integrated reproductive health and family planning services that without targets, 
contraceptive prevalence increased by 50%. However, some states continued to set 
targets. Some countries with very few resources or experience in previous family 
planning service programs also adopted the reproductive health concept: Cambodia 
implemented a new policy to support “the rights of couples and individuals to choose 
freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children,” and adopted a 
“minimum service package” which “conforms to the broader principles of reproductive 
health” (UNFPA 1998: 8).   
Countries in Africa were reported to have different reactions to the ICPD Program 
of Action: some revised population policies adopted prior to 1994 to be more in line with 
the ICPD Program of Action, such as Ghana, Kenya, and South Africa, while others 
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developed new policies in line with the ICPD, such as Mauritania, Uganda, Chad and the 
Central African Republic. Other countries have not made any changes in relation to the 
ICPD, while others continue to set fertility rate goals (Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, and 
Zimbabwe) (UNFPA 1998: 9).  
 Countries such as Peru, Bangladesh and Ghana have recognized abortion as a 
public health problem, as the ICPD Program of Action recommends (UNFPA 1998: 7). 
The report cites an Alan Guttmacher survey that reported 61% of the world’s population 
lives in countries where induced abortion is permitted for a wide range of reasons or 
without any restrictions at all. 14% of the population lives where abortion is permitted to 
protect the physical or mental health of a woman, and 25% live where abortion is 
generally prohibited (Rahman, Katzive and Henshaw 1998). Since 1985, 19 countries 
liberalized their abortion laws, three since 1994, and only one, Poland, moved into a more 
restrictive category. Thus, the trend towards liberalization of abortion laws and policies 
continued after the Cairo conference.  
6.2 Analysis 
6.2.1 Abortion-rights movement 
 
Despite the success of the new paradigm of reproductive health and rights at 
Cairo, the very next UN conference, the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing 
in 1995, showed the women’s groups that the paradigm was more fragile than the success 
at Cairo might lead them to believe. The same feminist groups that were active at ICPD, 
such as the IWHC and WEDO and the Women’s Health Coalition, hoped to build on the 
gains of Cairo and address even more controversial issues, such as sexual health, at 
Beijing. They were indeed able to do so, but also had to spend considerable time and 
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effort to consolidate a consensus on the Cairo language at Beijing in the face of the 
doubled efforts of the Vatican and representatives of anti-abortion NGOs to roll it back 
(Eager 2004).  
In terms of its focus on the UN, its alliances with the human rights community 
and other women’s health and rights groups from developing countries, and its framing of 
arguments in a human rights frame, women’s reproductive health and rights groups 
continued what it had begun prior to the Cairo conference, and worked to advance the 
language of sexual health and rights (Eager 2004).  
In preparation for five-year review of Cairo (Cairo +5), a group of 24 women 
from around the world formed a coalition called Health, Empowerment, Rights and 
Accountability (HERA), through which they continued the coalition building and 
consensus building they had begun for the Cairo conference. These women conferred 
with women’s organizations worldwide to form a more formal coalition in order to more 
visibly and strategically affect the intergovernmental negotiations (Center for 
Reproductive Rights 1999: 2). As a result of their outreach, HERA was able to form the 
Women’s Coalition for ICPD before the March 1999 PrepCom; by the end of the review 
process in June 1999, more than 100 organizations joined the coalition from every region 
of the world. “The Women’s Coalition developed detailed proposals for changes and 
analysis of the ICPD +5 Key Action Document and conferred with government delegates 
and UN officials concerning their experiences and viewpoints” (Center for Reproductive 
Rights 1999:2). The consensus building the women’s groups performed prior to the 
review paid off in the access the coalition was able to have to government delegations 
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and UN officials during the review, demonstrating a continuation and strengthening of 
the tactics these groups had used so successfully in Cairo.   
The Association for Women in Development is one of many organizations that 
demonstrate how the advocacy in Cairo and Beijing continued to affect women’s 
reproductive health and rights groups. Instead of focusing narrowly on women in 
development, around the time of Cairo +5 and Beijing +5, this organization changed its 
name to the Association for Women’s Rights in Development, reflecting the broader 
focus on all individuals and organizations for women’s rights, and the importance of the 
rights framework to advocacy for women at this time: “more than half of our members 
identify themselves as working in human rights” (Leigh 2001:1). In addition, the 
organization signaled that it saw rights as growing in importance for the field of gender 
and development by its intention to take advantage of the strengths of the women’s rights 
framework. “Women’s rights provides the powerful language and monitoring system to 
assert that women’s rights are an inherent part of all women’s lives, and gender and 
development is an enabling tool for overcoming the social realities that violate those 
rights. We hope that this change in language will help catalyze changes in gender and 
development…” (Leigh 2001:1).  
The organization announced its name change in its newsletter with the headline, 
“AWID Goes Global”; the article went on to say that the headquarters of the organization 
would shift every two years to a new country, in order to better understand and reflect its 
membership, and “gain new insight into the many different concerns of women around 
the world” (Leigh 2001:1). The association itself already had ties to many members in 
developing countries, but it made those ties much deeper by committing to moving its 
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Secretariat to a different country every two years. It also printed a Spanish version of the 
main article side by side with the English version, and highlights of other articles in 
Spanish.  
Information Politics: Women’s health and rights NGOs continued to work to make the 
gains established at Cairo well-publicized, and the foundation of further meetings on 
similar topics. One way that they did this was to publish a book on the gains of Cairo and 
distribute them to universities all over the world. “After it was over, we published a good 
looking book that summarized the gains of Cairo, it made it easier to access. And we got 
thousands of them around to universities, libraries, governments. And that set the stage 
for the next meeting, Beijing was soon after” (Jill Sheffield Interview 2006). 
In preparation for the five-year review of Cairo, NGOs such as Family Care 
International (FCI) coordinated with other NGOs in the women’s movement as well as 
others to agree on their goals for Cairo +5. FCI then produced a set of briefing cards that 
were color-coded to each issue, translated them into French, Spanish, and distributed 
them to all the NGOs they had previously coordinated with; these NGOs took the briefing 
cards to the government delegations they had good relations with. These cards included 
the language from the Cairo Program of Action on the issue, and also what the women’s 
groups believed needed to be done, in terms of further language or action on that issue. 
Jill Sheffield remembers that  
One of the things that we did for Plus Five, which was really successful, was we assumed that 
most of the delegates had not been to Cairo. So we put together a set of briefing cards, quoting 
what Cairo said, what we needed to do, and why… The day they were discussing young people, I 
was up in the balcony, and I could see two-thirds of the delegates had the briefing card we 
prepared on adolescents. The fact that people are still using those cards is pretty wonderful. That 
was one of the things we did to help delegates catch up and make informed decisions. (Jill 




Success: The five-year review of Cairo was not anticipated to be a very large or 
representative conference, but the momentum from Cairo caused the five-year review of 
Cairo to be more extensive than anticipated. Stirling Scruggs, working at UNFPA at the 
time as Director of Information and External Relations, was fundraising for the 
conference, and he described it as “People were so enthusiastic in 1999… people were 
almost throwing money at me. It was supposed to be a selection of 50 countries, but we 
ended up having huge delegations from 178 countries. We couldn’t put on the brakes, it 
ended up being a very large conference, several million dollars” (Stirling Scruggs 
Interview 2006). Duff Gillespie, who attended the five-year review as an NGO 
representative, remembers that “Well, five years was very celebratory, and naively so. I 
mean, most of the meeting at the Hague was pushing the envelope a little bit more and 
showing great appreciation for the importance of HIV/AIDS, which wasn’t really 
appreciated at Cairo. … But mostly… everybody’s patting everybody else on the back” 
(Duff Gillespie Interview 2006). 
However, there was tension over the lack of international contributions for 
reproductive health programs and the Holy See’s objection to any inclusion of language 
referring to emergency contraception. Duff Gillespie again recalls that despite the 
celebratory atmosphere, some attendees of the review conference brought up concerns 
about the shortfall in funding promised at Cairo; however, it was not much debated at the 
conference. Instead, there were “a couple of just really powerful speeches about safe 
abortion not being given enough emphasis” (Duff Gillespie Interview 2006). Abortion 
was one of the issues that women’s groups tried to push further at the review conference, 
as well as the wording of “sexual and reproductive health and rights.” The UN General 
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Assembly adopted the “Key actions for the further implementation of the Program of 
Action of the International Conference on Population and Development” by consensus, 
which identified strategies “to address the sexual and reproductive health needs of 
adolescents as well as the need to take additional steps to reduce maternal mortality and 
morbidity” (Eager 2004: 168).  
 One of the key changes in the discourse of the abortion-rights organizations 
during the Cairo+5 and Beijing +5 conferences was the increasing awareness of anti-
abortion organizations and activists. Many women’s rights interviewees noted the 
increase of “anti-choice” activists, especially youth trying to take over the youth caucuses 
(Leigh 2001:7). Several news outlets at the time also reported on the opposition of 
Catholic and Muslim countries to sexual and reproductive rights at the Beijing +5 
conference, and the uphill battle women waged to advance the agenda of Beijing (Cabatu 
and Bonk 2000, NPR June 9, 2000). Some news organizations and women’s publications 
identified Austin Ruse of C-FAM as a key organizer of the “anti-choice” network, and 
“suspected” him of being supported by the Vatican (Leigh 2001:6, Cabatu and Bonk 
2000). A Center for Reproductive Rights briefing paper on the Cairo Review noted that 
NGOs were much more tightly controlled during the General Assembly Special Session, 
having to stand in line for special passes to attend the plenary session, and that although 
they were certainly outnumbered by progressive NGOs, conservative NGOs “secured a 
disproportionate number of speaking slots” (Center for Reproductive Rights 1999: 6). 
This paper also noted that conservative NGOs disobeyed the rules concerning handing 
out materials to delegates on the floor, and that conservative activism provided countries 
with an excuse to limit NGO participation and access to the conference (7).  
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Women’s groups also reported on the coalition building and change in framing of 
the anti-abortion organizations at the Beijing +5 conference. Specifically, the Association 
for Women in Development’s newsletter reported how the religious right began to search 
for allies among other conservative, religious right countries such as Algeria, Sudan and 
Iran “to strengthen their voice,” and that the “language of human rights has been 
appropriated by many in the anti-choice movement, even though their belief system is 
truly anti-feminist and anti-choice” (Leigh 2001:6). The fact that women’s organizations 
became more aware of anti-abortion organizations, their activism at the UN, and their 
changes in strategies, specifically in their coalition building and framing, is evidence of 
the scale shift that occurred for anti-abortion organizations between Cairo and the five-
year reviews of Cairo and Beijing. Fairly soon after, many of individual feminist activists 
and organizations began researching their opposition and brainstorming ways to adjust 
their tactics to the presence of these conservative NGOs at the UN. 
 
6.2.2 Anti-abortion movement 
 
Cairo was claimed as a huge victory for the feminist women’s health 
organizations by both women’s organizations and anti-abortion organizations. The 
change in language from family planning/population control to reproductive health and 
rights was a watershed accomplishment. Mr. Jyoti Singh reports that the change in 
language also resulted in the UNPFA reorienting its program priorities with the approval 
of its Executive Board in 1995 to focus on three main areas: reproductive health, 
population and development strategies, and advocacy, maintaining that reproductive 
health includes family planning and sexual health. A UN report in 1996 makes it clear 
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how the Program of Action changed the operations and allocation of resources at the 
UNPFA: “UNPFA has reviewed and adjusted all its operational guidelines to align them 
with the recommendations of the ICPD Program of Action. … country programs are 
being designed or re-oriented to reflect the priorities and commitments emerging from 
ICPD” (Singh 1998:171). This UN report also notes the shift in emphasis toward new 
objectives laid out in the ICPD Program of Action, including that of reproductive health 
and services, and directing such services toward adolescents. 
“Thus increased emphasis is being placed on the following themes and issues: adopting a 
reproductive health approach; increasing the role and responsibility of men in reproductive health 
and family life; expanding reproductive health services and information for youth and adolescents; 
ensuring women’s empowerment and the gender perspective; and expanding partnerships with 
non-governmental organizations” (UN 1996). 
 
Subsequently, many anti-abortion organizations began considering focusing their 
attention and resources on the UN, and how they could more effectively work in the 
international sphere. This began with attendance, however small and ineffective, at the 
Beijing Women’s Conference.  
For the first time, many organizations involved in conservative family advocacy 
in the U.S. attended a UN global conference; this was in large part due to the high-profile 
position of the Vatican at Cairo and the Program of Action that emerged from the Cairo 
conference, which was described by scholars as well as progressive activists as a “notable 
departure from its predecessors in its emphasis on a rights framework as central to any 
policy on population” (Buss and Herman 2003:106). In addition, that rights framework 
included a strong commitment to the empowerment of women in all aspects of their lives. 
Thus, many individuals and organizations from the Christian Right in the U.S. attended 
the Beijing Women’s Conference, and this generally negative experience prompted some 
to move regularly into the international system, but turned other completely off to it.  
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When Susan Roylance, the founder of the Mormon anti-abortion NGO United 
Families of America, attended the Beijing NGO Forum and introduced herself during a 
strategy session, “the participants laughed and jeered at the name of her organization” 
(Butler 2006). Roylance further recalls that conference leaders marginalized a Nigerian 
speaker, Carol Ugochukwu, who planned to critique the conference position on family 
life. Roylance’s activism from that point on focused on the international system, and 
particularly on the UN. However, when several staff from Focus on the Family, an 
evangelical anti-abortion NGO, attended the Beijing Women’s conference, including 
Tom Minnery, the Vice President of Public Policy, they were concerned about the “anti-
family, anti-life” tone they found there. Although Minnery and others with him were able 
to encourage some Latin American delegates to speak forthrightly about their convictions 
on family, Minnery had a very negative reaction to the forum of UN global conferences 
because he saw how the Latin American delegates were intimidated to voice a more 
traditional anti-abortion position (Butler 2006:111). Focus on the Family did not employ 
a full-time UN representative until 2001.  
The number of anti-abortion NGOs that attended the Beijing conference were still 
a small minority of the hundreds of NGOs that took part at that conference, and the anti-
abortion NGOs were not organized in a substantive way to influence the proceedings, 
much less the Platform of Action. However, the Holy See did take part, and in a 
significant fashion. 
At the Beijing Women’s Conference, the Vatican seemed to substantially change 
the way it approached the negotiation process in response to the outcome of the Cairo 
PrepComs and Conference. The Vatican specifically changed the image of its delegation, 
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the emphasis given to women’s roles and rights, and the way it critiqued feminism, in 
order to modify its reputation as being against women’s rights.  
The Vatican appointed Mary Ann Glendon, a Harvard law professor, as the head 
of its Beijing delegation, sending the message that it approached the issue of family 
planning, women’s rights and abortion in an academic, professional and sophisticated 
manner. This moved signaled quite a change from its previous efforts at the Cairo 
conference, where the Vatican did not bend to the professional and activist atmosphere of 
the UN agencies and women’s health and rights organizations. In the preparations for 
Cairo, the Vatican had worked back channels with Muslim countries to put together an 
alliance that depended on religious views on the role of women and the family in society, 
and on a traditional, moral understanding of abortion as murder of children. The 
appointment of Glendon as the Vatican’s Beijing delegation was one indication that the 
Vatican had learned from its experience in Cairo that it needed to come to the UN with 
leadership and advocacy strategies similar to the feminist NGOs it was attempting to 
oppose.  
John Paul II also issued several statements on the topic of women in which he 
made a concerted effort to explain his views as responsive to the needs of women, rather 
than simply anti-abortion or anti-woman. He addressed a public “Letter to Women” and a 
statement to the Secretary General of the conference, Mrs. Gertrude Mongella, in which 
he detailed a coherent policy on women, family, and human rights, which is subsequently 
echoed by many Catholic anti-abortion organizations as well as Protestant anti-abortion 
organizations. He began his statement by thanking women for their contribution to 
humanity and apologizing for their historical oppression. He called for equality for 
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women, defined as equal pay for equal work, protection of working mothers, fairness in 
career advancements, equality of spouses with regard to family rights. This diverse 
recognition of the many roles women play is balanced by the Vatican’s definition of what 
true womanhood means, the conservative definition of the family, and women’s roles 
within the family as mother and helpmate (Buss and Herman 2003:109). This change in 
the rhetoric of the Vatican concerning the rights and roles of women can be viewed as a 
response to the increased emphasis placed by the Cairo conference on the empowerment 
of women and on women’s rights. 
In addition, the Vatican critiqued feminism and particularly feminists who 
advocated for reproductive health and rights in ways that showed they had learned from 
their experience at Cairo. Instead of simply criticizing feminists for being anti-family or 
being radical, the Vatican framed them advocating a western-dominated agenda that did 
not represent women from the economic south, and that this feminism was “relying on a 
mainstream and limited rights discourse that is of little value to women” (Buss and 
Herman 2003: 114). Dr. Joaquin Navarro-Valls, director of the Holy See’s press office, 
alerted the conference attendees that they were being imposed on by “a Western product, 
a socially reductive philosophy” which is seen in the “disproportionate attention to sexual 
and reproductive health” (Navarro-Valls 1995:4). In particular, the Vatican criticized the 
Beijing Platform of Action for giving preference to sexually transmitted diseases or those 
that refer to reproduction, and ignoring tropical diseases that are more contagious and 
cause more deaths than sexually-transmitted diseases. The Holy See interpreted this as 
being biased against women from the south, for who tropical disease is more relevant 
(Navarro-Valls 1995).  
 
 214 
The Vatican’s second critique of feminism was for being limited in its view of 
women and rights. It characterized the “old” feminism as desiring an “undifferentiated 
leveling… of the two sexes” while the “new” feminism has “a growing sensitivity to the 
right to be different… in other words, the right to be a woman” (Holy See 1995). The 
Holy See had constructed a view of feminism that it was much more comfortable with, 
because it fit with the Catholic doctrine concerning women and their different but 
complementary roles; it is nonetheless, called feminism, and advocated by the Vatican. 
At the end of the Beijing conference, the Vatican also critiqued the “old” feminism as not 
being able to see beyond individualism to what women really need. In the Vatican’s 
reservations to the Beijing Platform for Action, it accuses the final document of  
an exaggerated individualism in which key, relevant, provisions of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights are slighted – for example, the obligation to provide 
“special care and assistance” to motherhood. This selectivity thus marks another step in 
the colonization of the broad and rich discourse of universal rights by an impoverished, 
libertarian rights dialect. Surely this international gathering could have done more for 
women and girls than to leave them alone with their rights! (Paragraph II). 
 
Buss and Herman (2003) argue that the Holy See’s statement takes the idea of rights and 
uses it to criticize feminists by characterizing them as focusing on rights without actually 
helping women and girls; the Holy See itself also adopted the idea of human rights and 
characterizes itself as focusing on the human rights of women and girls, and especially 
those of mothers. Robert Moynihan, writing for Inside the Vatican, detailed the double 
strategy of the Vatican: “to ally with progressive forces to increase women’s role in 
society... but at the same time to build an ‘anti-radical’ alliance against the proponents of 
radical feminism” (1995). The emergence of this alliance against feminism can be seen in 
the conservative organizations that have become active at the UN, but a key finding here 
is that the Vatican found it important to present itself as more progressive than it did 
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before, through its language and in support of human rights and health for women. 
However, the Holy See did not influence the final document emerging from Beijing in a 
significant way, due both to the fact that its main goals had to do with blocking language 
and also because it was outnumbered. 
 
Beyond the Vatican: the response of anti-abortion organizations 
Scale shift   Several important anti-abortion organizations that currently oppose abortion 
in the international and domestic contexts became active in the aftermath of the Cairo and 
Beijing conferences. Individuals who attended Cairo and Beijing started NGOs to more 
effectively work at the international level; one of the most influential and well known of 
these is Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute (C-FAM). Austin Ruse, C-FAM’s 
president, is an active speaker and writer, distributing the “Friday Fax,” a weekly e-mail 
bulletin that details issues at the UN of importance to a conservative audience, and 
mobilizing them into action. He attended the Beijing conference and was asked to head 
C-FAM in 1997; the organization has its headquarters in New York City in order to 
monitor and lobby the UN on behalf of natural family issues. He asserts that the impetus 
to form C-FAM came from the Cairo Conference and the Vatican’s subsequent call for 
aid in the international sphere on behalf of the family (Austin Ruse interview 2006).  
 Concerned Women for America (CWA) is a member of the Protestant Right; it 
was established in the 1980s by Beverly LaHaye in the 1980s, but did not participate in 
international politics until the 1990s. Wendy Wright, the president of CWA, came to the 
organization in 1999, and says that the 1994 Cairo conference on Population and 
Development was a “wake-up call for many of us that were in the pro-life movement” 
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(Wendy Wright interview 2006). She was not at the conference herself, but she noted that 
because of Cairo many pro-life activists realized that these issues were being debated 
internationally, and that it was the intent “of this conference… particularly from the 
Clinton administration to create an international, global right to abortion” (Wendy Wright 
interview 2006). Her own first experience at the UN was not until 1997. This is true for 
many of the current leaders of anti-abortion organizations: most did not get involved 
internationally until after the Cairo conference, and most cite the Cairo conference as the 
direct impetus for that involvement. Many of the most active anti-abortion organizations 
(C-FAM, CWA, Howard Center, Focus on the Family) cite this same reason for their 
involvement – to halt the liberal organizations and governments from instituting an 
international right to abortion, first threatened at the Cairo conference (Interviews with 
Austin Ruse, Wendy Wright, Allan Carlson 2006; Thomas Jacobson 2007). These 
organizations eventually applied for NGO accreditation with ECOSOC in order to attend 
the UN global conferences and be able to lobby at the UN. 
6.2.2.1 Coalition Building 
Although Protestant organizations have historically viewed the Catholic Church 
and the Pope with suspicion and distrust, the mid 1990s saw the start of a political 
alliance between the Catholic Church and the Christian Right in the U.S. and in the 
international sphere. Many religious conservatives began to recognize that they had more 
in common with other orthodox believers than with the more liberal members of their 
own faith (Butler 2000). While the differences between the Catholic Church and 
evangelical Protestantism have not disappeared and may be an issue in domestic contexts, 
Catholic, Protestant and Mormon anti-abortion organizations work together in their 
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efforts at the UN and UN global conferences. This alliance is a result of work by different 
conservative leaders both historically and more recently; Phyllis Schlafly worked to 
defeat the Equal Rights Amendment by bringing together activists from evangelical 
circles, Catholic churches, and Mormons, and this was the first time such an alliance had 
been successful. Despite uneasiness on all sides, Catholic, Protestant and Mormon groups 
worked together to defeat the ERA (Butler 2006: 98)). More recently, Austin Ruse from 
Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute has worked to bring together evangelical and 
Mormon organizations to work together at the UN (Butler 2006: 99). 
Another way in which anti-abortion organizations began adjusting to the 
international environment was to engage in coalition building across faiths; finding allies 
to block objectionable language is necessary in the consensus-based negotiation process 
of the UN. The Vatican made the first overtures towards Muslim countries at the Cairo 
conference in 1994, and conservative Protestant and Catholic organizations in the late 
nineties continued the trend by reaching out to the major orthodox monotheistic faiths of 
the world, including Muslims and Jews. The World Congress of Families is an 
international conference organized by the Howard Center, a research organization 
focused on family, religion and society; it was first held in Prague from March 19-22, 
1997, with the initial goal of helping Eastern European countries who were struggling 
with population issues. Scholars and demographers had invited Allan Carlson, the head of 
the Howard Center and a conservative demographic scholar, to speak at Moscow 
University, and he organized the first World Congress of Families to “compare and 
contrast the problems taking place in the developed Western world with those happening 
to the post-Communist nations” (Allan Carlson Interview 2006). However, even at that 
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first conference, the issue of increasing the “conservative, pro-life, pro-family presence at 
the United Nations” gained increasing attention, and the second World Congress of 
Families conference clearly had that as the principal focus (Allan Carlson Interview 
2006).  
The World Congress of Families is meant to bring together scholarship that 
supports the pro-family, anti-abortion stance, as well as allies from all over the world that 
belong to one of the three monotheistic religions. The World Congress of Families 
imitates UN global conferences, for at the end of each conference, participants endorse a 
declaration, although that declaration is not very contested. These international gatherings 
have increased in size since the first in 1997, which attracted over 700 delegates, 
representing 145 pro-family organizations from 45 nations. The second World Congress 
of Families was held in Geneva from November 14-17, 1999; 1,600 delegates attended, 
representing 275 secular and religious organizations from 65 countries (World Congress 
of Families, Geneva Background 1999). These conferences brought together many 
scholars as well as activists. Each conference focused not only on the importance of the 
family as the fundamental unit of society and the implications of its decline, but also on 
the importance of UN rhetoric and actions on the family (Holmes 1997, Landolt 1999). 
The World Congress of Families II had an important role in articulating the “natural 
family” view on marriage, children, sexuality, the sanctity of human life, economics and 
government (World Congress of Families, Geneva Declaration 1999). This conference 
not only brought together conservative activists from around the world in order to build 
an anti-abortion coalition, it helped this coalition find a voice in framing their arguments 
based on the natural family, educated many of the attendees on the process of an 
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international conference, and mobilized these organizations for the UN conferences and 
meetings that dealt with the issues of abortion, women’s rights and health, sexuality and 
adolescents (Buss and Herman 2003: 80-81). Allan Carlson, the president of the Howard 
Center and the founder of the World Congress of Families conferences, describes the 
World Congress of Families II as trying to “bring more intellectual coherence and 
direction to the work we were doing,” trying to put together a coherent world view and an 
agenda” for the many different groups that had come together for the conference (Allan 
Carlson Interview 2006). He felt that the most important thing the anti-abortion 
organizations did at the time was to define the natural family as a term around which the 
many groups could rally (Allan Carlson Interview 2006).  
Other meetings during this time period demonstrate the increasing ties between 
the anti-abortion organizations and the organizations of other faiths they were building 
alliances with. In 1995, a Catholic-Muslim commission was created to allow 
organizations and individuals from both faiths to take part in an interfaith dialogue. This 
commission met on three occasions between 1995 and 1997; its third meeting in Morocco 
in 1997 had two themes, that of “how Muslims and Christians can talk with each other,” 
and “the rights of minorities” (Catholic World News June 28th, 1997). In 1999, just prior 
to the five-year review of Beijing, the anti-abortion network held a pro-family seminar at 
UN headquarters entitled “Church, Synagogue, Mosque: Solutions for the Modern 
Family.” This seminar was co-sponsored by Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute, 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the governments of Argentina and 
Nicaragua (Religion Counts 2002: 9). These meetings demonstrate the efforts made 
during this time period between Muslim and Catholic organizations to establish ties in 
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order to create a stronger coalition on behalf of conservative issues both were interested 
in lobbying for at the UN. The strength of the ties between Muslim organizations and the 
anti-abortion network are not as strong as the ties between the three Christian sects, 
however, and have recently shown some signs of breaking down, as I will discuss in 
Chapter 7.  
6.2.2.2 Framing 
The ability to create alliances among organizations advocating against abortion 
from different theological convictions within Christianity, and different faiths and 
cultures all over the world, was enhanced by the innovative framing of these issues as 
pertaining to the “natural family.” Allan Carlson of the Howard Center explained that the 
family had become a deconstructed word, defined to mean different things according to 
the agendas of those who were defining it. He saw the deconstruction as “without 
question purposeful. People had other agendas,” including the population control 
movement and the feminist movement (Interview 2006).   He believed that the word 
family described an entity “rooted in history, rooted in natural law, rooted in human 
nature;” when he and his colleagues put together a definition of the natural family, they 
do not view themselves as imposing an ideological meaning, but a valid understanding 
“viewed historically but also viewed relative to human biology and what we know from 
the social sciences.  …I think it’s actually reflective of reality.” (Allan Carlson Interview 
2006).  
The World Congress of Families II in Geneva (1999) boosted interest in the 
“natural family” a phrase that signified interest in several related issues, including 
motherhood, abortion, homosexual marriage, and adolescent rights and sex education. 
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The Howard Center’s definition does not refer to God by a name that might exclude any 
of the monotheistic religions, instead using the more neutral phrase “Creator.”  
We affirm that the natural human family is established by the Creator and essential to 
good society. We address ourselves to all people of good will who, with the majority of 
the world's people, value the natural family. Ideologies of statism, individualism and 
sexual revolution, today challenge the family's very legitimacy as an institution. … To 
defend the family and to guide public policy and cultural norms, this Declaration asserts 
principles that respect and uphold the vital roles that the family plays in society. (Howard 
Center Principles) 
 
The phrase “natural family” allowed activists from all over the world and from different 
faiths to focus on their agreement on these issues of policy rather than the different ways 
they arrived at this agreement. However, is important to realize that even the Christian 
organizations come from three theologically different standpoints, the coalition is not 
uniform, and particularly between faiths, it is fairly fragile (Allan Carlson Interview 
2006). 
Rights language also permeated the anti-abortion arguments, but any change in 
the framing of their arguments in terms of rights was much more subtle than those 
observed with the Holy See. Many of these organizations, as a result of their domestic 
work in the U.S., had experience in framing their arguments in terms of human rights and 
the rights of the individual; to them, the human right they were most concerned with was 
the right to life, and the individual they were concerned with was the child rather than the 
mother. These frames transferred fairly easily to the UN, but they did not play as large a 
role in the adjustment of these organizations to advocacy at the UN. Instead, many anti-
abortion organizations have focused on the wrong premises of UN population programs 
in the first place; they have turned around the problem identified by demographers and 
the rationale behind family planning and abortion prior to the reproductive health change 
in paradigm by arguing that the real problem is ageing populations in developed 
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countries, and that was the result of population control measures (Population Research 
Institute 1999). Although they have adopted rights language, they have never truly used 
the human rights framework to mean the right of the individual involves choice 
concerning reproduction, especially abortion; I believe this frame is too close to heart of 
the issue for the anti-abortion network, and it would undermine their grass-roots support. 
However, a greater adjustment has been visible in the framing of anti-abortion 
arguments by Catholic organizations, which supports an understanding of group rights 
rather than individual rights. This more conservative understanding of rights has been 
linked to the cultural, traditional and religious values of developing countries that are 
under attack by Western values, or lack thereof. The Holy See began to frame its 
arguments against the “cultural imperialism” of developed countries beginning with the 
Beijing Women’s conference, and subsequently, the International Right to Life 
Federation and Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute have positioned themselves 
as friends of developing countries who were being coerced by Western countries into 
accepting liberal rights that were against their cultures, religions, and traditions. 
Throughout Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute’s newsletters and the 
International Right to Life newsletters, and the publications and articles put out by 
closely allied organizations, the opposition is labeled as “Western” countries or 
organizations, who have lost their moral compass and are attempting to coerce 
developing countries into abandoning their traditions and religious morals with their 
undue influence in the international sphere (International Right to Life Newsletter 
March/April 2000, Friday Fax 2000).  
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As many anti-abortion organizations use this frame of Western imperialism to 
denounce the UN setting standards and monitoring on issues of sexual and reproductive 
health, they also support state sovereignty as a bulwark against the expansion of 
international norms that are seen to conflict with traditional cultural and religious 
practices. Most anti-abortion organizations, Catholic and evangelical, use arguments that 
emphasize the sovereignty of states, referring back to the Charter of the UN and arguing 
that the UN should not interfere with states’ abilities to make their own rules and enforce 
them (Concerned Women for America 1999, Austin Ruse Interview 2006). This has 
continued to be a major theme for most anti-abortion organizations when speaking of the 
UN; their arguments center on the lack of accountability of many monitoring 
commissions, who interpret language to mean abortion rights and request countries to 
liberalize abortion laws (UN Human Rights Commission, International Right to Life 
Newsletter).  
Interestingly, most anti-abortion organizations do not direct their framing 
strategies at UN employees because they do not believe they can influence them; they do 
not directly targeted the UN because they believe these men and women are so liberal 
that they will not hear them (Jack Willke Interview 2006, Austin Ruse Interview 2006). 
For instance, Austin Ruse stated that “I think that the UN bureaucrats are our opponents 
on these issues. … There’s no question about it that we’re not wanted by the powers that 
be” (Austin Ruse Interview 2006). He went on to argue that everyone at the UN, but 
especially at the UNFPA, would be sympathetic to abortion-rights organizations and 
activists, and hostile to anti-abortion activists (Austin Ruse Interview 2006). Allan 
Carlson, a former neo-Malthusian demographer, now sees the anti-abortion network 
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working against “a fairly aggressive, radical secular individualism which has been the 
dominant force in the UN for several decades now” (Allan Carlson Interview 2006). He 
traced the roots of this secular individualism in population policy at the UN to Alva 
Myrdal, a Swedish feminist and population scholar who, along with her husband, had a 
lot of influence in the 1930s in Sweden, and again in the 1960s. Carlson describes her as 
a “bright, creative person, and when she got involved in population policy, …her agenda 
was very much secular, individualist, … socialist, building a post-family order where the 
state essentially had replaced the family as the organizing principle of society.  She was 
open and clear about this” (Allan Carlson Interview 2006). In the 1940s, she was the 
highest-ranking woman in the UN, and she oversaw social and population policy, and 
Carlson believes that “certainly her vision, her ideology… has had a long and strong 
legacy” (Allan Carlson Interview 2006). In addition, he sees this mindset – “the modern 
European mindset, which is secular, individualistic, focused heavily on the self” as 
widespread within Europe, and as a result, has greatly shaped the UN and its policies due 
to the many Western European individuals that “have disproportionately peopled the 
social policies offices” (Allan Carlson Interview 2006). “By and large Europe itself 
became heavily secularized, and it’s a wealthy place with a heavy influence at the United 
Nations.  And it’s a place that takes the U.N. much more seriously than the United States 
does” (Allan Carlson Interview 2006).  
These interviews demonstrate the prevalent view among anti-abortion activists 
that the UN is a hostile place for them to work, one dominated by a secular and 
individualist culture. However, these organizations continue to adjust their strategies to 
lobby at the UN, illustrating that even the mainly “friendly” government delegations that 
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they target require them to shift their language to fit the environment they are working 
within.  
6.2.2.3 Information Politics 
Anti-abortion organizations used moral and traditional arguments for preserving 
the natural family and against abortion in their newsletters and literature to their 
constituents. However, as they became more involved in the international sphere, anti-
abortion organizations have begun to use more research based arguments to persuade 
government delegations at the UN of their positions on abortion and the natural family. 
The use of scientific research in the initial stages of their advocacy at the UN was 
negligible, but as they became more committed to the international sphere, anti-abortion 
organizations began to utilize research from several conservative organizations that took 
on the role of providing evidence to support conservative advocacy on these and other 
issues. 
Several organizations, such as the Howard Center and the Population Research 
Institute, have taken on the role of producing research and statistics to support the 
advocacy of anti-abortion organizations. The Howard Center labels itself a non-profit 
research center that believes the natural family is the fundamental unit of society and 
offers research and analysis on how the erosion of the family has affected key areas of 
society, including education, child abuse, and the economy. The president of the Howard 
Center, Allan Carlson, described his organization as trying to support anti-abortion 
advocacy with “some intellectual ammunition, and also mobilizing what we know about 
the social sciences behind that” (Allan Carlson Interview 2006). One of the Howard 
Center’s publications, The Family in America, “analyzes the status of the family in this 
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nation and time” (Howard Center, The Family in America). The Howard Center also 
publishes a supplement to The Family in America called New Research, featuring ten to 
twelve “readable abstracts” from professional journals in the fields of sociology, 
psychology, medicine, law, anthropology, and history that “cast light on the vital 
importance of the natural family and the serious consequences that derive from its 
decline” (Howard Center, New Research). This is especially revealing because this 
research is not produced by the Howard Center, but derives greater legitimacy because 
they have been published in professional journals.  
The Population Research Institute (PRI), presided over by Steve Mosher, 
describes itself as a “non-profit research and educational organization dedicated to 
objectively presenting the truth about population –related issues” (Population Research 
Institute http://www.pop.org). Steve Mosher a vocal critic of the “myth of 
overpopulation” and a prolific writer who has published articles throughout the years in 
newspapers and journals. PRI’s publications include a weekly briefing newsletter that 
provides information concerning population policy, including abortion policies, in 
countries around the world. PRI’s Research and Education webpage includes articles and 
information concerning U.S. documents that support population control, and “Web 
Watch,” which analyzes demographic and abortion-rights websites for “the distortions 
and poor logic that often characterize these organizations” (PRI Web Watch). PRI also 
includes an “In-Depth Reports” page, which includes research papers on abortion policy 
in the U.S. and abroad, especially the connection between U.S. funding and the UN. In 
2003, Mosher published a paper on the integration of HIV/AIDS programs and Sexual 
Health and Rights programs in Africa and why such programs would not alleviate the 
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HIV/AIDS epidemic; in 1999, a report called “Money for Nothing” on “Why the U.S. 
Should Not Resume UNFPA Funding” based on the use of UNFPA funding to support 
coercive population programs; and in 1996, a report on the “Demographic, Social, and 
Human Rights Consequences of U.S. Cuts in Population Control Funding,” which argued 
that such cuts in funding would decrease human rights abuses associated with coercive 
population programs.   
At the World Congress of Families II in Geneva, the inclusion of secular speakers 
and scholars also showed that the organizers of the conference were aware of the need to 
persuade on the basis of science and reason rather than the mainstays of religion and 
traditional values. Twenty-five of the seventy-five speakers on the program in 1999 were 
university scholars and current or former government officials or diplomats, up from 
about fifteen in 1997. Several speakers used a scientific and research-based approach in 
their speeches supporting the natural family, including references to how the natural 
family supports the economy, how strong marriages helps reduce the incidence of crime 
by teenagers, and how the natural family reduces the tax on society of divorce and child 
abuse.  
The newsletters of two active anti-abortion organizations, International Right to 
Life and Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute, both began to use research put out 
by the UN Population Division concerning world population estimates and projections to 
claim that the true problem the world was dealing with was population ageing, or de-
population, rather than over-population. In 1999, Catholic Family and Human Rights 
Institute stated, based on UN research, that  
The most alarming statistic of the 1998 revision is the number of countries who have 
reached what is known as `below replacement fertility', a condition where the citizens of 
a country no longer replace themselves. In order to replace itself, a country must have at 
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least 2.1 children per couple. Two years ago, 51 countries had fallen below that number. 
The number of countries now in low replacement fertility is 61. Experts fear these 
countries are in demographic free fall, with no end in sight. (Friday Fax March 1999) 
 
The International Right to Life newsletter stated that  
 
Pro-lifers who wish to inform their fellow citizens of the truth about world de-population, 
as supposed to the mythical propaganda being employed by U.N. population imperialists, 
can now begin to cite figures from this official U.N. population report. These figures are 
authoritative and should be widely disseminated. (International Right to Life Newsletter 
Feb/March 1999) 
 
 When anti-abortion organizations felt that they could use UN data to support their 
claim that declining fertility rates rather than rising fertility rates was the true population 
problem, they credited UN data about world population projections as authoritative and 
began to support using that data for wide dissemination. However, these same newsletters 
reported on the status of abortions and abortion laws in many other countries around the 
world, and used mostly anecdotal evidence to support their position. Thus, the use of 
science and reason to support their advocacy claims can be seen mainly in arguments 
presented to more hostile audiences, or “outsiders” while arguments or information 
directed at “insiders” continued to use more traditional supports such as anecdotes or 
referrals to moral codes.   
These were distinct changes in strategy for conservatives, and demonstrated not 
only an adjustment in moving from the domestic to the international, but the way in 
which they moved into the international space. The World Congress of Family 
conferences imitated UN conferences in substance, organization and procedure, and 
provided conservative activists with a change in mindset as well as tools; as such, they 
were better prepared to enter that international stage and influence international debate 
and policy on a par with the women’s organizations which had more than a decade of 





Cairo+5 was another triumph for the women’s organizations that advocated 
reproductive health and rights, as discussed previously; these organizations had the 
momentum from the Cairo conference success and the continued support of the Clinton 
administration, and pushed the language in the final declaration to include sexual health 
as well as reproductive health and rights (Sinding Interview 2006). However, the Cairo 
+5 conference also demonstrated the scale shift of the anti-abortion network up to the 
international sphere, and the adjustments they made in order to better advocate at the UN. 
The Holy See and anti-abortion organizations that had developed in the time since Cairo 
attended the five-year review and were organized and vocal in their opposition to the 
expansion in reproductive health and rights language. 
Although the negotiations on the review document were not meant to re-negotiate 
the agreements from Cairo, those who advocated for reproductive health and rights tried 
to address new issues and include new language, while those against reproductive health 
and rights argued against both new and old language that they opposed. The issues of 
abortion, sexual health, and adolescent rights were high on the reproductive health 
network’s agenda; reproductive health and rights activists, along with the EU and U.S. 
delegations, tried to include references to emergency contraception, with the most visible 
and vocal objectors to otherwise accepted language being a coalition of Catholic and 
Muslim states including Algeria, Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, Egypt, Libya, Sudan, 
Morocco, Nicaragua (Fahey 1999). The Vatican’s delegation raised opposition to 
mentions of emergency contraception, arguing that it is an abortifacient rather than a 
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contraceptive, and objected to the term “safe motherhood,” arguing that it was a code 
word for abortion legalization (Klitsch 1999: 197). The language referring to emergency 
contraception was as a result much more vague than women’s rights advocates wanted.  
Another issue that created a lot of friction was parents’ rights to supervise their 
children, with the Holy See and anti-abortion NGO members seeking to add the phrase 
“the rights, duties and responsibilities of parents” in providing children with guidance in 
sexual and reproductive matters. One introductory paragraph in the section on 
adolescents quoted from the Cairo Program of Action and referred to the rights, duties 
and responsibilities of parents. In the substantive sections on adolescents, a compromise 
text read “with the active support and participation, as appropriate, of parents, families, 
communities, NGOs and the private sector” (UN General Assembly Report 1999: 
paragraph 21b). In another instance, when a section called for “effective referral 
mechanisms across services and levels of care,” the Holy See asked for an explicit 
conscience clause that would allow providers to refuse to refer. Some countries objected 
to this by arguing that the Holy See in turn was trying to include new language; in the 
end, the compromise text read “taking care that services are offered in conformity with 
human rights and with ethical and professional standards,” which did not include a 
conscience clause. 
More anti-abortion NGOs activists attended the negotiations for the five-year 
review of Cairo than attended either Cairo or the Beijing conference; organizations 
including International Right to Life Federation, Opus Dei, Human Life International, 
and the Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute brought around 100 representatives. 
Many progressive activists noted with dismay the greater ranks and increased boldness of 
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these anti-abortion organizations, and especially their role in stalling the negotiations on 
the review document so much that even after the negotiations had been extended an extra 
day, a consensus document could not be produced, and another session had to be 
scheduled just prior to the time the document was to be presented at the General 
Assembly meeting in June. Joseph Fahey, a delegate for the American Humanist 
Association, noted that the anti-abortion organization delegates numbered more than a 
hundred and “lobbied government delegates in an effort to derail the Program of Action” 
(Fahey 1999). Kathy Hall Martinez, a representative for the Center for Reproductive Law 
and Policy, also remarked, “I was amazed at how much more organized and sophisticated 
the Holy See and its allies were as compared to Cairo in 1994. They are better organized 
now than the women’s movement because they are very focused on a small number of 
issues. And they have a lot of folks who will volunteer their own time and use their own 
money to attend these meetings” (Eager 2004).  
In addition, Fahey (1999) notes that the progressive NGO representatives took 
part in three actions as the conference went on that displayed their frustration with the 
anti-abortion side, especially the Holy See. First, as a result of the delays due to 
contentious debate, the General Assembly had decided to cancel the five presentations 
from NGOs scheduled for that day. They sent a unanimous resolution to the president of 
the special session, Didier Opertti, to reinstate the NGO presentations, and three were. 
Second, a progressive Catholic professor of theology delivered a confrontational speech 
accusing the Holy See of not representing the diversity of views on abortion and 
contraception among Catholics, and urging the Vatican to step down from its privileged 
Observer Status, which was met with much applause. Third, an open letter to the Vatican 
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was released by women’s NGOs from Latin America and supported by over eighty 
international NGOs from the women’s coalition, which asked several pointed questions 
meant to expose apparent discrepancies between the Holy See’s discourse on life and 
their actions against the Program of Action, and to again ask why the Vatican, as a male 
establishment, was concerned with contraception, sexual education and women’s health 
services.  
Scholars and activists from both sides agree that although anti-abortion 
delegations and NGOs contested the review process much more successfully, the review 
of Cairo was a progressive success because it re-affirmed the language and core 
principles of the Cairo Program of Action and offered concrete proposals to help 
governments further implement the goals of Cairo, especially in the area of improving 
contraceptive practice, lessening illiteracy among women and girls, reducing maternal 
mortality, and preventing and treating HIV and AIDS in young people.  
 
6.3 Conclusion 
The time period between Cairo and the five-year review of Cairo was one of 
intense learning for anti-abortion organizations, some of which were created as a result of 
Cairo. Many Christian Right organizations in the U.S. felt that they had to respond to the 
impact of the women’s health and rights movement at Cairo by attending and advocating 
against abortion at subsequent UN global conferences that referenced population issues, 
and although many did attend the Beijing Women’s conference, they were not prepared 
for advocacy at the UN level and were discouraged by their cold reception in an 
environment that was primarily the sphere of progressive organizations with progressive 
causes and methods. However, the Holy See had begun to change their tactics at this 
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point, and many of the anti-abortion organizations used the time from 1995 to 1999 to 
change their approach to the UN. As a result, anti-abortion organizations created a space 
for their advocacy at the Cairo +5 conference, which mainly reflected their influence in a 
negating sense, in that women’s health and rights activists were not able to further the 
language on the issues of abortion and emergency contraception as far as they would 
have liked.  
The impact of the state continued to play out in this time period, but with mixed 
results in the case of the U.S. The Clinton administration continued to appoint delegates 
sympathetic to reproductive health and rights, as well as abortion, but was wary of 
appearing too sympathetic to the issue of abortion in the international sphere because of 
the Republican Congress that was elected in 1994 (Barbara Crossette 2004). European 
delegations, however, continued to strongly support reproductive health and rights, and 
increased their spending for population programs in response to the decrease in U.S. 
spending, again a result of the Republican Congress; this allowed the Cairo +5 
conference to be quite extensive, and population programs to continue without much loss 
of functionality.  
6.3.1 Findings 
The women’s health and rights movement in the years from the Beijing 
conference to the five-year review of Cairo seemed to move forward in their use of 
science and reason to support their advocacy, and to find more effective ways of reaching 
government delegations. They were able to maintain the relationships they built with UN 
employees, especially within the UNFPA, and build on them to further the language of 
Cairo at the Beijing Women’s Conference and at Cairo +5. 
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The conservative activists of the anti-abortion movement used the time after Cairo 
to scale up their advocacy to the international level, especially at the UN. Many Christian 
Right organizations involved in domestic anti-abortion lobbying began attending UN 
global conferences, especially Protestant or Mormon organizations that did not formerly 
engage the UN (Focus on the Family, United Families International, Howard Center). 
Human Life International created and funded an entire new organization, Catholic Family 
and Human Rights Institute, to lobby against abortion at the UN. As these anti-abortion 
organizations moved into the international sphere, they felt the same pressures as any 
other group to conform to their environment in order to better influence it. At the UN, 
this was a little harder for anti-abortion groups to do, given their central theme against 
abortion; such a position is perceived as a conservative, traditional, religious position, in 
an environment that valued consensus, rights, and progress through science and reason. 
In the 1995-2000 period, anti-abortion organizations began to build coalitions across 
faiths and across borders. Their attempts were fairly tentative, and struggled to walk the 
line between speaking to insiders in a language they were comfortable with, that of 
traditions and religiously-based morals, and making that language palatable in an 
environment such as the UN global conferences, where such rationales were not the 
norm. As a result, science and research became more visible as tools that anti-abortion 
organizations tried to use in lobbying at the UN. Key organizations such as the Howard 
Center also framed their arguments in the more neutral terms of the natural family so that 
groups of many different faiths would be comfortable joining the network.  
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6.3.2 Comparison of the two movements 
Women’s rights organizations, building on their success at Cairo, attempted to 
push the language on reproductive health and rights to include sexual health and rights at 
the Beijing Women’s Conference in 1995 and at the five-year review of Cairo. These 
organizations continued to strengthen their ties with the human rights community, in 
order to have human rights organizations working with them on the issue of reproductive 
health and rights, and also continued to frame reproductive health as a human right. 
Having adjusted their international focus to include many developing country 
organizations for the Cairo conference, they continued to work with these organizations 
at Beijing and Cairo +5. They were more aware of the presence of anti-abortion activists 
at these two conferences, and had to work harder to preserve the previously agreed-upon 
language from Cairo than they had anticipated as a result, but continued to push 
successfully for sexual health and rights, greater focus on adolescents, and abortion 
rights.  
Anti-abortion activists attended Beijing in much greater numbers in response to 
the change in language to reproductive health and rights and the call by the Holy See to 
advocate against an international right to abortion, with mixed results because many of 
these activists were not organized or allied, and felt outnumbered and belittled. The main 
change and influence by conservative actors at the Beijing conference came from the 
Holy See; Vatican delegates changed their framing in order to portray themselves as 
more progressive and concerned with women’s health and rights. The fact that the Holy 
See felt the need to portray itself as more progressive is a telling sign of the extent to 
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which religious actors at the UN feel the need to conform to the cultural environment that 
emphasizes the individual, and especially the rights framework. 
Prior to Cairo +5, the World Congress of Families, an international conference 
organized by the Howard Center, continued the Holy See’s attempts to reach out to other 
monotheistic faiths; it also built ties between sects of the Christian Right in the U.S., 
between Catholic, Protestant, and Mormon organizations. This was helped by the framing 
of conservative issues as “natural family” issues, which included many concerns, 
including abortion, the role of marriage and husbands and wives in strengthening society, 
and to some extent gay marriage and rights. The World Congress of families also 
emphasized research-based evidence for positions on the natural family, with many 
academic speakers. Both the coalition-building and the information politics that took 
place at the World Congress of Families, and its superficial similarities to UN global 
conferences, provide evidence that the anti-abortion organizations were aware of that 
they had to make adjustments in order to work at the UN, specifically to have more 
international allies and an evidence-base that would be better accepted in the UN 
environment.  
At Cairo +5, conservative activists were more organized and able to affect the 
proceedings of the NGO Forum. They also lobbied country delegations more effectively, 
to oppose emergency contraception and to introduce language concerning parents’ 
responsibilities for adolescents. I would argue that as a whole, the anti-abortion 
organizations did not utilize framing, coalition-building, and the use of science and 
reason in combination, and so had quite a limited influence on the conference. They were 
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not able to introduce any language concerning the rights of parents over adolescents, but 









The ten-year review of Cairo did not occur as a global conference, but regional 
meetings reviewing the progress towards meeting the goals set out in the Cairo Program 
of Action took place in Bangkok on December 11-17, 2002 for Asia and the Pacific; in 
Port-of-Spain on November 11-12, 2003 for Latin America and the Caribbean; in Geneva 
on January 12-14, 2004 for Europe; in Dakar on June 7-10, 2004 for Africa; and in Beirut 
on November 19-21, 2004 for the Arab region. The General Assembly in New York 
commemorated the 10th anniversary of the ICPD, at which time member states made 
statements and reaffirmed their commitment to the Cairo Program of Action. The 37th 
session of the Commission on Population and Development (CPD) met on March 22-26, 
2004 to review the progress made in implementing the ICPD Program of Action. 
Countries reported to the CPD at this time on country-level progress, but at least two 
regional meetings had not as yet taken place. The negotiations on the draft resolution on 
the Follow-up of the Program of Action of the ICPD took place at that time, and the 
resolution was adopted at the reconvening of the commission on May 6th. 
Regional reviews of the implementation of ICPD ten years later took place 
beginning in 2002 and continuing through 2004. In December 2002, the Fifth Asia and 
Pacific Population Conference was held on the theme of “Population and Poverty.” On 
November 11-12, 2003, twenty Caribbean countries and territories reaffirmed their 
commitment to the ICPD; Latin American countries also reaffirmed their commitment to 
the ICPD in June 2004, and adopted a resolution that urges countries in the region to 
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intensify their efforts to continue implementing the Cairo Program of Action. The 
Economic Commission for Europe and UNFPA convened the European Population 
Forum in Geneva on January 12-14, 2004. The Forum brought together experts from 
executive and legislative branches of government, academia, research, intergovernmental 
organizations and institutions, non-governmental organizations, youth and the private 
sector. The Forum emphasized the pertinence of the ICPD to the European region and 
called for greater attention on how best to further implement the Program of Action in the 
region as well as worldwide. In June 2004, the Economic Commission for Africa 
convened an expert meeting followed by a ministerial level meeting; both endorsed the 
Africa Regional Report and a Declaration that reaffirms Africa’s commitment to the 
ICPD goals and their importance in achieving the MDGs. The Arab Population Forum 
review took place in November 2004; it focused on population, poverty and development, 
and how best to overcome high maternal mortality, especially barriers to the enforcement 
of reproductive rights and gender equality. 
 Internationally, the General Assembly commemorated the Tenth Anniversary of 
the ICPD on October 14th, 2004. The Commission on Population and Development used 
its 37th session on March 22-26, 2004, to review and appraise the progress made in 
implementing the ICPD Program of Action. Countries reported on significant progress in 
implementation of the ICPD Program of Action, and how well the ICPD agenda has been 
integrated into national policies and strategies. The meeting re-affirming the theme for 
2005, “Population, Development and HIV/AIDS,” and also considered an additional 
topic for 2005: the contribution of the implementation of the ICPD Program of Action to 
the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (Countdown 2015 – Events, 
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2004). The UNFPA held a Special Event Panel Discussion, “Putting People First: 
Implementing the ICPD Agenda and Achieving the MDGs,” on June 21st, 2004 in 
Geneva, Switzerland.  
The UNFPA also organized four thematic high-level roundtables for the 10-year 
review, on issues they believed to be essential to the further implementation of the ICPD 
Program of Action. Of the two that occurred in 2004, one was the High Level Global 
Consultation on Linking HIV/AIDS with Sexual and Reproductive Health. In May 2004, 
technical experts met in New York to discuss the linkages between HIV/AIDS and sexual 
and reproductive health, and proposed actions that would help form the ‘Commitment to 
Action;’ this Commitment to Action was then discussed and endorsed by the high-level 
global leaders from both the reproductive health and HIV/AIDS fields that met at the 
High Level Global Consultation in June 2004 in New York. The reproductive health and 
HIV/AIDS leaders came together to reach consensus on a set of actions and 
recommendations that would “ensure more effective integration and linkage between 
policies and programs that address HIV/AIDS and those that address reproductive health” 
(Countdown 2015 – Events, 2004). The second meeting that occurred in 2004 was the 
October Roundtable on Promoting Reproductive Health and Rights: Reducing Poverty, in 
Sweden. Policy-makers, experts, and “selected social and opinion leaders” gathered for a 
meeting meant to present evidence on the importance of reproductive health and rights in 
helping to reduce poverty, which would then be used to inform the 2005 UNGA Review 
of the Millennium Declaration. The declared goal of the meeting was stated as 
“positioning Reproductive Health and Rights as a cornerstone of national poverty 
eradication strategies, in order to promote social and economic growth within a human 
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rights framework, and at presenting arguments to prioritize investments in Reproductive 
Health and Rights” (Countdown 2015 – Events, 2004). 
7.2 Analysis 
7.2.1 Abortion-rights movement 
 
Framing and Alliances:  
 
Women’s health and rights organizations have made some smaller framing changes 
since the Cairo and Cairo+5 conferences. Organizations have tended to shy away from 
names that denote a purpose dedicated to strictly population decrease, and instead 
adopted names that indicate broader concerns; in addition to the crisis view of population 
becoming unpopular since the Cairo conference, funding opportunities have become 
restricted since the perception that population growth is no longer an urgent issue has 
become more widespread (Gillespie 2004: 35). In addition, long-time family planning 
experts and demographers have argued that reproductive health and rights are too vague a 
formulation for policy-makers and donors to fund, and that the greatly decreased funds 
for family planning worldwide are a direct result of the Cairo Program of Action’s 
emphasis on formulations that are too complex and indirect to be compelling to policy-
makers or donors (Gillespie 2004).  
Duff Gillespie was a long-time population and health expert with USAID and a 
member of the U.S. delegation to Cairo and he is currently affiliated with the Gates 
Institute for Population and Reproductive Health at Johns Hopkins. He believes that 
pushing for the entire Cairo Program of Action is too difficult, but that there are certain 
components of the program that could be championed effectively because of their clear 
goals and concrete actions (Gillespie 2004). He emphasizes several components that he 
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believes are “best bets,” including averting HIV/AIDS transmission from mother to child 
with a one-dose anti-retroviral drug as well as family planning services directed at 
HIV/AIDS positive women and reducing abortion, especially unsafe abortion, as an 
explicit goal of family planning services.  
Most abortion-rights advocates continue to use a human rights basis to frame 
reproductive health and rights rather than the security framework that justified population 
control policy in the past (environmental, resources, or otherwise); however, they have 
attempted to regain an urgency for their programs and to raise funds for their programs 
by connecting them intimately with the Millennium Development Goals, and more 
specifically, to HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment. Beginning with the adoption of the 
Millennium Declaration in 2000 and the Millennium Development Goals in 2001 and 
continuing to the 2005 review of the MDGs, reproductive health and rights advocates 
have framed the Cairo Program of Action as essential to the fulfillment of the MDGs, and 
they have worked to include a reproductive health and rights MDG in order to maintain 
funding and visibility at the UN. The reproductive health and rights organizations have 
also worked to ally themselves with the HIV/AIDS community and frame their issue as 
essentially connected to the prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS, especially at 
Countdown 2015, the liberal NGO ten-year review of Cairo. These are the biggest 
changes in both framing and coalition building for the abortion-rights network from 
2000-2004, and the alliance with the HIV/AIDS community is one that almost every 
interview respondent from the abortion-rights NGO community cited as a present or 
future goal. Jill Sheffield of Family Care International (FCI) stated that as an 
organization, FCI added HIV/AIDS as a major objective in the context of safe 
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motherhood; to her, it was clear at that time that women and girls were suffering 
disproportionately, especially in Africa (Jill Sheffield Interview 2006). When discussing 
future allies, the HIV/AIDS community was high on the list of many of these NGOs, 
along with the human rights community (Jill Sheffield Interview 2006, Barbara Crane 
Interview 2006, Steven Sinding Interview 2006).   
I will first elaborate on the Millennium Development process and how reproductive 
health and rights came to be left out of the Declaration and the Goals, and how women’s 
reproductive health and rights groups have worked to keep reproductive health and rights 
on the agenda; I will then trace how this movement has worked to re-frame their issues in 
relation to HIV/AIDS and ally with the HIV/AIDS organizations in the 2000-2007 time 
frame, especially in the 10-year NGO review of Cairo, a meeting called Countdown 
2015. 
 
The absence of reproductive health and rights from the Millennium Development Goals  
 The Millennium Development Declaration and Goals were meant to provide the 
UN and its member nations with a roadmap for world development by 2015, a 
culmination of the work done throughout the 1990s in global conferences with individual 
UN agencies, governments, and NGOs in identifying issues and solutions of global 
importance. Rights language continues to play an important role in the Millennium 
Declaration, which includes a section on “Human Rights, Democracy, and Good 
Governance” that elaborates on human rights, minority rights, and development rights. 
However, neither the Declaration nor the Goals included a recommendation on, or indeed 
any explicit mention of, reproductive health and rights. This exclusion has been a major 
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setback for the women’s health and rights movement; despite the consensus on 
reproductive health and rights at Cairo and the reiterated support for that consensus at the 
five-year review of Cairo, reproductive health and rights was not included the in blueprint 
for the UN’s future agenda and work. The Millennium Development Goals have also 
been adopted by NGOs and private organizations throughout the world as the minimum 
that must be done for the world’s poor and developing nations, and the omission of 
reproductive health and rights further distances civil society from the concept and 
language. Although this might seem a victory for the anti-abortion network working to 
roll back UN language on reproductive health and rights, in fact it seems the network was 
only indirectly responsible for the omission. 
The Millennium Development Declaration and Goals both evolved from the 
Secretary General’s Millennium Development Report, published in April 2000. It was 
written under the leadership of John Gerard Ruggie, Kofi Annan’s chief adviser for 
strategic planning from 1997 to 2001(Crossette 2004: 4). Theo-Ben Gurirab of Namibia, 
the General Assembly president for the year that preceded the Millennium Assembly, 
wanted the draft of the Declaration written quickly and without the typical intense debate 
over social issues; as a result, he did not create a preparatory committee and asked two 
experienced diplomats to put together the Declaration without the involvement of NGOs 
in order to streamline the process. These were Ambassador Gert Rosenthal of Guatemala 
and Michael John Powles, the permanent representative of New Zealand at the UN; 
Rosenthal testifies that drawing up a draft Millennium Declaration was difficult even 
without a preparatory process, and that it was largely drawn from the Secretary General’s 
Report, a document that he “admits had been composed to skirt controversy” (Crossette 
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2004: 4). The Millennium Development Declaration was brought to a vote in the fall of 
2000, and the Millennium Development Goals were adopted in August 2001. The 
Millennium Development Goals included eight broad goals, 18 specific targets, and 48 
indicators.  




2. Achieve universal 
primary education 
3. Promote gender 
equality and 
empower women 














The Report did not include a recommendation incorporating reproductive health, 
although reproductive health is indirectly mentioned in connection to poverty, disease, 
and the prevention of HIV-AIDS (Millennium Development Report 2000). As a result, 
the Millennium Declaration and later the Millennium Development Goals also did not 
include any specific recommendations concerning reproductive health. This absence is all 
the more glaring because the topic of every other major global conference of the 1990s 
was included in the Millennium Development Goals. Journalist Barbara Crossette 
researched the reasons for this omission at the request of the Hewlitt Foundation; one key 
reason she detailed in her report ironically involved the success of the five-year review of 
the Cairo conference in 1999. The strong efforts of NGOs and official delegations at that 
time, and the success of those efforts at the review, led the NGOs and government 
delegations to be fatigued and overconfident concerning their issue; they did not turn 
their attention to the Millennium Development process quickly or effectively enough, 
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according to Stan Bernstein, senior researcher and editor at UNFPA, and sexual and 
reproductive health advisor to the Millennium Project (Crossette 2004: 9).  
The opposition of the G-77 nations in 1999 was another key reason for the 
absence of reproductive health and rights from the Declaration and Goals; the G-77 
government delegations were divided about women’s rights, and states such as Iran and 
Libya kept negotiations going until 3 AM in order to prevent a consensus that they 
opposed. The opposition of many Islamic and Catholic countries was also apparently a 
factor in the Secretariat’s decision to not fight for reproductive health and rights as a 
recommendation or goal. “I think the calculation of the Secretariat was, Let’s not 
sacrifice the greater coherence and get involved in these highly controversial topics” 
(Rosenthal in Crossette 2004: 10).  
In addition, some key leadership during the Cairo process was missing during the 
Millennium Development process; Nafis Sadik had stepped down as Secretary-General of 
the UNFPA, and the head of the U.S. delegation to Cairo, Tim Wirth, had left the Clinton 
administration to be the head of the UN Foundation. The Clinton administration was still 
responsible for the U.S. mission to the UN, but by 2000, the conservatives had captured 
Congress and opposed the Clinton administration’s stance on many issues, but especially 
abortion, and as a result, the administration had stopped promoting women’s rights at the 
UN. Vice President Al Gore, then running for president in 2000, chose not to emphasize 
women’s rights at a time when the conservatives, especially on the issue of abortion, 
were strengthening their hold on the American electorate. Dr. Nafis Sadik in an interview 
with Barbara Crossette blamed the Secretariat’s caution and John Ruggie’s need for 
concrete indicators for the lack of reproductive health in the Millennium Development 
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process (Crossette 2004: 11). Ruggie, she said, did not understand how reproductive 
health could be quantifiably measured, and as a result, he did not want to include it as a 
goal.  
By the time NGOs realized that reproductive health and rights was in danger of 
not making it as a Millennium Development Goal, their efforts were too late. The many 
letters written to Thora Obaid and phone calls to Dr. Sadik, private meetings with UN 
officials and sympathetic country delegates, were not able to change the content of the 
Millennium Development Goals; it was now 2001, Michael Doyle had replaced John 
Ruggie, and in addition to the opposition from G-77 countries, Doyle believed that “the 
Bush administration was waiting in the wings to block any reference to women’s rights or 
even to the use of the term ‘reproductive health,’ which conservatives argue is a cloak for 
a ‘feminist agenda’ that included the right to abortion” (Crossette 2004: 12). This 
represents a change in the opportunity structure for abortion-rights organizations. 
However, Doyle also believes that the Secretariat and UN agencies were not opposed to 
the Cairo program, only trying to wait out the opposition from G-77 and the U.S. at the 
time, which would have made the Millennium Development Goals with a reproductive 
health and rights MDG very hard to pass. Doyle in fact worked to include reproductive 
health and rights in the indicators and targets of the existing MDGs. Several that survived 
include: the proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel, considered a basic 
measure of a woman’s right to good reproductive care by Unicef and the World Health 
Organization; in the section devoted to HIV-AIDS, indicators such as the condom 
prevalence rate among married women and sex workers and a more general measure of 
contraceptive prevalence are used. But reproductive health is not included as an indicator 
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of gender equality or the empowerment of women, and the major reasons seem to be the 
conservative opposition from G-77 countries as well as, later, the Bush administration. In 
addition, some NGO members and UN employees cite a difficult situation for NGOs who 
were facing a backlash against “civil society” involvement at the UN in 2000 and 2001 
(Crossette 2004, Joseph Chamie Interview 2006). Although they did not directly aim for 
the exclusion of reproductive health and rights from the MDGs necessarily, the 
conservative organizations of the anti-abortion movement certainly succeeded in 
identifying the phrase “reproductive health and rights” as code for abortion, an issue that 
raised the hackles of many conservative Islamic and Catholic countries in addition to 
women’s rights in general. This, in addition to the desire of the General Assembly 
president to draft the Millennium Development Declaration quickly and without a great 
deal of prolonged deliberation, a change of leadership in key places, and the inability of 
women’s rights NGOs to be significantly involved in the Millennium Development 
process, kept reproductive health and rights out of the Millennium Development Goals. 
Using this general overview and analysis, I see the exclusion of reproductive 
health and rights in the UN Millennium Development Goals as an indirect victory for the 
conservative anti-abortion movement, and one that served notice to the abortion-rights 
movement that they must adjust their strategy to account for a more robust anti-abortion 
movement than they had so far encountered in the international realm. The Vatican and 
anti-abortion organizations did not directly influence the Millennium Development 
process, but the furor created by the reproductive and sexual health and rights language in 
the conservative countries of the G-77 and the lack of support from the Bush 
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administration for such language was enough to make important decision-makers within 
the UN want to sidestep any possible landmines in the approval process for the MDGs.  
The reaction of the women’s reproductive health and rights movement to the 
exclusion of their concerns from the MDGs tells us a great deal about the importance of 
the UN and its declarations to this community and to the foundation community; their 
strategies in response to the exclusion of reproductive health and rights from the MDGs 
tells us much about the future of the movement and how they have learned to adjust to 
the presence of a larger and more vocal anti-abortion international NGO presence. The 
results of the omission of reproductive health and rights as an MDG has resulted in 
decreasing funds from established progressive foundations such as the Ford Foundation 
and the Rockefeller Foundation, but new sources such as the Hewlett, the Packard, and 
the Bill & Melinda Gates foundations have displayed their commitment to and given 
resources to reproductive health and rights (Basu 2005: 133). However, funds have 
continued to decrease for reproductive health/family planning programs as a whole, as 
governments decrease their funding, and so the reproductive health and rights movement 
has continuously worked to insert their concerns into the targets and indicators of the 
MDGs, and to introduce it as a new MDG after the 2005 review of MDGs.  
Although the MDGs are worded as simply as possible in action-oriented terms, 
their elaboration in the Millennium Development Declaration make it clear that they are 
founded in a human rights framework. The Declaration begins with a statement of the 
“fundamental values” which the authors consider “essential to international relations in 
the 21st century” (UN 2000). These include freedom (the right to live in dignity, free from 
hunger, violence, oppression or injustice), equality (of rights and opportunities), 
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solidarity (distributing costs and burdens of global challenges fairly), tolerance (respect 
for human beings, a culture of peace and dialogue), respect for nature (sustainable 
development), and shared responsibility (multilateral responsibility for economic and 
social development, as well as international peace and security) (UN 2000). Thus, the 
rights framework continues to be important for the key issues reflected in the Millennium 
Development Declaration and Goals, but the opportunity structure and the strength of the 
opposition’s framing efforts combined to keep reproductive health and rights out of these 
documents. 
Individuals at institutions such as the UNFPA, World Bank and the IPPF have 
been working since 2001 to connect reproductive health and rights concerns with the 
existing MDGs, especially maternal health and child health and empowerment of women, 
as well as MDG targets and indicators (Gillespie 2004: 35, Oppenheim 2004: 4). The 
Commission on Population and Development held a “Seminar on the Relevance of 
Population Aspects for the Achievement of the Millennium Development Goals” in 
November 2004. A sample of the papers presented at that seminar, and the organizations 
that were represented there, provide a comprehensive understanding of how UN 
organizations and reproductive health and rights advocates worked to connect 
reproductive health and rights to the MDGs5. Many papers listed each MDG and 
formulated different arguments concerning how the language of the ICPD or its goals or 
prescriptions helped accomplish that particular goal (Stan Bernstein 2004, UNFPA 2004). 
Most papers focused on the MDGs dealing with reducing maternal and child mortality, 
                                                
5 Papers were submitted by Stan Bernstein, Senior Policy Advisor for Sexual and Reproductive Health, the 
UNFPA, UNESCO, the World Bank, the World Health Organization, UNAIDS, UNICEF, as well as 
professors from the Harvard School of Public Health, SUNY and Population Council, Johns Hopkins 
University, and the Universities of Hawaii and Minnesota. 
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increasing gender equality and empowerment of women, and halting and reversing the 
spread of HIV/AIDS. Karen Oppenheim from the World Bank details the contribution of 
the ICPD Program of Action to the third Millennium Development Goal of gender 
equality and empowerment of women in particular, and as a result, to several other 
MDGs, arguing “the first and most important step to empowering women may be to 
enable them to control their reproduction… Historically, then, women’s ability to control 
the timing and numbers of their pregnancies may be one necessary, even if not sufficient, 
condition for undermining the traditional gender-based division of labor that results in 
men’s dominance over women” (Oppenheim 2004: 5).  
Hilary Anderson of the International Research and Training Institute for the 
Advancement of Women (INSTRAW) at the UN wrote on the missing links between 
gender equality, the MDGs and the ICPD; she argues that the holistic vision of 
reproductive health, rather than a more narrow focus on education of women, is 
necessary to the fulfillment of MDG 3, promoting gender equality and empowerment of 
women. In addition, Anderson argues that the ICPD’s holistic focus on reproductive as 
opposed to the more narrow maternal health “ensures that young girls and women have 
access to the services needed to ensure safe and freely chosen motherhood with the 
involvement of their partners” (Anderson 2004: 4). For Anderson, this holistic focus 
contributes not only to achieving MDG 5, reducing maternal mortality, but also to 
reducing extreme poverty (MDG 1), achieving universal primary education (MDG 2), 
reducing child mortality (MDG 4), and ensuring environmental sustainability (MDG 7). 
Kofi Annan, directly after the formulation of the MDGs, spoke on the importance of 
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reproductive health to the reduction of extreme poverty, the first MDG that is often 
shorthand for all of them:  
The Millennium Development Goals, particularly the eradication of extreme poverty and 
hunger, cannot be achieved if questions of population and reproduction are not squarely 
addressed. And that means stronger efforts to promote women’s rights, and greater 
investment in education and health, including reproductive health and family planning. 
(UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan) 
 
Knowing that the MDGs would be reviewed in 2005, the women’s health and 
rights community has also campaigned tirelessly to have their issue included as an 
additional MDG by writing about the importance of reproductive health and rights to the 
fulfillment of other MDGs, and holding regional and international meetings on the topic. 
In November 2004, the International Planned Parenthood Federation joined the UNFPA, 
the Alan Guttmacher Institute and UNAIDS in publishing a report titled “The Role of 
Reproductive Health Providers in Preventing HIV,” which urged the integration of health 
and family planning services (Crossette 2004: 14). In addition, Steven Sinding of IPPF 
promoted the introduction of a ninth Development Goal to explicitly cover reproductive 
rights, involving organizations that are broadly concerned with health and women’s 
issues as well as poverty reduction. Sinding felt very strongly that in order to get 
reproductive health and rights included in 2005 as an MDG, the G-77 countries had to 
take the lead in pressing for the inclusion of women’s sexual health (Crossette 2004: 15), 
and IPPF worked with their many national affiliates in developing countries to support a 
reproductive health and rights MDG.  
 Family Care International (FCI) documents two years of advocacy at the UN 
beginning in 2003-2004 on behalf of integrating sexual and reproductive health into the 
MDGs “on the grounds that global health and poverty reduction cannot be achieved 
otherwise” (FCI 2006). From 2001 to 2006, FCI claimed that sexual and reproductive 
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health was closely related to the two Millennium Development Goals of reducing 
maternal mortality and morbidity, and combating HIV/AIDS (FCI, Global Sexual Health 
and Rights 2007).  
 The 2005 World Summit was the 60th session of the General Assembly and also 
where a comprehensive review of the progress made in the fulfillment of all 
commitments contained in the UN Millennium Declaration and Goals as well as the UN 
global conferences would be made (UN 2004). Prior to this Summit, FCI distributed its 
Millennium Development Goals and Sexual and Reproductive Health Briefing Cards, a 
set of easy-access fact sheets “designed to help UN delegates, advocates, and government 
officials work these concepts into their development plans and policies” (FCI 2006). 
 As demonstrated, reproductive health and rights advocates have worked hard to 
connect reproductive health and rights to the Millennium Development Goals, and also 
lobbied long and hard for reproductive health and rights to be included as an MDG; the 
success of this lobbying by NGO activists as well as those inside UN agencies, is 
demonstrated by the General Assembly formally approving the Secretary-General’s 
report in October 2006, which recommends that the reproductive health objective be 
adopted as one of four new global development targets. The other targets include decent 
work for youth and women, universal access to HIV/AIDS treatment, and preserving 
biodiversity (FCI 2006). The inclusion of reproductive health as a new target connected 
with the MDGs is not the same as the inclusion of a new reproductive health MDG; 
however, it does put reproductive health on the radar for all organizations that look to the 
MDGs for guidance on programs and funding, along with key issues for the future, such 
as the environment, HIV/AIDS, and employment.  
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The abortion-rights network has lobbied diligently in response to the success of 
the framing efforts of the anti-abortion network to put reproductive health and rights back 
on the UN agenda by connecting it to the MDGs. Their adjustment is made easier by the 
many key figures at the UN, such as former Secretary-General Kofi Annan, that are 
committed to reproductive health and rights, as well as the close connections abortion-
rights activists continue to have with UN and UNFPA personnel. The Millennium Project 
was commissioned by the Kofi Annan in 2002 to develop a concrete action plan for the 
world to achieve the MDGs, and the project was headed by Professor Jeffrey Sachs, who 
was also extremely committed to reproductive health and rights as a means to the 
fulfillment of the other MDGs. Stan Bernstein, who works for the UNFPA, was enabled 
to work on the Millennium Project as a special reproductive health advisor as a result of 
extra funding provided by foundations “who were concerned that the whole Millennium 
Project wasn’t putting enough emphasis on reproductive health and rights” (Barbara 
Crane 2006). Bernstein was then made responsible for the Sexual and Reproductive 
Health Report, detailing the importance of sexual and reproductive health for achieving 
the Millennium Development Goals (Bernstein 2006). Stan Bernstein has a long-time 
professional relationship with Barbara Crane of the abortion-rights NGO IPAS, and asked 
her to submit a background paper on abortion for the Sexual and Reproductive Health 
Report, which allowed her to access and influence the Millennium Project on behalf of 
abortion rights (Barbara Crane Interview 2006). The background paper co-authored by 
Crane is titled “Access to Safe Abortion: An Essential Strategy for Achieving the 
Millennium Development Goals to Improve Maternal Health, Promote Gender Equality, 
and Reduce Poverty” (Crane and Smith 2006).  
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Cancellation of ICPD +10 
One fundamental change in reaction to the growing strength and influence of the 
anti-abortion network was the cancellation of ICPD +10, with most interview 
respondents citing the influence of the anti-abortion network under the Bush 
administration as the main reason why the conference was limited to regional meetings 
(Interviews with Stan Bernstein 2006, Steven Sinding 2006, Stirling Scruggs 2006, 
Suzanne Ehlers 2006). Activists and UN officials have mixed opinions on whether it was 
a warranted move on the part of abortion-rights activists (Interviews with Steven Sinding 
2006, Suzanne Ehlers 2006). However, even the regional meetings and international 
meetings taking place under the Commission on Population and Development and the 
UNFPA show the change in frame and growing emphasis on connecting reproductive 
health and rights with the HIV/AIDS issue, as well as to the Millennium Development 
Goals. 
Regional reviews of the implementation of ICPD ten years later took place 
beginning in 2002 and continuing through 2004. In December 2002, the Fifth Asia and 
Pacific Population Conference was held on the theme of “Population and Poverty.” On 
November 11-12, 2003, twenty Caribbean countries and territories reaffirmed their 
commitment to the ICPD; Latin American countries also reaffirmed their commitment to 
the ICPD in June 2004, and adopted a resolution that urges countries in the region to 
intensify their efforts to continue implementing the Cairo Program of Action. The 
Economic Commission for Europe and UNFPA convened the European Population 
Forum in Geneva on January 12-14, 2004. The Forum brought together experts from 
executive and legislative branches of government, academia, research, intergovernmental 
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organizations and institutions, non-governmental organizations, youth and the private 
sector. The Forum emphasized the pertinence of the ICPD to the European region and 
called for greater attention on how best to further implement the Program of Action in the 
region as well as worldwide. In June 2004, the Economic Commission for Africa 
convened an expert meeting followed by a ministerial level meeting; both endorsed the 
Africa Regional Report and a Declaration that reaffirms Africa’s commitment to the 
ICPD goals and their importance in achieving the MDGs. The Arab Population Forum 
review took place in November 2004; it focused on population, poverty and development, 
and how best to overcome high maternal mortality, especially barriers to the enforcement 
of reproductive rights and gender equality. 
Internationally, the General Assembly commemorated the Tenth Anniversary of 
the ICPD on October 14th, 2004. The Commission on Population and Development used 
its 37th session on March 22-26, 2004, to review and appraise the progress made in 
implementing the ICPD Program of Action. Countries reported on significant progress in 
implementation of the ICPD Program of Action, and how well the ICPD agenda has been 
integrated into national policies and strategies. The meeting re-affirmed the theme for 
2005, “Population, Development and HIV/AIDS,” and also considered an additional 
topic for 2005: the contribution of the implementation of the ICPD Program of Action to 
the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (Countdown 2015 – Events, 
2004). The UNFPA held a Special Event Panel Discussion, “Putting People First: 
Implementing the ICPD Agenda and Achieving the MDGs,” on June 21st, 2004 in 
Geneva, Switzerland.  
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The UNFPA also organized four thematic high-level roundtables for the 10-year 
review, on issues they believed to be essential to the further implementation of the ICPD 
Program of Action. Of the two that occurred in 2004, one was the High Level Global 
Consultation on Linking HIV/AIDS with Sexual and Reproductive Health. In May 2004, 
technical experts met in New York to discuss the linkages between HIV/AIDS and sexual 
and reproductive health, and proposed actions that would help form the ‘Commitment to 
Action;’ this Commitment to Action was then discussed and endorsed by the high-level 
global leaders from both the reproductive health and HIV/AIDS fields that met at the 
High Level Global Consultation in June 2004 in New York. The reproductive health and 
HIV/AIDS leaders came together to reach consensus on a set of actions and 
recommendations that would “ensure more effective integration and linkage between 
policies and programs that address HIV/AIDS and those that address reproductive health” 
(Countdown 2015 – Events, 2004). The second meeting that occurred in 2004 was the 
October Roundtable on Promoting Reproductive Health and Rights: Reducing Poverty, in 
Sweden. Policy-makers, experts, and “selected social and opinion leaders” gathered for a 
meeting meant to present evidence on the importance of reproductive health and rights in 
helping to reduce poverty, which would then be used to inform the 2005 UN General 
Assembly Review of the Millennium Declaration. The declared goal of the meeting was 
stated as “positioning Reproductive Health and Rights as a cornerstone of national 
poverty eradication strategies, in order to promote social and economic growth within a 
human rights framework, and at presenting arguments to prioritize investments in 
Reproductive Health and Rights” (Countdown 2015 – Events, 2004).  
NGO review of Cairo, 2004  
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An NGO ten-year review of Cairo, outside the UN framework but with 
participation from many former and several current UN officials, took place in London in 
2004, organized and sponsored by International Planned Parenthood Federation, 
Population Action International, and Family Care International. Conservative 
organizations were not invited (Barbara Crane Interview 2006), which is not surprising 
since the UN website lists this conference as involving a wide range of NGO and donor 
partners “committed to making the ICPD vision a reality” 
(http://www.unfpa.org/icpd/10/note.htm). The meeting, called Countdown 2015: Sexual 
and Reproductive Health and Rights For All, was attended by 700 people, with 100 of 
those being youth delegates. The declaration put out by the meeting stated its purpose as 
a partnership of civil society to reinvigorate commitment to the Cairo Consensus and 
measure global progress towards those goals. “Countdown 2015 seeks to set clear 
priorities, recruit new allies, and focus on the critical role of young people… the 
campaign has come to involve a wide range of NGOs, donors, UN and governmental 
agencies with a singular commitment to making the ICPD vision a reality” (Countdown 
2015 Global Roundtable Declaration 2004).  
The impressive list of speakers, representing organizations and countries from all 
over the world, included key figures from the 1994 Cairo Conference: former Director of 
UNFPA and Secretary General of ICPD Dr. Nafis Sadik, her deputy-secretary general 
Jyoti Singh, and the leaders of the two major working groups Fred Sai and Nicolaas 
Biegman. Other key figure from the current UN administration was Thoraya Obaid, 
Director of UNPFA, and Jeffrey Sachs, special adviser to the Secretary General and head 
of the Millennium Project at Columbia University. Several employees or consultants with 
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the World Bank, involved with reproductive health and rights programs, included: 
Elizabeth Lule, the Population/Reproductive Health Adviser with the Human 
Development Network at the World Bank, and Tom Merrick, advisor for the World Bank 
Institute’s Learning Program on Reproductive Health, Poverty, and Health Sector 
Reform.  High-profile reproductive health and rights NGO advocates included Steven 
Sinding, Director General of IPPF; Frances Kissling, president of Catholics for a Free 
Choice, Amy Coen, President and CEO of Population Action International; Jill Sheffield, 
founder and President of Family Care, International; and Sonia Correa, Coordinator for 
DAWN. Although this meeting was organized by NGOs, the presence of important 
former and current UN employees at the meeting made this nearly a substitute for the 
official 10-year review that did not occur at the UN level, but with the decided bias 
toward supporting reproductive health and rights.   
The Countdown 2015 Roundtable Declaration also listed several established and 
new progressive foundations as donors: not only the Ford Foundation, MacArthur 
Foundation and Rockefeller Foundations, but the UN Foundation, the Bill and Melinda 
Gates, Hewlett, and Packard Foundations. Several governments were also listed as 
donors, including the Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the United Kingdom 
Department for International Development, the Swiss Agency for Development 
Cooperation, and the European Union; in addition, the UN Population Fund and the 
World Bank, two very strong supporters of reproductive health and rights since the Cairo 
conference, also financially donated to the Countdown 2015 Global Roundtable.   
The participants of the Roundtable summarized the challenges to implementation 
of the ICPD Program of Action as mainly consisting of the opposition of conservative 
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forces, including the U.S. Bush administration, and the failure of governments around the 
world to commit the resources they promised to ICPD-related programs. In particular, 
they noted the global gag rule reinstated by President Bush on his first day in office in 
2001, preventing overseas groups from receiving U.S. family planning funding if they 
discussed, advocated, or provided abortion counseling or services, even if the groups 
used non-U.S. funds for these particular activities. They also documented the fact that the 
Bush administration has repeatedly opposed reaffirming the ICPD Program of Action at 
various international conferences, and that Bush’s “Emergency Plan for HIV/AIDS” 
requires that one-third of $5 billion over 5 years be used to promote sexual abstinence 
until marriage, a method of dealing with reproductive health issues that most long-time 
activists dislike, believing it is unrealistic and not as effective as providing condoms. In 
relation to funding, the participants noted that in 2001, total global spending toward 
ICPD goals was $9.6 billion, less than half the international commitment for the year 
2000. 
The action agenda for the conference detailed ten topics that the Roundtable 
participants believed important for the future of reproductive health and rights. These 
included the necessity of welcoming youth as equal partners on sexual and reproductive 
health issues; fully integrating HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment with sexual and 
reproductive health education and services; pushing for greater funding from donor 
countries by making the case for sexual and reproductive health and rights in economic as 
well as social benefits; working to make safe, legal abortion accessible and available to 
every woman who chooses it; urging human rights bodies to take on the challenge of 
recognizing sexual orientation and gender identity as human rights issues; ending poverty 
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in relation to public health care and services; improving maternal health by both 
empowering women and improving access to medical personnel; better defining the 
rights-based approach to sexual and reproductive health and rights; engaging in strategic 
partnerships with the women’s movement; and finally, fully understanding opposition 
strategies and developing countermeasures. 
The prominent position of the goal of fully integrating HIV/AIDS prevention and 
treatment with sexual and reproductive health in this action agenda demonstrates how 
keenly activists regard the importance of the HIV/AIDS issue to reproductive health. 
Steven Sinding admits, “Well, any SRH organization that ignores AIDS is crazy. That’s 
where the money is, and to a very considerable extent AIDS mortality and morbidity has 
replaced high fertility as the reproductive health issue of our time. And the organizations 
have got to change their focus in response that changing reality” (Steven Sinding 
Interview 2006). This view is not exactly representative, as Sinding feels quite strongly 
that reproductive health and rights took away the urgency and thus the funding for 
population programs. Most abortion-rights activists frame their alliance with HIV/AIDS 
as natural, given that sexual and reproductive health deals with the same issues as 
HIV/AIDS programs. Others, such as Nafis Sadik, argue that the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
would be better addressed and if the Cairo Program of Action was better implemented 
(Nafis Sadik Interview 2006). Part of the strategy to bring reproductive health and rights 
back into public focus is the widening of the frame to include preventing and treating 
HIV/AIDS, and allying with the NGOs that deal with HIV/AIDS to present reproductive 
health as a crucial aspect of dealing with HIV/AIDS. Steven Sinding, in his statement at 
the end of the Roundtable meeting, declares  
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it is essential that we unite the sexual and reproductive health movement with the movement 
fighting HIV/AIDS… But family planning and reproductive health programs have been sidelined 
as many funders support stand-alone AIDS programs. In the process, they have bypassed 
tremendous experience, knowledge and resources available through our existing infrastructure. 
The enormous challenge of taming the HIV/AIDS pandemic will only succeed if everyone is 
working together. (Sinding 2004) 
 
Sinding also argues in his statement that IPPF and the participants of the 
conference do not believe that the ICPD went far enough in calling for universal access to 
safe abortion where it is legal; because unintended pregnancies cannot be eliminated 
altogether, safe abortion must be legalized and accessible for “every woman in every 
country” (Sinding 2004: 2). Abortion continues to be a key goal for the movement, as 
evidenced by its place in the Action Agenda for the 2015 meeting. The goal of pushing 
for reproductive health and rights by emphasizing its economic benefits as well as its 
rights benefits reflects the realization by many in the movement that the Cairo Program of 
Action has not been funded adequately, and that ten years later, governments seem 
further from their commitments than before. Duff Gillespie remembers one of the themes 
of the 2015 meeting being the realization that “we haven’t done well at all and in some 
ways have back-slid the vision of Cairo… Basically the entire meeting [of foundations] 
was: What can we do? What went wrong? How do we reinvigorate Cairo? Is it the right 
package? … Should we try for something more realistic?” (Interview with Duff Gillespie 
2006) 
Strategy for the future of advocacy for reproductive rights, sexual health, and 
abortion was discussed in great detail at this NGO roundtable. In addition to the Global 
Roundtable, a series of regional meetings reflecting the themes and program of the 
Roundtable took place just prior to the Roundtable and continued to take place into 2005; 
these were organized by IPPF regional offices along with other NGOs and networks. 
IPPF also launched national advocacy initiatives, to focus on building national support, 
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action, and mobilization of partners on the issue of reproductive health. The three 
sponsoring NGOs planned a magazine that will in effect be a report card on the progress 
of countries on ICPD commitments, as well as featuring articles on substantive issues 
relating to sexual and reproductive health and rights. A deliberate communications 
campaign “aimed at refocusing attention on the importance and urgency of the goals of 
the ICPD and at generating media coverage of the events taking place in 2004 and 2005” 
was also part of the strategy developed at the Countdown 2015 (Countdown 2015 Global 
Roundtable Declaration 2004: 8). The regional meetings, Global Roundtable, national 
advocacy initiatives, magazine and communications campaign can all be seen as an effort 
in bringing sexual and reproductive health and rights back into the public eye, but 
especially to the attention of governments and donors. The Global Roundtable also 
reiterated the importance of the Cairo consensus for achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals, and blamed the mostly male UN delegates’ apparent squeamishness 
about sexuality for leaving out sexual and reproductive health and rights as an MDG 
(Sinding 2004: 2). The final component of the strategy for promoting sexual and 




 In the new century, abortion-rights groups have also adjusted to the stronger 
presence of anti-abortion organizations at the UN by compiling information concerning 
anti-abortion organizations and sharing it among their network; this information generally 
takes the form of research publications, informally published by individual abortion-
rights groups on their websites, or formally published in journals or reports funded by 
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foundation grants. Barbara Crane of IPAS notes “There’s more sharing of info between 
abortion-rights groups in response to anti-abortion groups. There’s more coming 
together” (Barbara Crane Interview 2006).  
Catholics for a Free Choice (CFFC) particularly makes an effort to report on anti-
abortion organizations and their activities, with many of their publications dating from 
2000, after anti-abortion organizations succeeded in bringing around three hundred 
delegates to the Beijing +5 conference. CFFC’s journal, Conscience, often includes 
articles on how best to combat the Catholic Church’s opposition to reproductive health 
and rights (Farrell 2005). CFFC publishes an Opposition Watch report, doing research on 
the “anti-choice” movement by attending their networking events, such as the World 
Congress of Families conferences, and investigating individual organizations, especially 
conservative Catholic groups and individuals. In their investigative series on conservative 
Catholic influence in Europe, they have put together reports on the World Youth 
Alliance; Catholic Action Group in the United Kingdom; Anna Zaborska, elected chair of 
the European Parliament’s Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality in 2004; 
Dr. Rocco Buttiglione, a conservative Catholic doctor who was proposed as Vice 
President of the European Commission in 2004; Opus Dei, an organization within the 
Catholic Church that is active in international affairs; and the Vatican’s agenda at the 
European Union. The reports on individuals detail each person’s biographical 
information, including family, education and professional positions, and their positions 
on all issues of interest to the abortion-rights movement. Organizational reports include 
their funding sources, founders and leaders, and campaigns.  
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CFFC has also put out detailed reports on the anti-abortion organizations Human 
Life International (1997), the Culture of Life Foundation (2004), and the Catholic Family 
and Human Rights Institute (Kissling and O’Brien 2001), considered by many on both 
sides to be the lead anti-abortion organization at the UN. The reports on Human Life 
International and the Culture of Life Foundation follow the general template of 
organizational reports by CFFC by detailing the people, funding sources, and positions on 
issues of interest to CFFC; however, the report on Catholic Family and Human Rights 
Institute seems to have the specific purpose of proving the organization’s unfitness for 
lobbying at the UN. This report alleges that the Catholic Family and Human Rights 
Institute (C-FAM) is controlled by Human Life International, an anti-abortion 
organization that was rejected for ECOSOC accreditation, and so created C-FAM with 
the purpose of obtaining accreditation to lobby at the UN. Using quotes from speeches by 
Austin Ruse, the president of C-FAM, and documents obtained from a court case 
involving the first president of C-FAM, CFFC questions the organization’s conduct at the 
UN, whether it meets the requirements for ECOSOC status, whether it undermines the 
work of the UN, and how it addresses human rights. CFFC presents a case against C-
FAM receiving accreditation from ECOSOC in an investigative and well-documented 
manner, but, interestingly, concludes that C-FAM has little effect on policy-making at the 
UN. Nevertheless, the most damaging quotes CFFC cites against Austin Ruse are 
repeated several times in different articles on their website, and have come up in 
conversation with interviewees from other abortion-rights organizations, demonstrating 
this new use of research by the abortion-rights network in response to the greater 
presence of anti-abortion organizations at the UN. 
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CFFC is also one of the organizations that manages a project called Religion 
Counts, along with the Park Ridge Center for the Study of Health, Faith, and Ethics. The 
project put together a research report, funded by a grant from A Better World Foundation, 
called “Religion and Public Policy at the UN” (Religion Counts 2002); the report is 
meant to explore religion’s place and power at the UN, which as a secular institution was 
dealing with the increasing presence of religious organizations of different types 
attempting to influence its policy-making process. The report is quite extensive, and is 
clearly spurred by the tension between conservative anti-abortion organizations and 
abortion-rights organizations at the Cairo and Beijing conferences and reviews (Green 
1999, Religion Counts 2002). Of particular interest in the report are statistics concerning 
the number of religious NGOs that have ECOSOC status: only 9%, or 180 of 2,000 
NGOs with ECOSOC status have a religious identity, and only 11% of those, or 19, have 
the most desirable, general consultative status with ECOSOC (Religion Counts 2002: 14, 
17). The report also notes the possibility of censure of exclusion of religious NGOs by 
the UN, and obstacles facing religious groups at the UN; however, it does not elaborate 
on these possibilities, instead focusing on the political or institutional obstacles that may 
face any NGO at the UN (Religion Counts 2002: 26-27).  
The Public Eye is a publication of the progressive think tank, Public Research 
Associates (PRA); PRA’s goal is to “advance progressive thinking and action by 
providing research-based information, analysis, and referrals” by exposing “movements, 
institutions, and ideologies that undermine human rights” 
(www.publiceye.org/about.html). The Public Eye has published several extended articles 
concerning conservative organizations working domestically and at the UN. Two in 
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particular deal with the anti-abortion network, one published by Jennifer Butler in 2000 
that documents the growing alliance in the international sphere between conservative 
evangelicals, Catholics, Mormons, and Muslims.  A more recent article on the anti-
abortion network, written by Pam Chamberlain (2006), has circulated quite widely 
among the abortion-rights network (Interviews with Barbara Crane, Jill Sheffield, 
Confidential Interview III, 2006). This piece, titled “The Right Targets the UN with its 
Anti-Choice Politics,” details the major anti-abortion organizations working at the UN, 
their impact on the Bush administration, and their successes and failures at the UN. One 
incident Chamberlain details is of interest because it deals with the work of reproductive 
health and rights organizations’ work to ensure the right to abortion. Chamberlain claims 
that the “forward momentum of the anti-choice efforts at the UN suffered a setback” in 
November 2005 when the UN Human Rights Committee, an 18-member group that 
monitors the implementation of the UN’s human rights covenants, decided in its first 
abortion case, KL v. Peru, that abortion is a human right (Chamberlain 2006: 2). “This 
decision affirmed the work of international women’s health advocates and sent anti-
choice NGOs into tailspins” (Chamberlain 2006:2). While anti-abortion organizations 
claim that the decision is non-binding, the Center for Reproductive Rights claims that 
every woman who lives in any of the 154 countries that are party to the UN human rights 
covenants, including the U.S. , “now has a legal tool to use in defense of her rights” 
(Center for Reproductive Rights 2005). However, that right can only be enforced where 
abortion is already legal (Center for Reproductive Rights 2005).  
These reports and articles demonstrate how abortion-rights organizations are 
reacting to the presence of anti-abortion organizations at the UN by conducting and 
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publishing investigative research on the organizations and the network as a whole. 
Although they recognize the growing savvy of the network, many conclude their research 
with sentiments similar to Jon O’Brien, president of Catholics for a Free Choice:  
It’s good for the soul, as we have discovered time and again that these groups are far less 
scary up close than one might think if one relied solely on their propaganda for 
information. They are less than the sum of their parts and reminding ourselves of this is 
always a useful exercise. To know them is to know their weaknesses and it always helps 
to expose what little there is behind the veneer of their bombast. Knowing them makes us 
stronger and in that spirit we are always happy to share the information we find with the 
movement… (O’Brien 2007)   
 
 
7.2.2 Anti-abortion movement 
The anti-abortion movement in the 2000-2004 time period has greatly increased 
the resources and attention directed to the international sphere, as well as their efforts in 
building international coalitions. Several key organizations have expanded their lobbying 
by involving organizations in other states where they have affiliates, in order to influence 
delegates prior to UN meetings or conferences. They have also worked to build stronger 
alliances with international Latin American and Muslim organizations. These efforts have 
resulted in increasing the influence of the anti-abortion network on these issues, 
especially since the Bush administration’s support for “natural family” issues has boosted 
the ability of these organizations to block language they object to at several UN meetings 
and conferences; the conservative U.S. administration’s opposition to reproductive health 
and rights was cited by both UN employees and activists from both movements as one of 
the key factors in the decision not to hold an international conference for the ten-year 
review of Cairo.  
 
Scale shifting A greater number of anti-abortion organizations have become involved on 
an international scale, receiving NGO consultative status and bringing hundreds of NGO 
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participants to UN conferences. Focus on the Family received NGO consultative status in 
2003 (Thomas Jacobson Interview 2007), a significant addition given the credibility and 
political capital Focus on the Family wields among evangelicals in the U.S., and the 
international ministries that Focus on the Family supports. Through its national affiliates 
in twenty countries around the world, it is able to lobby other countries within their 
capitals to respond in pro-family ways to UN resolutions. In one recent example of Focus 
on the Family’s reach, the Costa Rican affiliate successfully lobbied their government to 
respond to a UN draft resolution to ban human cloning. In 2003, Costa Rica then 
submitted a draft that would seek a total ban on all forms of cloning, including 
therapeutic cloning, rather than the ban on reproductive cloning that most other countries 
supported. Other anti-abortion NGOs, including Concerned Women of America, lobbied 
in Washington, Latin America and Eastern Europe to support this total ban on cloning, 
but a motion to adjourn the debate was passed by one vote, reflecting the failure of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to support the ban. Several key anti-
abortion organization leaders were upset that the OIC did not support the resolution, and 
one leader saw this as indicative of the fact that the issue of cloning has not been a 
subject of debate in Islamic society. The incident demonstrates the difficulty in bringing 
together so many diverse countries with diverse interests into a voting bloc on 
conservative issues. The OIC itself “includes members from several regional groupings 
that often have competing interests” (Butler 2006: 123).  
  
Framing The framing of conservative social views on abortion, gay marriage, women’s 
roles and adolescent rights as pertaining to the preservation of the “natural family” as the 
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central unit of society has become more widespread, especially at the meeting celebrating 
the tenth anniversary of the International Year of the Family in 2004 in Doha, organized 
by anti-abortion organizations. As noted by Butler (2006), conservatives speak about the 
family as a social category in and of itself, which is how speakers from the developing 
countries speak of the family, thus allowing them to relate better. In contrast, “liberals 
view family policies through the analytical lens of the family’s various components… 
important less as an issue in and of itself, and more in terms of how family policy impacts 
other social issues like women’s rights, children’s rights, and reproductive health” (Butler 
2006:77).  
Concerned Women of America’s concern for international issues began to emerge 
in the late nineties, pre-dating their actual involvement at the UN. A common theme from 
that time to the present has been the importance of preserving a country’s national 
sovereignty against the UN’s attempts to interfere in domestic policy. One of CWA’s 
early concerns was the environmental movement, because they saw an explicit link 
between environmental initiatives such as the Framework Convention on Climate Change 
and the Biodiversity Convention and population policy. Historically, population concerns 
were framed in terms of environmental scarcity, as when Thomas Malthus argued that 
population control was necessary because of limited food production, or when more 
contemporary environmentalists argued that population growth was directly harming the 
environment (Ehrlich 1970; Kaplan 1994; Bandarage 1997). Most environmentalists do 
not take such an extreme view, but population as an environmental threat has been a 
recurring theme in the literature. As a result, anti-abortion groups such as the CWA have 
spoken against environmental initiatives; in several articles published in 1996-1997, 
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CWA critiqued international environmentalism as a threat to American sovereignty, an 
attempt to control the lives of Americans, and a means of justifying population control 
(Buss and Herman 2003: 70). In a 1998 publication specifically on the United Nations, 
CWA argued that international environmentalism was “predicated upon the belief that 
people are a ‘plague’ upon the earth…” and therefore rejected international 
environmentalism (CWA 1998). In addition, the CWA opposed “the redistribution of 
wealth” and “entitlement to food” at the World Food Summit, which is consistent with a 
conservative rejection of government interference in social, political, and economic 
policy (Buss and Herman 2003: 74).   
 However, beginning in 1999 and continuing into the 21st century, CWA has de-
emphasized the political implications of environmentalism, and argues for a more 
complex understanding of the relationship between population and environment (CWA 
1999). Instead of calling for U.S. withdrawal from international aid commitments, CWA 
now argues for humanitarian aid and technology to alleviate the effects of famine. This 
fits with the larger change in CWA discourse, moving away from criticizing international 
environmentalism and international aid as Marxist concepts that would ultimately take 
away American sovereignty, independence and values, to arguing for compassion on “the 
needs of the world’s people,” and against Western imperialist methods of population 
control (CWA 1999b). This change has been observed by other scholars, and attributed to 
the growing connection between CWA and C-FAM, a Catholic organization that also 
emphasizes the need to deal with poverty in the Third-World. I would argue that although 
that might be the case, this does not answer why the Catholic Church emphasizes the 
need to deal with poverty and maternal mortality and health in the international system, 
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speaking of the right to development and health rather than the right to reproductive 
health and rights or women’s rights. Anti-abortion organizations are moving towards a 
rights-based framing of their arguments, and for the CWA a discourse that emphasizes 
the need to deal with poverty in the third world points toward an adjustment in framing 
and coalition-building necessitated by interaction and advocacy at the UN. 
 Another illustration of the adjustment of the anti-abortion network to the UN is to 
praise the initial foundations of the UN, including the UN Charter and the Declaration of 
Universal Human Rights, because it endorsed the natural family and respected the 
sovereignty of each nation, and criticize the abortion-rights network as corrupting the UN 
as a forum for good in the international system. Gwendolyn Landolt, the vice-president of 
REAL Women of Canada, spoke at the third World Congress of Families, citing the 
language of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 16, which endorsed the 
family: “The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to 
protection by society and the State” (UN 1948). She also cited the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights that went into effect in 1976, which reiterated the same language on the 
family from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This example demonstrates 
another framing adjustment by some organizations in the anti-abortion network: they 
attempt to use language from early documents of the UN to demonstrate the legitimacy of 
their position, and implicate the abortion-rights network for turning the UN away from 





Coalition building: World Congress of Families held its third conference in 2004, 
bringing together many conservative organizations, especially those concerned with the 
natural family and the issue of abortion. The third World Congress of Families was held 
in Mexico City, with the number of delegates more than doubling again to over 3,300 
from over 60 countries; the location of this event in Mexico City was seen as a strategic 
move to engage Latin America in the anti-abortion movement (Buss and Herman 2003). 
Red Familia, an anti-abortion coalition of 150 regional and international organizations in 
Mexico, was a co-sponsor of the event in Mexico City. Red Familia as an organization 
began as a result of Mexican activists attending the 1999 World Congress of Families; 
several prominent activists and Catholic businessmen joined forces to create what is now 
a “an aggressive, pro-family, pro-life” umbrella organization representing about 12 
million people, with offices in a dozen Mexican cities and a representative office in New 
York City engaging the UN on a full-time basis (Allan Carlson Interview 2006).  
 Red Familia’s collaboration with the Howard Center to plan and host the third 
World Congress of Families demonstrates the possibilities of successful alliances with 
other developing countries for the anti-abortion network. Two leaders of Red Familia, 
Jesus Hernandez and Fernando Milanes, began the process of bringing the World 
Congress of Families to Mexico City by bringing a proposal to Allan Carlson at the 
Howard Center; they believed they could raise the resources necessary for the 
conference, and according to Allan Carlson, their planning abilities were key in ensuring 
a World Congress conference took place in 2004. Red Familia emphasized the 
importance of stable families in maintaining a stable economy, and thus appealed to 
Catholic businessmen and secured the support of corporate sponsors such as Grupo 
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Bimbo, one of the largest bakeries in the world. Lorenzo Servitje, the founder of the 
bakery, is known as a supporter of conservative cultural values; he has spoken in public 
of the links between Catholic values and his business practices, and has tried to bring 
pressure to bear on Mexican television to change its content (Butler 2006: 128). At the 
2004 World Congress of Families, Servitje urged business to take a leading role in 
strengthening the family in order to maintain the social fabric. Such sentiments are 
clearly in line with the pro-family American organizations leading the international 
network; indeed, Servitje warned that the “family and society were being undermined by 
poor education at home, unstable marriages, mothers who worked outside the home, 
sexual immorality and a media that promoted irresponsible behavior as well as 
contraceptives” (Butler 2006: 129). Other powerful Mexican corporate sponsors of the 
2004 conference included Pemex, the national oil company; Cementos Mexicanos 
(CEMEX), the world’s fourth largest cement company; Gigante, the Mexican superstore; 
and Grupo Televisa, the world’s largest producer of Spanish language television 
programs. President Vincente Fox demonstrated his support for the natural family point 
of view by being one of the few that responded early on to the lobbying of Red Familia, 
and contributing to the conference through the Division of Family Services and the 
Division of Social Services; his wife, Martha Fox, added a note of personal support by 
speaking at the conference (Butler 2006: 129).  
 The truly international character of the planning process for this conference is 
evident by the many different people on the planning committee: those involved came 
from the Czech Republic, the Philippines, the Congo, Nicaragua, Mexico, Pakistan, India, 
and Russia (World Congress of Families III, 
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www.worldcongress.org/WCF3/wcf3_home.htm). Those with important political 
connections included Moktar Lamani, the head of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference and Francisco Tatad, former majority leader of the Philippines Senate. From 
the Bush administration, Ellen Sauerbrey, Ambassador to the United Nations 
Commission on the Status of Women, and Wade Horn, Assistant Secretary for Children 
and Health at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services both attended and 
spoke at the conference; Sauerbrey read a letter from President Bush encouraging the 
delegates of the conference and stating support for the main causes of the conference, 
including strong families, sanctity of marriage, the well-being of children, adoption, 
crisis-pregnancy programs, and parental notification laws (Bush 2004). Five 
Congressmen, including Chris Smith, also sent a letter to the conference on behalf of the 
United States Congress, affirming support for the conference’s goals, and commending 
the delegates for their work (Smith et al 2004).  
 The high profile of the conference was no accident; Jesus Hernandez and 
Fernando Milanes spent time and resources recruiting regional leaders and UN diplomats 
to attend the conference. Hernandez and Milanes flew to New York City repeatedly the 
months leading up to the conference, meeting with diplomats at the UN and other 
missions; as a result of these meetings, twenty-six UN delegates attended the third World 
Congress of Families, as well as representatives of the family services divisions of ten 
Latin American countries (Butler 2006: 130). Red Familia’s success in organizing and 
lobbying politicians and diplomats is matched by its success in reaching out regionally in 
Mexico. Since 2004, Red Familia has opened offices in twelve Mexican cities. The 
organization, although led by Catholic businessmen, has showed a great willingness to 
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reach out in inter-religious collaboration, making close connections with other Protestant, 
Mormon, Pentecostal and Jewish activists and organizations (Butler 2006: 131). 
The World Congress of Families Conference has continued to build networks and 
increase the awareness of conservative NGOs from all over the world on UN activities 
and committee meetings that are of importance. Several speakers over the years have 
contradicted the traditionally conservative view that what happens at the UN is 
unimportant or corrupt. Ellen Sauerbrey as the U.S. Representative to the UN 
Commission on the Status of Women continued her tradition of speaking of the UN’s 
influence on the family at the World Congress of Families. In her speech to the 
conference, Sauerbrey noted that the UN’s environment over the past 20 years had 
become hostile towards families. She cited Harvard Professor Mary Ann Glendon’s 
shock when she realized that a draft document from the Committee on the Status of 
Women barely mentioned marriage or motherhood. Sauerbrey however cautioned against 
dismissing UN conferences and the language that comes out of them, citing that these 
norms may become legally binding in the future. She detailed the efforts of the Bush 
administration to insert positive language on the family in UN meetings on the Status of 
Women, and while praising the UN’s efforts to “improve health, access to food, literacy, 
and other areas that impact the family,” she encourages countries not to bow to “extreme 
pressure” to conform to the liberal consensus at the UN, but take a stand when issues 
concerning the family are debated at the UN.  
 
Information Politics: Coalition building at the World Congress of Families has increased 
the number of conservative organizations that focus their advocacy at the UN, and helped 
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them to do it in a way that conforms to the research-oriented manner in which advocacy 
is conducted at the UN. One example that illustrates the anti-abortion network’s 
adjustment to research and statistics as the support for advocacy on the international stage 
occurred in 2002, when the World Congress of Families held a meeting in New York 
City to give UN delegates and pro-family advocates “the latest statistics and evidence on 
marriage, family and religion” (Wright 2002). This meeting was co-sponsored by other 
conservative organizations that had worked at the UN, and it was timed to bolster the 
advocacy of conservative NGOs during the upcoming World Summit on Children. 
Speakers included the First Lady of Uganda, Janet Museveni, who spoke on the benefits 
of abstinence to slow the spread of AIDS; Dr. Wade Horn, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of 
Family and Children for the Department of Health and Human Services, who spoke on 
the importance of stable marriages for the health and safety of children; and Jeremy 
Rabkin of Cornell University on the inability of a world body to govern better than a 
nation-state. 
 One of the key arguments made by anti-abortion organizations to support their 
position on the natural family concerns the ill-effects on society as a whole and mothers 
and children in particular of the erosion of the institution of marriage and a liberal view 
of sexuality and abortion. This argument is supported by research and statistics produced 
by the Heritage Foundation, in particular Dr. Patrick Fagan (World Congress of Families 
1999). He argues that divorce weakens the family by weakening the relationship between 
children and parents; it particularly hurts children by increasing behavioral, emotional 
and psychiatric risks. He also elaborates on the harmful effects of divorce for other 
aspects of society: in education, divorce diminishes learning capacities and high school 
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and college attainment; in the economy, divorce reduces household income and 
drastically cuts the life-wealth of individuals; and affecting government and citizenship, 
divorce massively increases crime rates, abuse and neglect rates, and the use of drugs. 
These arguments concerning the importance of marriage and the natural family for the 
stability of society are significant because of the way in which they are presented: not in 
terms of the traditions or religions that endorse these views, but in terms of the costs and 
benefits to society. These more neutral standards for evaluating the arguments of anti-
abortion networks are an important adjustment to the environment of science and 
research that these organizations perceive to be prevalent in both the U.S. and in the 
international sphere.  
 
 
Non-occurrence of Cairo+10 
Participants and observers have offered many reasons for why the ten-year review 
of Cairo did not occur, including conference fatigue (Eager 2004), a lack of resources 
(Interview with Suzanne Ehlers 2006), and the fact that the scope of the Program of 
Action adopted in Cairo was twenty years, and the most fruitful review would be closer 
to that timeline (Interview Stan Bernstein 2006). However, my interviews with UN 
employees, abortion-rights activists and anti-abortion activists lead me to believe that a 
major contributing factor to the cancellation of the ten-year review was the growing 
success of the anti-abortion NGO network. UN officials responsible for organizing the 
ten-year review of Cairo were greatly influenced by abortion-rights activists and their 
own fears of a Bush-appointed U.S. delegation and anti-abortion activists undoing the 
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reproductive health and rights framework attained at Cairo if they were to re-open the 
Cairo Program of Action for debate (Ruse Interview 2006; Wright Interview 2006).  
One interestingly contrary opinion came from Steve Sinding, former president of 
International Planned Parenthood Federation. He believed it was a tactical mistake to 
preemptively withdraw the possibility of a Cairo +10 meeting, which he believed 
happened because there was consensus among the principal donors to population 
programs, supported by the most influential progressive organizations that supported 
reproductive health and rights, that an international meeting would open up the 
opportunity to “roll back the gains that had been made at Cairo.” Sinding thought that 
withdrawal was a victory for the anti-abortion organizations because “every time there is 
an international meeting and a confrontation, the right winds up losing.” Although an 
international ten-year review of Cairo would have been controversial, he would have 
welcomed the confrontation because he believes that “global opinion overwhelmingly 
supports the progressive agenda.” Sinding cites as evidence the 1984 Mexico City 
conference on population and development, when a Reagan-appointed U.S. delegation 
announced that the U.S. did not support family planning unequivocally and would 
withdraw funding for any organization that provided abortion services.  
What the U.S. did in effect, completely unintentionally, was to create a much stronger 
consensus among the developing countries about the importance of population and doing 
something about it than probably would have existed otherwise. And in a sense, the Bush 
administration’s done the same thing since it took office. There is more money flowing to 
the UNFPA and IPPF from Western Europe and Japan than we could hope to have been 
receiving had the U.S. not created such a contrarian position. And what we did see in the 
Cairo Plus Ten events that occurred, which were the regional conferences, was 
tremendous solidarity in opposition to the American position. (Sinding Interview 2006) 
 
Sinding’s opinion seems justified given the events preceding the ten-year review 
of Beijing in 2005, which was tentatively approached by progressive women’s NGOs and 
 
 280 
countries. Many of the abortion-rights NGOs believed that the review conference should 
focus on implementation rather than textual negotiations and different countries 
counseled carefully considering the possibility that anti-abortion activists, especially 
within the U.S. delegation, would try to erase the gains made in the area of sexual and 
reproductive rights (Butler 2006: 60). In order to test the political climate, women’s 
rights activists asked the Commission on the Status of Women to reaffirm the Beijing 
Platform of Action; even though the U.S. had signed it, it opposed this current 
affirmation, and called for a vote on the issue, which is usually avoided at the UN, where 
consensus is highly valued. Even though the European Union among other groups asked 
the U.S. to abstain rather than voting against the measure, in order to voice dissent more 
diplomatically, the U.S. voted against the measure. Jennifer Butler describes the 
trepidation and suspense felt by women’s movement NGO representatives as they waited 
for the votes to be tallied, wondering if the international community would reaffirm the 
Beijing Platform of Action or if the U.S.’s breaking of ranks would influence many other 
countries to break away from the consensus. In the end, “when the votes were posted on 
the UN voting board, only one country had voted against it: the United States. NGO 
representatives breathed a sigh of relief” (Butler 2006: 60).  
Although this incident demonstrates the strength of the global consensus on the 
Beijing conference on women, the willingness of the U.S. delegation to pull out of the 
consensus and oppose the global women’s movement and their agenda caused leaders of 
the women’s movement to advocate that the Beijing +10 focus on reviewing the 
implementation of the Platform of Action. The only document that would involve 
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negotiation would be a general political declaration that would affirm the Beijing 
Platform for Action. Butler notes: 
Rather than push the international community into new territory, the global women’s 
movement realized it would struggle just to hold its ground. The decision reflected the 
fragile political climate caused by the presence of new conservative players on the UN 
scene. (Butler 2006: 61) 
 
In fact, the U.S. delegation held up the adoption of the draft declaration affirming the 
Platform of Action by insisting that the gathering add wording to clarify that the 
declaration created neither any “new international human right” nor “the right to 
abortion” (Hoge 2005). Women’s NGOs and European country delegations objected to 
this, arguing that UN conferences had heretofore remained neutral on the legality of 
abortion, and this wording would push the declaration more in the direction of making 
abortion illegal. Toward the end of the conference, the U.S. delegation dropped its 
insistence on adding the new wording and the declaration was adopted unanimously. 
Significantly, the leader of the U.S. delegation, Ellen Sauerbrey, explained the U.S.’s 
adoption of the resolution by saying that the debate on the new wording had assured the 
U.S. delegation that the Beijing documents did not “create new human rights and that the 
terms ‘reproductive health services’ and ‘reproductive rights’ do not include abortion” 
(Butler 2006:62). Thus, despite the affirmation of the global consensus on the Beijing 
Platform of Action, the U.S. delegation was able to prevent any discussion on furthering 
the Beijing consensus, and further establish that the current wording of international 





The abortion-rights movement was greatly affected by decreased funding of 
population programs from the late nineties to 2004, especially by governments. The lack 
of funding by governments, the lack of a reproductive health and rights MDG, and the 
subsequent lack of funding opportunities from traditionally progressive foundations, 
caused the abortion-rights movement to reassess its strategies, particularly its coalition-
building strategies. The Countdown 2015 Meeting was especially telling in that abortion-
rights organizations and leaders did not change their framing of the issue as a key human 
rights issue, but did their best to connect reproductive health and rights as integral to 
treating and preventing HIV/AIDS. This was both to boost the visibility and funding of 
reproductive health and rights, since most international attention and funding is directed 
towards the HIV/AIDS issue; HIV/AIDS is one of the few issues most governments can 
agree on as an urgent need, including the Bush administration. Another key event for the 
abortion-rights network was the cancellation of the 10-year review conference of Cairo; 
many abortion-rights and UN interviewees admitted that they encouraged the review to 
be limited to regional conferences in order to prevent the Bush administration and anti-
abortion organizations from having the opportunity to reverse the language on 
reproductive health and rights.  
The anti-abortion movement greatly increased their presence as NGOs at UN 
conferences; they were more organized, with larger delegations, and more coordinated 
with other NGOs. However, they are still very much a minority presence as far as NGOs 
at any global review or meeting. This reflects the strategy of the conservative movement, 
in that they do not direct a majority of their resources towards the UN, but strategically 
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invest as much time, effort, and resources as they believe necessary to convince enough 
government delegations as they will need to block language they find objectionable at 
any particular meeting. The anti-abortion organizations do not put as much effort into 
cultivating relationships with UN officials, because they believe they will be unsuccessful 
and wasting their time and resources. This is especially interesting given the 
contradictory opinions of my interviewees from abortion-rights organizations and the 
UN: several interviewees from abortion-rights organizations felt that anti-abortion 
organizations got perfectly fair or preferential treatment from UN officials (Jill Sheffield 
Interview 2006, Nafis Sadik Interview 2006), while other abortion-rights interviewees 
and UN officials felt that due to relationships and underlying philosophies, abortion-
rights organizations were able to work more closely with many UN agencies and funds 
(Barbara Crane Interview 2006, Sterling Scruggs Interview 2006).  
The anti-abortion organizations’ big successes have been indirect, but their re-
framing of reproductive health and rights as “code” for the international right to abortion 
on demand contributed to many Catholic and Muslim countries within the G-77 opposing 
a reproductive health MDG, and also to the reluctance of the UNFPA, sympathetic 
European governments, and abortion-rights organizations to hold a 10-year review of 
conference of the Cairo Program of Action, where negotiations on reproductive health 
language might occur. As a result, one might argue that reproductive health and rights as 
an initiative continues to be eclipsed at the UN; however, the language of reproductive 






7.3.2 Comparison of the two movements  
 
Women’s health and rights organizations have angled their rhetoric and their 
alliances towards connecting themselves with the HIV/AIDS community, in order to 
restore visibility to their cause, and especially to keep themselves on the radar of 
organizations that use the Millennium Development Goals to direct their funds and 
programs. They have done this by working tirelessly from 2000-2004 to frame 
reproductive health and rights as integral to nearly all the Millennium Development 
Goals, especially maternal and child health, HIV/AIDS, and poverty and hunger. They 
have continued to use research in papers presented to UN agencies and UN meetings to 
support their claims that reproductive health will help improve maternal and child health, 
reduce maternal mortality, help treat and prevent HIV/AIDS, empower women, and 
overall contribute to the reduction of poverty and hunger (Stan Bernstein 2004, 
Oppenheim 2004).  
The anti-abortion movement continued to build coalitions with other faiths and 
bring more U.S. domestic organizations into the international sphere; in this time period, 
they also worked with affiliates in developing countries, who in turn lobbied their 
domestic governments in order to get more support for anti-abortion concerns at the UN. 
This is very similar to the strategy employed by abortion-rights organizations to build 
widespread developing country support for their initiatives at the UN during the Cairo 
conference. In addition, anti-abortion organizations began to frame their arguments in 
more progressive and rights-oriented terms, particularly in their new take on 
environmentalism as conserving God-given resources and their focus on combating 
infectious diseases, poverty, and hunger around the world. These groups also use the 
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tools of science and research much more than they did in the past to bolster their 
advocacy on behalf of natural families, marriage, and against alternative conceptions of 
the family, gay marriage, and abortion.  
Although the right to safe abortion continues to be a central issue for women’s 
health and rights groups, they have reacted to anti-abortion groups’ re-framing of that 
term by trying to preserve the status quo of reproductive health and rights; in other words, 
given the hostile U.S. administration, they are doing more to keep reproductive health 
and rights from being eroded rather than pushing the envelope concerning sexual health 
and rights, or abortion rights. However, organizations that focus on the right to abortion 
such as IPAS have worked to develop relationships with key women’s groups in 
developing countries who formerly did not want to get involved in the issue, such as a 
group of female lawyers, in order to change their perception of abortion, and eventually 
get their support for legal reform of domestic policy on abortion. For example, Barbara 
Crane notes  
It was a very big thing recently, the national council of women’s societies in Nigeria has 
come around to support legal reform [on abortion] in Nigeria. Adrienne wrote an article 15 
years ago on this topic – the fact that the women’s groups wouldn’t support it then was a 
major factor in defeating it in Nigeria. What changed was that there was generational 
change, leadership change, IPAS has a very strong presence in Nigeria, and a very 





8 Recent Work of the Two Networks 
 
To illustrate how each network continues to adjust to each other’s presence at the 
UN and use the strategies of framing, coalition building, and research-based advocacy to 
better influence the UN since 2004, I will discuss two recent conferences for each 
movement as representative of the work each is doing: the UN Review on HIV/AIDS for 
the abortion-rights movement, and the World Congress of Families IV for the anti-
abortion movement. The abortion-rights movement has lobbied diligently to frame 
HIV/AIDS as a sexual and reproductive health issue, and the fulfillment of the ICPD 
Program of Action as central to the treatment and prevention of HIV/AIDS. The 
attention, urgency, and resources in the international sphere have shifted to the 
HIV/AIDS issue, as evidenced by the continued increase in infrastructure and funding 
from the UN and developed country governments (Blanc and Tsui 2005, Chowka 2005). 
The abortion-rights movement has recognized both a natural fit between their issue and 
HIV/AIDS and the need for a new way to connect to sources of funding that have 
decreased steadily since the Cairo conference. The results of their lobbying and coalition 
building efforts at the UN Review are most evident in the way that the NGO community 
involved has embraced a holistic approach to the treatment and prevention of HIV/AIDS 
that involves providing for sexual and reproductive health and rights. These lobbying 
efforts continue to build on the norms established as part of the UN system, including 
those of a rights framework, coalition building, and scientific research-based advocacy.   
The anti-abortion network continues to build ties with other organizations from 
around the world, and the World Congress of Families conferences are key coalition-
building events for these organizations. However, there are important divides in the 
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approaches of the core of the anti-abortion network, the U.S. organizations, and the 
international organizations they are trying to build ties with, as demonstrated by my 
analysis of the most recent World Congress of Families conference, that involve the 
liberal norms of world culture.  
8.1 HIV/AIDS Conferences 
Two HIV/AIDS conferences were held in 2006 to review the progress made since 
the 2001 Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, the consensus document signed at 
the UN General Assembly Session (UNGASS) on HIV/AIDS: the UNGASS Review, 
held from May 31-June 2, and the XVI International Conference on AIDS, held in 
Toronto from August 13-18. The Declaration of Commitment (DoC) set goals and targets 
for halting and reversing the spread of HIV and AIDS around the world, but most 
countries had failed to reach the targets. The UNGASS Review was meant to bring 
together government delegations, experts, and civil society on an unprecedented scale to 
review the technical and political aspects of implementing the DoC. The International 
Conference in Toronto was based on the theme, “Time to Deliver,” and is held every two 
years to publicize the latest research and program approaches on HIV/AIDS. Women’s 
reproductive health and rights organizations were especially interested and involved in 
these conferences, and continued to frame sexual and reproductive health and rights as 
central to the prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS; their attendance at these 
conferences and their interest in the reproductive health and rights implications of the 
political declaration that came out of the UNGASS Review signals the on-going 
coalition-building efforts of these organizations with the HIV/AIDS community. A brief 
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analysis of the newsletters of many of these organizations also signals a serious framing 
effort to transform HIV/AIDS into a sexual and reproductive health and rights issue. 
The first two days of the UNGASS Review meeting were technical in nature, with 
roundtables, panel discussions, plenary sessions, and an interactive hearing with civil 
society. The resolution adopted by the General Assembly in December 2005 calling for 
this comprehensive review made specific provisions for civil society participation in the 
meeting, inviting NGOs in consultative status with ECOSOC, as well as accrediting 
representatives from many other NGOs, civil society organizations, and the private sector 
(Fried 2006a). Governments were also encouraged to include civil society representatives 
in their national delegations. Three hundred and twenty NGOs were accredited from 
Africa, with a significant number attending from Nigeria (43), and Kenya (79); 114 
NGOs were accredited from Asia, 160 from Europe, 104 from Latin America, 20 from 
the Middle East and North Africa, and 68 from North America, the majority of those 
being from the U.S. (53). One example of a private sector organization that was included 
in the list of U.S. NGOs accredited to attend the meeting was Merck, the pharmaceutical 
company. These nearly 800 organizations were accredited especially for this conference; 
another 600 participants were registered from organizations that were already accredited 
with ECOSOC. Representatives from reproductive health and rights organizations of 
interest to this study made up nearly one-sixth of those 600 participants, including: 
Catholics for a Free Choice; Center for Reproductive Rights; Center for Development 
and Population Activities (CEDPA); Development Alternatives with Women for a New 
Era (DAWN); Family Care International, with 13 representatives; the Guttmacher 
Institute; International Planned Parenthood Federation, Western Hemisphere, with 21 
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representatives; International Women’s Health Coalition, with 24 representatives; and 
IPAS.  
The preliminary documents published by UNAIDS for the UNGASS Review 
made special note of the importance of civil society participation, particularly in order to 
ensure involvement from every sector of society to stem the spread of AIDS.  
The decision by UN Member States to accommodate such a high number of 
organizations marks a critical moment in the history of the AIDS response helping to 
underline commitment from many corners of the world to work on AIDS across sectors 
and in partnership. The Review promises an unprecedented level of involvement for civil 
society including presentation slots in plenary, roundtable and panel sessions. (UNAIDS 
2006) 
 
The “Information for Civil Society” document (UNAIDS 2006) goes on to note the 
financial support UNAIDS raised with donors to support NGO representatives from 
developing countries. This support, both rhetorical and financial, for civil society 
participation highlights the failure of official AIDS initiatives to reach their goals, and the 
prevailing view that local civil society support and representatives of those living with 
HIV/AIDS are needed to curb the spread of HIV/AIDS.  
In addition to the many NGOs focused on the issue of HIV/AIDS, the 
reproductive health and rights organizations kept track of all the preparations for the 
UNGASS Review through several e-bulletins throughout 2006, encouraging those 
interested in reproductive health and rights to attend the conference and/or get in touch 
with their UN mission, and pointing out the role of sexual and reproductive health and 
rights in the preliminary political declaration of the UNGASS Review (FCI and IWHC 
2006, Fried 2006). Although the Toronto International Conference was mentioned often, 
the majority of the attention was given to involvement in the UNGASS Review; one can 
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safely assume that many of these reproductive health and rights organizations believed 
that the UNGASS Review was of greater importance.  
 Prior to the UNGASS Review, the Commission on the Status of Women issued a 
Resolution on Women, the Girl Child, and HIV/AIDS in March 2006, which called for 
placing women and girls at the center of the response to HIV/AIDS, and urged 
governments to provide universal access to reproductive health by 2015, enable women’s 
empowerment, protect women’s human rights, and strengthen policy and programmatic 
linkages between HIV/AIDS and sexual and reproductive health, among many other 
recommendations. The second FCI/ IWHC newsletter sent out prior to the UNGASS 
Review noted “This resolution will be an important contribution to the 2006 HIV/AIDS 
UNGASS review and high-level meeting and can be used to advocate for a stronger 
commitment to addressing the needs of women and girls and increasing linkages between 
HIV/AIDS and sexual and reproductive health in the meeting’s outcome document” 
(FCI/IWHC 2006b).  
 There were many other indications of the importance these organizations have 
placed on connecting sexual and reproductive health and rights with HIV/AIDS. The 
Sexual Health and Rights Project of the Soros Initiative also sent out several newsletters 
to reproductive health and rights organizations prior to the UNGASS Review detailing 
the many ways that reproductive health and rights activists and organizations could get 
involved in the civil society portions of the conference, and also the connections that had 
already been made and that, in their view, needed to be made between sexual health and 
rights and HIV/AIDS.  The Soros newsletter reviewed the current status of the 
negotiation for the political declaration that would be signed by the delegates to the 
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UNGASS Review, and highlighted the key sexual health and rights issues included, 
commenting that the conference would be “a key opportunity to highlight… the 
connections between sexuality and health and rights and HIV/AIDS information and 
services” (Fried 2006a). The newsletter also did its best to prepare activists to be savvy 
advocates at the conference by listing the key UN documents to which they could refer 
for language already agreed upon on sexual and reproductive health and rights, including 
the Program of Action from ICPD and its reviews, and the Plan of Action from the 
Beijing Women’s conference and its reviews. In addition, the key civil society activities 
during the conference were also listed, and for those who would not be able to attend the 
conference, a form letter that they could send to their UN mission was attached. This 
letter expressed concern that the draft of the political declaration to come out of the 
UNGASS Review did not address the feminization of the HIV and AIDS epidemic, and 
failed to “assert unequivocal support for and real commitments to reproductive and 
sexual rights and health” (Fried 2006a). In addition, the letter asks that the Declaration 
“take an unmitigated position of support of the promotion and protection of basic human 
rights, including reproductive and sexual rights, of all persons” and urged “the inclusion 
in the final UNGASS declaration of all of the points outlined below regarding the 
strengthening of efforts to promote both sexual and reproductive rights and expanded 
services” (Fried 2006a, emphasis in the original). These newsletters demonstrate how 
carefully and precisely reproductive health and rights activists are re-framing HIV/AIDS 
as a sexual and reproductive health and rights issue. They also argue that the HIV/AIDS 




 The second issue of the FCI/IWHC newsletter highlights the recommendations on 
sexual and reproductive health and rights made by early regional consultations on 
HIV/AIDS, including the fact that Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States did not make any specific recommendations on women or sexual and 
reproductive health and rights issues. The second newsletter put out by the Soros 
initiative also printed the actual language from the draft Political Declaration, including 
the textual changes recommended by civil society in general; in addition, the newsletter 
also highlighted the particular changes needed to make sexual and reproductive health 
and rights much more clear and specific in the Political Declaration, including specific 
paragraph numbers. Written just prior to the UNGASS Review, the newsletter also had a 
tentative listing of sexual and rights-related NGO side-events during the conference, so 
that advocates would be better able to network with each other. 
 During the actual UNGASS Review, the Soros initiative also put out a briefing on 
each day’s events. These briefings described the frustration of many NGOs who were 
pushing for greater acknowledgement of the marginalized populations suffering from 
HIV/AIDS, such as women and girls, sex workers, and men having sex with men, as well 
as those who were pushing for a greater commitment to sexual and reproductive health 
and rights services in connection with HIV/AIDS. The necessity of striving for consensus 
in a UN document made many government delegations sidestep much of this language. 
The newsletter described what was going on at the review as “inside the negotiation 
rooms, the real issues, it seems, are being whitewashed in favor of ‘consensus’ or, in 
reality, the lowest common denominator” (Fried 2006c). While many government 
delegates diplomatically spoke on what they believed they could develop consensus on, 
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civil society representatives again and again refused to speak diplomatically, and 
according to this newsletter, “noted the devastating linkages of gender inequality and 
women’s subordination with HIV/AIDS” (Fried 2006c). To stress this point even further, 
a statement by an NGO representative from India was printed in full, ending with the 
point that governments must allocate resources for comprehensive sexual and 
reproductive health services, subsidized condoms, and comprehensive sexuality 
education, among others things (Fried 2006c). 
 The Soros newsletter described the second day of negotiations on the Political 
Declaration as coming out with much stronger content on sexual health and rights, and 
human rights more generally, and without making the explicit connection between the 
two statements, that civil society organizations had worked hard to provide 
recommendations on the Declaration. The newsletter also printed the full press statements 
of several NGOs, many of which continued in the vein of the previous newsletter; 
included were statements by a coalition of women’s groups to the negotiation process at 
the Review, the African civil society coalition on AIDS, and the Coalition on Sexual and 
Bodily Rights in Muslim Societies. In their statement, the women’s groups condemned 
governments for not acknowledging the importance of women’s rights issues to the 
pandemic, in particular the need for universal access to and protection of sexual and 
reproductive health and rights. The African civil society coalition contended that the 
African government delegations were negotiating in bad faith by refusing to include 
measures to protect and promote the human rights of vulnerable groups. The Coalition on 
Sexual and Bodily Rights in Muslim Societies took the Organization of Islamic Countries 
to task for not representing “the civil society perspectives and best practices regarding 
 
 294 
HIV/ AIDS within our countries, as well as our commitment to the universality and 
indivisibility of human rights” (Fried 2006d).  
 The end of the conference saw marked disappointment on the part of civil society 
and some governments over the disconnect between the Political Declaration and the 
speeches and recommendations of most civil society groups. The civil society press 
release on the last day of the conference, when the language of the Political Declaration 
was set, denounced the meeting as a failure because it failed to set hard targets on 
funding, prevention, care and treatment; it also did not acknowledge at-risk populations, 
promote sexual and reproductive health and rights, or the establish the centrality of 
human rights. The statement by human rights groups seemed to capture well the body of 
issues civil society had with the Political Declaration: “For human rights to be respected, 
protected and fulfilled in relation to HIV and AIDS, cultural exceptionalism cannot 
qualify human rights provisions and cannot inform programmatic responses to 
comprehensive sexual education” (Fried 2006e). Thus, despite the advocacy of many 
AIDS NGOs as well as sexual and reproductive health and rights NGOs, and the 
strenuous attempts of many of the latter NGOs to frame sexual and reproductive health 
and rights as central to the prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS, not enough of the 
country delegations agreed on the language and recommendations of these civil society 
groups to include them in the Political Declaration. This was due mainly to the opposition 
of the U.S. delegation, influenced by the Bush administration, and several other Islamic 
countries. Although the official newsletters of the reproductive health and rights 
organizations only very generally named conservative countries as opposing their 
language, unofficial blogging reports from the conference named the U.S. as a major 
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obstacle to the sexual and reproductive rights language sought by many NGOs to frame 
the HIV/AIDS issue. The U.S.’s insistence on the language “evidence-informed” rather 
than “evidence-based” policies caused one irate blogger to suggest, “As the public health 
community continues to voice its concern about the triumph of ideology over science 
(perhaps now over reason as well?), this news suggests that the U.S. delegation is not 
listening” (RHRealityCheck.org, May 31, 2006). In addition, several bloggers wrote that 
the conservative NGOs were conspicuously missing from the civil society forum at 
UNGASS:  
the conservative ideologues who back such language are "evidence-invisible." They have 
not even applied to participate in any of the public forums where their ideas could heard 
and debated. At the recently concluded hearing of Civil Society and governmental 
representatives, not one NGO spoke in favor [sic] the abstinence-only until marriage 
policies that others were complaining about. No one with a conservative perspective was 
there to explain why condoms are bad, to show the "evidence" that "informs" their 
ideology or to articulate clearly why public health data should not be the basis for 
decisions about the AIDS pandemic. (RHRealityCheck.org, May 31, 2006) 
 
The UNGASS Review of the commitments made to treat HIV/AIDS was an important 
conference that demonstrates the ongoing work of reproductive health and rights 
organizations to put their issue back at the forefront of UN and donor attention by 
framing HIV/AIDS as a sexual and reproductive health and rights issue.  
 The Toronto International Conference was another conference that many 
reproductive health and rights organizations attended; although their framing of the 
HIV/AIDS issue was not successful on the intergovernmental level at the UNGASS 
Review, it has been successful among many NGOs dealing with the HIV/AIDS issue. 
However, not many anti-abortion organizations attended the conference, similar to the 
UNGASS Review; Jill Sheffield of Family Care International noted especially that “the 
opposition sees the link between reproductive health and rights and HIV/AIDS, but they 
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weren’t there in force to oppose it at Toronto” (Jill Sheffield Interview 2006). This 
suggests that the anti-abortion organizations do not see the HIV/AIDS issue as one they 
can profitably contest, given the enormous support from both conservative and 
progressive organizations for HIV/AIDS (Chowka 2005). It may also indicate that anti-
abortion NGOs were relying on the voice of the U.S. government in this case.  
 The intense interest of the abortion-rights organizations in building an alliance 
with the HIV/AIDS community is based mainly in their need to find alternative streams 
of funding as a result of their decreasing influence after the Millennium Development 
Goals were released. However, the ways in which the abortion-rights network has gone 
about trying to regain that influence conform quite closely to the tactics that were 
successful at the 1994 Cairo conference: coalition building, framing HIV/AIDS as a 
human rights issue that needs to be dealt with holistically in a sexual and reproductive 
health context, and producing research that supports reproductive health as essential to 
the treatment and prevention of HIV/AIDS, especially among women. Thus, the abortion-
rights network continues its advocacy at the UN by using strategies that conform to UN 
norms.  
8.2 World Congress of Families 
The anti-abortion network continues to build alliances with similar organizations 
around the world; one of the key events since 2004 that demonstrates the international 
focus of this network is the World Congress of Families IV, held in 2007. The documents 
and speeches from the conference also demonstrate the continuing adjustment of anti-
abortion organizations to the norms of the UN, including framing in terms of human 
rights and using research to support advocacy. The World Congress of Families IV also 
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demonstrates a key divide within the coalition, between those who are just beginning to 
focus on their attention on the international arena, and those who have done so for the 
past ten years.  
The Fourth World Congress of Families was held in Warsaw, Poland, from May 
11-13, 2007. Around 3,000 people attended, from 70 different countries; the conference 
was again organized by the Howard Center, and co-sponsored by many pro-family 
organizations, such as Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute, Concerned Women 
for America, Defend the Family International, Red Familia, Family Research Council, 
Focus on the Family, the Heritage Foundation, Human Life International, Population 
Research Institute, and United Families International. The Howard Center chose Warsaw 
was chosen as the site of this most recent Congress of Families because many pro-family 
organizations see Europe as an overwhelmingly liberal policy environment, and Poland, 
as a staunchly Catholic country, as one of the only countries in Europe whose 
conservative leaders will speak out for traditional views of the family and against 
abortion. The WCF IV website maintains, “Through demographic winter and the rule of 
anti-family elite, Europe is almost lost to family values. …Poland is a bastion of 
tradition, faith and family” (World Congress of Families IV Information 2007).   
The stated goals of the conference were to shift the terms of the public policy 
debate  
from “The family as an obstacle to development” to “The family as the source of social renewal 
and progress;” from “overpopulation” to “under-population” as the demographic challenge of the 
21st century; from “The small family and voluntary childlessness as good” to “The celebration of 
the large family as a special social gift;” and from religious orthodoxy as a “threat to progress” to 
“religious orthodoxy as the source of humane values and cultural progress.”  World Congress of 
Families IV, Background 2007 
 
This statement of purpose demonstrates the intent of these organizations to re-frame the 
debate on population and development in the terms that would further their own goals; 
each of the changes stated above describe a major shift, especially in the population field. 
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The main themes of the conference - larger families as a source of human capital rather 
than an detriment to development and the environment, population aging and negative 
birthrates as the real problem of the modern world, traditional marriage and family as the 
building blocks of a successful society, and religion as the source of stability and values 
that anchor that successful society – can all be found in the statement on shifting terms 
(World Congress of Families IV, Background 2007). It seems clear that in addition to 
networking with other like-minded organizations and building an international 
movement, one of the major goals of the pro-family movement at the World Congress of 
Families IV was to also re-frame the terms of debate.  
 The networking aspect of the conference was also prominent, as evidenced by the 
many different organizations from different parts of the world represented at the 
conference, and the many NGOs represented in the booths set up for that purpose. The 
on-line conference literature (World Congress of Families IV, Background, Information, 
Planning 2007) touts the international character of the conference; the simultaneous 
translation of all conference speeches for the attendees, the reference to these attendees as 
delegations from different countries, and the adoption, as at previous conferences, of a 
Declaration, all point to obvious parallels to UN global conferences. In fact, an article on 
Christianwire.com quotes Alan Carlson, founder of the WCF conferences, as saying 
“You might say we’re the United Nations of the pro-family movement” (Christian 
Newswire April 24, 2007). Carlson describes the gathering: 
In terms of speakers, organizers and attendees, the Congress spans six continents. This 
demonstrates the universality of family concerns and the desire of pro-family leaders, scholars and 
activists to network and develop joint plans of action to address those concerns at the national 




NGO booths at the conference reflected the interest of a wide variety of 
conservative organizations in the issue of the family, as well as the resource that such a 
conference is for brand-new organizations such as Watchmen on the Walls, that began 
only a year ago. Watchmen on the Walls bills itself as an International Christian 
Movement for Human Rights, founded mainly by Latvian and American journalists and 
activists to provide support to Christians all over the world who want to advocate for 
their values. Many well-established American organizations such as Focus on the Family, 
Heritage Foundation, and United Families International had booths side by side with 
newer Polish organizations, both religious-based and advocacy-based. These 
organizations were not only focused on the natural family and the issues that go along 
with that concept, but also advocated for more traditional conservative concerns, such as 
the involvement of government in private life. One example was a representative of a 
home-schooling organization, which passionately argued for the dismantling of the public 
school system as one of the largest, most wasteful and ineffective government programs, 
which also indoctrinated children to agree with and support the government rather than 
criticize it. The representative of this organization believed home-schooling children was 
the best way of educating them, that parents could and would step up to the challenge if 
they were required to do so. The sheer proximity of these NGOs to each other created 
networking opportunities that would not have otherwise existed. 
 From reports and articles written by abortion-rights organizations, they seem to be 
aware of but not react very strongly to the WCF IV; reports on both sides are visibly 
biased, but the abortion-rights reaction can be described as disgusted. Catholics for a Free 
Choice posted daily reports on the conference that mainly represented it as a gathering of 
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delusional right-wingers, not worthy of much notice (Catholics for a Free Choice, May 
11-14, 2007). Catholics for a Free Choice was one of the few reproductive health and 
rights organizations that reported on the WCF IV; one of their Opposition Watch reports 
(Catholics for a Free Choice, May 11 2007) derides the speakers at the Congress as being 
known anti-choice advocates, and describes the Polish Prime Minister and President, 
slated to speak at the conference, as men who either are not married or have only one 
child, and therefore hypocritical in their support of the “natural family.” In the end, 
however, neither Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski nor President Lech Kaczynski 
spoke at the conference, the latter sending someone to read his speech instead.  
In addition, both the Opposition Watch summary report (O’Brien 2007) and the 
daily reports from the conference took pains to report the indifference of the city of 
Warsaw in general and the Polish mainstream media to the conference, and the fact that 
prominent members of the city did not strongly associate themselves with the conference. 
This includes the city mayor, Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, who actually is a member of the 
WCF honorary committee, but did not take special pains to welcome the conference, nor 
announce her involvement in her public appearances.  
A letter sent by a working group of the European Parliament to U.S. 
Representative to the UN Commission on the Status of Women, Ellen Sauerbrey in late 
March of 2007 represents a more serious reaction to the WCF IV. The letter asks her not 
to participate in the WCF IV because as a senior representative of the U.S. government, 
she lends the conference and its supporting organizations legitimacy and a government 
stamp of approval, which they deemed inappropriate because the major organizations 
attending the conference hold “extremist and intolerant views” (European Parliamentary 
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Working Group on Separation of Religion and Politics, March 28, 2007). The letter lists 
organizations by name and details statements made by their founders or members against 
gay rights, abortion, or alternate concepts of the family, including Friar Thomas 
Euteneuer of Human Life International, Steven Mosher of Population Research Institute, 
and Austin Ruse of the Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute.  The MEPs then 
characterize the WCF as a gathering whose sole aim is to “turn back the clock on recent 
advances in civil and political rights around the world, with the work done at the UN and 
the EU a particular target” (European Parliamentary Working Group, March 28, 2007), 
and cautions Sauerbrey that her participation would lend official support to these groups 
and undermine their efforts to promote tolerance in Europe, especially among newer 
members of the European Union. The letter goes on to state “In your role as Assistant 
Secretary of State for Population, Refugees and Migration, you must be aware of the 
impact that the unrepresentative views of the people attending this conference will have 
on the life and death issues that affect the world’s poor” (European Parliamentary 
Working Group, March 28, 2007).  This last statement seems to be the strongest 
acknowledgement of the impact of conservative groups at the regional and international 
level. 
Christianwire.com also published an article detailing the reaction of feminists, 
humanists, and the Sex Information and Education Council of the United States 
(SIECUS) to the World Congress of Families IV, using as a subhead “Why is the left so 
agitated over World Congress of Families IV? Why has the Warsaw Congress become a 
target of anti-family forces?” (Christian Newswire March 27, 2007). This article, along 
with others published by anti-abortion organizations and more conservative sites, seem to 
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emphasize the reactions of abortion-rights organizations to the World Congress of 
Families, implying that the gathering has international importance and a significant effect 
of some kind – why else would these opposing organizations bother to criticize the 
gathering or its participants? It is an interesting tactic, because the subhead only implies 
that abortion-rights organizations view the World Congress of Families IV through 
questions, while the article itself goes on to state quite explicitly “Feminists, militant 
secularists, and the vanguard of the sexual revolution agree that the World Congress of 
Families is a threat to their agenda.” Although there has been some reaction to the World 
Congress of Families by abortion-rights organizations, most notably the letter to Ellen 
Sauerbrey from the European Parliamentary Working Group, for the most part even 
organizations who keep close track of anti-abortion and conservative opposition groups 
did not attribute much importance to the World Congress of Families. However, the one 
aspect in which World Congress of Families was similar to UN conferences was the 
opportunity it presented for anti-abortion groups to network with each other, and this 
article astutely noted not only that this was part the of the aim of WCF and as the most 
likely goal to be accomplished would cause anti-abortion groups some worry, but that as 
a strategy, it was taken from the abortion-rights movement. “They worry about WCF 
following their example by networking with allies in Europe and the Third World and 
working together for common goals” (Christian Newswire March 27, 2007).  
 As an attendant of this conference for this research, I noticed two things in 
particular that stood out as representative of the gathering. The first is that this conference 
could easily be described as a celebration of the family, marriage, and conservative 
values; as such, it did not resemble an international meeting at the UN, but demonstrated 
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the differences between such a meeting and one that only included NGOs that agreed on 
the issue. It did not include the type of negotiation that one would associate with a global 
UN conference that included many different groups of differing views, and even the 
substantive speeches assumed that the audience already agreed with the speaker’s point 
of view, and merely needed more information to strengthen that agreement. Many other 
speeches, especially by Polish nuns and priests, were encomiums to marriage and the 
family, to religion’s place in upholding the family, and to the family’s place in upholding 
society. In addition, several hours in each conference day were taken up by cultural 
entertainment with a purpose; artwork by Polish schoolchildren depicting families, a 
concert by youth at the end of the first day, and an exhibition by the cast of a popular 
Polish children’s television show, Ziarno. The host of the show was a grandmother who 
took care of the children when they came to visit her, and helped them to learn traditional 
and national Polish songs as well as Polish poetry.  The children sang and spoke of their 
experiences on the show, and an episode of the show was shown on a large screen in 
which children and older youth came to the grandmother with different problems that she 
helped them deal with, such as fighting parents or falling in love at first sight. This 
celebration of family and marriage was interesting to me, because it seemed to be one of 
the primary purposes of the conference – to reinforce and celebrate the issues the 
conference attendees found important. 
The second thing I noticed was that many of the speakers from Poland were nuns 
and priests, whereas many of the speakers from the U.S. were activists, academics, and 
leaders of their own non-governmental organizations. I do not believe that in Poland, all 
those concerned with the natural family and the issues highlighted by the World Congress 
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of Families were only religious figures; in fact, Polish academics and scientists spoke at 
many of the breakout sessions. However, the fact that so many of the Polish plenary 
speakers were religious figures or politicians that referred heavily to religion, seems to 
me an indication that religious figures are still given pride of place in a way that seems 
out of place in the United States for those involved in advocacy.  
The substantive sessions tended to be in the breakout sessions rather than the 
plenary sessions, but the plenary sessions by U.S. speakers, such as Pat Fagan of the 
Heritage Foundation, or Steven Mosher of the Population Research Council, tended to 
include research and statistics to provide evidence for their point of view. Pat Fagan 
showed graphs and charts relevant to his argument that every child had a right to the 
marriage of its parents because that is where children are safest – in a two-parent, married 
family. Steve Mosher argued that no country whose birthrate has fallen below 
replacement has ever succeeded through government policies in bringing birthrates back 
up to replacement levels. Paul Mero, President of the Utah-based Sutherland Institute, 
spoke about “The Physics of the Natural Family,” arguing that as the science of physics 
guides the integrity of structures, there are scientific reasons why families lose the 
integrity of their structures.  Mero carried the metaphor through to his claim that the 
natural family is more able to withstand a load, to bend and not break, whereas other 
types of arrangements are not as elastic. He specifically appealed to a scientific point of 
view by saying, “Because of emotions, we prefer not to think about families in honest, 
scientific terms. … Ideologies don’t explain away natural families – ideology is 
defenseless against truth” (Mero 2007). Paul Mero’s speech stood out in great contrast to 
an earlier Polish speaker in that he approached the study of the family scientifically, and 
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presented his argument as more valid as a result. Several of the Polish speakers notably 
did not have a scientific approach to the family, but made statements like, “There is 
nothing more beautiful than life, and above life is love.” Although both the Polish 
speakers and the Western speakers ended up with similar conclusions about the natural 
family and the importance of marriage to society, and Paul Mero concluded his speech by 
alluding to Christ’s admonition to be like a little child, the arguments supporting their 
conclusions were starkly different between the Polish religious figures and the mostly 
American NGO speakers. Although the American speakers for the most part also referred 
to their religious backgrounds, they kept them to the background, rather than 
foregrounding them the way many of the Polish speakers did.  
The World Congress of Families IV in Poland demonstrates the continuing 
importance that the anti-abortion movement places on building coalitions with 
organizations from Europe and developing countries in order to further their goals, at 
country levels and at the international level. The conference also presents a good 
opportunity to compare the reports made by the abortion-rights and anti-abortion 
organizations on the event and try to decipher what each was trying to accomplish with 
these reports, as well as what about the event concerned or excited each respective group. 
The abortion-rights groups took pains in their reports to denigrate the effects of the 
conference and to downplay the participation of high-ranking Polish government 
officials, while anti-abortion groups took pains to emphasize the negative or “threatened” 
reactions of abortion-rights groups, and to highlight the importance of the conference. 
The participants’ speeches at World Congress of Families also provided an interesting 
comparison between the scientific arguments of Western speakers, especially U.S. NGO 
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leaders, and the more religious statements made by Polish speakers. Although this was 
very much an “insiders” gathering, Western speakers in general still approached their 
topic from a scientific point of view, with arguments to convince and persuade their 
audience, while Eastern European speakers tended to celebrate the family and their 
common religious convictions. 
These observations about the differences between the conservative organizations at 
the World Congress of Families suggest that a period of adjustment awaits the Polish 
organizations that have joined the anti-abortion coalition but have not yet moved fully 
into advocacy at the UN. In addition, the divide between the Western groups’ approach to 
advocacy and the Polish groups’ approach may be a sign that the two groups have not 
exchanged significant information or worked very closely together. Whether the alliance 
will last and whether the Polish groups will change as they attempt to join Western 
groups in advocacy attempts at the UN remains to be seen. I believe the scientific and 
research-based arguments of the Western NGO leaders demonstrates some of the 
substantive change that has occurred in these organizations as a result of their lobbying at 
the UN. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I discuss the tensions demonstrated at the World Congress of 
Families IV within the conservative movement between those organizations that are more 
comfortable with the scientific and research-based advocacy that is the norm of the UN 
and those that continue to use moral and religious arguments. Acknowledging these 
tensions add nuance to an understanding of the anti-abortion movement and the different 
norms within the conservative tradition to which these organizations hold. As I have 
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discussed in earlier chapters, there is also nuance within the liberal tradition, which is 
closer to the center, while many progressive women’s rights organizations belong further 
on the left on the political and philosophical spectrum. Many of the left-leaning 
organizations wanted to focus more on economic rights and enact more radical change 
than is implied in an individualist, private, liberal human rights framework. In fact, these 
more progressive organizations, while they continue to ally themselves with liberal 
organizations, have been more vocal about the need for more economic and development 
rights, and struggle in a similar manner, if not to the same degree, as anti-abortion 
organizations to maintain their identity apart from the liberal tradition of the UN. Thus, 
the alliance of liberal and progressive (or more radical) women’s organizations on the 
issue of reproductive health and rights required similar adjustments to the norms of the 
UN as those made by anti-abortion organizations, in framing, coalitions, and research-





Both the abortion-rights and anti-abortion networks established themselves at the 
UN, and regardless of changes in funding from both governments and foundations, or 
rhetorical support from influential institutions in the population field such as the U.S. 
government, they have adjusted their strategies in order to continue to influence UN 
norms and policy as best they can. The theoretical framework I am suggesting can help 
explain specifically how these organizations have adjusted. Although I argue that the UN 
is characterized by certain ideological elements, such as the emphasis on the individual, 
the drive for progress through reason, and the environment of bureaucratic rationalism, I 
do not argue that these norms are deterministic for individuals or movements; they are 
elements that have evolved over time in importance as a part of the UN system, and it is 
possible to influence the UN without them or to work around them. However, for NGO 
networks and social movements without the authority of a state, adapting to the norms of 
the UN is especially important in order to influence international norms and policy on 
abortion. In particular, I argue that both movements have adjusted to the norms of the UN 
by shifting their scale appropriately, whether up to the UN level or down to include 
grassroots organizations; adjusting the framing of their arguments to include a more 
individual emphasis on rights; building coalitions to increase their numbers and 
connections to issues already in the public eye; and using science and reason to 
professionalize their advocacy.  
The theoretical framework that I am proposing helps us understand more than 
conventional explanations for why the abortion-rights movement was so successful in the 
early nineties, and why the anti-abortion movement gained momentum and influence in 
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the latter part of the century and the beginning of this decade. A top-down explanation 
using world-polity theory or globalization theory would suggest convergence of norms 
and practices, a structural perspective that minimizes the role of actors. I believe such 
theories and explanations miss the ability of actors to change and adapt, if only 
instrumentally, to succeed in their goals. Some alternative bottom-up explanations using 
social movement theories would suggest resources, in the form of abundant sources of 
funding, or openings in political opportunity structures, in the form of the support of the 
U.S. government, as the determining factors in which the movement rose in influence. 
While the support of the U.S. government is very important, in that each administration 
fills the delegation with appointees that fit its point of view and allocates or takes away 
resources accordingly, the changing U.S. administrations does not provide a full 
explanation for the success or staying power of these movements. The networks’ 
influence at the UN is not consistent with the change in administrations. The abortion-
rights movement began to build relationships and gain traction at the UN well before the 
Clinton administration came into office, and lost some influence while Clinton was still 
in office. The anti-abortion network has continued to work at the UN and increase its 
numbers there long after the Bush administration took up their concerns there. In 
addition, the decrease in resources to the abortion-rights network cannot be said to have a 
causal connection to its loss of influence, because one could argue that the decrease in 
resources occurred as a result of its loss in influence, especially when the Millennium 
Development Goals were released without a reproductive health and rights goal.6  
                                                
6 I will address the role of resources and an alternative explanation from the transnational advocacy 
network literature more fully in following sections.   
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Both of these movements asserted themselves at the UN at a time when they were 
not being supported by the current U.S. administration, and built up their influence 
slowly by appealing to grassroots organizations and scaling up from there. In the nineties, 
the abortion-rights movement had the support of the U.S. administration, but several 
other factors played equally important roles in contributing to its influence at Cairo. First, 
women’s organizations put together a few very important and pragmatic lobbying 
strategies to create one document that incorporated all the changes in language and policy 
that women’s rights organizations around the world wanted to work toward; as a result, 
they were able to distribute this language directly to many country delegations and lobby 
them directly to support it (Confidential Interview 2006). Second, the relationships 
women’s health and rights organizations built with foundations and UN officials played 
the biggest role in bringing feminist NGOs to Cairo in such great numbers; their good 
relationships with UN officials also allowed them to attend the preparatory meetings for 
Cairo, where they were able to influence the wording of the Program of Action to a great 
extent.   
In the late 90s, the anti-abortion movement was not making much visible 
progress, in that the Cairo+5 conference, which was supposed to be a low-key review, 
became a huge international conference in which abortion-rights activists continued to 
advocate successfully for abortion rights and sexual health in addition to reproductive 
health and rights. However, it was precisely during this time, when the influence of the 
anti-abortion movement could least be seen, that the anti-abortion movement began 
adapting its strategies to the international sphere. Although not many internationally 
active anti-abortion organizations exist, especially in comparison to the number of 
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feminist NGOs supporting the right to reproductive health and especially to abortion, 
those that exist were created in or became active at the UN between the late 90s or and 
early 2000s. Many of the important organizations in the anti-abortion network currently 
are Christian Right organizations from the U.S. that turned their attention to the issue of 
abortion and the natural family at the UN as a result of the Cairo conference. They began 
to build alliances with other NGOs, both Catholic and Mormon groups, and then reached 
out to developing countries through their affiliates in those developing countries, and also 
through international conferences held on the topic of the natural family. Throughout the 
21st century, these anti-abortion organizations have expanded the ways they frame their 
arguments; not only do they argue in terms of rights, especially the right to life, but 
organizations that once rejected the environmental movement and other progressive 
causes have now embraced such causes and connected them to the natural family and, 
importantly, argued that money spent on abortion does not address the larger problems of 
infectious disease, hunger, and environmental blight.  
9.1 Major findings 
9.1.1 Abortion-rights and Anti-abortion movements 
The anti-abortion movement has a more difficult time reconciling their position on 
the issue of abortion with liberal norms, but they have been able to adjust their strategies 
in order to have more of an impact on the UN. As previous chapters show, conservative 
organizations have adjusted to the environment of the UN by shifting the scale of their 
advocacy, changing the framing of their arguments, building coalitions across faiths and 
borders, and professionalizing their advocacy to include science and reason as rationales 
for policy change. This case study provides evidence that a movement not based in 
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liberal philosophies can adopt the strategies required to lobby in a liberal 
environment, and that although these norms may not be natural to the network, 
they can be instrumentally manipulated.  
However, the anti-abortion movement has a core set of ideas and goals that has 
motivated its activism for decades, first domestically, and now internationally. The 
movement is supported by grassroots organizations that emphasize the key norms and 
beliefs that motivate the movement’s goals, such as belief in God, the importance of 
family, tradition, and the ability of people to thrive apart from the interference of 
governments. The frames and alliances these advocacy organizations undertake do not 
stray from these core norms, for doing so would jeopardize the support of the grassroots 
organizations that are generally much more focused on domestic concerns than 
international ones. This means that although many of the conservative organizations 
mentioned in this research emphasize democracy, they do not subscribe to global civil 
society’s goals of inclusiveness and voice for all; although they lobby at the UN, they 
consistently deride the idea that the solutions to important problems can be left in the 
hands of UN agencies, citing their inefficiency, scandals of corruption at the UN, and 
their “clear bias” toward liberal or leftist claims and NGOs (Crouse 2002). Therefore, the 
changes I have observed in the strategies these NGOs have used over time have not 
substantially changed the content of their claims, nor the underlying values that motivate 
their activism. As a result, I would argue that it is possible for social movements coming 
from different philosophies to lobby at the UN without changing the content of their 
claims, although their influence is more limited. The example of the anti-abortion 
network in particular demonstrates that these activists have chosen not to change 
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their framing substantially, or be more in line with the norms governing the 
progressive NGOs. This disadvantages them in their ability to influence UN officials 
and build broader alliances, but the anti-abortion group chooses such disadvantages at the 
UN rather than materially damaging their standing with their constituents.  
Despite the generally negating influence these organizations have had on UN 
conferences and conference reviews, in that they have been more successful in blocking 
language or watering down resolutions than in inserting language they approve of, it is 
important to realize that they have not been working in the UN system for very long or in 
great numbers. If these organizations grow in numbers or in the number of actors they 
deploy, and if they are able to command greater resources and influence more countries 
with conservative leadership, they may well be a greater influence on future UN global 
conferences or consensus documents. If the conservative organizations do grow in 
numbers and resources and are still unable to greatly influence UN policy, such a finding 
might have interesting implications for the world-polity structural perspective on the 
international system. Therefore tracing the interaction of these organizations, their change 
over time, and the characteristics of the system in which they work, will help us better 
understand the nature of the international system and how structure and agency interact.   
My findings indicate that even though the abortion-rights movement had an 
easier time because its position is built on a liberal understanding of the world, the 
abortion-rights movement also had to adjust its strategies to work at the UN. 
Activists not only had to tone down the radical elements of their movement, which many 
politically successful movements in many environments must do, but they had to adjust 
their frame within the UN – they moved to a human rights framing of reproductive 
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health. This is a mainstream liberal perspective on reproductive health, and many 
feminists argued then and continue to argue now that the private, rights-based framing of 
reproductive health surrenders key ground. What they are concerned about is the ability 
to carry out reproductive health choices, both to prevent or terminate a pregnancy and to 
carry one to term. That is where, according to many feminists, the right to reproductive 
health falls short, because once the baby is born, there is little provision to take care of 
the baby in a way that allows the woman to work and make further choices about her life, 
unless she is financially well-off. However, in order to fit their agenda with other issue 
areas of importance at the time (environmentalism), or with a powerful perspective 
(human rights), abortion-rights activists made choices about how to frame their 
arguments and what goals to accomplish: they chose to frame their argument as the right 
to reproductive health services, concerned that women should have access to family 
planning services and other health services that would allow them to make crucial 
decisions about their fertility. Subsequently, many feminist organizations have brought 
up these issues of access to services, and the economic and social rights connected with 
raising children; however, sexual health and rights has become the prevailing frame with 
which reproductive health and rights organizations have tried to overcome the problem of 
being excluded from the UN Millennium Development Goals and reconnecting to 
sources of funding. 
 
Levels of Influence for the Two Movements 
Analysis of interview data, in particular, demonstrates that groups influence 
the UN on two levels. At the first level, advocates influence UN employees at the 
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different agencies and funds that deal with population issues; they operate by working on 
the same issues in the field, building relationships, and finding common understandings 
of the world, or underlying beliefs and assumptions. At this level, abortion-rights 
organizations are able to exert much more influence than anti-abortion 
organizations because they have worked with UN agencies over time, have built 
strong relationships with UN employees, and have similar views on human rights, 
women’s rights, and reproductive rights. Abortion-rights activists, I would argue, build 
strong working relationships based on their common views on human rights, women’s 
rights, and reproductive rights, which are in turn built on similar liberal values 
concerning the importance of the individual, a rights framework, and the importance of 
science and reason in developing and changing policy. 
Anti-abortion organizations, on the other hand, do not work in the family 
planning services field, have not as a result built strong relationships with UN 
agencies and funds that support such services, and do not have similar views on 
human rights, women’s rights, or reproductive rights. This is a result of the 
incongruence of their underlying conservative values with the liberal norms governing 
the UN environment, especially those of the rights framework and the importance of the 
individual. I see the key anti-abortion organizations that have emerged from developed 
countries and especially the U.S. as much more willing to adapt to the use of science and 
reason as the basis for their advocacy, but mainly when presenting their arguments to 
those outside their known supporters, or those who may be undecided. The use of science 
and reason to support their advocacy is much less likely to alienate them from grassroots 
supporters, as long as they continue to refer to religious backgrounds and traditional or 
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moral reasons for being involved in this advocacy. However, the importance of the 
individual and the rights framework are too much associated with such liberal institutions 
as the UN, and therefore must be carefully manipulated by these anti-abortion 
organizations in order to avoid negative reactions from their constituents.  
At the second level, advocates influence government delegations at the UN during 
meetings and conferences on relevant issues. Success requires that advocates have 
knowledge or experience with the UN global conference process, and lobbying strategies 
and resources appropriate to the UN environment. Both abortion-rights and anti-
abortion organizations had to learn how UN global conferences worked, and how 
best to influence the language of the final document. The abortion-rights organizations 
had a head start by scaling up to international advocacy in the 1970s, and gaining 
experience with UN global conferences through the Women’s Decade conferences from 
1975-1985; however, anti-abortion organizations have quickly learned to operate on this 
level over the last ten years and have adjusted their strategies to the UN environment.  
Many of those who have worked at the UN on population issues since the 1970s 
believed in the family planning paradigm, in which demographers were the experts and 
allowing men and women to control their fertility was both the answer to a population 
crisis and a step towards helping women better their lives (Stan Bernstein Interview 2006, 
Stirling Scruggs Interview 2006, Steven Sinding Interview 2006). These same UN 
employees did not have far to go to be persuaded of the reproductive health and rights 
paradigm, which emphasized the right of women to a holistic treatment of their 
reproductive needs, including family planning services, rather than the wholesale 
distribution of contraceptives. Most employees were already working for the 
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empowerment of women (Steven Sinding Interview 2006), and they also sympathized 
with the reproductive health and rights activists who argued for safe abortion, although 
the UN itself does not support abortion as a family planning method. As a result of this 
confluence of interests at the UN Secretariat level, abortion-rights NGOs work closely 
with UN agencies and funds, and are able to use UN meetings and publications to 
network and advocate for their point of view. For instance, Barbara Crane noted that the 
networks and relationships in the field of reproductive health and rights are deep and long 
lasting.  
That’s one of the sociological facts. There are pretty close networks, pre-Cairo, Cairo, post-Cairo, 
of people who are scattered around, even when we don’t specifically coordinate, we can help each 
other quite a bit. … WHO, UNFPA, World Bank Reproductive Health Training Institute, they 
don’t do so much specifically with abortion, but all that activism and work that happens broadly 
around RH creates an environment, it creates a network, and frameworks around which abortion 
activism happens. (Barbara Crane Interview 2006)  
 
Abortion-rights organizations also have close ties and influence with UN 
employees because many of these organizations are not only advocacy organizations, but 
use the funds distributed by UNFPA to provide services on the ground in developing 
countries. As a result, they have built close relationships, and since the 1994 Cairo 
conference, have been working together for the same goals. Amy Tsui, a demographer at 
Johns Hopkins University who has studied the relationships between reproductive health 
and rights service NGOs and the UN, felt that reproductive health and rights 
organizations may have directed their efforts to persuade the UNFPA prior to the Cairo 
conference, but that “Today, I would say… they are completely aligned. They correspond 
almost completely in their goals” (Amy Tsui Interview 2006). The cross-fertilization of 
personnel between the UN and the abortion-rights NGOs demonstrates the concurrence 
between these two sectors and encourages further cooperation between them. For 
instance, Maria Jose Alcala, a key figure in helping to mobilizing input from abortion-
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rights NGOs from all over the world into a consensus document at Cairo, at the time 
worked for Family Care International; soon after the Beijing Women’s conference, she 
was hired by UNFPA, where she still works (Jill Sheffield Interview 2006). Barbara 
Crane also considered that there was mobility between the abortion-rights NGOs and the 
UN system: “For example, the IPAS Mexico director has just become a country 
representative for Guatemala. I mean, there’s not a huge amount, but there’s a certain 
amount of movement, and that facilitates the bonding and ability of NGOs to have 
access” (Barbara Crane Interview 2006).  
This type of influence seems to depend on the relationships abortion-rights 
activists have with UN employees, but also on the liberal point of view that most of them 
have, which allies the two against the conservative activists at the UN. Stirling Scruggs, 
formerly with UNFPA, noted that although UNFPA works closely with many 
reproductive health and rights NGOs, they do not tell each other what to do. However, he 
acknowledged that “we are usually singing the same song and working together, just as 
the Holy See and the people that work with them are doing the same thing” (Stirling 
Scruggs Interview 2006). Another example of the concurrence of interests and liberal 
point of view that enables the influence of abortion-rights activists at the UN level was 
the power and influence of former IWHC president, Bella Abzug; many interviewees 
spoke of Bella Abzug’s close relationships and influence over influential figures such as 
Al Gore, Tim Wirth, and Nafis Sadik. Stirling Scruggs humorously remembers that Nafis 
Sadik and Bella Abzug did not originally get along, “but by the end they were best 
friends. I remember going into Nafis’s office, and the two of them were in a corner 
deciding what to do about the Program of Action” (Stirling Scruggs Interview 2006). At 
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this first level of influence, adjusting their strategies would not help anti-abortion NGOs 
unless either UN personnel completely changed, or the anti-abortion NGOs over time 
changed their conservative assumptions and beliefs.  
The quote by Amy Tsui demonstrates at a minimum goal convergence between 
the UNFPA and the abortion-rights activists: both see their different goals served by the 
same actions and working together. However, based on my research and the examples of 
the exchange of personnel between the two groups and their close connections during 
conferences, I would argue that the UFNPA and reproductive health and rights activists 
come together in their goals due to the deeper convergence of liberal values. The two 
groups have demonstrated similar approaches especially to the human rights framework, 
the need for consensus building, and the use of science and reason to support policy 
change. In addition, the UNFPA has committed to the concept of reproductive health and 
rights so completely that even when it would have been easier to distance themselves 
from abortion-rights activists and reproductive health, because they believed that 
reproductive health and rights was the right, correct approach to family planning. One 
example is when the Bush administration took away UNFPA’s funding because of the 
possibility that reproductive health and rights included abortion. The UNFPA at that time 
distanced itself from the issue of abortion to some extent (Barbara Crane Interview 2006), 
but not from the reproductive health and rights approach. Another example is when 
reproductive health and rights were not included in the Millennium Development Goals, 
the UNFPA spent a great deal of its resources in researching and presenting how 




The second level of influence is at the intergovernmental level, which requires 
that advocates have knowledge of how UN global conferences work and lobbying 
expertise in order to reach out to the many different delegations. Lobbying depends on 
building relationships, but many of these relationships are temporary since new delegates 
are often sent to each meeting, whereas relationships with UN employees tend to be 
longer lasting. Lobbying government delegations, especially those they believe will be 
sympathetic to their beliefs, is something that anti-abortion organizations have learned to 
do by attending conferences since Cairo 1994, as abortion-rights organizations learned to 
do by attending Women’s conferences. In fact, many abortion-rights activists commented 
that the anti-abortion activists have become much more organized and savvy about the 
UN conference lobbying process. Jill Sheffield, of Family Care International, in 
particular deemed that the anti-abortion NGOs got smarter after the Cairo conference: 
“They’ve decided that you only need twelve governments to disrupt any meeting. I was 
appalled, but I was also impressed that the opposition had done their homework so well. 
That’s what makes them so serious” (Jill Sheffield Interview 2006). Barbara Crane of 
IPAS also believes that anti-abortion organizations have gotten more organized, and have 
figured out how to lobby better at the UN as a result of coming to UN conferences since 
Cairo: “They’ve figured out now, how to press certain buttons and make certain things 
happen, and how to get a certain delegate to say something or do something to benefit 
your side. …So the international conference process has been a major opportunity for 
NGOs to learn how these processes work, and how to influence them” (Barbara Crane 
Interview 2006).  
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In addition to learning to work within the lobbying system that the UN allows 
NGOs, abortion-rights NGOs were also able to push the envelope of the rules governing 
NGO participation, especially in the 1990s conferences. However, one of the ways in 
which anti-abortion NGOs have been able to curb the influence of abortion-rights NGOs 
is to insist on strict rule enforcement of the NGO voice, and to fuel the debate concerning 
the unrepresentativeness of NGOs. Thus, Wendy Wright of Concerned Women of 
America argues that NGOs do not have a place at plenary sessions, and should not be 
able to speak or vote, as some NGOs would like to (Wendy Wright Interview 2006). This 
is corroborated by Jill Sheffield, who says of anti-abortion organizations: “They make 
access to delegates tighter just by enforcing the rules – they got lax for a while, and now I 
think they’re tighter again” (Jill Sheffield Interview 2007). Thus, the second level of 
influence, which is working within the UN meetings and conferences to lobby 
government delegations, is one that both abortion-rights and anti-abortion organizations 
have been able to successfully use by adjusting their strategies and taking advantage of 
political opportunities.  
9.1.2 Social Movements 
This research also speaks to the literature that explores how and when 
socialization of actors occurs by international bodies, and how deep that socialization can 
go. Recent literature on the socialization of national actors by transnational or 
international bodies suggests a continuum of change or socialization, which is “defined as 
a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community” (Checkel 
2005: 804). On one end lies strategic calculation, in which no socialization has occurred 
because agents are instrumentally rational and seek to maximize their interests by 
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adapting their behavior to the norms and rules favored by the international community. In 
the middle lies Type I internalization, where agents switch from following a logic of 
consequences to a logic of appropriateness; this involves moving from strategic 
calculation to conscious role-playing. Type II internalization involves going beyond role 
playing and accepting community or organizational norms as right and good. Agents who 
have been socialized in this more significant way adopt the interests or even the identity 
of the community, and no longer think instrumentally about their position (Checkel 2005: 
804).  
I would argue that the way conservative NGO networks work in the international 
sphere is very similar to progressive groups – they work as lobbyists. But there is one 
important difference: they don’t subscribe to the same underlying liberal philosophy, so 
they do not seek consensus, work inclusively, or work for the greater legitimacy of the 
UN. This causes them to clash severely with progressive NGOs working at the UN, and 
with most UN personnel as well. Research findings in this area also support the argument 
that form does not automatically guarantee content. Although much of the literature on 
NGOs and civil society has assumed that NGOs and civil society hold only 
progressive goals, conservative NGOs and networks work in nearly identical ways to 
progressive NGOs and networks, and work at the UN in similar ways.  However, 
while conservative organizations may have similar goals as progressive organizations and 
express them in rights or health language, this language is usually reserved for the 
persuasive arguments directed at the UN or outside their own organizations. My research 
suggests that conservative organizations are instrumentally rational and engage in 
strategic calculation to further their interests in the international community. However, 
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one of the mechanisms of the shift to internalization explored by Checkel and other 
scholars (2005) is that of strategic calculation, because what “starts as behavioral 
adaptation, may—because of various cognitive and institutional lock-in effects—later be 
followed by sustained compliance that is strongly suggestive of internalization and 
preference change” (Checkel 2005: 809). Research in the future may demonstrate more 
effectively whether the conservative network is being more substantively changed as a 
result of its work at the UN; based on my findings, I would argue that there are core 
norms that the anti-abortion network cannot change, including the importance of 
community and society rather than individual freedom. However, I do think substantial 
change will occur the longer that these organizations lobby at the UN, especially when 
they no longer have the backing of a conservative U.S. government.  
The evidence of more substantial change in the conservative network 
emerges in recent years as many anti-abortion organizations join in the call for 
more positive changes related to the Millennium Development Goals. For instance, 
Concerned Women for America shifted its position on the environment, from a rejection 
of the environmental movement because of its connection with neo-Malthusian 
population policies, to advocating for the conservation of God-given resources as good 
stewards (Randall 2006). This is more than merely strategic or instrumental adaptation 
because anti-abortion organizations do not derive any alliance or framing benefits from 
supporting the environmental movement. The environmental movement does not extend 
itself on behalf of population issues in the current era, and so there are no obvious 
benefits for this change. I believe this is an effort to be more in step with other religious 
organizations that are advocating for the Millennium Development Goals. In a similar 
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way, Concerned Women for America has also joined several other conservative groups in 
advocating for resources to be spent on the alleviation of hunger and the reduction of 
infectious diseases (Crouse 2006). This can be traced to the effect of Protestant 
evangelical organizations with Catholic organizations that have been lobbying for 
international efforts to address these problems for many years.  
Alternative explanation 
 Many of the most influential anti-abortion organizations that work at the 
international level have come from the U.S., and began to direct their attention toward the 
UN during the late nineties.  An alternate explanation for why these anti-abortion 
organizations shifted their focus to the international system could stem from the 
“boomerang” explanation of Keck and Sikkink (1998), in which non-state actors gather 
transnational allies and draw on international resources in order to affect an intractable 
domestic government or situation. Some might argue that this is the case for American 
anti-abortion NGOs, seeking to influence the Clinton administration during the nineties. 
However, it would not explain why these organizations have chosen to increase the 
number of resources they focused on the international system even while President 
George W. Bush has been in office. The complexity of the connections between their 
international and domestic advocacy cannot be so simply characterized, as the anecdote 
below illustrates.  
John Mallon of Inside the Vatican provides a vivid description of the tension 
between the Vatican’s representative, John Klink, and the head of the U.S. delegation 
Margaret Pollack, illustrating the increasing savvy of the anti-abortion network and the 
obstacle that a pro-choice U.S. delegation presented to them. The negotiation was going 
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late into the night, and John Klink addressed the chair and said, “ Mr. Chairman, in a 
document that makes explicit references to ‘sexual and reproductive rights’ in practically 
every paragraph, I fail to see why it should be so difficult to have the phrase “the rights, 
duties and responsibilities of parents’ appear in even one paragraph of this document” 
(Mallon 2000). However, Margaret Pollack would not concede the point to the Holy See, 
and so Mr. Klink read out several quotations compiled for him by pro-family 
organizations on the rights, duties and responsibilities of parents, not letting on until the 
end that Bill Clinton and Al Gore had made them. “The entire assembly erupted in 
laughter, except for Margaret Pollack who did a slow burn” (Mallon 2000). John Mallon 
included this description of the tension between a Clinton-appointed U.S. delegation and 
the Holy See in an editorial published in the Washington Times on October 18, 2000. The 
tactics of the pro-family organizations may not be remarkable, but this editorial, 
published in the month prior to the presidential election between Bush and Gore, began 
with Mallon almost nonchalantly brushing aside an attempt to paint Bush as anti-Catholic 
as a result of a visit to Bob Jones University and ends with the sentence, “… Mr. Gore is 
one of the key leaders of this anti-family and anti-life apparatus that has been the true 
face of the Clinton-Gore administration that few Americans ever get to see.” The editorial 
was published well after the five-year review of Cairo in order to demonstrate to a U.S. 
conservative electorate how inimical the Clinton-Gore administration was to their 
interests in the international arena, specifically a UN global conference. This 
demonstrates a change in how the conservative leadership as well as their constituents 
viewed the UN, because prior to the mid-90s, these voters would not have cared about 
how their presidential choice affected the debate or policy at the UN.  
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This editorial was also attached to a letter sent out one week later by Susan 
Roylance of the Mormon NGO United Families International, titled “If We Could 
Change the U.S. Presidency to One More Supportive of the Family than Clinton-Gore.” 
Roylance begins the letter by saying  
The following article shows how tough it is for those of us lobbying at UN International 
conferences when our most powerful opposition is the United States. The negotiators for the U.S. 
are appointed by the State Department, in consultation with the White House. If we could change 
the U.S. Presidency to one that is more supportive of family values it would make ALL THE 
DIFFERENCE in our efforts to promote family-friendly public policy for the world. … So -- 
please pass this message on to everyone in your e-mail address list -- and let it get to as many 
people as possible in the United States. We desperately need a change in the Presidency of the 
United States -- so that the State Department appointments will be more pro-family. (Roylance 
2000) 
 
This letter demonstrates very clearly a point of view that is expressed both explicitly and 
implicitly by many conservative NGO leaders, that although they worked in the 
international sphere when the U.S. administration was hostile to them, they did not do so 
with the aim of affecting the domestic political arena through international resources and 
alliances, the “boomerang effect” (Keck and Sikkink 1998). If anything, conservative 
NGO leaders have expressed an inclination towards a reverse boomerang effect, the 
motivation to change the progressive character of the U.S. administration into a 
conservative one so that they could then more effectively work at the UN. I would argue 
that the connections between the domestic sphere and the international arena are even 
more complex than that: these anti-abortion activists used an international framing of the 
issue of family values to lobby for a domestic change, which would then change the 
international opportunity structure to one more favorable for their advocacy.  
9.1.3 International Relations Theory 
 World-polity theory, while providing us with a concrete explanation of what 
norms are prevalent in the international system, does not give us a complete explanation 
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of how actors may instrumentally adjust to them in order to accomplish their goals. 
However, I incorporated a social movements perspective to better understand the 
strategies that NGO networks used to adjust to or work around these norms at the UN. 
Thus, I would argue that world-polity theory is incomplete as a structural theory, and 
benefits from a complementary agent-oriented approach. 
 What I believe world-polity theory does add to my research, and to 
international relations in general, is the ability to step back and acknowledge that 
what appears to be the ingrained practices or inevitable actions of a “reasonable” 
person are choices that actors in the past have made; these choices then reach a 
tipping point such that they appear to be the only reasonable available option, an 
established norm (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Many may question how useful it is to 
trace the ways advocates adjust to the norm that science and reason are the means to 
progress, since this norm is so pervasive. However, this norm was not always so 
dominant; how this norm became so prevalent and how groups who do not subscribe to it 
adjust to a world that does, is what interests me. In part, this dissertation tries to trace the 
growing strength of such norms at the UN, and how different actors played a part in 
making these norms a part of the foundation of the UN. I spend a greater part of the 
dissertation tracing the effect of these norms on activists as they try to make claims from 
a traditional and different philosophical basis. I think it is important to acknowledge that 
many other cultures and societies around the world still hold these traditional views, and 
that within even Western societies, conservative views have a stronghold that have an 




The Power Dynamics between States, IGOs, and NGOs 
In the international system, states have both authority and institutional power; IGOs 
have as much authority as states are willing to cede to them, and the legal authority to 
compel states who are signatories of international legal treaties or conventions; and 
NGOs have no hard power or legal authority, but depend on the power of ideas, norms, 
and public opinion to help enforce what has been agreed to in IGO forums. The realist 
approach to international relations views states as the major actors, with the only true 
power, in the international system, and argues that IGOs and NGOs may only 
peripherally affect states. To realists, IGOs and NGOs do not have any material power 
over states that is not granted to them by states. The liberal approach would see the key 
explanation for changes such as the adoption of reproductive health and rights language 
as rooted in domestic actors within states. The constructivist approach to international 
relations emphasizes the importance of ideas and how they constitute the identities and 
interests of actors. Although my research takes a constructivist approach to IR, this 
approach specifically documents the influence of both structural norms and the 
importance of actors working with or around those norms. Individuals within states, 
IGOs, and NGOs all played an important part in the adoption of reproductive health and 
rights as the new paradigm for population policy. However, I would argue that the world-
polity approach is helpful because they were all also affected in some way by basic 
liberal and rational norms that were the foundation of the UN environment they were 
attempting to influence.  
This research also shows that the power relationships between states, IGOs and 
NGOs are not as uni-directional as any one of these approaches might argue. While 
 
 329 
the liberal culture is a powerful influence enacted by Western liberal states and embedded 
in IGOs such as the UN, conservative NGOs are able to create opportunities within that 
culture for their interests by both instrumentally adjusting to these norms and working 
around them with the power of like-minded states. While states have the most power in a 
material sense, even the U.S. during the Clinton administration was greatly influenced by 
NGOs actors to support reproductive health and rights, and the Bush administration, 
despite its best efforts, has not been able to reverse the language on reproductive health 
and rights at the UN. The UN as an IGO is able to exert a great deal of power over the 
NGOs that work within its global conferences and lobby within its various meetings by 
creating a space in which NGOs must adjust to its norms; however, that influence does 
not run in only one direction NGOs representatives were also able to influence UN 
officials to allow NGOs to participate in the PrepCom process, and to support 
reproductive health and rights to the exclusion of traditional population and development 
concerns. As I will discuss later, many UN social agencies now have to deal with a 
backlash by member governments against the inclusion of NGOs in the decision-making 
process of UN global conferences and meetings; they must address exactly what 
populations NGOs represent and how well, and how accountable they are for their actions 
and use of funds.  
9.2 Other important factors for further research 
Several factors emerged in my research that may be significant for my central 
argument, but that I was unable to follow up on as thoroughly as I wished. The limiting 
of NGO participation in global conferences and the increased questioning of the 
legitimacy of NGOs as participants in intergovernmental negotiations are recent 
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developments that might significantly affect the influence of NGO advocacy at the UN. 
In future research, I would explore how these recent developments might constitute 
political opportunities that may or may not be connected to underlying norms, and 
whether progressive and conservative organizations are differentially affected.  
Another factor that emerged during my research was the importance of resources 
and especially the key role of foundations in enabling NGOs to exert as much influence 
as they did. I discuss briefly how underlying norms help determine whether foundations 
support progressive and conservative organizations, I would like to investigate further 
how foundations may have shaped the advocacy of the NGOs they supported, and thus 
the goals and strategies of the network.   
9.2.1 Backlash Against Inclusion of NGOs at UN 
An issue I would like to explore further in future research is how the role and 
access of NGOs at the UN is being questioned, not simply by states that do not wish to be 
held accountable to the issues for which most NGOs advocate, but by scholars, UN 
officials, and activists themselves. I believe this is an instance of the involvement of 
NGOs causing the UN as an IGO to adjust in specific ways; this issue of questioning the 
accountability, representativeness, and legitimacy of NGOs at the UN will also 
undoubtedly have future implications for the ability of NGOs to participate as fully in 
global conferences. Their participation and influence may be limited until these issues are 
addressed, or until they find another strategy by which to work around these issues.  
NGOs in the 21st century have been subjected to greater scrutiny due to several 
well-publicized instances of corruption, inefficiency, and the growing realization that 
terrorist groups often use NGOs to front their activities. Up to this point, most democratic 
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institutions generally considered NGOs beyond questioning because of their positive 
impact in alleviating poverty, protecting human rights, preserving the environment, and 
providing relief, emergency and otherwise, worldwide (McGann and Johnstone 2005). 
However, the efficiency, accountability, transparency, and legitimacy of NGOs are now 
being investigated in greater depth, and especially at the UN. In 2002, UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan proposed a Panel of Eminent Persons to investigate the UN-civil 
society relations; this panel put together a report, commonly known as the Cardoso 
Report, published in 2004. The report calls for reforms in the way that the UN deals with 
NGOs; NGOs approved of some of its suggestions, such as possible accreditation to the 
General Assembly and a de-politicized accreditation process. Other suggestions seemed 
to express much more wariness concerning the role of civil society at the UN, and might 
weaken access for NGOs while increasing access for business in the UN system.   
Joseph Chamie, the former Director of the Population Division of the United 
Nations, is an example of a long-time UN employee who has viewed the increasing role 
for NGOs at the UN with wariness. He articulated the need to step back and be aware of 
what role NGOs can and should play in an intergovernmental institution. Although he 
believes that NGOs can contribute to the decisions and working of the UN, they should 
not be primary actors in decision-making because there is no standard governing the 
interests or groups NGOs purport to represent, how well they represent any particular 
group of people, and who supports these NGOs financially. “So what starts happening 
then is that you start having NGOs who say I’m representing all the disenfranchised 
women, or children, or AIDs cases, or gays, or indigenous, or whatever group it is. And 
then another group gets started that says, I’m representing them, and then they start 
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fighting” (Joseph Chamie Interview 2006). Chamie believes that the UN is still wrestling 
with the issue of just how much access to grant NGOs, because their role has not been 
fully thought through. For instance, what rationale does the UN use to justify NGOs 
participating in social issues, but not security issues? Questions like these are ones that 
the UN is currently dealing with, and the results may change both NGOs and the UN.   
In addition, while many NGOs and scholars on NGOs themselves admit the need 
to have standards of efficiency, accountability, and representativeness for NGOs that will 
have influence on the international level, there are also those who argue that bringing the 
credibility and legitimacy of NGOs into question is a tactic of the conservatives (Lobe 
2005). I would like to explore to what extent conservatives initiated these issues, and to 
what extent they simply used them in an attempt to curb the influence of the much more 
numerous liberal organizations.  
9.2.2 The Role of Resources and Foundations in the Influence of 
NGOs 
Resource mobilization is one popular approach within social movement theory to 
account for the influence of social movement organizations. Resources are an important 
part of any explanation of social movements, and given that the agent-oriented, social 
movement theory is part of my theoretical framework, I do see resources playing a role in 
how networks and movements are able to influence policy. However, my research shows 
that ideational structures and the framing of reproductive health and rights strongly 
influenced whether resources were made available to the abortion-rights and anti-abortion 
networks.  
The contribution of funds by UNFPA and progressive foundations such as the 
Rockefeller Foundation and the MacArthur Foundation helped pay the way of many 
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developing country NGOs to attend the Cairo conference, as well the passage of many 
feminist developing country NGO representatives to attend as part of their government 
delegations. These funds were a key factor allowing representatives of feminist NGOs 
from developing countries to attend the conference, giving physical form to the coalition 
feminist NGOs were building; the funds that allowed NGO members to attend as 
members of government delegations were also important because they were able to 
directly influence the negotiations of language during the conference and the approval of 
their delegations for that language. However, those who would argue that as a result the 
resources were what determined the influence of these NGOs would be missing the 
ideational structure that brought those resources to bear on behalf of feminist NGOs in 
1994.  
Women’s reproductive health and rights activists had been writing and advocating 
for reproductive health and rights for years prior to the Cairo conference or Prepcoms. 
They did not automatically receive funding from progressive foundations, which had 
been funding population programs even prior to the U.S. government, until after they had 
worked to frame existing population programs as coercive and a holistic approach to 
reproductive health a much better framework for these programs. In addition, the Reagan 
administration’s about-face concerning population programs in the 1980s caused 
foundations that were still supportive of family planning and women’s reproductive 
health and rights activists to be more encouraged to work together. As a result, in 1990, 
Carmen Barroso, a women’s health and rights academic and activist, became the Director 
of the Population and Reproductive Health Program for the MacArthur Foundation, and 
she was a key player in directing funds towards reproductive health and rights; the 
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MacArthur Foundation set aside $1.5 million to support NGOs at Cairo (Carmen Barroso 
Interview 2006). It was also the relationships that women’s activists built with UNFPA 
officials especially Secretary-General Nafis Sadik, Director of Communications and 
External Relations Sterling Scruggs, and Stan Bernstein, and their framing of 
reproductive health and rights as a far better framework for population programs than 
population control that persuaded them that NGOs should be involved in the Cairo 
process and conference, and that UNFPA would contribute funds for that purpose 
(Carmen Barroso Interview 2006, Sterling Scruggs Interview 2006, Steven Sinding 
Interview 2006).  
 Another instance of the influence of resources, and especially foundations, on the 
practical operation of NGOs is precipitous decline in funding dedicated to population 
programs by the U.S. government since the late 1990s. The Bush administration actively 
opposed family planning programs and reproductive health and rights, directing funds 
instead toward HIV/AIDS programs, alleviation of infectious diseases, and education. 
Some abortion-rights activists have suggested that it has become more difficult to win 
resources from important progressive foundations because of the current hostile political 
environment in the U.S.; these foundations support the right to reproductive health and 
abortion just as strongly, but they are reluctant to “throw money away” given the Bush 
administration’s opposition to reproductive health and rights (Duff Gillespie Interview 
2006). Some would argue that the lack of funding for population programs and the new 
influx of funds to HIV/AIDS programs would better explain the shift of feminist NGOs 
to connect with the HIV/AIDS issue through framing and coalition-building. However, I 
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would argue that ideational structures again better explain at least the direction of funds 
away from reproductive health and rights.  
The anti-abortion organizations and the Holy See’s efforts to identify reproductive 
health and rights as a term synonymous with the right to abortion made reproductive 
health and rights a hot-button issue for many organizations looking to avoid controversy 
(Confidential Interview 2006). The disagreement surrounding the term of reproductive 
health and rights was cited as one of the first factors that prevented reproductive health 
and rights from being considered as an MDG. The controversy created by the framing 
efforts of the anti-abortion organizations combined with the opposition of the Bush 
administration has now channeled funding from progressive foundations away from 
reproductive health to some extent (Amy Tsui Interview 2006); however, as evident by 
Countdown 2015, both traditionally progressive foundations and relatively new ones such 
as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation are directing money to population programs, 
and other states have increased their funding to cover some of the decrease in U.S. 
government spending (Barbara Crane Interview 2006, Steven Sinding Interview 2006, 
Duff Gillespie Interview 2006).  
Although I do not see resource mobilization as a sufficient explanation for the 
influence of NGOs, I am interested in the literature within resource mobilization theory 
on how foundations shape social movements, and I would like to in the future draw on 
this literature to explore how foundations shape and open opportunities for both liberal 
and conservative networks. Some sociologists have argued that foundations may act as 
gatekeepers by selecting social movement organizations that are more moderate than 
radical and more professional than protest-oriented; as a result, foundations over time 
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shape a social movement to be more moderate and professional (Jenkins and Eckert 1986, 
Brulle and Jenkins 2005). Other sociologists argue that foundations act as a 
transformative influence; when foundations fund NGOs, they pressure them to develop 
bureaucratic procedures and professional staffs, which as a result makes them dependent 
on donors and less grass-roots oriented (Jenkins and Halcli 1999, Brulle 2000). Tim 
Bartley argues that foundations also create entire fields and recruit social movement 
organizations to be a part of that field (Bartley 2007).  
Further research on these issues would benefit from tracing the possible 
channeling influences of conservative and progressive foundations on NGOs. The 
research to date seems to concentrate on progressive foundations and their effect on 
organizations; given the different goals and underlying philosophies of the conservative 
foundations, I would like to explore whether conservative and progressive foundations 







Carmen Barroso, Director of IPPF Western Hemisphere; September 2006.  
Stan Bernstein, senior researcher and policy advisor, Office of the Director, UNFPA; 
June 2006. 
Allan Carlson, President of the Howard Center; September, 2006. 
Joseph Chamie, former Director of Population Division, UNFPA; June 2006. 
Richard Cincotta, staff on U.S. Delegation to Cairo; June 2006. 
Barbara Crane, Executive Vice President of Ipas; June and August 2006. 
Suzanne Ehlers, Senior Associate, International Advocacy at Population Action  
International; August 2006. 
Duff Gillespie, Professor of Population and Family Health Sciences, Johns Hopkins 
 Bloomberg School of Public Health, and of Bill and Melinda Gates Institute for  
Population and Reproductive Health; August 2006. 
Thomas Jacobson, Focus on the Family Representative to the U.N.; January 2007. 
Malcolm Potts, Bixby Professor of Population and Family Planning at University of  
California, Berkeley; June 2006. 
Austin Ruse, President of Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute (C-FAM); August 
 2006. 
Nafis Sadik, former Director of UNFPA and Secretary General of ICPD, Cairo; August 
 2006. 
Stirling Scruggs, former Director of External Relations at UNFPA; August 2006.  
Jill Sheffield, President of Family Care International; August 2006. 
Steve Sinding, former Director General of International Planned Parenthood Federation; 
 September 2006. 
Amy Tsui, Professor of Population and Family Health Sciences, Johns Hopkins 
 Bloomberg School of Public Health, and Director of Bill and Melinda Gates 
 Institute for Population and Reproductive Health; August 2006. 
Jack Willke, President of Life Issues Institute, former president of International Right to 
 Life Federation, October 2006. 
Wendy Wright, President of Concerned Women of America, September 2006.  
Confidential Interview; August 2006 
Confidential Interview II; September 2006 

















Adams, Edith G. (1965) “World Population Conference, Belgrade August 30-September  
10.” Population Index, 31(4): 435-444. 
 
Adamson, Fiona. (2003) “The Diffusion of Competing Norms in Central Asia:  
 Transnational Democracy Assistance Networks vs. Transnational Islamism.”  
APSA.  
 
Adler, Emanuel. (1997) “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics.”  
 European Journal of International Relations 3(3): 319-63. 
 
Adler, E., & Barnett, M. N. (1998). Security Communities. New York: Cambridge 
University Press.   
 
Amoore, Louise and Paul Langley, “Ambiguities of Global Civil Society,” Review of  
             International Studies 30 (2004): 89-110. 
 
Anderson, Hilary. (2004) “Missing Links: Gender Equality, the MDGs, and the  
International Conference on Population and Development.” Paper written for  
UNFPA Seminar on the Relevance of Population Aspects for the Achievement of  
the Millennium Development Goals. Available:  
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/PopAspectsMDG/10_INSTRAW.
pdf. Accessed July 2007.  
 
Antrobus, P., S. Correa, M. De La Fuente, A. Germaine, L. Keysers, B. Madunagu, and J.  
Pitanguy. (1993) International Conference on Population and Development  
(ICPD-Cairo ’94): History and Process of Some Initiatives. Buzios, Brazil.  
 
Avineri, S., & De-Shalit, A. (1992). “Introduction.” In S. Avineri and A. De-Shalit, eds.  
Communitarianism and Individualism. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Baker, Gideon. (2002) “Problems in the Theorization of Global Civil Society,” Political  
Studies 50: 928-943. 
 
Banaszak, L. A. (1996). Why Movements Succeed Or Fail Opportunity, Culture, And The 
Struggle For Woman Suffrage. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. 
 
Bandarage, A. (1997) Women, Population and Global Crisis: A Political-Economic  
Analysis. London: Zed Books.  
 
Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore. (2004) Rules for the World: International  
Organizations in Global Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 
Bartley, Tim. (2007) “How Foundations Shape Social Movements: The Construction of  
 
 339 
An Organizational Field and the Rise of Forest Certification.” Social Problems  
54(3): 229-255.  
 
Basu, Alaka M. (2005) “The Millennium Development Goals Minus Reproductive  
Health: An Unfortunate, but Not Disastrous, Omission.” Studies in Family  
Planning 36(2): 132-134. 
 
Batliwala, Srilatha. (2002) “Grassroots Movements as Transnational Actors: Implications  
For Global Civil Society.” Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and  
Nonprofit Organizations 13(4): 393-409. 
 
Benford, Robert and David Snow. (2000) “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An  
Overview and Assessment.” Annual Review of Sociology 26: 611-639. 
 
Bernstein, Stan and Emily White. (2004) “The Relevance of the ICPD Programme of  
Action for the Achievement of the Millennium Development Goals – and Vice  
Versa: Shared Visions and Common Goals.”  Paper written for UNFPA Seminar  
on the Relevance of Population Aspects for the Achievement of the Millennium  
Development Goals. Available:  
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/PopAspectsMDG/11_Millennium
Proj.pdf. Accessed July 2007.  
 
Bernstein, Stan and Charlotte Juul Hansen. (2006) Public Choices, Personal Decisions:  
Sexual and Reproductive Health and the Millennium Development Goals. United  
Nations Development Programme: UN Millennium Project. 
 
Blanc, Ann and Amy Tsui. (2005) “The Dilemma of Past Success: Insiders’ View on the  
Future of the International Family Planning Movement.” Studies in Family  
Planning 36(4): 263-276. 
 
Boli, John and George M. Thomas. (1997) “World Culture in the World Polity.”  
American Sociological Review 62: 171-190. 
 
Boli, John and George M. Thomas (eds). (1999) Constructing World Culture:  
International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875. Stanford, California:  
Stanford UniversityPress. 
 
Brems, Eva. (1997) “Enemies or Allies? Feminism and Cultural Relativism as Dissident  
Voices in Human Rights Discourse.” Human Rights Quarterly 19(1): 136-164. 
 
Brulle, Robert J. (2000) Agency, Democracy, and Nature: The U.S. Environmental  
Movement from a Critical Theory Perspective. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
 
Brulle, Robert J. and J. Craig Jenkins. (2005) “Foundations and the Environmental  
Movement: Priorities, Strategies, and Impact.” In Daniel Faber and Debra 
McCarthy, eds. Foundations for Social Change: Critical Perspectives on  
 
 340 
Philanthropy and Popular Movements, 151–73. Philadelphia: Temple University  
Press. 
 
Bunch, Charlotte. (1990) “Women’s Rights as Human Rights: Toward a Re-Vision of  
Human Rights.” Human Rights Quarterly, 12: 486-498. 
 
Bunch, Charlotte. (1995) “Transforming Human Rights from a Feminist Perspective,” in  
Julia Peters and Andrea Wolper, eds. Women’s Rights, Human Rights:  
International Feminist Perspectives, 11-18. New York, New York: Routledge. 
 
Bunch, Charlotte and Niamh Reilly. (1994) Demanding Accountability: The Global  
Campaign and Vienna Tribunal for Women’s Human Rights. Rutgers University,  
Center for Women’s Global Leadership. 
 
Bunch, Charlotte and Samantha Frost. (2000) “Women’s Human Rights: An  
Introduction.” Retrieved online at http://www.cwg.rutgers.edu/whr/html on June  
10th, 2007. 
 
Bunch, Charlotte with Peggy Antrobus, Samantha Frost, and Niamh Reilly. (2001)  
“International Networking for Women’s Human Rights” in Michael Edwards and  
John Gaventa, eds. Global Citizen Action, 217-230. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne  
Rienner Publishers. 
 
Bush, George W. (2004) Presidential Letter to World Congress of Families, Warsaw.  
March 26. Available: http://www.worldcongress.org/WCF3/wcf3_potus.htm.  
Accessed: August 2007. 
 
Buss, Doris and Didi Herman. (2003) Globalizing Family Values: The Christian Right in  
International Politics. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.  
 
Butler, Jennifer S. (2000) “For Faith and Family: Christian Right Advocacy at the United  
Nations.” Public Eye, Summer/Fall: 10-11. 
 
Butler, Jennifer S. (2006) Born Again: The Christian Right Globalized. London: Pluto  
Press. 
 
Cabatu, Elena and Kathy Bonk. “Global Population Media Analysis, Women  
2000/Beijing +5 Media Coverage, June 1-22, 2000.” Communications  
Consortium Media Center. 
 
Caldwell, John C. (1996) “Demography and Social Science.” Population Studies 50(3):  
305-333. 
 
Caldwell, John C., James F. Phillips, and Barkat-e-Khuda. (2002) “The Future of Family  




Campbell, T. (2006). Rights: A Critical Introduction. New York: Routledge.   
Catholics for a Free Choice (CFFC). (1997) “Report on Human Life International.”  
Catholics For a Free Choice (CFFC). (2004) “Report on Culture of Life Foundation.”  
Catholics For a Free Choice. (May 11-14, 2007). “From Winter to Spring – and back  
again? A Report from the World Congress of Families in Warsaw.” Opposition  
Watch. Available:  
http://www.catholicsforchoice.org/news/documents/WorldCongressofFamilies/Re
portfromtheWorldCongressofFamiliesinWarsaw.asp. Accessed August 2007. 
 
Center for Reproductive Rights Briefing Paper. (1999) “ICPD +5: Gains for Women  
Despite Opposition.” Retrieved online at 
http://www.reproductiverights.org/pdf/pub_bp_ICPD+5.pdf on January 2007.  
 
Center for Reproductive Rights. (2005) “UN Human Rights Committee Makes Landmark  
Decision Establishing Women’s Right to Access Legal Abortion.” Press release,  
November 17, 2005. http://www.crlp.org/pr_05_1117KarenPeru.html. 
 
Center For Women’s Global Leadership. (1993) “International Campaign for Women’s  
Human Rights, 1992–1993 Report.” New Brunswick. 
 
Chamberlain, Pam. (2006) “The Globalization of an Agenda: The Right Targets the UN  
with its Anti-Choice Politics.” The Public Eye Magazine 20(1): 1-8. 
 
Chappell, Louise. (2006) “Contesting Women’s Rights: Charting the Emergence of a  
Transnational Conservative Counter-network.” Global Society 20(4): 491-520. 
 
Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2005) “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe:  
Introduction and Framework.” International Organization 59 (Fall): 801-26. 
 
Chen, Martha Alter. (1996) “Engendering World Conferences: The International  
Women’s Movement and the UN,” in Thomas G. Weiss and Leon Gordenker,  
eds. NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance, 139-158. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne 
 Reinner Publishers. 
 
Chowka, Peter Barry. (2005) “HIV/AIDS – And Cancer: How Far Have We Come?”  
Natural Health Line Newsletter February 1st, 2005.  
 
Christian Newswire. (March 27, 2007) “The Left Takes Note of World Congress of  
Families IV (Warsaw, May 11-13).” Available:  
www.christiannewswire.com/news/635102621.html. Accessed August 2007. 
 
Christian Newswire. (April 24, 2007) “World Congress of Families IV Will Be a Truly  
 
 342 
International Gathering.” Available: 
www.christiannewswire.com/news/547352915.html. Accessed August 2007. 
 
Cliquet, Robert and Kristiaan Thienpoint. (1995) Population and Development: A  
Message from the Cairo Conference. Boston, Massachusetts: Kluwer Academic  
Publishers. 
 
Cohen, Susan A. (1993) “The Road from Rio to Cairo: Toward a Common Agenda.”  
International Family Planning Perspectives, 19(2): 61-66. 
 
Coleman, William D. and Sarah Wayland. (2006) “The Origins of Global Civil Society  
And Nonterritorial Governance: Some Empirical Reflections.” Global  
Governance 12: 241-261. 
 
Concerned Women for America. (1998) “The United Nations.” April 15. Retrieved  
September 2006, from http://www.cwfa.org. 
 
Concerned Women for America. (1999) “Cairo +5 Preparatory Conference – March  
1999.” Available:  
www.cwfa.org/printerfriendly.asp?id=1371&department=cwa&categoryid=life.  
Accessed January 2007.  
 
Cook, Rebecca and Jeanne M. Haws. (1986) “The United Nations Convention on the  
Rights of Women: Opportunities for Family Planning Providers.” International  
Family Planning Perspectives, 12(2): 49-53. 
 
Cook, Rebecca. (1993) “Women’s International Human Rights Law: The Way Forward.”  
Human Rights Quarterly, 15(2): 230-261. 
 
Cook, Rebecca, ed. (1994) Human Rights of Women: National and International  
Perspectives. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
 
Correa, Sonia and Rosalind Petchesky. (1994) “Reproductive and Sexual Rights: A  
Feminist Perspective,” in Gita Sen, Adrienne Germain and Lincoln Chen, eds.  
Population Policies Reconsidered: Health, Empowerment, and Rights, 107-126.  
Boston Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
 
Correa, Sonia and Rebecca Reichmann. (1994) Population and Reproductive Rights:  
Feminist Perspectives from the South. New Jersey: Zed Books Limited.  
 
Countdown 2015. (2004) “Events.” Available: 
 http://www.countdown2015.org/act_regnat.htm. Accessed July 2007. 
 
Countdown 2015. (2004) “Global Roundtable Declaration: Health and Hope, Rights and  
Responsibilities.” Available: http://content.ippf.org/output/ICPD/files/4918.pdf.  




Crane, Barbara and Charlotte E. Hord Smith. (2006) “Access to Safe Abortion: An  
Essential Strategy for Achieving the Millennium Development Goals to Improve  
Maternal Health, Promote Gender Equality, and Reduce Poverty.” UN  
Millennium Project: Background Paper. 
 
Crossette, Barbara. (2004) “Reproductive Health and the Millennium Development  
Goals: The Missing Link.” Commissioned by the Population Program of the  
William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. 
 
Crouse, Janice Shaw. (2002) “United Nations Opens the Door for NGO Statements.”  
Concerned Women for America, January 1.  
 
Crouse, Janice Shaw. (2006) “Misguided Attempts to Eradicate Global Poverty.”  
Concerned Women for America, August 15, 2006. Available:  
http://www.beverlylahayeinstitute.org/articledisplay.asp?id=11307&department=
BLI&categoryid=reports&subcategoryid=blirel. Accessed January 2007.  
 
Demeny, P. (1988) "Social science and population policy." Population and Development  
Review 14:451-479. 
 
Dixon-Mueller, Ruth and Adrienne Germain. (1994) “Population Policy and Feminist  
Political Action in Three Developing Countries.” Population and Development  
Review, 20: 197-219. 
 
Donaldson, Peter J. (1990) Nature Against Us: The United States and the World  
Population Crisis: 1965-1980. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of  
North Carolina Press. 
 
Dubois, Ellen and Vicki Ruiz, eds. (1994) Unequal Sisters: A Multicultural Reader in  
U.S. Women’s History. New York, New York: Routledge, Inc.  
 
Dunn, Charles, and J. David Woodard. (2003) The Conservative Tradition in America.  
Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. 
 
Druelle, Anick. (2000) “Right-Wing Anti-Feminist Groups at the United Nations.”  
Institute for the Research of Feminist Studies, May 2000.  
 
Eager, Paige Whaley. (2004) Global Population Policy: From Population Control to  
Reproductive Rights. England: Ashgate Publishing Limited. 
 
Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (June 3, 1992) “UNCED Highlights: 2 June 1992.” 2(3).  
Published by the Institute for Sustainable Development. 
 
Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (June 2, 1993) “Summary of the second substantive Session  





Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (April 25, 1994) “Summary of the third substantive Session  
of the ICPD Preparatory Committee.” 6(30). Published by the Institute for  
Sustainable Development. 
 
Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (September 7, 1994) “ICPD Highlights: Wednesday, 7  
September 1994.” 6(34). Published by the Institute for Sustainable Development. 
 
Earth Negotiations Bulletin. (September 10, 1994) “ICPD Highlights: Friday, 9  
September 1994.” 6(36). Published by the Institute for Sustainable Development. 
 
Eisinger, Peter K. (1973) “The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities.” 
 American Political Science Review 67: 11-28. 
 
Ehrlich, P. R., & Ehrlich, A. H. (1970). Population Resources Environment. San 
Francisco: W. H. Freeman.   
 
European Parliamentary Working Group on Separation of Religion and Politics. (2007)  
Letter to Ellen Sauerbrey. Available:  
www.catholicsforchoice.org/news/pr/2007/EuropeanParliamentaryWorkingGroup
LettertoSauerbrey.asp. Accessed August 2007. 
 
Fahey, Joseph. (1999) “Cairo Plus Five – and How it Almost Failed – United Nations’ 
International Conference on Population and Development.” Humanist 59(5): 5-9. 
 
Falk, Richard. (1998) “Global Civil Society: Perspectives, Initiatives, Movements.”  
Oxford Development Studies 26(1): 99-111. 
 
Family Care International. (2006) “The New York Call to Commitment: Linking 
HIV/AIDS and Sexual and Reproductive Health.” Available:  
www.familycareintl.org/UserFiles/File/pdfs/pub_pdfs/nyctc_en.pdf. Accessed  
August 2007. 
 
Family Care International. (2007) “Global Sexual Health and Rights.” Available:  
http://www.familycareintl.org/en/issues/24. Accessed August 2007.  
 
Family Care International and International Women’s Health Coalition. (2006) “Update –  
2006 HIV/AIDS UNGASS Review No. 1.” 30 January. Available:  
familycareintl.org/UserFiles/File/pdfs/pub_pdfs/hivaids_ebulletin_1_30.pdf.  
Accessed August 2007.  
 
Family Care International and International Women’s Health Coalition. (2006b) “Update 
 – 2006 HIV/AIDS UNGASS Review No. 2.” 30 January. Available:  
familycareintl.org/UserFiles/File/pdfs/pub_pdfs/hivaids_ebulletin_1_30.pdf.  




Farrell, Susan A. (2005) “Reframing social justice, feminism and abortion: isn't it time  
we combated the bishops' opposition to reproductive rights on our terms?”  
Conscience XXVI(1). Available: 
http://www.catholicsforchoice.org/conscience/archives/c2004spring_reframingsoc
ialjustice.asp. Accessed August 2007.  
 
Fasulo, Linda. (2004) An Insider’s Guide to the UN. New Haven, CT: Yale University  
Press. 
 
Ferree, Myra, W. Gamson, J. Gerhards, and Dieter Rucht. (2002) Shaping Abortion  
Discourse: Democracy and the Public Sphere in Germany and the United States.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Finkle, Jason L. and Barbara Crane. (1975) “The Politics of Bucharest: Population,  
Development, and the New International Economic Order.” Population and  
Development Review, 1(1): 87-114. 
 
Finkle, Jason L. and Barbara B. Crane. (1985) “Ideology and Politics at Mexico City: The  
United States at the 1984 International Conference on Population.” Population  
and Development Review, 11(1): 1-28. 
 
Finkle, Jason L. and C. Alison McIntosh. (1995) “The Cairo Conference on Population  
and Development: A New Paradigm?” Population and Development Review  
21(2): 223-260. 
 
Finkle, Jason L. and C. Alison McIntosh. (2002) “United Nations Population  
Conferences: Shaping the Policy Agenda for the Twenty-First Century.” Studies  
in Family Planning 33(1): 11-23. 
 
Finnemore, Martha. (1991) “Science, the State, and International Society.” Ph.D.  
dissertation, Stanford University.  
 
Finnemore, Martha. (1993) “International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The  
 United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science  
Policy.” International Organization, 47(4): 565-597. 
 
Finnemore, Martha. (1996) “Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from  
Sociology’s Institutionalism.” International Organization, 50(2): 325-347. 
 
Finnemore, Martha. (1999) “Rules of War and Wars of Rules: The International Red  
Cross and the Restraint of State Violence,” in Boli, John and George M. Thomas  
(eds). Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental 
Organizations since 1875. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 
 
Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. (1998) “International Norm Dynamics and  




Florkin, Marcel. (1956) “Ten Years of Science at UNESCO.” Impact of Science on  
Society 7: 123-24. 
 
Ford, Lucy H. (2003) “Challenging Global Environmental Governance: Social  
Movement Agency and Global Civil Society.” Global Environmental Politics  
3(2): 120-134.  
 
Fraser, Arvonne S. (1987) The UN Decade for Women: Documents and Dialogue.  
Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
 
Fraser, Arvonne. (1999) "Becoming Human: The Origins and Development of Women's  
Human Rights," Human Rights Quarterly 21(4): 853-906. 
 
Fried, Susana T. (2006) “UNGASS in SHARP Focus: Sexual Health and Rights and the  
2006 UNGASS Review.” Issue 1. Available:  
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/health/focus/sharp/articles_publications/publicati
ons/ungass_20060601/ungass1_20060601.pdf. Accessed August 2007.  
 
Fried, Susana T. (2006a) “UNGASS in SHARP Focus: Sexual Health and Rights and the 
2006 UNGASS Review.” Issue 2, 31 May 2006.  
 
Fried, Susana T. (2006b) “UNGASS in SHARP Focus: Sexual Health and Rights and the  
2006 UNGASS Review.” Issue 3, 31 May 2006. Available:  
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/health/focus/sharp/articles_publications/publicati
ons/ungass_20060601/ungass3_20060601.pdf. Accessed August 2007. 
 
Fried, Susana T. (2006c) “UNGASS in SHARP Focus: Sexual Health and Rights and the  
2006 UNGASS Review.” Issue 4, 1 June 2006. Available:  
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/health/focus/sharp/articles_publications/publicati
ons/ungass_20060601/ungass4_20060601.pdf. Accessed August 2007. 
 
Fried, Susana T. (2006d) “UNGASS in SHARP Focus: Sexual Health and Rights and the  
2006 UNGASS Review.” Issue 5, 2 June 2006. Available:  
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/health/focus/sharp/articles_publications/publicati
ons/ungass_20060601/ungass5_2006.pdf. Accessed August 2007. 
 
Fried, Susana T. (2006e) “UNGASS in SHARP Focus: Sexual Health and Rights and the  
2006 UNGASS Review.” Issue 6, 5 June 2006. Available:  
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/health/focus/sharp/articles_publications/publicati
ons/ungass_20060601/ungass6_20060606.pdf. Accessed August 2007.  
 
Friedman, Elisabeth J. (1995) “Women’s Human Rights: the Emergence of a  
Movement.” In J. Peters and A. Wolper, eds. Women’s Rights/Human Rights:  




Friedman, Elisabeth Jay. (2003) “Gendering the Agenda: The Impact of the Transnational  
Women’s Rights Movement at the UN Conferences of the1990s.” Women’s  
Studies International Forum, 26(4): 313–331. 
 
Furedi, Frank. (1997) Population and Development: A Critical Introduction. New York: 
St. Martin’s Press.  
 
Gamson, W. A. (1992). Talking Politics. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University  
Press. 
 
Garcia-Moreno, Claudia and Amparo Claro. (1994) “Challenges from the Women’s  
Health Movement: Women’s Rights versus Population Control,” in Gita Sen,  
Adrienne Germain and Lincoln Chen, eds. Population Policies Reconsidered:  
Health, Empowerment, and Rights, 47-62. Boston Massachusetts: Harvard  
University Press. 
  
Geddes, Barbara. (1990) "How The Cases You Choose Affect The Answers You Get:  
Selection Bias in Comparative Politics." Political Analysis 2(1): 131-150.  
 
Gerring, John. (2001) Social Science Methodology - A Critical Framework. Cambridge:  
 Cambridge University Press. 
 
Gillespie, Duff. (2004) “Whatever Happened to Family Planning and, for that matter,  
Reproductive Health?” International Family Planning Perspectives 30(1): 34-38. 
 
Goodwin, Jeff, and James M. Jasper. (1999) “Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine: The  
Structural Bias of Political Process Theory.” Sociological Forum 14(1): 27-54. 
 
Green, J. F. (1956). The United Nations and Human Rights. Washington D.C.: The  
Brookings Institute. 
 
Green, Marshall. (1993) “The Evolution of U.S.  International Population Policy, 1965- 
92: A  Chronological Account.” Population and Development Review 19(2): 303- 
321. 
 
Gurr, Ted R. (1970). Why Men Rebel. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
 
Green, M. Christian. (1999) “At the Center: Religion Counts,” Bulletin Home Care Issue  
11 Park Ridge Center.  
 
Hamilton, Gary and Nicole Biggart. (1988) “Market, Culture, and Authority: A  
Comparative Analysis of Management and Organization in the Far East.” The  
American Journal of Sociology 94:S52-S94. 
 





Hartmann, Betsy. (1987) Reproductive Rights and Wrongs: The Global Politics of  
Population Control. Boston: South End Press. 
 
Hartmann, B. (1995). Reproductive Rights And Wrongs: The Global Politics Of 
Population Control. Boston, Mass: South End Press.   
 
Head, Jeanne. (1999) “International Right to Life Federation: Statement to the UN  
General Assembly.” UNGASS Cairo +5: July 2, 1999.  
 
Higer, Amy J. (1999) “International Women’s Activism and the 1994 Cairo Population  
Conference,” in Elisabeth Prugl and Mary Meyer, eds. Gender Politics in Global  
Governance, 122-142. New York, New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,  
Inc.  
 
Hodgson, Dennis and Susan C. Watkins. (1997) “Feminists and Neo-Malthusians: Past  
and Present Alliances.” Population and Development Review 23(3): 469-523. 
 
Hoge, Warren. “Panel Backs Women’s Rights After U.S. Drops Abortion Issue,” New  
York Times, March 5, 2005. 
 
Holmes, Elizabeth. (1997) “What Effect Have United Nations Actions Had on the  
Family?” Speech delivered at World Congress of Families I, March 19-22,  
Prague, The Czech Republic. Retrieved January 2007, at  
http://www.worldcongress.org/wcf1_spkrs/wcf1_holmes.htm.   
 
Holy See. (1995) “Report of the Holy See in Preparation for the Fourth World 
Conference on Women.” 
 
Hovden, Eivind and Edward Keene, ed. (2002) The Globalization of Liberalism. New  
York: Palgrave. 
 
Howard Center for Family, Religion and Society. “Principles and Purpose.” Retrieved  
January 2007, from  http://www.profam.org/THC/xthc_principles.htm. 
 
International Right to Life Newsletter. (March/April 2000) “Beijing +5 Prep-Com.”  
11(2).   
 
Jacobsen, Judith E. (2000) “The United States.” In Shepard Forman and Romita Ghosh,  
eds. The Reproductive Health Approach to Population and Development. 252- 
273. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
 
Jang, Yong Suk. (2000) “The Worldwide Founding of Ministries of Science and  
Technology, 1950-1990.” Sociological Perspectives 43(2): 247-270. 
 
Jasper, James. (1997) The Art of Moral Protest: Culture, Biography, and Creativity in  
 
 349 
Social Movements. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Jenkins, J. Craig and Craig M. Eckert. 1986.  “Channeling Black Insurgency.“ American  
Sociological Review 51: 812-29. 
 
Jenkins, J. Craig and Abigail Halcli. 1999. "Grassrooting the System?  Recent Trends in  
Social Movement Philanthropy, 1953-1990.”  In Ellen Condliffe-Lagemann, ed.  
Studying Philanthropic Foundations: New Scholarship, New Possibilities. 277- 
299. Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press. 
 
Jenson, Jane. 1987. “Changing discourse, changing agendas: Political rights and  
reproductive policies in France.”  In Mary Fainsod Katzenstein and Carol  
McClurg Mueller (eds.), The Women’s Movements of the United Status and  
Western Europe, 64-88. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
 
Joachim, Jutta. (1999) “Shaping the Human Rights Agenda: The Case of Violence  
Against Women,” in Elisabeth Prugl and Mary Meyer, eds. Gender Politics in  
Global Governance, 142-160. New York, New York: Rowman & Littlefield  
Publishers, Inc. 
 
Joachim, Jutta. (2003) “Framing Issues and Seizing Opportunities: The UN, NGOs, and  
Women’s Rights.” International Studies Quarterly 47: 247-274. 
 
Johnson, Stanley. (1987). World Population and The United Nations Challenge and 
Response. New York: Cambridge University Press.   
 
Johnson, Stanley. (1995) The Politics of Population: The International Conference on 
Population and Development, Cairo 1994. London: Earthscan Publications. 
 
Johnston, Hank. (2002) “Verification and Proof in Frame and Discourse Analysis.” In 
Bert Klandermans and Suzanne Staggenborg, eds. Methods of Social Movement  
Research, 62-91. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota. 
 
Kacowicz, Arie M. (2005) The Impact of Norms in International Society. Notre Dame,  
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press. 
 
Kane, Gillian. (2004) “A Family Affair.” Ms. Magazine (Fall Issue). Accessed online. 
www.msmagazine.com/fall2004/worldcongressoffamilies.asp 
 
Kaplan, R.D. (1994) “The Coming Anarchy.” Atlantic Monthly 273(2): 44–76. 
 
Kardam, Nuket. (2004) “The Emerging Global Gender Equality Regime from Neoliberal  
and Constructivist Perspectives in International Relations.” International Feminist  
Journal of Politics 6(1): 85-109. 
 
Katzenstein, P.J., ed. (1996) The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in  
 
 350 
World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Kaufmann, J., & Hadwen, J. G. (1980) United Nations Decision Making. Rockville, Md., 
USA: Sijthoff & Noordhoff.   
 
Keck, Margaret and Kathryn Sikkink. (1998) Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy  
Networks in International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 
King, G., Keohane, R. O.,  & Verba, S. (1994). Designing Social Inquiry Scientific  
Inference In Qualitative Research. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. 
 
Kissling, Frances and Jon O’Brien. (2001) “Bad Faith at the UN: Drawing Back the  
Curtain on the Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute.” Catholics for a Free  
Choice. 
 
Kitschelt, Herbert P. (1986) “Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti- 
Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies.” British Journal of Political Science  
16(1): 57-85. 
 
Klandermans, Bert, & Staggenborg, Suzanne. (2002) “Introduction.” In Methods Of  
Social Movement Research, ix-xx. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.   
 
Klitsch, Michael. (1999) “The Bumpy Road from Cairo to Now and Beyond.”  
International Family Planning Perspectives 25(4): 196-199, 213.  
 
Klotz, Audie. (1995) Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
 
Kocs, Stephen A. 1994. “Explaining the Strategic Behavior of States: International Law  
as System Structure.” International Studies Quarterly 38(4): 535-56. 
 
Lasch, Christopher. (1991) The True and Only Heaven: Progress and its Critics. New  
York: W.W. Norton and Company. 
 
Lasher, Craig. (1998) “U.S. Population Policy Since the Cairo Conference.”  
Environmental Change and Security Project Report 4: 16-23. 
 
Landolt, C. Gwendolyn. (1999) “The Family at the United Nations: Where Do We Go  
From Here?” Speech delivered at the World Congress of Families II, November  
14-17, Geneva, Switzerland. Retrieved January 2007, from  
http://www.worldcongress.org/wcf2_spkrs/wcf2_landolt.htm.  
 
Lechner, F. J., & Boli, J. (2005). World Culture Origins And Consequences. Malden,  
MA, USA: Blackwell Pub.   
 
Leigh, Erin. (2001) “AWID Goes Global.” Association for Women’s Rights in  
 
 351 
Development News 5(1): 1. 
 
Lobe, Jim. (2005) “The Right’s Hostility to NGOs Glimpsed in Amnesty Flap.” Inter  
Press Service June 6th. Available at Global Policy Forum. 
 
Luck, Edward C. (2003) “Reforming the United Nations: Lessons from a History in  
Progress.” International Relations and the United Nations Occasional Papers (1).  
 
MacKinnon, Catharine A. (1989) Toward a Feminist Theory of the State. Boston:  
Harvard University Press. 
 
Mallon, John. (2000) “Pro-choice and anti-family.” Washington Times October 18, 2000.  
 
Marin-Bosch, Miguel. (1987) “How Nations Vote in the General Assembly of the United 
Nations.” International Organization 41(4): 705-724. 
 
Martin, William. (1999) “The Christian Right and American Foreign Policy.” Foreign  
Policy Spring 1999: 66-80. 
 
McAdam, Doug. (1999) Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency. 2nd  
ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
McAdam Doug, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds. (1996) Comparative  
Perspectives on Social Movements Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and  
Framing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
McCarthy, John D., and Mayer N. Zald. (1977) “Resource Mobilization and Social  
Movements: A Partial Theory.” American Journal of Sociology 82: 1212-42. 
 
McGann, James and Mary Johnstone. (2005) “The Power Shift and the NGO Credibility  
Crisis.” Brown Journal of World Affairs 11(2):  
 
Melucci, Alberto. (1996) Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Mero, Paul. (2007) “The Physics of the Natural Family: Why Families Don’t Fall Down.” 
Speech at World Congress of Families IV. Available:  
http://www.worldcongress.org/wcf4.spkrs/wcf4.mero.htm. Accessed August  
2007. 
 
Meyer, John and Brian Rowan. (1977) “Institutionalized Organization: Formal Structure  
as Myth and Ceremony.” American Journal of Sociology 83(2): 340-363. 
 
Meyer, John, John Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco O. Ramirez. (1997) “World  




Moghadam, V. M. (2005). Globalizing Women Transnational Feminist Networks.  
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Moynihan, Robert. (1995) “The Battle in Peking.” Inside the Vatican 3 (8/9). 
 
Muehlebach, Andrea. (2003) “What Self in Self-Determination? Notes from the Frontiers  
Of Transnational Indigenous Activism.” Identities: Global Studies in Culture and  
Power 10:241-268. 
 
National Security Council. (April 24, 1974) National Security Study Memorandum 200:  
Implications of Worldwide Population Growth for U.S. Security and Overseas  
Interests.  
 
Navarro-Valls, Joaquin. (1995) “To Promote Women’s Equal Dignity.” L’Osservatore  
Romano 36(6): 2,4. 
 
Notestein, Frank W. (1954) “World Population Conference Rome, August 31-September  
10.” Population Index 20(4): 241-248. 
 
O’Brien, Jon. (2007) “World Congress of Families 2007, Warsaw.” Opposition Watch,  
May 14, 2007. Available: 
http://www.catholicsforchoice.org/news/documents/WorldCongressofFamilies/20
07. (Accessed 20, August 2006). 
 
Onuf, Nicholas G. 1989. World of our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and  
 International Relations. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.  
 
Oppenheim, Karen. (2004) “Contribution of the ICPD Programme of Action to Gender  
Equality and the Empowerment of Women.” Paper written for UNFPA Seminar  
on the Relevance of Population Aspects for the Achievement of the Millennium  
Development Goals. 
Available:http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/PopAspectsMDG/07_O
PPENHEIMMASON.pdf. Accessed July 2007. 
 
Otto, Dianne. (1999) “A post-Beijing reflection on the limitations and potential of human  
rights discourse for women.” In K. D. Askin, & D. Koenig eds., Women and  
International Human Rights Law (pp. 115 – 135). New York: Transnational  
Publishers. 
 
Petchesky, Rosalind P. (1997) “Spiraling Discourses of Reproductive and Sexual Rights: 
 A Post-Beijing Assessment of International Feminist Politics,” in C. Cohen, K.  
Jones, and J. Tronto, eds. Women Transforming Politics: An Alternative Reader,  
569-586. New York, New York: New York University Press. 
 
Pfeffer, P. F. (1985) “A Whisper in the Assembly of Nations: The United States’  
Participation in the International Women’s Movement of Women’s Rights from  
 
 353 
the League of Nations to the United Nations.” Women’s Studies International  
Forum 8:459–471. 
 
Piotrow, P.T. (1973) World Population Crisis: The United States Response. New York:  
Praeger. 
 
Population Research Institute. (1999) “Weekly Briefing: Feminist Rights Agenda Storms  
United Nations.” 1(17).  
 
Preston, S. H. (1993) “The Contours Of Demography: Estimates And Projections.”  
Demography 30(4): 593. 
 
Rahman, Anika, Laura Katzive, and Stanley K. Henshaw. (1998) “A Global Review of  
Laws on Induced Abortion, 1985-1997." International Family Planning  
Perspectives 24(2): 54-64. 
 
Rajagopal, Balakrishnan. (2003) International Law from Below: Development, Social  
Movements and Third World Resistance. Cambridge: Cambridge University  
Press. 165-287. 
 
Randall, Lindsay. (2006) “Global Warming Fanatics Warming Up to Evangelicals.”  
Concerned Women for America, December 19. Available:  
http://www.cwfa.org/articledisplay.asp?id=12033&department=CWA&categoryi
d=misc Accessed January 2007. 
 
Reese, Thomas J. (1996) Inside the Vatican: The Politics and Organization of the  
Catholic Church. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
 
Religion Counts. (2002) “Religion and Public Policy at the UN.” The Park Ridge Center  
and Catholics for a Free Choice. 
 
Richardson, James L. (2001) Contending Liberalisms in World Politics: Ideology and  
Power. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Press. 
 
Risse, T., S. C. Ropp, And K. Sikkink. (1999) ‘‘The Socialization of International Human 
Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction.’’ In The Power of Human  
Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, edited by T. Risse, S. C. Ropp  
and K. Sikkink, pp. 1–38. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Roth, K. (1994) ‘‘Domestic Violence as an International Human Rights Issue.’’ In  
Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives, edited by R. J.  
Cook, pp. 326–339. Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press. 
 
Roylance, Susan. “Powerful Opposition to Family Issues At UN by Clinton-Gore State  




Rubin, H. J., & Rubin, I. (2005). Qualitative Interviewing The Art Of Hearing Data (2nd  
ed.). Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications.   
 
Rucht, Dieter. (1999) “The Transnationalization of Social Movements: Trends, Causes,  
Problems”, in Donatella della Porta, Hanspeter Kriesi and Dieter Rucht, eds.  
Social Movements in a Globalizing World. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
 
Ruggie, John. (1998) Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International  
Institutionalization. London: Routledge. 
 
Salas, Rafael. (1976) People: An International Choice, and the Multilateral Approach to  
Population. New York, New York: Pergamon Press. 
 
Sen, Gita. (1994), “Development, Population, and the Environment: A Search for  
Balance,” in Gita Sen, Adrienne Germain, and Lincoln C. Chen, eds. Population  
Policies Reconsidered: Health, Empowerment, and Rights, 63-74. Boston,  
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
 
Sen, Gita, Adrienne Germain and Lincoln C. Chen. (1994) “Reconsidering Population  
Policies: Ethics, Development, and Strategies for Change,” in Gita Sen, Adrienne  
Germain, and Lincoln C. Chen, eds. Population Policies Reconsidered: Health,  
Empowerment, and Rights, 1-11. Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard University  
Press. 
 
Sewell, William. (1980) Work and Revolution in France. Cambridge: Cambridge  
University Press. 
 
Schechter, M. G. (2005). United Nations Global Conferences. New York: Routledge.  
Shindlmayr, Thomas. (2004) “Explicating Donor Trends for Population Assistance.” 
Population 
Research and Policy Review 23: 25-54.  
 
Singh, Jyoti S. (1998) Creating A New Consensus on Population. London: Earthscan. 
 
Smelser, Neil. (1963) Theory of Collective Behavior. New York: Free Press.  
 
Smith, Courtney B. (1999) “The Politics of Global Consensus Building: A Comparative  
Analysis.” Global Governance 5(2): 173-202. 
 
Smith, Courtney B. (2004) “Strategies of Influence at the United Nations.” ACUNS  
Annual Meeting Paper, June 30-July 2, 2004.  
 
Smith, Jackie. (1998) “Global Civil Society? Transnational Social Movement  





Smith, Chris, Jim Ryan, Kevin Brady, Donald A. Mangullo, and JoAnn Davis. (2004)  
Congressional Letter to World Congress of Families III. March 26. Available:  
http://www.worldcongress.org/WCF3/wcf3_uscongress.htm. Accessed August  
2007.  
 
Snow, David and Danny Trom. (2002) “The Case Study and the Study of Social  
Movements.” In D. Snow and D. Trom, eds. Methods Of Social Movement  
Research, 146-172. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford Jr., Steven K. Woorden, and Robert D. Benford.  
(1986) “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement  
Participation.” American Sociological Review 51: 464-81. 
 
Snow, David A. and Robert D. Benford. (1988) “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and  
Participant Mobilization.” In Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney  
Tarrow, eds. From Structure to Action: Comparing Social Movement  
Participation across Cultures, 197-218. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press. 
 
Snow, David A. and Robert D. Benford. (1992) “Master Frames and Cycles of Protest.”  
In Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, edited by Aldon D. Morris and Carol  
McClurg Mueller, 133-55. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 
 
Steinberg, Marc W. (1999) Fighting Words: Working-Class Formation, Collective Action  
and Discourse in Early Nineteenth Century England. Ithaca, N.Y.” Cornell  
University Press. 
 
Stycos, J. M. (1987), “Demography as an Interdiscipline,” Sociological Forum, 2(4):616. 
 
Swidler A. (1986) “Culture In Action: Symbols And Strategies.” American Sociological  
 Review 51:273–86. 
 
Tabah, Leon. (1984) “Preparations for the 1984 International Conference on Population.” 
Population and Development Review 10(1): 81-86.  
 
Tarrow, Sidney. (1989). Democracy And Disorder Protest And Politics In Italy, 1965- 
1975. New York: Oxford University Press.   
 
Tarrow, Sidney. (1994) Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and  
Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Tarrow, Sidney. (2001) “Transnational Politics: Contention and Institutions in  
International Politics.” Annual Review of Political Science 4: 1-20. 
 
Tarrow, Sidney. (2005) The New Transnational Activism. New York: Cambridge  




Thomas, George M. (2001) “Religions in Global Civil Society.” Sociology of Religion  
62(4): 515-533. 
 
Tilly, C. (1978). From Mobilization To Revolution. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Company.   
 
Tilly, C. (2004). Social Movements, 1768-2004. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers.   
Tvedt, Terje. (2002) “Development NGOs: Actors in a Global Civil Society or in a New  
International Social System?” Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and  
Nonprofit Organizations 13(4): 363-375. 
 
UN (1975) “Report of the United Nations World Population Conference, Bucharest, 19- 
30 August 1974.” (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.75.XIII.3)  
 
UN (1984) “Report of the International Conference on Population, Mexico City, 6-14  
August 1984.” (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.84.XIII.8).  
 
UN (1989) “ECOSOC Resolution 1989/91: International Conference on Population and  
Development.” Retrieved September 2006, from 
http://www.un.org/popin/icpd/newslett/92_04/ECOSOC+Resolution.html. 
 
UN (1991) “ECOSOC Resolution 1991/93: International Conference on Population and  
Development.”  Retrieved September 2006, from 
http://www.un.org/popin/icpd/newslett/92_04/ECOSOC+Resolution.html. 
 
United Nations. (1993a) “Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women,  
adopted by the UN General Assembly.” 20 December, A/RES/48/104. 
 
United Nations. (1993b) “Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the  
World Conference on Human Rights.” Vienna, 14–25 June, A/CONF.157/24. 
 
United Nations. (1994) “Draft Programme of Action of the International Conference on  
Population and Development.” (A/CONF.171/L.1, 13, May).  
 
United Nations. (1994b) Programme of Action of the 1994 International Conference on  
Population and Development. New York: United Nations.  
 
United Nations. (1994c) “Report of the International Conference on Population and  
Development.” Cairo, 5–13 September 1994, 18. A/CONF.171/13/Rev.1, sales  
no. 95.XIII. 
 
United Nations. (1995) Platform for Action, Fourth World Conference on Women. New  




UN (1996) “Implementation of the Programme of Action of the International Conference  
on Population and Development” (A/51/350, September 25). 
 
UN (1997) “Implementation of the Programme of Action of the International Conference  
on Population and Development” (A/52/208/24 June). 
 
UN General Assembly Press Release. (2004) “More Comprehensive Approach Needed  
To Harmonize Pro-Family Actions, General Assembly President Says In Message  
To Mark International Year.” July 12, 2004. GA/SM/347 
 
UNAIDS. (2006) “2006 High Level Meeting on AIDS: Civil Society Participation  
Information Note.” Available: www.un.org/ga/aidsmeeting/2006.  Accessed  
August 2007. 
 
UNFPA. (1998) “ICPD: Four Years Later, Recent Trends and Challenges in Meeting  
ICPD Goals in Reproductive Rights and Reproductive Health.” Background  
Report prepared for the Expert Round Table Meeting on Ensuring Reproductive  
Rights and Implementing Sexual and Reproductive Health Programmes, including  
Women's Empowerment, Male Involvement and Human Rights - Kampala,  
Uganda, 22-25 June. Available:  
http://www.unfpa.org/icpd/icpd5/meetings/kampala_rh/kampalain.htm. Accessed  
July 2007.  
 
UNFPA. (2004) “Non-Governmental Organizations: Countdown 2015.” Available:  
http://www.unfpa.org/icpd/10/note.htm#ngo. Accessed July 2007. 
 
van Evera, Stephen. (1997) Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. 
 
Waldron, Jeremy. (1987) “Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism.” The Philosophical  
Quarterly, 37(147): 127-150. 
 
Wooster, Martin Morse. (2004) “The Ford Foundation: Founder of Modern Population  
Control.” Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute: The International  
Organizations Research Group, New York City. White Paper Series, no.4. 
 
World Congress of Families. In Howard Center. Retrieved September 12, 2006, from 
http://www.profam.org/THC/xthc_wcf.htm. 
 
World Congress of Families. (1999) “Geneva Background,” available:  
www.worldcongress.org/WCF2/wcf2_back.htm (accessed 14 December  
2006). 
 
World Congress of Families. (1999) “Geneva Declaration,” available:  





World Congress of Families. (2004) “Mexico 2004: Convening Organizations,”  
available: www.worldcongress.org/WCF3/wcf3_home.htm (accessed January  
2007).  
 
World Congress of Families. (2007) “Warsaw Background,” available:  
www.worldcongress.org/WCF4/wcf4.ini.htm (accessed 1 August 2007).  
 
World Congress of Families. (2007) “Warsaw Information,” available:  
www.worldcongress.org/WCF4/wcf4.nmx0701.htm (accessed 1 August 2007). 
 
World Congress of Families. (2007) “Warsaw Planning,” available:  
http://www.worldcongress.org/WCF4/wcf4.plan.htm (accessed 1 August 2007). 
 
Wright, Wendy. (2002) “World Congress of Families Equips Delegates for Battle at  
World Summit on Children.” Concerned Women for America 1/1/2002. Retrieved  
October 20, 2006, from 
http://www.cwfa.org/articles/1958/CWA/nation/index.htm. 
 
Yin, R. K. (2003). Case Study Research Design And Methods (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks,  
Calif: Sage Publications.   
 
Zald, M. N., & McCarthy, J. D. (1979). The Dynamics Of Social Movements Resource  
Mobilization, Social Control, And Tactics. Cambridge, Mass: Winthrop  
Publishers.  
  
Zald, M. N., & McCarthy, J. D. (1987). Social Movements In An Organizational Society  
Collected Essays. New Brunswick, U.S.A: Transaction Books. 
 
Zinsser, Judith P. (2002) “From Mexico to Copenhagen to Nairobi: The United Nations  
Decade for Women, 1975-1985.” Journal of World History 13(1): 139-168. 
 
 
